Australia announced on 15 September 1939, twelve days after the declaration of war, that it would raise a special military force of one infantry division and auxiliary units, totalling 20,000 men. This division would be raised for service either at home or abroad. It was also announced that the militia would be called up for home defence. Because there were already five militia infantry divisions, the new division was named the 6th Australian Division. The special military force was called the Second Australian Imperial Force (Second AIF). On 28 September Major General Sir Thomas Blamey was chosen to command the Second AIF. Half of the vacancies in the new force would be filled by serving militiamen, one quarter by men who had previously served in the militia or other forces and the rest by men with no previous military experience.
The 6th Division was regionally recruited. New South Wales contributed the 16th Brigade comprising the 2/1st, 2/2nd, 2/3rd and 2/4th Battalions, Victoria the 17th Brigade with the 2/5th, 2/6th, 2/7th and 2/8th Battalions and other states contributed the 18th Brigade consisting of the 2/9th, 2/10th, 2/11th and 2/12th Battalions. The prefix 2/ distinguished the new battalions from militia battalions. The Second AIF's supporting forces, the divisional cavalry, artillery, engineers, signals and others were also regionally recruited. Recruiting and subsequently training gained impetus and, almost imperceptibly, the civilians became soldiers. These soldiers keenly awaited the order that would send them abroad. At 10 o'clock on the morning of 10 January 1940, the first convoy of the Second AIF steamed under the Sydney Harbour Bridge bound for the Middle East.
At midnight on 10 June 1940, less than a week after Dunkirk, Mussolini declared that Italy had entered the war. Sandwiched between French Algeria and British Egypt, Mussolini's North African Colony of Libya was, at the outbreak of war, a vulnerable outpost of the Axis powers. However, Italy anticipated the fall of France six days later and the Middle East situation was reversed with only the British presence in Egypt barring the road to the Nile and the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. Against the 30,000 strong Western Desert Force, the Italians could boast about 250,000 men. From the moment Italy joined the war, Mussolini's aims in North Africa were clear. He intended to sweep through Egypt, cross the River Nile and raise the Italian flag over the Middle East oil fields. On 13 September 1940 the Italian army invaded Egypt and, after a seventy mile advance through the Western Desert, the Italians stopped at Sidi Barrani and showed little disposition to press farther forward. In October and November British mobile columns harassed the enemy but there were few heavy clashes.
On 7 December, seventy miles of open desert separated the main British and Italian forces. The British Commander-in-Chief in the Middle East, General Wavell had only two divisions at his disposal - the British 7th Armoured and the 4th Indian. Outnumbered but with a force more spirited and expert and probably stronger in tanks, Wavell visualised an attack that was more in the nature of a massive raid rather than an orthodox military offensive. On the night of 7/8 December the British forces moved forward some forty miles. The advance went undetected due to allied aircraft keeping enemy aircraft away. The following night the attacking forces moved into position and on the morning of 9 December, the Indian and British infantry supported by artillery and armour turned the 'raid' into a decisive victory with the capture of Sidi Barrani. About 35,000 Italian troops were captured and the remainder retreated in a disorderly manner. Four days before the attack the commander of the 6th Australian Division, Major-General Ivan Mackay, was warned the 6th Division would move into the desert at the end of December to relieve the 4th Indian Division which was to move to the Abyssinian front.
The 6th Division, although still short of equipment, was in a good state of preparedness. Its officers and men had been in training for a year and had been exercising with hardened British regulars. Since October the division had been in the desert immediately west of the Delta, where it was responsible for a defensive position covering Lake Maryut and the Rosetta Nile in case the Italians overcame the Matruh position. On 12 December, by rail and road, its leading brigades set off westward. From the railhead at Mersa Matruh a bitumen road travelled through the desert to Sidi Barrani and then a dirt road went to Salum where the 600 foot escarpment, which to the east lay about twenty miles from the coast, touched the sea. Two main tracks climbed the escarpment near Salum, over to the Italian frontier and beyond. The second, a good road, ran through Bardia, Tobruk and Derna and finally to Benghazi. The British believed that the Italian army in Libya had been rendered impotent and would abandon Bardia without a fight. When General Mackay the arrived at desert headquarters on 14 December, Wavell ordered one of Mackay's brigades be kept at Alexandria in case it was later able to move to Bardia by sea and land there unopposed. The remainder of the division was carried forward over roads littered with tanks, trucks and weapons discarded by the retreating Italians.
The 6th Division in December 1940 was a different organisation from the original unit formed in Australia. In the Middle East, the division had been reorganised along British lines and the 18th Brigade with the third convoy had yet to arrive in Egypt having been diverted in May 1940 to England. The brigades of the 6th Division were now the 16th, 17th and 19th. On 19 December the 6th Division relieved the 4th Indian Division on the road south of Bardia. The town was defended along an 18-mile arc of concrete underground bunkers behind an anti-tank ditch and barbed-wire barriers. Machine-gun posts and light guns complemented the other obstacles. The rear posts were some 400 yards behind and further back still were about 110 field and medium guns. The Australians made night patrols to measure the width and depth of the anti-tank ditch, test the wire and observe the routine of the enemy. These patrols drew heavy fire from the Italian posts. The plan of attack called for the 16th Brigade (2/1st, 2/2nd and 2/3rd battalions) to cross the anti-tank ditch, blow gaps in the wire and take the posts west of Bardia. At daylight the tanks and the 2/5th and 2/7th Battalion of the 17th Brigade would follow. The third battalion of the 17th Brigade, the 2/6th, was to create a diversion at the southern end of the objective. The 19th Brigade (2/4th, 2/8th and 2/11th Battalions) was held in reserve in Alexandria.
On 3 January 1941 the assault began. At 5.30 am the guns opened fire and the two leading companies advanced. In under 30 minutes the infantry had gone through the ditch and the wire. The Italian line was already breached. The men were heavily laden with weapons, tools, ammunition and three day's rations. They were dressed in greatcoats and leather jackets over their uniforms. The Italians at some posts and bunkers fought with determination but elsewhere they surrendered with little resistance. The enemy's resolve was not strengthened by the Royal Navy's heavy bombardment of the sector north of Bardia. There was one Italian effort to counter-attack but it was soon beaten back by the 2/3rd Battalion. At the end of the day the Australians were in a position to encircle Bardia the next morning. A battalion and a troop of tanks cleared the area south of the town and the 2/2nd Battalion entered the lower town. The 2/3rd Battalion entered upper Bardia and the fortress had been cut in two. The enemy occupied an area only about one mile deep by two miles wide and the 2/6th Battalion pressed forward. The Italian commander hoisted the white flag. The allied forces had taken the 40,000 prisoners and had captured about 500 field and anti-tank guns, about 120 light tanks and 700 motor vehicles. The Australian losses totalled 130 killed and 326 wounded.
Before Bardia fell, General Wavell had decided that Tobruk also should be taken, partly because the possession of that port would ease supply problems. It was a small port on the coast of Cyrenaica with a pre-war population of about 4,000 people living in a few hundred white buildings. The square in the centre of town boasted a few palm trees. The importance of Tobruk lay in the fact that its harbour was the only safe and accessible port for over 1000 miles, between Sfax in Tunisia and Alexandria in Egypt. The advancing drive was living on the country and using captured enemy vehicles and captured petrol and rations. If the harbour of Tobruk was able to be serviced, most of the needed supplies could be carried forward from the base in Egypt by sea. On 15 January 1941, it was estimated that 25,000 Italian soldiers were at Tobruk. At that garrison, just like at Bardia, the flat hard floor of the desert sloped down towards the coast in a series of low escarpments lying from east to west. The original Italian map of the Tobruk defences show two lines of strong-points, completely sunk into the ground. These covered a perimeter of some 35-40 miles with a radius of about 20 miles. The outer defences consisted of a series of heavily concrete dug-outs - many cleverly improvised from natural caves - each holding 30-40 men. These dug-outs were inter-connected by trenches with locations every few hundred yards for machine-guns, mortars and anti-tank guns. The trenches were roofed in with thin boarding and covered lightly with sand so that they were invisible from even a few yards away. In front of the outer defences barbed wire was laid, varying in some places from a single coil in width to a belt 30 yards wide elsewhere. In front of the barbed wire the Italian's had built an anti-tank ditch, often adapting an existing natural ravine. Straight-sided, and averaging 7 feet deep and 10 feet wide, the ditch was designed to thwart any attempted crossing by a tracked vehicle. The inner defensive line was some 2,000 to 3,000 yards behind the outer line and constructed to the same pattern, but without the anti-tank ditch..
Two main routes led westwards from Bardia to the Tobruk area. As close to the sea as the deep coastal wadis would allow travelled the straight bitumen road to Tobruk itself ten miles inland, and above an escarpment that rose 500 feet above sea level, ran the track from Capuzzo to El Adem, an airfield eight miles south of the Tobruk defences. The 7th Armoured Division advanced along the Capuzzo track, and the 6th Australian Division moved parallel to it along the main road. The advance to Tobruk was proceeding so quickly that within several days, the 7th Armoured Division had encircled the town. British and Australian troops were actually passing Italian soldiers who had escaped from Bardia and who were fleeing to Tobruk. The 17th Brigade systematically searched the wadis and took many prisoners. The campaign was going so well that the senior officers became worried by signs of what was described as a `picnic spirit' and all troops were reminded of the realities of the situation and of certain indisciplines that were becoming evident. It should be noted that the men were living under extremely arduous conditions and were sleeping in holes dug in the stony ground.
In the nights preceding the attack on Tobruk, Australian infantry and engineers sent patrols forward to measure the anti-tank ditch, to explore for mines and booby traps and to mark the start line. Before dawn on 21 January the attack opened. Two brigades of the 6th Division had been in position outside the eastern half of the Tobruk perimeter and the armoured division lay across the roads leading west and south-west. The tanks and the entire 16th Brigade moved in the darkness close to a sector of the Italian line supported by an eighty-eight gun artillery barrage. The 2/3rd battalion attacked on a front of 600 yards and took the five Italian posts the covered the point of the break through. The tanks and infantry pass through gap created by the 2/3rd Battalion. The 2/1st Battalion made inroads into the Italian line while the 2/2nd Battalion moved deep into enemy territory to capture the enemy's support guns. At 7.55 am the 19th Brigade moved forward and the 2/8th Battalion fought its way west along the escarpment. One company lost all but one of its officers and sergeants and nearly half of its men before the fight was over. By nightfall, most of Tobruk had been taken and on the morning of 22 January all resistance collapsed. The Australian casualties were 49 dead and 306 wounded. Over 25,000 Italian soldiers were taken prisoner.
When Rommel launched his forces against the Western Desert Force in April 1941, the opposition crumbled before him, and he did not anticipate wresting Tobruk would take much longer than the two days it had taken Wavell to capture it from the Italians. The 9th Australian Division was to prove him wrong, and would in the process write itself into a special place in Australian military history during the ensuing siege of Tobruk
Giarabub, an Italian oasis fort, was captured in March 1941 by the Australian 18th Brigade after a stiff fight during a sandstorm. The Australian units concerned were the 2/9th Battalion, a company of the 2/10th and the 6th Division Cavalry Regiment, with other units in reserve.
In February 1941, Western Desert Force which had captured Cyrenaica and reached El Agheila on the border of Tripolitania was ordered onto the defensive while forces moved to Greece. General Sir Archibald Wavell (C-in-C Middle East) proposed that the battle hardened 6th Australian Division remain in Cyrenaica and the 7th and 9th Australian divisions move to Greece. Lieutenant General Sir Thomas Blamey (GOC AIF Middle East), perceiving that the Greece expedition would be hazardous, insisted that the contingent should be formed from his best trained troops. An extensive reorganisation and regrouping of the AIF was carried out and the composition of the 9th Division that emerged was very different from its composition when first formed.
The composition of the AIF Divisions was as follows:
Brigade |
Battalion |
Battalion |
Battalion |
6th Division |
|||
16th Brigade |
2/1st |
2/2nd |
2/3rd |
17th Brigade |
2/5th |
2/6th |
2/7th |
19th Brigade |
2/4th |
2/8th |
2/Llth |
7th Division |
|||
18th Brigade |
2/9th |
2/10th |
2/12th |
21st Brigade |
2/14th |
2/16th |
2/27th |
25th Brigade |
2/25th |
2/31st |
2/33rd |
8th Division |
|||
22nd Brigade |
2/18th |
2/19th |
2/20th |
23rd Brigade |
2/21st |
2/22nd |
2/40th |
27th Brigade |
2/26th |
2/29th |
2/30th |
9th Division |
|||
20th Brigade |
2/13th |
2/15th |
2/17th |
24th Brigade |
2/28th |
2/32nd |
2/43rd |
26th Brigade |
2/23rd |
2/24th |
2/48th |
The 6th Division was to be the first Australian division to move to Greece and was to be relieved by the 9th Division which was assigned the task of garrisoning Cyrenaica. The reorganised 9th Division comprised the 20th, 24th and 26th Infantry Brigades which were the least trained or the most recently enlisted. Although allotted for garrison duty, the enemy was in contact and it was not only possible but probable that the division would become heavily engaged in the following two or three months. The task of moulding the raw units into a division was given to 52 year old Major General Leslie Morshead, a citizen soldier who had been soldiering all his life. Morshead was every inch a general, with slight build and a seemingly mild facial expression which masked a strong personality, the impact of which, even on a slight acquaintance, was quickly felt. The precise, incisive speech and flint like piercing scrutiny acutely displayed impressions of authority, resoluteness and ruthlessness.
On 8 March, the 9th Division's 20th Brigade relieved the 6th Division's 17th Brigade in its position astride the main road between Marsa Brega and El Agheila. Morshead was convinced that the enterprising German patrols operating across the frontier were heralded an offensive and recommended that the 20th Brigade be withdrawn from Marsa Brega leaving only a mobile armoured brigade of the 2nd Armoured Division forward. The 20th Brigade rejoined the 9th Division which occupied the escarpment overlooking Benghazi. In the last week of March, General Rommel, commander of the new German Africa Corps, possessing only slender armoured forces, commenced his advance. At Marsa Brega on 31 March and Agedabia on 2 April, the Germans destroyed most of the tanks of the 2nd Armoured Division leaving the route to Mechili open.
The Germans entered Benghazi early on 4 April, whereupon the 9th Division was ordered to withdraw to the second and higher escarpment east of Benghazi. By 6 April it was evident that the Germans were moving along the route to Mechili in force and the 9th Division and the infantry of the armoured division were ordered to withdraw along the northern routes towards Tobruk while the armour went to Mechili. In a confused withdrawal part of the 2/15th Australian Battalion was taken prisoner, and an armoured brigade retired not to Mechili but Derna. Mechili was surrounded and although some managed to break out, most of the garrison, including part of the 2/3rd Australian Anti-Tank Regiment, were captured. Protected by this rearguard at Mechili and by the Support Group east of Derna, the 9th Division continued its withdrawal through Derna.
On 6 April it was decided that Tobruk should be held even if isolated and that the 7th Division (less its 18th Brigade which would reach Tobruk on the 7th) go to Mersa Matruh rather than Greece. On 14 April Morshead took complete control at Tobruk, where the garrison consisted mainly of his division. Within the thirty mile Tobruk perimeter there were some 31,000 troops of whom 24,000 were fighting troops. There were the three brigades of the 9th Division, the 7th Australian Division's 18th Brigade, the 3rd Armoured Brigade (two regiments), four regiments of British field artillery, and two of anti-tank and two of anti-aircraft artillery. Of the twenty seven infantry, artillery, and armoured units fifteen were Australian, eleven British and one Indian.
Morshead had 13 infantry battalions, 12 Australian and 1 Indian at his disposal. He placed 7 of his infantry battalions on the perimeter each with a reserve company half a mile behind it. Thus each forward company usually held a front of more than a mile. About two miles within the perimeter an inner line, the Blue Line, was gradually dug and wired; each forward brigade had one battalion in this line. Farther back Morshead held in reserve one brigade and his tanks, armoured cars and carriers. By 11 April (Good Friday) the Germans were astride the road leading east from Tobruk. The siege had begun. On the 13th, Rommel had most of the German 5th Light and part of the Italian Aries Armoured Division outside Tobruk. He attacked that night using a tank regiment and a machine-gun battalion, just west of the El Adem road in the 2/17th Battalion's sector. A group of Germans who established themselves inside the wire with two guns, a mortar and eight machine-guns were dislodged with grenades and bayonets by Lieutenant F A Mackell, Corporal J H Edmondson and five men. Edmondson fought on after being severely wounded and died the next day. He was awarded the Victoria Cross, the first won by an Australian in the 1939-45 war. At dawn some fifty tanks thrust on towards the escarpment overlooking the port. The forward infantry waited in their posts for the German infantry to follow up. When the tanks came under fire from the guns of the 1st RHA and anti-tank guns of the 3rd RHA and 2/3rd Anti-Tank Regiment, eight were soon knocked out. The infantry in the perimeter shot down the German infantry and gunners as they advanced to join the tanks, which by 7 am were being attacked on all sides by artillery and the defending tanks. They Germans fled, leaving seventeen wrecked tanks, 150 dead and 250 prisoners within the perimeter. As the tanks were fleeing forty German aircraft attacked, and ten were shot down. The garrison suffered only eighty casualties.
While this fight was in progress the Germans reached Bardia where British forces supported by naval fire halted the advance. Decisive successes in Abyssinia in late March and early April enabled Wavell to order the 4th Indian Division to return to Egypt. In order to prevent a concentrated axis offensive against the eastern flank in the Middle East, Syria was attacked on 8 June 1941. The 7th Australian Division (less the 18th Brigade in Tobruk) reinforced by units of the 6th Australian Division played a major part in the campaign which ended with an armistice on 12 July. Operation Battleaxe designed to relieve Tobruk opened on 15 June with some success on the first day, but Rommel, using tanks from Tobruk counter-attacked and forced the British-Indian force to withdraw having lost more than half of its tanks and leaving Tobruk still besieged. On 21 June, shortly after the Battleaxe failure, General Wavell learnt that he was to change places with General Sir Claude Auchinleck (C-in-C India). Wavell was held responsible, in part or wholly, for the reverses in North Africa, Greece and Crete despite the fact that it was Churchill and his advisers in London who decided to denude North Africa to send an expedition to Greece. Ironically, Wavell heard the news of his sacking the day Damascus fell.
In Tobruk the 9th Division continued to fight on what was now the most active front in the Middle East. Throughout May the positions in the Salient had been improved and the vigorous program of night patrolling continued. Morshead insisted that every forward unit must strive to gain and retain mastery of no-man's land. It was in this phase that the bush artillery came into its own. Before the siege opened infantry units in Tobruk had begun to equip themselves with captured Italian guns, often in imperfect condition but with an inexhaustible supply of ammunition. In mid-May the garrison began to press forward more strenuously all along the line and particularly in the Salient to incessantly exert pressure upon the enemy and relentlessly drive him back. The Germans were also active and on 16 May attacked the northern corner of the Salient but without success. In June the 20th Brigade pressed systematically and steadily forward and succeeded in shortening the line in the Salient by about 600 yards and this arduous process was continued until by early July the line round the Salient had been advanced by about 2,000 yards, leaving the Salient about 3,000 yards deep at its middle.
The ships supplying Tobruk in the face of enemy air attack had brought in only bare essentials in the weeks before Battleaxe, but the failure of that offensive made it necessary to increase the monthly tonnage. To ease the supply problem the base personnel were drastically reduced in June and July until the total garrison was 22,076 of whom only 1,400 were in base units. The Royal Navy kept open the supply line to Tobruk. All the Australian destroyers in the Mediterranean, including the new Napier, Nizam and Nestor took part but it was one of the old Australian destroyers, Vendetta, that made the record number of thirty-nine trips. Lost on the supply run were two destroyers including HMAS Waterhen, three sloops including HMAS Parramatta and twenty one smaller vessels.
On 2 August, in the belief that the enemy was thinning out along the Salient, an attack was launched by a company of the 2/43rd Battalion along the perimeter from the north and a company of the 2/28th Battalion from the south. In fact there were three German battalions in the Salient, facing two Australian battalions and the left flank of a third. The attack was carefully planned and supported by more than sixty guns but the enemy artillery swiftly replied, and his infantry were ready. The attack was gallantly pressed but failed with heavy losses. This was the last effort to straighten the line and from then on the main task was to hold the perimeter while making aggressive patrols into no-man's land. From July, Blamey urged that the 9th Division be withdrawn from Tobruk, a request supported successively by the Menzies, Fadden and Curtin Governments. Auchinleck considered the relief would unnecessarily endanger naval ships and impede preparations for a desert offensive. The issue reached Cabinet level with Churchill supporting Auchinleck and Curtin supporting Blamey who was concerned the troops were becoming physically weak and run-down. In August the 18th Brigade was withdrawn to rejoin 7th Division in Syria, and was replaced by a Polish Brigade. In September and October the 9th Division was replaced by the 70th British Division. On the last night of the relief the convoy proceeding to Tobruk was attacked from the air and turned back with the result that the 2/13th Battalion remained at Tobruk until the siege ended.
In late September the British command structure in the Western Desert was reorganised and the Eighth Army came into existence. Operation Crusader, the relief of Tobruk was launched on 18 November. After nine days of heavy and costly fighting the attacking force linked with a force, including the 2/13th Battalion, which had attacked eastward from Tobruk. Rommel counter-attacked, and cut Tobruk off again, but a British flanking move at length persuaded the enemy to abandon the whole battle area. By 10 December the Germans and Italians were in retreat. They stood west of Tobruk, but were forced back again, this time to the El Agheila position from which Rommel had begun his advance nine months before.
The siege of Tobruk lasted eight months. Barton Maughan wrote in the official Australian history:
'If the greatest single factor in repelling the German assaults and holding the besiegers off was the steadfast, efficient and brave work of the field artillery which for some of the time was solely and for the whole time preponderantly from the British Army; if the greatest call on deep resources of courage was laid most often upon the anti-aircraft gunners who stood to their guns day and night even when they themselves were the direct target of the strike; if the most dreadful burden borne by the defenders was the constant manning of shallow and sun-scorched diggings and weapon-pits in the regularly bombed, bullet-raked Salient, in which to stand in daylight was to stand for the last time; these judgements only illustrate that each man had his own job in the conduct of the defence. The spontaneous respect of all arms and services for the performance of the others and the loyalty with which they combined were the things that made Tobruk strong in defence and dangerous to its besiegers. General Auchinleck summarised the garrison's achievement in his dispatch:
`Our freedom from embarrassment in the frontier area for four and a half months is to be ascribed largely to the defenders of Tobruk. Behaving not as a hardly pressed garrison but as a spirited force ready at any moment to launch an attack, they contained an enemy force twice their strength, they held back four Italian divisions and three German battalions from the frontier area from April until November.'
That such success was achieved was due most of all to Morshead's own insistence on an aggressive conduct of the defence; his determination that the enemy should be attacked wherever he came within reach; his single-minded rigid resolve, to which he adhered in the face of counsels for a more flexible defence that his forces should never yield ground nor give quarter, that if any place was rested from them, they should not relent until they recaptured it.
The three Australian divisions in the Middle East in 1941 saw hard fighting. In Cyrenaica, the 9th Division suffered 3309 casualties including 788 killed; in Cyrenaica, Greece and Crete, the 6th Division lost 750 killed, 1500 wounded and over 5000 captured; and in Syria the 7th Division and attached units suffered 1600 casualties including 416 killed.
The Battle of El Alamein in late 1942 was the decisive battle of the North African campaign that lasted from 1940 until 1943. El Alamein was located 70 miles west of the main Egyptian port of Alexandria and could not be outflanked because movement of vehicles was restricted to a corridor of 40 miles between the sea and the impassable Quattara depression. Although the 8th Army had overwhelming superiority in men, tanks, guns and aircraft and could not have lost the battle the prospect of a clear cut and decisive victory hung in the balance for eleven days.
The North African campaign opened at the end of 1940 when General Wavell launched a successful offensive against the Italians. The Germans responded three months later by introducing into the desert the Africa Corps led by General Erwin Rommel. However, the successful Australian defence of the besieged fortress of Tobruk thwarted the Germans who were eventually pushed out of Cyrenaica. In January 1942, Rommel again attacked and drove the British 8th Army to Gazala, just west of Tobruk. There was a lull in the desert war for four months until Rommel resumed the offensive. Tobruk capitulated on 21 June and the 8th Army first fell back to Mersa Matruh and then to the defensive positions at El Alamein where the long retreat halted. Rommel, confident that he could smash his way through to Alexandria, attacked the El Alamein defences on 1 July but, in three days of fighting, the 8th Army held against the German and Italian thrusts.
The 9th Australian Division which, under the command of General Leslie Morshead, had formed the bulk of the Australian garrison at the siege of Tobruk in 1941 and was retained in the Middle East in 1942. The Australian Government sought its return to help fight the Japanese but before it returned home it was to play a notable part in the decisive battles for Egypt in the second half of 1942. After its withdrawal from Tobruk, the division moved to Palestine where it was brought up to strength, was re-equipped and where training recommenced. In January 1942 it moved to Syria where it was stationed on 25 June when orders were received that it should move to Egypt.
The Australians joined the British XXX Corps at El Alamein on 4 July and five days later attacked along the coast towards Tel El Eisa. The division mounted four attacks on 10, 17, 22 and 26/27 as part of XXX Corps operations. In the attack on 22 July, Private A S Gurney of the 2/48th Battalion won a posthumous Victoria Cross. His citation stated:
'For gallantry and unselfish bravery in silencing enemy machine-gun posts by bayonet assault at Tel el Eisa on 22nd July, 1942, thus allowing his Company to continue the advance. During an attack on a strong German position in the early morning of 22 July 1942, the Company to which Private Gurney belonged, was held up by intense machine-gun fire from posts less than 100 yards ahead, heavy casualties being inflicted on our troops, all the officers being killed or wounded. Grasping the seriousness of the situation and without hesitation, Private Gurney charged the nearest enemy machine-gun post, bayoneted three men and silenced the post. He then continued on to a second post, bayoneted two men and sent out a third as a prisoner. At this stage a stick of grenades was thrown at Private Gurney which knocked him to the ground. He rose again, picked up his rifle and charged the third post using the bayonet with great vigour. He then disappeared from view and later his body was found in an enemy post. By this single-handed act of gallantry in the face of a determined enemy, Private Gurney enabled his Company to press forward to its objective, inflicting heavy losses upon the enemy. The successful outcome of this engagement was almost entirely due to Private Gurney's heroism at the moment when it was needed .' ( London Gazette 11 September 1942)
Allied offensives in late July by the New Zealanders against Ruweisat Ridge and by the Australians against Miteiriya Ridge failed to drive Rommel from Alamein but effectively blocked his drive to the Nile. On 30 August, Rommel made his last attempt to break through to the Nile Delta but was defeated by the strongly fortified Alam el Halfa position south of Ruweisat Ridge.
In August 1942, Winston Churchill made sweeping changes in the army high command to the Middle East. General Sir Harold Alexander became Commander-in-Chief and Lieutenant-General Bernard Montgomery was given command of the 8th Army. Alexander, on 19 August wrote to Montgomery with orders to prepare to attack the Axis forces with a view to destroying them at the earliest possible moment. The two armies were in close contact on a front of nearly forty miles between the sea and the Quattara depression with both sides improving their positions and adding to the profusion of mines supporting their defences. The initiative moved from the Germans to the British with Rommel having depleted forces with critical supply problems whereas the British were daily growing stronger on land and in the air. Moonlight was considered essential for the start of the attack since it was only in moonlight that defended minefields could be tackled. Montgomery insisted that with reinforcements to absorb and train, new equipment to master and other preparations to be made, that the September moon period would be too soon. He recommended 23 October for the attack; a date Alexander accepted.
Troops and armour as well as ammunition and supplies were moved into position in the period leading up to 23 October 1942. Careful planning, with much work done at night, using both concealment and deception, covered the intense preparations for the attack. The infantry completed their moves by the night of 22/23 October and at daylight all was ready. At 10 pm on 23 October, three simultaneous attacks were to be made, the main attack by XXX Corps and two diversionary attacks by XIII Corps. The task of XXX Corps was to secure, before dawn on 24 October, a bridgehead beyond the enemy's main defended zone and to help the two armoured divisions of X Corps to pass through the defended zone. The task of X Corps was to follow XXX Corps and pass through its bridgehead with the aim of bringing on an armoured battle where full use could be made of the superior weight of British armour and armament to destroy the enemy. Both XXX Corps and XIII Corps were then to proceed with the methodical destruction of the enemy's static troops.
Four infantry divisions from XXX Corps - 9th Australian, 51st Highland, 2nd New Zealand and 1st South African were to launch the main attack. On the first night they planned to drive a corridor six miles wide and four miles deep through the enemy defences. Once the assault divisions had cleared the minefields, the 1st and 10th Armoured Divisions of X Armoured Corps would advance along two corridors to deal with the enemy armour. It was hoped the enemy guns would be reached the first night. The Australians, in addition to their frontal advance to the west, were to establish a firm front facing north in the heavily defended enemy area near the coast road.
The Battle of El Alamein opened at 9.40 pm on 23 October 1942 when 900 British medium and field guns fired an intense fifteen minute barrage against the enemy gun lines. The advance began at 10 pm with the artillery creeping forward ahead of the infantry to assist them on to their objectives. Almost immediately, the Australians ran into machine-gun and mortar fire as they threaded their way through mines and booby traps. At the enemy wire the men were held up for a few minutes until the barrage lifted and moved on ahead of them through the enemy minefields. Engineers used bangalore torpedoes to blow gaps in the wire and the infantry passed through and started to methodically mop up the enemy posts. The 9th Division's attack was made on a two brigade front with the 26th Brigade less 2/23rd Battalion on the right and the 20th Brigade on the left. The 24th Brigade continued to hold the existing Australian front near the coast. The Australian infantry battalions went into battle with strengths ranging from 30 officers and 621 other ranks to 36 officers and 740 other ranks; the war establishment was 36 officers and 812 other ranks.
The Australians attacked on a two brigade front with the object of penetrating four miles into the enemy lines. Three battalions were to capture the first objective which was two miles from the start line and while they consolidated their gains, two new battalions were to pass through the captured positions and move towards the final objective. The first objective of the right brigade, the 26th, was taken by the 2/24th Battalion which had a front of 800 yards but also had an open flank to protect. The left brigade, the 20th, had a front of 2400 yards and its first objective was taken by the 2/15th and 2/17th battalions. The first objectives were taken, without great opposition, by midnight but the second objectives, which included the main line of defence sited in considerable depth, proved to be more difficult.
The Australian's second objectives were allotted to the 2/48th Battalion which passed through the 2/24th Battalion and the 2/13th Battalion which passed through the 2/15th and 2/17th Battalions. The 2/48th, operating on the narrower front, achieved it's objective but tanks that were to support the 2/13th Battalion were delayed when the main enemy minefield proved to be 1600 yards deep instead of the expected 250 yards. The 2/13th, without support, attacked the enemy defences and, suffering heavy casualties, was unable to reach the final objective before dawn.
The four XXX Corps infantry divisions had similar experiences. The first objectives were quickly taken but minefields proved to be much more extensive than expected and the strongest resistance was encountered in the drive towards the second objective. The extensive minefields, despite valiant efforts of the engineers, prevented the divisions of X Armoured Corps from breaking through the bridgehead and into the enemy's communications before dawn. The failure to penetrate the minefields lost an exceptional opportunity because dawn on 24 October saw the German forces without direction as the barrage had dislocated their communications and the German commander, General Stumme, was missing and was later found to have died of a heart attack. Furthermore, the German armour was dispersed across the desert and the German command was unaware of the intended point of the breakout.
The 8th Army attack continued on the night of 24/25 October and the previous night's final objectives were taken. However, a breakthrough was not achieved with the armoured thrusts faltering as the Germans established a new front line. With the failure of the original plan, Montgomery began preparing a new strategy and the main brunt of the battle, which increased in intensity daily to a climax on 1 November, fell on the 9th Division. The Australian's task was to shift the focus of their attack from the west to the north and destroy the enemy between them and the sea.
On the night of 25/26 October, the 9th Division made the first of three attacks that would create the conditions for victory at El Alamein. The attack opened at midnight with an artillery barrage. It was made by 26th Brigade with the 2/48th Battalion attacking towards Trig 29, a slightly raised feature on an otherwise flat plain, and the 2/24th attacking on the right. The 2/24th captured its objective but depleted by casualties it was unable to hold an extended position and withdrew 1000 yards. The 2/48th captured Trig 29, an excellent observation post which was used in subsequent days to call in artillery to break up enemy counter-attacks. Advancing with the 2/48th was Private P E Gratwick who was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The citation for his award said:
'During the attack on Trig 29 at Miteiriya Ridge on the night of 25-26 October 1942 the Company to which Private Gratwick belonged, met with severe opposition from strong enemy positions which delayed capture of the Company's objective and caused a considerable number of casualties. Private Gratwick's Platoon was directed at these strong positions but its advance was stopped by intense enemy fire at short range. Withering fire of all kinds killed the platoon commander, the platoon sergeant and many other ranks and reduced the total strength of the Platoon to seven. Private Gratwick grasped the seriousness of the situation and acting on his own initiative, with utter disregard for his own safety at a time when the remainder of the Platoon were pinned down, charged the nearest post and completely destroyed the enemy with hand grenades, killing amongst others a complete mortar crew. As soon as this task was completed, and again under heavy machine-gun fire, he charged the second post with rifle and bayonet. It was from this post that the heaviest fire had been directed. He inflicted further casualties, and was within striking distance of his objective, when he was killed by a burst of machine-gun fire. By his brave and determined action, which completely unnerved the enemy, and by his successful reduction of the enemy's strength, Private Gratwick's Company was able to move forward and mop up its objective. Private Gratwick's unselfish courage, his gallant and determined efforts against the heaviest opposition, changed a doubtful situation into the successful capture of his Company's final objective.' (London Gazette: 28 January 1943.)
On the night of 26/27 October, the 7th Motor Brigade attacked Kidney Ridge in front of the right flank of the 51st Highland division near its boundary with the 9th Division. It was here that the armoured breakout later took place but throughout 27 October, the 2nd Battalion Rifle Brigade repelled strong armoured assaults without field artillery support and showed that German armour could not throw back an infantry front pushed firmly forward and protected by anti-tank artillery. The Rifle Brigade's commanding officer, Lt Colonel V B Turner, was awarded the Victoria Cross.
Neither the 8th Army nor the Africa Corps continued the attack during the daylight hours on 28 October but at 10 pm, the 9th Division's 20th Brigade struck northwards towards the coast road. In heavy fighting involving many casualties the Australian line was pushed a little closer to the coast road. As a result of these operations, Rommel concentrated even more forces in the north and in the following four days the Australian sector became the focal area of the battle. The 9th Division again attempted to cut the coast road on the night of 30/31 October. Under command of 26th Brigade, the 2/24th, 2/32nd and 2/48th infantry battalions and the 2/3rd Pioneer battalion attacked and although not achieving all that was hoped for, inflicted substantial casualties and took over 500 prisoners. Sergeant W H Kibby, 2/48th Battalion, who was killed attacking a machine-gun post was awarded the Victoria Cross for heroic conduct that night and for two previous occasions beginning on 23 October The citation read:
'During the initial attack at Miteiriya Ridge on 23 October 1942, the Commander of No. 17 Platoon, to which Sergeant Kibby belonged, was killed. No sooner had Sergeant Kibby assumed command than his platoon was ordered to attack strong enemy positions holding up the advance of his company. Sergeant Kibby immediately realised the necessity for quick decisive action, and without thought for his personal safety he dashed forward towards the enemy post firing his Tommy-gun. This rapid and courageous individual action resulted in the complete silencing of the enemy fire, by the killing of three of the enemy, and the capture of twelve others. With these posts silenced, his Company was then able to continue the advance.
After the capture of Trig 29 on 26 October, intense enemy artillery concentrations were directed on the battalion area which were invariably followed with counter-attacks by tanks and infantry. Throughout the attacks that culminated in the capture of Trig 29 and the re-organisation period which followed, Sergeant Kibby moved from section to section, personally directing their fire and cheering the men, despite the fact that the Platoon throughout was suffering heavy casualties. Several times, when under intense machine-gun fire, he went out and mended the platoon line communications, thus allowing mortar concentrations to be directed effectively against the attack on his Company's front. His whole demeanour during this difficult phase in the operations was an inspiration to his platoon.
On the night of 30-31 October, when the battalion attacked "ring contour" 25, behind the enemy lines, it was necessary for No. 17 Platoon to move through the most withering enemy machine-gun fire in order to reach its objective. These conditions did not deter Sergeant Kibby from pressing forward right to the objective, despite his platoon being mown down by machine-gun fire from point-blank range. One pocket of resistance still remained and Sergeant Kibby went forward alone, throwing grenades to destroy the enemy now only a few yards distant. lust as success appeared certain he was killed by a burst of machine-gun fire. Such outstanding courage, tenacity of purpose and devotion to duty was entirely responsible for the successful capture of the Company's objective. His work was an inspiration to all and he left behind him an example and memory of a soldier who fearlessly and unselfishly fought to the end to carry out his duty.' (London Gazette: 28 January 1943)
On the morning of 31 October, the Australian battalions were concentrated in the most fiercely contested area of the whole battlefield. During the early hours of 1 November, 24th brigade took over command of the forward units and the 2/28th and 2/43rd battalions relieved the 2/24th and 2/48th battalions. At midday, a major enemy assault by tanks with aerial and artillery support commenced and continued throughout the afternoon and well into the night. It did not die down until 2.30 am on 2 November which was ninety minutes after the long awaited break-out Operation Supercharge had opened with an intense artillery barrage.
From the night of 26 October 1942 when the Australians started their drive northwards and brought the whole weight of the Africa Corps against them, Montgomery had been regrouping his forces to create a reserve for the break-out. On 2 November, with the Axis reserves concentrated against the 9th Division, Montgomery made his thrust through the bridgehead originally secured by the 9th Division on the opening night of the battle. The Germans did not break immediately but the overwhelming British aerial and armoured strength ensured success. Rommel first gave the order to retreat on the evening of 2 November, cancelled the order when Hitler directly intervened and finally restarted his withdrawal on the night of 3/4 November. On 5 November, the 9th Division found the enemy gone from its front and having fought the last Australian battle in North Africa returned home in early 1943. The victorious 8th Army was unable to seize the opportunity of cutting off and capturing a sizeable proportion of Rommel's force and it was not until 13 May 1943 that North Africa was cleared of enemy forces.
The 8th Army casualties were 13,500 killed, wounded or missing. About 27,000 prisoners were taken, 450 tanks destroyed or abandoned and much equipment captured. The 9th Australian Division losses between 23 October and 4 November totalled 2,694, including 620 dead, 1944 wounded and 130 taken prisoner. Churchill in The Second World War said the magnificent drive towards the coast by the Australians, achieved by ceaseless bitter fighting, swung the whole battle in favour of the British. Montgomery's chief of staff, Sir Francis de Guingand said in Operation Victory of the Australian thrust towards the coast:
'I think this area saw the most determined and savage fighting of the campaign. No quarter was given, and the Australians fought some of the finest German troops in well-prepared positions to a standstill, and by their action did a great deal to win the battle of El Alamein.'
On 28 October 1940, Italy invaded Greece from Albania. The intention was a lightning campaign which would lead to the Italian domination of the southern Balkans and the Aegean Sea. The invasion was a failure with the ill-equipped but high-spirited Greek infantry successfully fighting on familiar ground to defeat the more numerous and heavily armed invader. The Italians were forced back into Albania.
Italy's attack on Greece made Greece an ally of Britain against Italy but not against Germany. Five RAF squadrons were soon operating from Greek airfields against the Italians in Albania and a small infantry group was landed in Crete. General Sir Archibald Wavell, the Middle East Commander-in-Chief went to Athens to offer the Greek dictator, General Metaxas, immediate reinforcements. These were declined on the grounds that they would not effectively reinforce the Greek Army and might provide the Germans with the pretext for attacking Greece. However, it is now known that Hitler had ordered his staff on 12 November 1940 to plan for the occupation of northern Greece, with the objective being enlarged later in the month to include the whole of Greece. Germany's aim was to secure its southern flank in preparation for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, timed to begin some time after the 15 May 1941. The German operation, code-named Marita, was to be launched by the 12th Army of 13 divisions attacking northern Yugoslavia and the 2nd Army of 15 divisions attacking southern Yugoslavia and Greece. These forces were supported by air units of the Luftwaffe.
On 29 January 1941 General Metaxas died. The new Greek Prime Minister, Alexander Koryzis sent a note to the British Government reaffirming Greece's determination to resist a German attack, repeating that a British force should not be sent to Macedonia unless the German Army entered Bulgaria, but suggesting that the size and composition of the proposed force should be determined. On 24 February at a meeting of British and Greek political and military leaders, British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, said Britain could offer three infantry divisions, the Polish Brigade and an armoured brigade, a total of 100,000 men. By 6 April 1941, the date Germany attacked Yugoslavia and Greece, 50,000 British and Commonwealth troops had arrived in Greece. These forces included the 6th Australian Division commanded by Major General Ivan Mackay, the 2nd New Zealand Division commanded by Major General Sir Bernard Freyberg VC and the British 1st Armoured Brigade. These formations comprised 38 armour, infantry and artillery units, including 16 New Zealand, 14 Australian and 8 British battalions and regiments.
The Greek Army consisted of 21 divisions, 15 of which were on the Albania front and 3 on the Metaxas line along the Greek/Bulgarian border in eastern Macedonia and Thrace. The remaining three divisions were part of a joint Greek-British force on the Olympus-Aliakmon line in central Macedonia which stretched from Mount Olympus to the Yugoslav border. On 5 April, General Maitland Wilson formally took command of the forces in central Macedonia with his advanced headquarters at the foot of Mt Olympus on the main Larisa-Florina road. The 1st Australian Corps commanded by General Thomas Blamey was situated from the sea to the Veria Pass. The Greek forces, two divisions called the Central Macedonian Army were in the Vernion mountains, north of Veria.
The ill-prepared Yugoslav Army and the Greeks on the Bulgarian border took the shock of the German attack on 6 April. However the Luftwaffe delivered a heavy blow to the British expedition on the night of 6/7 April when German bombers seriously damaged Piraeus, the port of Athens sinking seven merchant ships, sixty lighters and 25 caiques. The port was closed for 2 days and when it reopened, it was with a much reduced capacity to handle the ships needed to reinforce and maintain the British expedition. The Greek forces on the Bulgarian border yielded very little territory in the first three days of fighting but the Germans outflanked the Greek forces by attacking through Yugoslavia down the Axios plain to Salonica. The Greek commander in eastern Macedonia capitulated his isolated army on 9 April.
The danger to the Olympus-Aliakmon line was also an outflanking move from Yugoslavia through the Monastir Gap. Wilson decided to create a blocking force in the Florina valley directly under his command. The 1st Armoured Brigade and the 19th Australian Brigade were detached from Blamey's 1st Australian Corps and placed under command of General Mackay. As a result of the German success in eastern Macedonia, the Greek military decided to withdraw from the Albanian front and central Macedonia to a new defence line which would on the east include the Olympus-Aliakmon position but would omit the passes west of the Florina Valley. A rear defensive line from Mt Olympus along the south bank of the Aliakmon River was also planned for a protracted defence.
Mackay's force deployed on 9 April at Vevi where the Monastir valley narrows to 100 to 500 yards and followed a winding course through a defile flanked by steep rock-strewn hills with few trees. Next day, German and British guns exchanged fire in the valley and Mackay was ordered to hold until the night of 12 April before withdrawing. Mackay's infantry was commanded by Brigadier Vasey who had 3 battalions spread across ten miles of front much of which was covered with snow; the 2/8th Australian Battalion on the east, the 1st Rangers in the centre and the 2/4th Australian Battalion on the hills to the west. On 12 April the Germans thrust back the Rangers but the Royal Horse Artillery and Australian anti-tank gunners held back German infantry and tanks. By dusk German tanks were among the forward posts of the 2/8th and it was out of touch with Brigade Headquarters. It withdrew but the men reached the vehicles further south and on the west the 2/4th withdrew except for a company which walked into the German lines and was captured. After two successful rearguard actions by the armoured brigade the force was extricated and the infantry reached the Olympus-Aliakmon Line.
The 16th Australian Brigade was hurried forward to the Veria Pass on 8 April where it began to take up its positions. The brigade was astride a mountain road some 3000 feet above the sea and troops had to carry their gear, ammunition and rations either by hand or on the backs of donkeys. Snow and rain fell on the mountains and for shelter each platoon had a tent-fly which sagged under the weight of the snow. However, having established itself, the brigade was ordered on 10 April to march back through the snow covered mountains to fill a gap in the New Zealand front west of Servia.
With Australian and New Zealand units fighting side by side, Blamey as commander of 1 Australian Corps renamed it the Anzac Corps on 12 April. The following day, Wilson, aware that he would receive no substantial reinforcements from Egypt and concluding that the Greek divisions on his west could not be relied on, informed Blamey that he had decided to withdraw about 100 miles to a shorter line from Thermopylae to the Gulf of Corinth. The order for retirement was issued on 15 April with conduct the withdrawal to be commanded by Blamey. The same day, Wavell and other senior British Middle East commanders met and decided that the evacuation of all forces from the Greek mainland was unavoidable.
Blamey's orders for the withdrawal provided that the 6th NZ Brigade would occupy a rearguard position astride the roads near Elasson through which the two forward New Zealand Brigades would withdraw; the 16th Australian Brigade would occupy a position west of Larisa through which the 17th Australian Brigade would withdraw and the 19th Australian Brigade would form a final rearguard at Domokos. Meanwhile German divisions were rushing south and west over muddy cratered roads. Blamey ordered Brigadier Allen's 16th Brigade to the Pinios Gorge to halt the German thrust towards the main road at Larisa, a bottle-neck which was the only escape road for the Anzac Corps. By midnight of 17 April, the Anzac Corps' four forward brigades had west their positions, embussed and driven south, leaving the 6th NZ and the 16th and 17th Australian Brigades astride the 3 main roads converging on Larisa.
Throughout daylight on 18 April the Germans attacked the 16th Brigade in the Pinios Gorge and the 6th NZ Brigade at Elasson. The 16th Brigade held the road until late that night but the German tanks forced the two battalion of the 16th brigade into the hills. From the air, the Luftwaffe attacked the long lines of vehicles along the 70 miles escape route to Lamia. Although the air attacks continued all day and were noisy and nerve wracking, the Luftwaffe failed to exploit its superiority and was unable to halt the retreating column and did remarkably little damage to men and vehicles. By dawn on 19 April, all units except parts of battalion in the Pinios Gap were south of Larisa and the Anzac Corps was deploying in the Thermopylae positions. It took the Germans five full days to cover the distance to Thermopylae and prepare for their next attack.
On 18 April, Koryzis, the Greek Prime Minister committed suicide and two days later, without authority from Athens, the Greek Army which had fallen back from Albania, surrendered to the Germans. The plans for the evacuation were brought forward and the night of 24/25 April was scheduled for the withdrawal from the Thermopylae line and also for the first large-scale embarkation. The embarkation was from various beaches in the Athens area or in the Peloponnese. To lift the troops there were 6 cruisers, 24 destroyers and escort vessels, 2 Landing Ships Infantry, 14 troopships and a number of landing craft.
On 24 April, the Germans attacked the Thermopylae line which was held by the 6th NZ Brigade on the east and the 19th Australian Brigade on the west. German tanks tried to break through the New Zealanders while mountain troops attacked the high pass held by the Australians. The New Zealanders destroyed twelve tanks and together with the Australians held their ground. The 5th NZ Brigade and 6000 corps and base troops embarked on the night of 24/25 April. The 19th Australian Brigade embarked from the Peloponnese beaches the following night. On 26 April, German paratroops cut the only road linking the two parts of the British force. That night troops of the armoured brigade were embarked from Athens beaches and 8000 troops including the 16th and 17th Brigades from Kalamata. The 4th NZ Brigade fought off the Germans on the 27 April and embarked that night but some groups at Kalamata and Navplion were captured.
Of the 50,662 troops embarked from Greece, about 30,000 were landed in Crete, without most of their vehicles and heavy weapons. On 30 April, General Freyberg was given command of all the forces on the island with orders to defend it against a probable attack by German airborne troops. After some men were shipped to Egypt, Freyberg was west with a force of 15,000 British, 7,700 New Zealand, 6,500 Australian and 11,000 Greek troops. The Australian forces comprised five infantry battalion (2/1st, 2/4th, 2/7th, 2/8th and 2/11th) all much below strength. In addition there were portions of other units such as the 2/1st Machine Gun Battalion, 2/2nd and 2/3rd Field Regiments and the 2/8th Field Company. Most of these were assigned infantry tasks. Since Allied Intelligence had reported the invasion would take place from the air, General Freyberg had disposed his forces with that in view. They occupied four main sectors - the towns of Retimo, Canea and Heraklion and the vital port of Suda at the head of Suda Bay on Crete's northern coast. The force was gravely short of equipment and after the systematic heavy bombing by the Germans there were only six British aircraft still serviceable and they were flown to Egypt.
The German plan, Operation Mercury, was to capture Crete with airborne troops with a glider regiment and a parachute regiment to land at Maleme and Canea on the morning of the 20 May. These troops were to be followed in the afternoon by two parachute battalion at Retimo and four at Heraklion. Additional troops would come from a mountain division which was to be partly landed on captured airfields with the remainder taken to Crete by sea. The initial German airdrop on Maleme suffered heavy casualties but further landings in the open country to the west provided sufficient forces for the Germans to capture Maleme airfield. The runway was only some 2000 feet long but its capture by the Germans was essential to the success of its operation and they were able to hold onto to it despite strong New Zealand counter-attacks.
The loss of Maleme airfield threatened the whole allied position in Crete since the Germans, with air-superiority, were able to bring in reinforcements and supplies. Despite Australian success at Retimo and Heraklion, German pressure continued to rise and on 27 May 1941 General Wavell ordered allied forces to abandon the island. The 2/4th Australian Battalion, at Heraklion was the first to leave. They boarded the cruisers Orion and Dido and the destroyers Hereward, Hasty, Havoc, Imperial, Hotspur and Jackal. During the 350 mile trip these ships were under constant attack from waves of German Stukas. About 600 men were killed including 48 Australians. After that, the naval authorities decided there was no hope of lifting troops from Canea, Suda Bay and Retimo. The forces were ordered to fight their way out of the towns and strike across the island to the village of Sfakia where the navy would meet them on 31 May. About 15,000 men were embarked from Sfakia and Heraklion with about 12000 being taken prisoner. The Germans lost some 4,000 men killed and 2500 wounded on Crete.
Australian losses on Greece were 320 killed, 494 wounded and 2000 captured. On Crete, 274 Australians were killed, 507 were wounded and 3100 were captured including most of the 2/1st, 2/7th and 2/11th Battalions. New Zealand losses for Greece and Crete were 962 killed, 2000 wounded and over 3000 captured.
The 7th Australian Division was by far the major element of the British, Indian and Free French forces which defeated the Vichy French forces during this five weeks' campaign, waged in summer heat and mountainous country. The crossing of the Litani River was stubbornly contested by skilful, well-led enemy, but an Australian artillery force drove off Vichy destroyers which had come inshore to shell Australian positions. Beyond the Litani, there was much stalking and close quarter fighting in the jagged ravines. Australians fought at Djezzine, where Private Jim Gordon of the 2/31st Bn won a VC. His citation stated:
'On the night of 10 July 1941 during an attack on "Greenhill', North of Djezzine, Private Gordon's Company came under intense machine-gun fire and its advance was held up. Movement even by single individuals became impossible, one officer and two men being killed and two men being wounded in the effort to advance. The enemy machine-gun position which had brought the two forward platoons to a halt was fortified and completely covered the area occupied by our forces. Private Gordon, on his own initiative, crept forward over an area swept by machine-gun and grenade fire and succeeded in approaching close to the post; he then charged it from the front and killed the four machine-gunners with bayonet. His action completely demoralised the enemy in this sector and the Company advanced and took the position. During the remainder of the action that night and on the following day, Private Gordon, who has throughout operations shown a high degree of courage, fought with equal gallantry.' (London Gazette: 28 October 1941.)
The second Victoria Cross awarded in the Syrian campaign was that awarded to Lieutenant A R (later Sir Roden) Cutler of the 2/5th Australian Field Regiment. the citation for his award states:
'For most conspicuous and sustained gallantry during the Syrian Campaign and for outstanding bravery during the bitter fighting at Merdjayoun when this artillery officer became a byword amongst forward troops with which he worked.
At Merdjayoun on 19 June 1941, our infantry attack was checked after suffering heavy casualties from an enemy counter-attack with tanks. Enemy machine gun fire swept the ground, but Lieutenant Cutler with another artillery officer and a small party pushed on ahead of the infantry and established an outpost in a house. The telephone line was cut and he went out and mended this line under machine gun fire and returned to the house, from which enemy posts and batteries were successfully engaged. The enemy then attacked this outpost with infantry and tanks, killing the Bren gunner and mortally wounding other officers. Lieutenant Cutler and another manned the anti-tank rifle and Bren gun and fought back, driving the enemy infantry away. The tanks continued the attack, but under constant fire from the anti-tank rifle and Bren gun eventually withdrew. Lieutenant Cutler then personally supervised the evacuation of the wounded members of his party. Undaunted he pressed for a further advance. He had been ordered to establish an outpost from which he could register the only road by which the enemy transport could enter the town. With a small party of volunteers he pressed on until finally with one other he succeeded in establishing an outpost right in the town, which was occupied by the Foreign Legion, despite enemy machine gun fire which prevented our infantry from advancing. At this time Lieutenant Cutler knew the enemy were massing on his left for a counter-attack and that he was in danger of being cut off. Nevertheless he carried out his task of registering the battery on the road and engaging enemy posts. The enemy counter-attacked with infantry and tanks and he was cut off. He was forced to go to ground, but after dark succeeded in making his way through enemy lines. His work in registering the only road by which enemy transport could enter the town was of vital importance and a big factor in the enemy's subsequent retreat.
On the night of 23-24 June he was in charge of a 25-pounder sent forward into our forward defended localities to silence an enemy anti-tank gun and post, which had held up our attack. This he did and next morning the recapture of Merdjayoun was completed. Later at Damour on 6th July, when our forward infantry were pinned to the ground by heavy hostile machine gun fire Lieutenant Cutler, regardless of all danger, went to bring a line to his outpost when he was seriously wounded. Twenty-six hours elapsed before it was possible to rescue this officer, whose wounds by this time had become septic necessitating the amputation of his leg. Throughout the Campaign this officer's courage was unparalleled and his work was a big factor in the recapture of Merdjayoun.' (London Gazette: 28 November 1941.)
The Australians who fought the long and sometimes costly battle around Merdjayoun had held a pass which could have allowed the enemy into Palestine, with dire results. The 7th Australian Division was reinforced by units from the 6th Australian Division whose 2/3rd Bn gallantly stormed the high ground near Mezze which ensured the surrender of Damascus.
Twenty Thousand Australian airmen served with (the Bomber Command of the Royal Air Force during the 1939-45 War. These men had been recruited into the Royal Australian Air Force and remained members of the RAAF but after training in Australia and Canada were employed operationally within the RAF which assumed full financial responsibility for such service except where Australian rates of pay and pensions differed from the British. The training of the RAAF airmen who flew with Bomber Command was through the Empire Air Training Scheme (EATS) which linked training organisations in Australia and Canada. The first ground instruction schools in Australia under the EATS scheme opened in April 1940 and were followed a month later by elementary flying courses. The first Australian EATS drafts from Canada reached England in December 1940 and by March 1941 individual RAAF men were joining Bomber Command squadrons.
The first Australians to see action with Bomber Command were Australian born regular RAF officers some of whom like Group Captain Hughie Edwards, who won the Victoria Cross in 1941, had trained with the RAAF. Australia was not able to employ all the airmen it trained prior to 1939 and many Australians transferred to the RAF when it was recruiting approximately 20% of its pilots from Commonwealth countries. Under the EATS scheme, aircrew were trained for Coastal, Fighter and Transport Commands as well as Bomber Command but it was to Bomber Command that the great majority were allotted. By the end of 1941, 300 Australians (mostly pilots) were spread in small numbers to no less than 46 Bomber Command squadrons.
The first two Australian medium bomber squadrons began to form - No 455 in June and No 458 in September 1941. After some delays both were flying regular missions against Germany by the end of 1941. The Australian government expressed the wish to consolidate RAAF airmen into RAAF units but there was never an Australian Group in Bomber Command to compare with No 6 (Canadian) group. The formation of Australian squadrons did not solve the problem since they were formed with only a small number of Australian aircrews. Crews were formed by the men themselves, without regard to nationality, at operational training units and did not care to be broken up on arrival at squadrons. A number of RAF station commanders favoured mixed nationality crews and, without the same determination shown by the Canadians for a Canadian group, Australians remained scattered among many crews and many squadrons of Bomber Command until the war's end. Where crews were predominantly Australian in composition, they could transfer without difficulty to RAAF squadrons and RAAF individuals especially desirous of serving on an Australian squadron could, and did, arrange for their whole crew to be posted with them but this meant further dilution of the RAAF squadrons.
The backbone of Bomber Command from 1939 until 1942 was the Wellington bomber which equipped No 455 Squadron. It was supported by Hamptons which equipped No 458 Squadron and Whitleys but it was decided in early 1942 to replace the Hamptons and Whitleys with four engined bombers which could carry twice the bombload of a medium bomber. Bomber Command soon found that the Lancaster was by far the most satisfactory aircraft for weight carrying, range and altitude and by July 1942 there were as many Lancasters as Halifaxes (the next most powerful type) in operation and there after the Lancaster predominated until the end of the war when they equipped no less that 55 squadrons.
Britain held back from bombing Germany for the first eight months of the war and it was not until four days after Germany had invaded France and the Low Countries that permission was given for Bomber Command to attack targets inside Germany. While Fighter Command fought the Battle of Britain, Bomber Command took the attack to Germany and of 47 Australian pilots actively engaged, five were killed and six became prisoners of war. Bomber Command strategy until mid-1941 was to attack petrol, oil and lubricant supplies but German military and political successes in South Eastern Europe in the first half of 1941 dramatically improved its petrol and oil situation. On 9 July 1941, Bomber Command received a formal directive which defined its main aim as "dislocating the German transportation system and destroying the morale of the civilian population as a whole and of industrial workers in particular." Nine rail centres were specified as primary objectives and six main towns with important rail facilities as secondary targets. Bomber Command had abandoned daylight bombing in favour of night bombing early in the war because of unacceptable losses. This change in policy reflected recognition of the fact that Bomber Command was unable to protect itself from enemy fighters and flak by day and it could not bomb accurately at night. The air attack on Germany continued for the rest of 1941 but it was not able to concentrate wholly on the offensive action of strategic bombing until February 1942. Much effort was diverted in this period into attacks against ports and harbours which held German capital ships and U-boats and in minelaying operations. However, at the same time, work on bombing technique and the aircraft to get the bombs to the target was proceeding.
In the first years of the war, raids against Germany were not closely planned and co-ordinated. Bombers did not have rigid take-off times, routes were not set out, there were no navigation aids, no set bombing heights and times, and there was no target marking. Germany took advantage of the fact that Berlin and other targets in central and southern Germany and in northern Italy could only be attacked on the long winter nights in its deployment of fighter and anti-aircraft forces. In August 1941, a survey of bombing accuracy found that, because of inaccurate navigation and faulty bomb aiming, only one in three aircraft were bombing within 5 miles of target. By the end of 1941, the fortunes of Bomber Command were at an ebb with the increasing effectiveness of German defences causing unacceptable losses. The appointment, on 23 February 1942, of Air Chief Marshall Arthur Harris was to change the course of the strategic bombing campaign and, under his leadership, Bomber Command was forged into a powerful fighting force.
The first of the navigational aids to help Bomber Command to locate its target was Gee but its initial use was disappointing and it was available for only a few aircraft. On 28/29 March, the Baltic port of Lubeck was attacked with incendiaries by a force of 224 aircraft including 10 Hamptons of No 455 RAAF Squadron which caused greater damage than had previously been caused on any German city. On 30/31 May, just three months after Harris took command, the first mass area attack was launched against Koln (Cologne) in the Ruhr valley with over 1,000 aircraft attacking. This was twice the size of any previous formation and, for the first time, used the bomber stream where all attacking aircraft flew the same route to and from the target and each was allocated its own place and height in the bomber stream. The attack was concentrated into as short a duration as possible in order to overwhelm the German fire fighting services and thereby allowing bigger fires to occur, causing greater damage. The damage caused by this raid was almost equal to the aggregate of damage in all other German towns attacked up to then and vindicated the tactics of concentration and incendiary attack. Of 18 bombers of No 460 Squadron attacking, 17 bombed the target and all returned. Of the attacking force of 1,042 aircraft, 40 failed to return. The raid was also important for the heartening effect it had on British public opinion and this helped strengthen Harris' demand for more bombers.
Two further 1,000 bomber raids were carried out in May and June 1942 but they did not have the same success as the first raid. Harris had stretched the resources of Bomber Command to mount these raids and the rest of 1942 was a period of consolidation for Bomber Command.
In August 1942, the Pathfinder force was created under the command of Australian Air Commodore Donald Bennett, an acknowledged expert on navigation. The force was to be a specialist target finding unit to help with bombing accuracy. No 460 Squadron was the only RAAF squadron with Bomber Command for most of 1942 - No 455 Squadron having left for the Middle East in February 1942 and No 458 Squadron having transferred to Coastal Command in April 1942. Two new Australian squadrons - Nos 466 & 467 - were formed at the end of 1942 and flew their first missions in January 1943 but with few Australian aircrew and fewer Australian ground crew. Australians continued to be scattered among British Squadrons and it was an Australian pilot, flying with RAF No 149 Squadron who was the only member of the RAAF flying with Bomber Command to win the Victoria Cross. In November 1942, Flight Sergeant Rawdon Middleton was flying the four engined Stirling Bomber when the aircraft was hit on the way to Turin, Italy. He flew onto the target where the aircraft was again hit, this time seriously wounding Middleton. Despite his wounds, Middleton flew the aircraft back to England where five of the crew were able to bail out safely but with fuel almost exhausted he was killed when the aircraft crashed into the sea.
In 1943, Bomber Command concentrated its effort against three major targets in what became known as the Battle of the Ruhr, the Battle of Hamburg and the Battle of Berlin. By this time, Bomber Command had received new technical navigation and bombing aids - Oboe, a blind bombing device, and H2S, an air radar set which gave a rough radar picture of the ground the aircraft was flying over. The Battle of the Ruhr opened on the night of 5/6 March 1943 when 369 aircraft, including 33 from the three Australian squadrons, attacked Essen in a highly successful raid. From March until July, 43 raids were launched against the Ruhr causing extensive damage to many of the industrial cities of that region. In late July and early August, Hamburg was attacked in four major raids in ten days causing enormous destruction with a conflagration, leaving the city in smouldering ruins. Window (aluminium strips dropped from the attacking aircraft to confuse the German air and ground radar) was first used during these raids with great success. Although Bomber Command concentrated its efforts on these major battles, many other targets were attacked during the same period. During the Battle of the Ruhr, the famous dams raid took place. The 16 Lancasters which made this attack carried 13 Australians, four of whom were captains of aircraft. Eight Lancasters were lost, involving the deaths of 55 men with only a solitary Australian rear gunner surviving to become a prisoner of war. Of the twelve other Australians, only two were killed, with ten returning safely. The Battle of Hamburg took place mid-way through a series of twelve raids against northern Italy designed to cripple the Italian will to resist the invasion of Sicily. In the late summer and autumn of 1943, Bomber Command regularly attacked towns in Southern Germany. Within a month of its success at Hamburg, three heavy raids were made against Berlin. With a sufficient number of heavy bombers assured, a winter campaign against the German capital, to damage both industrial capacity and national morale, seemed desirable. However, any raid against Berlin required a minimum of 500 miles flying over hostile territory. Between November 1943 and March 1944, Bomber Command launched 16 major attacks against Berlin. Unlike the Battles of the Ruhr and Hamburg, the results of the Battle of Berlin were indecisive. A total of 9,105 aircraft were dispatched to Berlin and over 6% (539 aircraft) were lost. Of 787 RAAF aircraft dispatched, just under 6% (45 aircraft) were lost. In addition to heavy losses, cloud completely covered Berlin on a number of occasions. Because Berlin was such a large area, most bombs did some damage but it was too big a target for Bomber Command to completely destroy the city.
In November 1943, a fourth Australian squadron, No 463, was formed from a flight of No 467 Squadron. (Only one Australian squadron, No 460, was substantially maintained by Australian ground staff.)
Other than Berlin, the main targets during the winter of 1943/44 were cities which supported the German aircraft industry. The last major raid of the winter was to the important political and industrial city of Numberg (Nuremberg) on 30/31 March 1944. 795 bombers including 75 from the four Australian squadrons were dispatched but 95 aircraft including 5 Australian aircraft failed to return. This was Bomber Command's worst loss in one raid during the entire war. Of the aircrew of the 95 aircraft lost, 545 were killed and 159 became prisoners of war. Five RAAF aircraft with 35 aircrew were lost, of whom 7 of the 20 killed were Australians. Another 40 Australians, including 11 pilots flying with 16 different RAF squadrons that night were killed
From the start of April until 5 June 1944, Bomber Command supported the attacks leading up to the D-Day landings. Bomber Command launched 53 raids against railway workshops in this period, with RAAF aircraft involved in 25 raids for the loss of 17 aircraft. Further attacks were made against road and rail bridges over the Seine and the Loire and against German radar and wireless installations. On the night before the landings, Bomber Command attacked 10 coastal batteries in the assault area with about 100 aircraft against each battery. This and other support from Bomber Command helped to contribute to the success of the invasion. Strategic Bombing did not completely stop in the lead up to the invasion. RAAF squadrons took pan in nine raids against Germany from 20 April until 23 May.
In the last ten months of the war, there was strong argument on which direction strategic bombing should take. The Americans and the RAF Chief of Air Staff argued for concentration against oil supplies, the Deputy Supreme Commander, Air Marshall Tedder argued for an attack against transportation and communications, while Harris still favoured area bombing. By this stage of the war, the allies enjoyed massive air superiority and Bomber Command had sufficient resources to launch heavy attacks against both oil and transportation targets while still attacking German cities. It was only as the war neared its end that the morality of area attacks on cities was seriously raised and then only after the bombing of Dresden in March 1945. Harris suffered no doubts and said "Dresden was a mass of munitions works, an intact government centre and key transportation centre. It is now none of those things." Bomber Command also assisted allied land operations, both on the offensive and in helping the Americans stop the German offensive in the Ardennes at the end of 1944. The main emphasis in February and March 1945 was attacking the Ruhr and Rhineland ahead of the advancing allied armies. A fifth Australian squadron, No 462, joined Bomber Command in August 1944 and it flew the last RAAF operational mission on 2/3 May 1945. For the last 10 days of the war, Lancasters were employed flying liberated prisoners of war back to England and in dropping food and medicine to civilians in Holland who had not been reached by allied ground forces.
Australian casualties in Bomber Command were 3,486 dead and 265 injured. After the war, 750 Australian aircrew were released from German prisoner of war camps, most of whom would have flown with Bomber Command.
Prepared by: Anthony Staunton
Herington, John. Air War Against Germany and Italy 1939-1945. Australian War Memorial, 1962
Herington, John. Air War Over Europe 1944-45. Australian War Memorial, 1963.
Messenger, Charles. 'Bomber' Harris and the Strategic Bombing Offensive 1939-1945. Arms and Armour Press, 1984.
Middlebrook, Martin and Everitt, Chris. The Bomber Command War Diaries, An Operational Reference Book, 1939-1945. Viking Press, 1985.
Middlebrook, Martin. The Nuremberg Raid. William Morrow & Co Inc, 1974.
Stanley, Peter. Bomber Command. Hodder & Stoughton (Aust.) Pty Ltd, 1985.
Heavy Bomber Squadrons
1 Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
12 |
128 |
47 |
9 |
100 |
137 |
48 |
6 |
101 |
199 |
54 |
9 |
103 |
188 |
65 |
11 |
150 |
107 |
25 |
4 |
153 |
31 |
3 |
|
166 |
136 |
40 |
4 |
170 |
49 |
6 |
1 |
550 |
144 |
8 |
1 |
576 |
118 |
27 |
3 |
625 |
163 |
30 |
5 |
626 |
75 |
13 |
3 |
3 Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
15 |
212 |
54 |
5 |
75 |
91 |
27 |
4 |
90 |
125 |
34 |
3 |
115 |
175 |
52 |
8 |
138 |
47 |
24 |
5 |
149 |
121 |
24 |
5 |
186 |
* |
11 |
* |
195 |
38 |
4 |
1 |
218 |
116 |
26 |
4 |
514 |
83 |
26 |
5 |
622 |
164 |
37 |
5 |
4 Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
10 |
68 |
18 |
6 |
51 |
167 |
38 |
11 |
76 |
77 |
22 |
6 |
77 |
90 |
34 |
1 |
78 |
134 |
35 |
10 |
102 |
134 |
42 |
11 |
5 Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
9 |
90 |
28 |
1 |
44 |
127 |
36 |
11 |
49 |
136 |
52 |
8 |
50 |
210 |
65 |
17 |
57 |
140 |
53 |
7 |
61 |
146 |
51 |
9 |
83 |
142 |
44 |
10 |
97 |
143 |
30 |
|
106 |
207 |
59 |
5 |
189 |
35 |
3 |
|
207 |
141 |
50 |
7 |
227 |
* |
14 |
* |
617 |
67 |
6 |
2 |
619 |
81 |
20 |
3 |
630 |
113 |
29 |
6 |
8 (PFF) Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
7 |
128 |
47 |
9 |
35 |
123 |
27 |
11 |
156 |
198 |
77 |
12 |
582 |
* |
11 |
* |
635 |
64 |
18 |
5 |
100 Group
Squadron |
Served |
Killed |
POW |
171 |
25 |
2 |
|
192 |
39 |
4 |
|
199 |
81 |
19 |
1 |
* means information unavailable
The above 52 RAF Lancaster and Halifax squadrons were operational with Bomber Command on 19 April 1945. In addition to 5 RAAF squadrons, there were 17 Canadian, Polish, and French heavy bomber squadrons in Bomber Command.
Source: AWM 54 Item No 81/4/59
On 19 February 1942 four of the six Japanese carriers that bombed Pearl Harbour launched another surprise attack. Eighty-one planes were launched against Darwin whose harbour was full of ships. Eight ships were sunk, two were beached and later refloated and many of the other thirty-five ships in the harbour were damaged by bomb or machine gun fire. Darwin town and the RAAF aerodrome were also heavily damaged by the raid.
Darwin would have been without any air defence except that ten Kittyhawks of the US 33rd Pursuit Squadron en route to Java had turned back to Darwin. Five of the aircraft landed while the other five remained in the air. In command in the air was Lieut Robert G Oestreicher who spotted Japanese planes diving on the Kittyhawks. He shouted a warning that Zeros were attacking. However three of the Kittyhawks were quickly shot down with two of the pilots being killed. A fourth American airman, although wounded, managed to land his damaged aircraft. Lieut Oestreicher was the only pilot who stayed in the air during the raid and was able to shoot down two Japanese planes although only one kill was confirmed. The five Kittyhawks that had landed were either destroyed on the ground or were shot down before they were able to regain combat altitude. Two of these pilots, including their Commanding Officer, Major Floyd Pell, were also killed. A second raid of 54 bombers two hours later on the same day met no resistance in the air. Antiaircraft guns that day destroyed four Japanese aircraft and probably destroyed another four.(1)
The raids on 19 February were the first two of sixty-four raids against the Darwin area. Two books, by Douglas Lockwood in 1966 (2) and by Timothy Hall in 1980 (3) have tended to concentrate attention on the first two raids. This article attempts to tell the story of the other raids on Darwin that lasted for 21 months. Other towns raided are also mentioned but main attention is on air defence when firstly American pilots in Kittyhawks and then Australian and British Spitfire pilots met the Japanese in numerous air battles over Darwin. Using the information from the Air Force official war histories, as well as other sources, an attempt has been made to highlight both Japanese and Australian casualties and air losses. There is no authoritative list of either allied or Japanese aircraft losses so the accompanying chart is the best estimate from a number of sources.
Darwin and its nearby airfields bore the brunt of Japanese attacks on mainland Australia. However there were also a number of attacks against Broome, Derby, Port Hedland and Wyndham in Western Australia and against Townsville and Cairns in Queensland. In addition, there were attacks against the small island of Millingimbi, east of Darwin and against Horn Island in the Torres Strait. Broome suffered Australia's second worst air raid on 3 March when 70 people were killed and 24 aircraft including 16 flying boats were destroyed. Simultaneous to the raid on Broome, eight Japanese fighters hit Wyndham setting a petrol dump on fire, destroying an aircraft on the ground and sinking a steamer. Broome was again hit on 20 March, the same day that Derby suffered its only raid. Wyndham was hit again on 23 March.(4)
The third Japanese raid against Darwin was on 4 March with eight Zeros making the attack. This was followed on 16 March with 14 bombers attacking and on 19 March with 7 bombers attacking. However, Darwin remained without any air defence until the arrival, on 17 March, of the United States 49th Fighter Group flying Kittyhawks. While moving to Darwin, the Fighter Group staged through Horn Island. When the Japanese hit that island on 14 March the Americans intercepted the Japanese force of 17 bombers and fighters and shot down four Zeros and one bomber for the loss of one Kittyhawk. Additional raids against Horn Island met no air resistance but ceased in August 1942 except for one bomber which jettisoned its bombs over the island on 28 June 1943.(5)
The 49th Fighter Group was not up to full strength at Darwin until mid April but the Group achieved its first victory during the Japanese raid of 22 March 1942 in what was the first successful radar controlled interception in Australia. During the period 28 March to 27 April, the Kittyhawks intercepted the Japanese on seven occasions and brought down 31 bombers and fighters. Antiaircraft guns brought down another two bombers. Eight Kittyhawks were lost and three American pilots were killed. Damage was not extensive although 30,000 gallons of fuel was lost on 2 April.(6)
The Japanese did not attack Darwin during May but the following month saw a concentrated series of attacks on four consecutive days. From 13 to 16 June, the Japanese attacked each day with 27 bombers escorted by about 20 fighters except for 14 June when only the fighters attacked. Despite the weight of the attacks, casualties were light and so was damage to the installations. The Kittyhawks destroyed 13 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 9 of their own.(7) Second Lieut Andrew Reynolds shot down his fifth victim over Darwin on 16 June and became the first of five allied aces in the Darwin area.(8)
The formation of RAAF radio location stations Nos 31, 105 and 109 enhanced the ability of the Kittyhawks to intercept the Japanese raiders. However, in July the Japanese switched to night raids and from 25 July to 30 July sent small groups of bombers without escort to attack Darwin. Without air-to-air radar these night raids were difficult to intercept. On the afternoon of 30 July, 27 bombers with an escort of 15 to 20 fighters were intercepted by Kittyhawks. Nine Japanese aircraft were confirmed as destroyed with a further ten probably destroyed or damaged.(9)
In late July, three nuisance raids were made against Townsville which was by then the most important air base in Australia. Three Kawanisi flying boats dropped bombs into the harbour on the night of 25/26 July and lone flying boats returned on the nights of 27/28 and 28/29 July. Further bombs were dropped on both occasions but no damage resulted. Several American Airacobras attempted interception on the latter two occasions and probably hit the flying boat on the second occasion without causing any serious damage. A final raid took place on the Australian east coast on the night of 30 July when a single bomb was dropped near a house at Cairns, injuring a child.(10)
The Japanese launched their next attack against the Darwin area on 23 August 1942 with a heavy daylight raid against the RAAF airbase at Hughes, fifty kilometres south of Darwin. Fuel and ammunition as well as two aircraft on the ground were destroyed. The Japanese were intercepted by 18 Kittyhawks which achieved their greatest success in bringing down 15 Japanese aircraft without loss.(11) Among the successful American pilots that day was First Lieut James B Morehead who became the second ace in the Darwin area with his fourth and fifth confirmed kills. This was to be the last fight of the US 49th Fighter Group in the Darwin area since a further seven raids during the remainder of August were minor raids at night which did not result in any interception. In five months in the Darwin area the US 49th Fighter Group had destroyed 72 Japanese aircraft for the loss of 17 Kittyhawks.(12)
Australian Kittyhawks moved to Darwin to replace the US Kittyhawks. In August No 77 Squadron RAAF arrived in the area and was followed by No 76 Squadron RAAF in October. The Japanese changed tactics after the heavy losses in August and abandoned heavy daylight raids for six months. During September, five small raids were made in the last week of the month without causing much damage. The Japanese continued with the same tactics in seven raids in late October but this time they struck Batchelor, Pell and Cox Peninsular as well as Darwin. Without air-to-air radar the Australian pilots found it almost impossible to intercept these Japanese night raids. In the last week of November, the Japanese launched heavy raids of 12 to 18 bombers against Darwin and Hughes on three nights. The only success of No 77 Squadron in the Darwin area occurred on 23 November when Wing Commander Cresswell shot down a nine-man Betty bomber in the first successful night interception over Australia.(13)
No 1 Fighter Wing, RAAF moved to the Darwin area with three Spitfire squadrons, No 54 RAF at Darwin, No 452 RAAF at Strauss and No 457 RAAF at Livingstone, during January 1943. Two small raids causing only minor damage were not intercepted that month. The Spitfires had their first major clashes with the Japanese on 2 and 15 March 1943. On the 2nd, 16 bombers attacked the Beaufighter base at Coomalie about 100 kilometres south of Darwin. The Spitfires destroyed three aircraft. On the 15th, Darwin town was hit by a mixed group of 40 to 50 bombers and fighters. The Spitfires shot down seven and probably destroyed another seven aircraft. Four Spitfires were lost but the only casualty was the Commanding Officer of No. 452 Squadron.(14)
On 2 May 1943 the Japanese again attacked with a force of 20 bombers and 20 Zeros. Spitfires intercepted the Japanese and shot down six aircraft and probably destroyed 4 more as well as damaging 8 others. Five Spitfires were shot down and two pilots killed. However eight Spitfires were forced to land through engine failure or shortage of fuel, although six of these aircraft were later recovered. The press obtained the casualty figures which resulted in press speculation that the Spitfires had not done well against the attacking Japanese.(15) The next raids were against the airfield on Millingimbi Island east of Darwin. On 9 May, the Japanese raid killed twelve servicemen and civilians. Next day, the Japanese were back but six Spitfires were able to intercept the enemy force and brought down two Zeros and a float plane. However, the Japanese sank a store ship and destroyed two aircraft and damaged three others. The third and last attack on Millingimbi took place on 28 May. Spitfires destroyed three bombers but two Spitfires with their pilots disappeared into the Arafura Sea.(16)
The Japanese returned to Darwin in strength on 20 June 1943. The Spitfires intercepted the formation of 21 bombers and 21 fighters, shooting down 9 bombers and 5 fighters. Two Spitfire pilots were shot down and killed.(17) This was the most successful encounter by the RAAF over Darwin, during which Wing Commander Caldwell, an ace from the European theatre, shot down his fifth Japanese aircraft. The other two Darwin aces were RAF Squadron Leaders E M Gibbs and R W Foster of No 54, Squadron RAF.(18) The Japanese again attacked on 28 June with nine bombers and nine fighters. Four fighters were destroyed and two bombers probably destroyed. One Spitfire was destroyed as a result of a forced landing. However the pilot was uninjured. From 30 June the Japanese directed their main attacks against the US Liberator base at Fenton, about 150 kilometres south of Darwin. Spitfires that day intercepted 27 bombers and 23 fighters and shot down 6 bombers and 2 fighters. Six Spitfires were lost, three due to engine failure, and one Spitfire pilot was killed. On 6 July a similar sized Japanese force again attacked Fenton. Seven bombers and two fighters were destroyed with another three bombers damaged. Eight Spitfires were destroyed and three pilots killed. A Liberator was destroyed by fire on the ground.(19)
The raid on 6 July 1943 was the last in strength over the Darwin area. Three raids in August were all at night and resulted in no casualties or damage. The Japanese were not intercepted on any of these raids but four Japanese reconnaissance aircraft were destroyed in mid August. August also saw the last raids against Broome and Port Hedland. On 7 September a twin engine aircraft escorted by fighters was intercepted by Spitfires. Five enemy fighters were destroyed and several others damaged for the loss of three Spitfires, with one pilot killed. Both raids in September were against Fenton but involved no casualties or aircraft losses. In the early morning of 12 November 1943, nine aircraft raided Darwin and Fenton. With the help of searchlights two bombers were shot down by Spitfires. This was the 64th and final raid on Darwin.(20) Japanese reconnaissance aircraft continued to fly over the Darwin area. The last Japanese aircraft destroyed in the Darwin area was shot down on 25 June 1944.
(1)Douglas Gillison, Royal Australian Air Force 1939?1942, Australian War Memorial 1962 pp 430-432
(2)Douglas Lockwood, Australia's Pearl Harbour Darwin 1942, Cassell Australia, 1966
(3)Timothy Hall, Darwin 1942, Australia's Darkest Hour, Methuen Australia, 1980
(4)Gillison, op cit, p.467
(5)Ibid., pp 457 & 552
(6)Mark Clayton, The North Australian Air War 1942?44, Journal of the Australian War Memorial No 8 April 1986 p 41
(7)Gillison, op cit, p559
(8)USAF Credits for the Destruction of Enemy Aircraft, World War II, Alfred F Simpson Historical Research Centre, 1978 p 159
(9)Gillison, op cit, p. 561?562
(10)Ibid, p 562-563
(11)Ibid, p 644-645
(12)USAF Credits, op cit, pp. 336-337
(13)Gillison, op cit, pp 646 & 648
(14)Ibid, pp 651-652
(15)George Odgers, Air War Against Japan 1943?1945 Australian War Memorial, 1957 pp 46-49
(16)Ibid, pp 51-54
(17)Ibid, pp 59-61
(18)Clayton, op cit, p 45
(19)Odgers, op cit, pp 61-65
(20)Ibid, pp 118
After rapid successes in the early months of the war, the Japanese Naval General Staff wanted to move into Eastern New Guinea, and down the Solomons and New Hebrides to New Caledonia, Fiji and Samoa. Admiral Yamamoto and the staff of the Combined Fleet considered Japan's first priority was the destruction of the American Pacific Fleet and instead proposed the seizure of Midway as a preliminary step to the invasion on Hawaii. The Naval General Staff opposition to Yamamoto's Midway operation promptly vanished on 18 April after the Doolittle raid on Tokyo. The Port Moresby thrust had proceeded too far to be called off by the time the order was given for the Midway operation leaving the Japanese with two concurrent strategies which were destined to overextend their forces.
The Port Moresby operation, under the overall command of Vice-Admiral Shigeyoshi Inouye, was to be preceded by the capture of Tulagi in the Solomons. The strike group to protect the expedition was commanded by Vice-Admiral Takagi with the powerful aircraft-carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, two cruisers and six destroyers and was to sweep through the Coral Sea and bomb the airfields at Townsville, Cooktown and Thursday Island. A Cover Group, under Rear-Admiral Goto, consisted of the light aircraft-carrier Shoho, four heavy cruisers and one destroyer. After it covered the Tulagi landing it was to turn back west to protect the Port Moresby Invasion Group of 11 transports, carrying both army troops and a naval landing force, which, screened by destroyers were to steam round the eastern end of Papua, through the Jomard Passage. Inouye thought he could envelop the allied fleet with Goto on the west flank and Takagi on the east, while the Invasion Group slipped through the Jomard Passage to Port Moresby. With the Allied fleet destroyed he could then proceed with the bombing of bases in Queensland.
The Americans had succeeded in completely breaking the Japanese naval code and possessed accurate and fairly detailed intelligence concerning the Japanese plans. However, the US had only limited forces available to take advantage of this knowledge. Only Rear-Admiral Aubrey W Fitch's Task Force 11 with the aircraft-carrier Lexington and Rear-Admiral Frank J Fletcher's Task Force 17 with the aircraft-carrier Yorktown were available. Fletcher was in tactical command of the whole force and ordered to operate in the Coral Sea from 1 May. Task Force 44, under Rear Admiral Crace, RN, with Australian heavy cruisers Australia and Hobart in Sydney and the American heavy cruiser Chicago and destroyer Perkins at Noumea, were ordered to rendezvous with Fletcher in the Coral Sea. Fitch's Lexington force joined Fletcher as planned at 0630 hours on 1 May. Both aircraft-carriers commenced refuelling. Fitch estimated that his refuelling would not be completed until 4 May whereas Fletcher only required 24 hours. Fletcher decided not wait for Fitch to refuel or Crace to arrive and steamed west on the 2nd, leaving orders for Fitch to rejoin him by daylight on the 4th.
On the evening of the 3rd Fletcher learnt of the landing at Tulagi and set off north to attack next morning. When Yorktown's aircraft arrived over Tulagi early on the 4th they found only small vessels and landing craft there. They attacked and sank some of them for the loss of three aircraft. Fletcher rejoined Fitch and Crace about 0816 on 5 May and spent most of the day refuelling from Neosho. Meanwhile, Takagi's Strike Group had moved down along the outer coast of the Solomons and was well into the Coral Sea by dawn on 6 May. The Port Moresby Invasion Group was on a southerly course for the Jomard Passage, while Goto's Cover Group began refuelling south of Bougainville, completing this task by 0830 the next morning. Inouye not knowing where the Fletcher was, used most of his aircraft on the 5th in a bombing attack on Port Moresby. On the 6th, the oilier Neosho, escorted by the destroyer Sims, was detached at 1755, and told to head south for the next fuelling rendezvous. Fletcher was receiving intelligence reports regarding the movements of Japanese ships and it became fairly obvious that the Japanese invasion force would come through the Jomard Passage on the 7th or 8th. He cut short fuelling operations and headed north-west at 1930 on 6 May, to be within strike distance by daylight on the 7th.
At 1030 hours on 6 May B-17s from Australia located and bombed the Shoho south of Bougainville. The bombs fall wide, but aircraft again spotted the Goto's Cover Group around noon and later located the Port Moresby Invasion force near the Jomard Passage. Estimating that Fletcher was about 500 miles to the south-west, and expecting him to attack the next day, Inouye ordered that all operations should continue according to schedule. At midnight the invasion transports were near Misima Island, ready to slip through the Jomard Passage.
At 0736 on 7 May one of Takagi's reconnaissance aircraft reported sighting an aircraft-carrier and a cruiser. This evaluation was accepted, the distance was closed and an all-out bombing and torpedo attack ordered. In fact, the sighted vessels were the Neosho and the Sims. Both ships were repeatedly attacked by Japanese aircraft, and at about noon, the Sims sank with the loss of 379 lives. The Neosho suffered seven direct hits and drifted until 11 May when 123 men were taken off and the oilier was scuttled.
At 0645, Fletcher ordered Crace's support group to push ahead on a north-westerly course to attack the Port Moresby Invasion Group, while the rest of Task Force 17 turned north. A Japanese seaplane spotted the support group at 0810 and in the afternoon when the ships of Crace's force were south and a little west of Jomard Passage they were successively attacked by land-based single-engined bombers, navy bombers and high-level bombers. A final attack by three bombers flying at 25,000 feet was later discovered to have been American B-26s stationed at Townsville. The support group had beaten off all the attacks and Crace had dispelled the Japanese myth that a naval force could not survive repeated attacks from land-based aircraft.
While Takagi's aircraft were attacking Neosho and Sims, the Shoho of Goto's Cover Group, had turned south-east into the wind to launch four reconnaissance aircraft and to send up other aircraft to protect the Invasion Group 30 miles to the south-west. By 0830 Goto knew exactly where Fletcher was, and ordered Shoho to prepare for an attack. Other aircraft had meanwhile spotted Crace's ships to the west. The result of these reports was to make Inouye anxious for the security of the Invasion Group, and at 0900 he ordered it to turn away instead of entering Jomard Passage, thus keeping it out of harm's way until Fletcher and Crace had been dealt with. In fact, this was the nearest the transports got to their goal.
At 0815 one of Yorktown's reconnaissance aircraft reported two carriers and four heavy cruisers about 225 miles to the north-west, on the other side of the Louisiades. Assuming that this was Takagi's Strike Group, Fletcher launched a total of 93 aircraft between 0926 and 1030. However, no sooner had Yorktown's attack group become airborne than the scout returned and it was immediately discovered that an error in the pilot's coding pad meant the two carriers and four heavy cruisers should have read two heavy cruisers and two destroyers. Fletcher allowed the strike to proceed despite the error in the hope that the invasion force or other profitable targets were in the vicinity. The attack group from Lexington, well ahead of the Yorktown aircraft, was nearing Misima Island in the Louisiades shortly after 1100, when it spotted an aircraft-carrier, two or three cruisers, and some destroyers about 25 miles to the starboard. This was the Shoho with the rest of Goto's Cover Group. As the Shoho was only 35 miles south-east of the original target location, it was a simple matter to redirect the attack groups over the carrier. Under a concentrated attack, the Shoho stood little chance and was soon on fire and dead in the water. The Shoho sank soon after 1135.
After the air groups safely landed, Fletcher set a westerly course during the night of 7/8 May. Both sides expected a decision on the 8th with everything depending on locating the enemy as early as possible in the morning.
One of Lexington's scouts sighted the Japanese carriers at 0815 and reported that Takagi was 175 miles to the north-east of Fletcher's position. At 0930, the Japanese Strike Group was sighted steaming due south in a position 25 miles north-east of the original contact, but about 45 miles north of Takagi's expected position at 0900 as predicted on the strength of the first contact. The discrepancy was to cause trouble for Lexington's attack group, which by this time was airborne. Fitch had begun launching his strike between 0900 and 0925, the Yorktown group of 24 bombers with two fighters, and nine torpedo-bombers with four fighters, departing ten minutes before the Lexington aircraft. The dive-bombers spotted the Japanese first, at 1030, and took cloud cover to await the arrival of the torpedo-bombers. While Shokaku was engaged in launching further combat patrols, Zuikaku disappeared into a rain squall. The attack, which began at 1057, thus fell only on the Shokaku. Although the Yorktown pilots co-ordinated their attack well, only moderate success was achieved. The American torpedoes were either avoided or failed to explode, and only two bomb hits were scored on the Shokaku, one damaging the flight-deck well forward on the starboard bow and setting fire to fuel, while the other destroyed a repair compartment aft. The burning Shokaku could recover but no longer launch aircraft. Only 15 of 37 Lexington aircraft located the target. The torpedoes were again ineffective, but the bombers scored a third hit on the Shokaku. Although 108 of the vessel's crew had been killed, she had not been holed below the water-line, and her fires were soon brought under control. Most of her aircraft were transferred to the Zuikaku before Takagi detached Shokaku at 1300, with orders to proceed to Truk.
The Yorktown and Lexington came under attack in the interval between the strikes of their respective air groups on the Japanese aircraft-carriers. The Japanese had begun launching at about the same time as the Americans, but their attack group of 18 torpedo-bombers, 33 bombers, and 18 fighters was larger, better balanced, and more accurately directed to the target. Although the American radar picked them up 70 miles away, Fitch had far too few fighters to intercept successfully, and was forced to rely mainly on his AA gunners for protection. At 1118 hours the Japanese aircraft commenced their attack. The Yorktown, with a smaller turning circle than the Lexington, successfully avoided eight torpedoes launched on her port quarter. Five minutes later she came under dive-bomber attack but escaped unscathed until 1127 when she received her only hit, an 800-pound bomb which penetrated to the fourth deck, but did not impair flight operations. During this time, the evasive manoeuvres gradually drew the American aircraft-carriers apart and, although the screening vessels divided fairly evenly between them, the breaking of their defensive circle contributed to Japanese success.
The Lexington had a larger turning circle than the Yorktown and despite valiant manoeuvres received one torpedo hit on the port side at 1120, quickly followed by a second opposite the bridge. At the same time a dive-bombing attack commenced from 17,000 feet, the Lexington receiving two hits from small bombs. A list of 7 degrees caused by the torpedo hits was corrected by shifting oil ballast, while her engines remained unharmed. To her returning pilots she did not appear to be seriously damaged, and the recovery of the air group went ahead. At 1247, a tremendous internal explosion, caused by the ignition of fuel vapours by a motor generator which had been left running, shook the whole ship. A series of further violent explosions seriously disrupted internal communications. Yet another major detonation occurred at 1445, and the fires soon passed beyond control. The destroyer Morris came alongside to help fight the blaze but the need for evacuation became increasingly apparent. At 1630 hours the Lexington had come to a dead stop, and all hands prepared to abandon ship. At 1710 the Minneapolis, Hammann, Morris, and Anderson moved to evacuate the crew. The destroyer Phelps fired five torpedoes at 1956 and the Lexington sank at 2000.
The Battle of the Coral Sea was now over. The Japanese pilots had reported sinking both American aircraft-carriers, and the acceptance of this evaluation influenced Takagi's decision to detach the Shokaku for repairs, as well as Inouye's order that the Strike Group should be withdrawn. Even though he thought that both American aircraft-carriers had been destroyed, the cautious Inouye still deemed it necessary to postpone the invasion, apparently because he felt unable to protect the landing units against Allied land-based aircraft. Yamamoto did not agree with this decision and, at 2400 hours, countermanded the order, detailing Takagi to locate and annihilate the remaining American ships. But, by the time Takagi made his search to the south and east, Fletcher was out of reach.
Although the Japanese lost 43 aircraft on 8 May to the 33 lost by the Americans, the sinking of the Lexington, Neosho, and Sims far outweighed the loss of the Shoho and the various minor craft sunk at Tulagi. The Japanese had achieved a material victory but despite their losses, the Americans were able to repair the Yorktown in time for Midway less than one month later where the war decisively turned against Japan. The Coral Sea was a decisive strategic American victory. The Japanese operation to capture Port Moresby was thwarted and the Australian eastern coast was not attacked and the only serious bombing threat during the 1939-45 War to major towns on the Queensland coast was eliminated. The battle was of great significance in the development of naval warfare since, for the first time, fleets had fought one another without direct visual contact. The aircraft carrier had replaced the battleship as the backbone of the fleet.
In 1942, a seldom used track climbed from the small village of Buna on the north coast of Papua, over the Owen Stanley Ranges and on to Port Moresby. The track was fairly easy up the slopes through Gorari and Oivi to the village of Kokoda which stood on a small plateau 400 metres above sea level, flanked by mountains rising to over 2000 metres. It then climbed over steep ridges and through deep valleys to Deniki, Isurava, Kagi, Ioribaiwa, Ilolo and, at Owens' Corner, linked with a motor road leading from plantations in the hills above Port Moresby down to the coastal plains. Between Kokoda and Ilolo, the track often climbed up gradients so steep that it was heart-breaking labour for burdened men to climb even a few hundred yards. Much of the track was through dense rain forest which enclosed the narrow passage between walls of thick bush. At higher levels the terrain became moss and stunted trees which were often covered in mist. From July to November 1942 this was the setting for a bitter campaign to prevent the fall of Port Moresby.
On 23 January 1942, less than seven weeks after the Pacific War had commenced and while the struggles for Malaya and the Philippines still continued, the Japanese landed at Kavieng on New Ireland and at Rabaul on New Britain where they quickly overcame the Australian defenders. From Rabaul the Japanese had aerial coverage of the whole of the Territories of Papua and New Guinea as well as Northern Australia with Port Moresby suffering its first raid on 3 February. On 8 March, the Japanese established themselves firmly in Australian New Guinea at Lae and Salamaua. However, the Battle of the Coral Sea from 5 to 8 May averted a Japanese seaborne invasion of Port Moresby and the American success at the Battle of Midway in June not only destroyed Japan's capacity for undertaking long range offensives but also provided the Americans with the opportunity to move from the defensive to the offensive. With a seaborne attack unavailable, the Japanese, who were regularly bombing Port Moresby with twenty to thirty bombers with fighter escort, decided on the overland attack across the Owen Stanley Ranges.
The Japanese landed in the Gona area of Papua on the night of 21/22 July 1942 and had built up a force of 13,500 troops by the end of July. The first contact occurred on 24 July with a forward platoon of the Papuan Infantry Battalion at Awala, 40 kilometres inland. The platoon fell back to Gorari where they linked up the following day with the leading company of the 39th Battalion, a Victorian militia unit. The Japanese pressed on and pushed the small Australian force back through Oivi to Kokoda where the 39th Battalion's commanding officer, Lt Colonel W T Owen was killed on the night of 28/29 July. The Australian defenders were again pushed back and consolidated at Deniki. On 8 August, an attack by three companies of the 39th Battalion reached Kokoda but being unable to hold the position the battalion was again forced to fall back to Deniki. The Japanese pressed the Australians and although attacks on 9 and 10 August were beaten off, the Australian position had become isolated with food and ammunition running low. The Australian position was strongly pressed on 13 and 14 August and the decision was taken to withdraw to Isurava where the 39th Battalion was joined by the 53rd Battalion on 20 August.
Further reinforcements from Australia were already on the way. The veteran 21st Brigade which had seen service in Syria commenced loading in Brisbane on 6 August and as soon as it landed at Port Moresby was rushed into the mountains. The Brigade Commander, Brigadier A W Potts, on foot like all his men, reached Isurava on 23 August with two of his battalions strung out along the trail behind him. Although he had been assured that adequate supplies had been moved forward, Potts found a completely inadequate reserve of rations and ammunition and although the cold was severe, only 80 blankets. There were not enough native carriers to bring up sufficient supplies and air-supply was limited by the lack of landing grounds and dropping areas, by the problem of developing efficient dropping methods and most of all by the shortage of aircraft. Without adequate supplies, the entire Australian operation in the Owen Stanley was in danger of collapsing. The failure of the supply system undermined Potts' position even before he met the Japanese and caused his command to change from an offensive to defensive role.
On 26 August, the 2/14th Battalion of the 21st Brigade moved up to Isurava to relieve the 39th Battalion whose men were in a weak condition due to a lack of warm clothing, blankets, shelter and rations. Before the relief was carried out, the Japanese renewed their attack which they sustained on the Australian positions on succeeding days. The 53rd Battalion at Alola attacked towards Missima on 27 August but its leading companies had came under sharp fire and Lt-Colonel K H Ward, their commanding officer, was killed. The Japanese broke through the Australian lines on 29 August and threatened the entire 2/14th Battalion position which was only saved by a counter attack. For his gallantry during the counter attack, Private Bruce Kingsbury was posthumously award the Victoria Cross.
The position of the 2/14th remained serious and on the morning of 30 August both the 2/14th and what was left of the 39th Battalion withdrew towards Alola. The 2/14th took heavy losses that day including its commanding officer, Lt Colonel Key, the third battalion commander killed on the Kokoda Trail in just over a month. The 2/16th Battalion, which had been held in reserve, took the forward position but by 2 September the 21st Brigade had become severely depleted and the order was given to withdraw to Templeton's Crossing. By this stage, the 21st Brigade had endured nearly a week of constant fighting, during most of which time they had been unable to even brew themselves a mug of tea and had certainly received no hot meals. Shelterless, their feet pulpy and shrivelled from the constant wet, they were soaked by continuous rain. In addition to their supply problems, the evacuation of the wounded was a desperate problem with never enough carriers to move stretchers along a congested trail to the road head.
The Japanese pursued the Australians who were unable to establish strong defensive positions. Just when the supply problems seemed to have been solved, Myola, with its facilities for receiving supplies, had to be abandoned. The 2/27th Battalion took up in front of Efogi on 5 September taking the automatic weapons and equipment of the 39th Battalions. The 39th Battalion was down to 185 men and moved off for Port Moresby. The Japanese probed the 2/27th position on 7 September and attacked in strength before dawn on the 8th. The frontal attack was beaten off but the Japanese worked around the flanks to threaten Brigade headquarters and to surround the rearguard unit. On the night of 8 September the survivors of the three battalions of the 21st Brigade began to extricate themselves along a side track. By 10 September, the 2/14th and 2/16th Battalion were in position in front of Ioribaiwa as a composite unit with only 307 men. In the next few days several large parties of the 2/14th, cut off in the earlier fighting and all the remained of the 2/27th, came in, weary and starving after long marches around the flanks of the advancing Japanese.
In leaving Myola, Brigadier Potts not only lost his main supply point but was also disregarding his latest orders. His decision was later vindicated but on 12 September he was replaced by Brigadier S H Porter and did not receive another active command until the closing months of the war. Porter in taking command of the 21st Brigade brought with him reinforcements, the 3rd Battalion and the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion and was told that the 25th Brigade would soon arrive to spearhead operations to stabilise the Owen Stanley front. The 25th Brigade had left Australia on 1 September, arrived at Port Moresby on 9 September and on 13/14 September began its deployment on the main Ioribaiwa feature to which Porter had withdrawn. On 14 September, the commander of the 25th Brigade, Brigadier K W Eather took command of all troops in the forward area. That day the Japanese renewed their attack using the rugged country to their advantage. The next day, the pressure continued against the whole Australian front and the Australians continued to lose men since they were unable to dislodge the Japanese from the high ground. With the Japanese feeling the whole front and flanks and with Eather concerned about committing all his units to defensive tasks and losing any freedom of movement, he requested permission to withdrew to Imita Ridge. The decision was left to Eather who withdrew his forces in stages on 17 September. Eather was then ordered to fight out the battle on Imita Ridge.
The Australians, lacking shovels, began to dig in on Imita Ridge with bayonets and helmets but were screened by offensive patrolling which harassed the Japanese. Eather had five battalions with 2600 officers and men against an estimated 5000 Japanese troops. However, the Australians now had short supply lines and it was the Japanese whose lines of communications were extended and with the increasing allied air power were now being attacked for the first time from the air. On 22 September the 2/25th Battalion began probing towards Ioribaiwa and by 28 September the Australians were in a position to launch a full attack only to find that the Japanese had abandoned their positions and much of their equipment. The factors that had operated so adversely against the Australians at the beginning of the Owen Stanley campaign; the misty, rainy, muddy, precipitous mountains, slippery tracks and thick forests with incredibly bad supply facilities and enormous medical problems were now operating even more effectively against the Japanese. By the end of September the overland threat to Port Moresby had been removed and with the defeat of the Japanese invasion at Milne Bay and the success of the American invasion at Guadacanal the threat to Port Moresby had been removed.
In early October 1942 while the 25th Brigade followed up the Japanese, further Australian and American reinforcements were reaching New Guinea. The strategy was now to eliminate the Japanese from the north coast of Papua by retaking the villages of Buna, Gona and Sanananda. The Australians were to continue attacking along the Kokoda Trail towards the coast while the Americans were to attack towards Buna from the south west. While some American troops were flown to Pongani, 80 kilometres down the coast from Buna, other American troops set out along the track from Jaure to Buna undertaking the difficult task of marching across the Owen Stanley Ranges. On the Kokoda trail, the Australians contacted the Japanese rearguard forward of Templeton's crossing on 8 October but the rate of the Australian advance depended on the establishment of adequate dumps of air-dropped supplies and the ability of the men to carry supplies forward from those dumps. The Japanese were well dug astride the trail forward of Templeton's crossing and it was only after heavy resistance in which 50 Australians were killed and 133 wounded that Templeton's crossing was recaptured on 16 October.
On 20 October, Brigadier J E Lloyd of the 16th Brigade took command of the forward area and commenced attacking the Japanese rearguard beyond Templeton's crossing. The Japanese defended Eora Creek until 28 October when the 2/3rd Battalion outflanked the Japanese positions and routed the defenders. On 2 November, the leading battalion of the 25th Brigade re-entered Kokoda with its airstrip which would finally solve the ever present supply problem. On 5 November, the 2/2nd and 2/3rd Battalion of the 16th Brigade ran into strongly manned Japanese positions at Oivi and at nightfall in relatively open country faced a defensive position that was some five kilometres in extent. A Japanese counter-attack on 6 November was defeated and while the 16th Brigade maintained pressure on the Japanese at Oivi, the whole of the 25th Brigade moved round the southern flank to cut Japanese communications. On 9 November, the Japanese defence around Gorari was overcome and the Gorari-Ilimo track was cut trapping the Japanese at Oivi. Frantic efforts by the Japanese to break out on 10 November were unsuccessful and the Australian battalions tightened their grip. On 11 November, the Japanese abandoned the Oivi position and fled north and east through the bush where they were repeatedly strafed by Beaufighters. The 25th Brigade pursued the Japanese from the foothills of the Owen Stanley Ranges and on 13 November, the 2/31st Battalion crossed the wide, swift Kumusi River with the coast 60 kilometres away. By 17 November 1942 all seven Australian infantry battalions were over the river and the Owen Stanley Ranges campaign was over.
The four month campaign in the Owen Stanley Ranges to defend Port Moresby had ended in the complete defeat of the Japanese. The campaign had involved four Australian Brigades with twelve infantry battalions which lost 605 killed and 1015 wounded. No accurate records exist of casualties due to sickness but between two to three men were hospitalised through sickness for every battle casualty. The ground battle had been an exclusively Australian one since they did not link up with any American ground units until after the crossing of the Kumusi. The campaign had been won by Australians who shown physical endurance and courage of the highest order.
The Papuan campaign was fought in three phases. The first ended with the Japanese retreat from Milne Bay. In the second phase, the Japanese advance over the Owen Stanley Ranges to within forty miles from Port Moresby was stopped by an Australian division comprising two AIF brigades and two Militia battalions and the Japanese were then driven from the ranges. The land forces involved in the first two phases were entirely Australian. The third phase, from 20 November 1942 until 22 January 1943, saw Australian and American troops clear the Japanese beach-heads at Gona, Buna and Sanananda.
The Australians and Americans approached Gona, Buna and Sanananda from three directions. The 7th Australian Division advanced along the northern end of the Kokoda Trail with one brigade pushing towards Gona and the other towards Sanananda. From the south, along two separate routes, two regiments of the US 32nd Division advanced towards Buna. The front was 11 miles long from Gona in the north to Sanananda in the centre and a three mile strip of coast on the south stretching from Buna Village on the left to Cape Endaiadere, a promontory, on the right. Because of the swampy terrain and poor land communication the struggle for the beachheads developed into three separate battles.
The 25th Australian Brigade commanded by Brigadier Eather reached the most southerly of the Japanese defences at Gona on 18 November. The Japanese had strongly fortified their positions with well prepared bunkers, trenches and firing pits. The approaches were covered with cleared fields of fire. The Australians were resupplied from the air on 21 November and were ready to attack the next day. On 22 November and again on 23 November, the 25th Brigade, which was down to about 1000 men, attacked but was halted with 204 men killed and wounded and little to show for its losses. On 24 November Gona was bombed and strafed from the air. A much better prepared attack with artillery support on the 25 November also failed but casualties were relatively light. However, by this stage the 25th Brigade was exhausted from the heavy fighting and those sick from malaria increased each day. On 28 November it was relieved by a fresh 21st Brigade under Brigadier Dougherty.
The 21st Brigade closed in on Gona and poured a furious rain of artillery and mortar shells into the Japanese defences, assisted by heavy aerial bombardment. The 2/14th, 2/16th, 2/17th Battalions and from 3 December the 39th took part in the repeated assaults and by the night of the 9 December, victory had been achieved at Gona. The Australians buried 638 Japanese dead at Gona but had suffered 750 killed and wounded in capturing the village. Fighting continued for another week to eliminate a new threat that arose on the extreme western flank where a Japanese force had been landed to harass the Australians.
The battle for Buna was double-pointed because of the two lines of approach, one along the coast and one by a corduroy road from the south that led through swamps to Buna Village, the Government Gardens and the Buna Mission. Impenetrable swamps varying in depth with the tides lay between these two approaches for more than a mile, isolating one from the other. The US 32nd Division attacked the Buna-Cape Endaiadere positions from both flanks on 19 November but were quickly pinned down by the formidable and well hidden Japanese defences. Little progress was made in succeeding days and although some troops reached the edge of Buna village on 30 November progress was not sufficient for the US Corps Commander General Eichelberger who relieved the commander of the 32nd Division and took responsibility himself for taking Buna.
The reorganised Americans again attacked on two flanks on 5 December and although they suffered heavy casualties some progress was made on the northern flank towards Buna village. Japanese counter-attacks were beaten off and so much pressure was maintained by the Americans that the Japanese abandoned the village on the night of 13 December. The Americans entered the village on 14 December and found the Japanese gone. However Buna Mission and the Government Gardens and the area south to Cape Endaiadere was still firmly in Japanese hands. By 11 December after for three weeks of action the Americans had suffered 667 killed and wounded and had evacuated 1260 sick.
The 18th Australian Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Wootten, and a squadron of the 2/6th Australian Armoured Regiment equipped with eight American M3 tanks, fast 14-ton vehicles but only lightly armoured) were brought forward to Buna to reinforce the Americans. Artillery support in the form of eight 25-pounders, three 3.7 inch howitzers and one American 105 mm gun was also available. On 18 December the Australians attacked towards Cape Endaiadere with the Americans on their left in support. At 7 am the 2/9th Battalion, supported by seven tanks, aircraft, artillery and American mortars, advanced north through the Americans, on a front of about 600 yards and with the sea on their right. Attacking with weapons blazing, against the line of close-set Japanese bunkers they pressed on, though soon many were hit by the Japanese fire. On the right one post after another was shelled or bombed into silence and the leading men reached Cape Endaiadere. However, the left company, attacking without tanks lost more than half its eighty-seven men in an advance of only about 100 yards and was pinned down. The attack did not resume until after the arrival of three tanks in the afternoon. The shells set the dry logs in some Japanese bunkers on fire and soon the enemy began to leap out and run. In half an hour sixteen Japanese bunkers had been taken. The battalion lost 171 officers and men, about half the strength of the attacking companies. Two tanks were burnt out.
At 7 am on 20 December the 2/9th Battalion reinforced by a company of the 2/10th Battalion on the right with an American battalion on the left continued the advance. With air support and four tanks spaced among the Australian infantry they moved through the coconut plantation without great opposition and by 10 am were advancing into the bush and kunai grass clothing the marshy country beyond the plantation. The tanks bogged down and were only able to travel along the beach. The attackers came under heavy mortar and machine-gun fire. The advance ended on the general line along the Simemi Creek. On 23 December, the 2/9th Battalion again attacked to take the tongue of land between the creek and the sea, losing fifty eight men killed or wounded. In six days of hard fighting the Japanese had been cleared from east of the Simemi Creek.
The Simemi Creek was a formidable obstacle to the Australians and Americans. Tanks could not negotiate the shallows and attempts to have troops attack in the area would cost many lives. After three days of searching for a safe crossing, the 2/10th battalion found a crossing downstream and the battalion moved across on 22 December. The Japanese were bewildered that the Australians had managed to cross the creek in the area they did and abandoned the adjacent positions on 23 December. By nightfall the 2/10th held about one third of the Old Strip. The 2/10th was ordered to continue the advance along the Old Strip next day and was supported by four tanks. The attack opened at 9.30 am with the tanks spaced at intervals of fifty yards, the Australians on and astride the Old Strip and an American battalion on the left flank. Tanks and infantry advanced steadily for half an hour. Then a concealed Japanese anti-aircraft gun opened fire at short range and knocked out the four tanks in quick succession. The infantry came under heavy fire but at the end of the day some 500 to 700 yards had been gained. Little progress was made on the next two days. The companies of the 2/10th were then no stronger than platoons and the desperate Japanese frequently counter-attacked. On the evening of 29 December, the 2/10th, strengthened by a company of the 2/9th and four newly arrived tanks, attacked the area between Giropa Point and the mouth of Simemi Creek, but gained nothing. On 31 December, the 2/12th Battalion relieved the 2/9th Battalion.
While the Australians and Americans under Brigadier Wootten had been making progress on Buna's right flank the Americans under General Eichelberger had made some gains on the left flank had captured the Government gardens and had isolated Buna Mission from Giropa Point. At 8 am on 1 January 1943 two Australian battalions, the 2/10th and the 2/12th with six tanks and two American battalions continued the attack on the Japanese positions east of Giropa Point. The tanks, working with precision, rolled close to the enemy's bunkers and lashed them with fire while the infantry rushed forward and hurled charges of ammonal through the loopholes. The strong-posts when overcome were found to contain from ten to seventy bodies. At the end of the long day, few Japanese posts east of Giropa Point held out. These remaining posts were reduced on 2 January, the same day the Americans captured Buna Mission. In the final drive, the 2/12th casualties were 12 officers and 179 men out of a total strength of 615.
There were 1400 Japanese buried at Buna, 500 in the American area west of Giropa Point and 900 east of Giropa Point. The US 32nd Division sustained 1,954 casualties; 466 killed and 1508 wounded. In sixteen days the 18th Brigade had lost 55 officers and 808 men, including 22 officers and 284 others killed.
The 16th Brigade, under Brigadier Lloyd approached Sanananda which was the main Japanese base. It was later estimated that 5300 Japanese were deployed in front of Sanananda at the commencement of the coastal fighting. On 20 November, the Australian advance came under heavy artillery fire, lost heavily and was stopped. The following day the Japanese counter attacked but the Australians, although skilful and resolute in holding their positions, were unable to advance themselves. The strength of the 16th Brigade was now down to 67 officers and 974 men having suffered battle casualties of 25 officers and 536 men since starting across the Owen Stanley Ranges.
The Australians were reinforced by the 126th Regiment of the US 32nd Division which attempted to push forward on 23 November without success. By the end of the month the Sanananda situation was a stalemate. The Americans established what was known as the Huggins Road Block and in the first few days of December held the position against continuing Japanese attacks. On 6 December two militia battalions of the 30th Brigade commanded by Brigadier Porter relieved the 16th Brigade. A third attempt to push forward was made by the 49th and 53rd/55th battalions on 7 December but the attacks were repulsed with heavy losses. There was to be a lull on the Sanananda front for twelve days since it was decided to strike at Gona and Buna first before attempting to reduce the Sanananda positions.
The Japanese received some reinforcements during the battle and by mid December the Japanese force at Sanananda numbered 6,000 men including sick and wounded. On 15 December it was estimated that they were opposed by 646 Australian and 545 American infantry. Two fresh units, the 2/7th Cavalry Regiment serving as infantry and the 36th Battalion, were brought forward from Port Moresby.
At 7.22 am on 19 December the guns opened fire on the Japanese positions with the mortars joining in four minutes later. At 7.30 am the 49th and 55/53rd battalion went forward with the 36th battalion in reserve. The 49th made good progress and Brigadier Porter promptly reinforced it with a company of the 36th. At the end of the day the 49th was a few hundred yards south-east of the Huggins road-block. The 55th/53rd met strong opposition and made little progress and on 21 December the 36th Battalion attacked but lost fifty five killed and wounded and gained little ground. The 2/7th Cavalry reached the Huggins road-block on 18 December having used a supply route flanking the Japanese positions. At 6 am the next day the 2/7th Cavalry moved north towards Sanananda Point. The regiment came under heavy fire and the commanding officer, Lt-Col E P Logan was killed. A squadron with about 100 cavalrymen became separated from the rest of the unit and at nightfall set-up a perimeter about 400 yards forward of Huggins. They remained cut-off for several days until a route was found between Huggins and the isolated men. On the 23 December the main body of the 2/7th Cavalry moved out of Huggins and concentrated in the perimeter 400 yards forward of Huggins. There was still well entrenched Japanese between the 2/7th Cavalry and Huggins and between Huggins and the 30th Brigade.
The 163rd Regiment of the US 41st Division began arriving at the Sanananda front on 30 December. On 5 January 1943 the 18th Brigade moved in from Buna. The Americans took over Huggins and the 2/7th Cavalry perimeter which they name Kano and on 7 January established a third road-block on the Killerton track called Rankin. The 18th Brigade with the 2/7th Cavalry replaced the 30th Brigade south of Huggins. At 8 am on 12 January the 18th Brigade with the support of three tanks launched its attack. The tanks were quickly knocked out by anti-tank fire but the infantry fought on doggedly, killing a great many Japanese and reducing a number of enemy positions. However, the 2/12th Battalion had scarcely advanced by the end of the day and had lost 4 officers and 95 men. The Australians were bitterly disappointed at the apparent failure of the day but had misread the situation. Although there were still plenty of unreduced bunkers standing, the Japanese had had enough and on 13 January began withdrawing from the positions in front of the Australians.
The 2/10th Battalion quickly advanced through bush and swamp to Cape Killerton, meeting only isolated Japanese parties. The 2/12th Battalion reached the track behind the Japanese on 17 January and the next day took Sanananda Village. On 19 January a company of the 2/10th Battalion broke into a strong Japanese base, killing about 150 and nearly encircling the remainder. The Japanese continued to resist and on the 21st the Australians closed in and killed the 100 remaining defenders who refused to yield. In the week from 13 to 20 January 1943, the Japanese evacuated about 1,200 sick and wounded and another 1,000 escaped overland. Although there were still many resolute Japanese moving about, organised resistance in the Sanananda area had been broken by 22 January. Australians and American casualties in the Sanananda area totalled 2100 including 600 Australian and 274 American dead.
The fall of Sanananda marked the end of the Papuan campaign. Of the 20,000 Japanese landed in Papua between July 1942 and January 1943, about 7000 were evacuated by sea or escaped overland. Nearly 13,000 Japanese were killed or died of illness in the Papuan operations. In operations in Papua 2,165 Australians and 671 Americans were killed and 3,533 Australians and 2,172 Americans wounded.
The 3rd Australian Division slowly fought its was towards Salamaua in a series of exacting and grim battles from April to August 1943 in a campaign largely overshadowed by the Papuan campaign the preceded it and by the capture of Lae that followed. The Salamaua campaign was designed to screen the preparations for the Lae offensive and to act as a magnet to draw reinforcements from Lae to Salamaua. The capture of Lae, the centre of the Japanese defensive line in New Guinea, was the allied target after the defeat of the Japanese in Papua. General Sir Thomas Blamey, the Australian Commander-in-Chief, directed that Salamaua be starved out after Lae was captured.
The Japanese landed at Lae and Salamaua on 8 March 1942. The New Guinea Volunteer Rifles and survivors of the 2/22nd Battalion from Rabaul destroyed all military supplies and withdraw into the hinterland where they observed the Japanese build-up. In May, Kanga Force, which included the 2/5th Independent Company, was airlifted into Wau to operate as a guerrilla force against the Japanese in the Markham Valley. On 29 June Kanga force raided Salamaua inflicting heavy casualties and capturing the first Japanese equipment and documents taken by the Australian Army. On 31 August a strong Japanese group arrived at Mubo but with the Japanese on the offensive along the Kokoda Trail and at Milne Bay reinforcements were not available for Kanga Force until October when 2/7th Independent Company joined.
In response to the defeat in Papua, the Japanese resolved to strengthen their hold on New Guinea. In January 1943, 3000 Japanese troops set out from Mubo along winding jungle tracks to seize Wau airfield. The Victorian 17th Brigade (2/5th, 2/6th and 2/7th Battalions) was flown into Wau to repel the Japanese advance. At the height of the crisis on 30 January, Japanese shots fell on the airfield as the troops disembarked. The last Japanese offensive to gain new ground in New Guinea was stopped by the Australians but they did not have the strength to go onto the offensive. The Australian units in the Wau-Bulolo area were completely dependent on air support for reinforcements as well as supplies.
The RAAF and US Army Air Force (USAAF) also conducted offensive missions against the Japanese. In the Battle of the Bismarck Sea in early March, the RAAF and USAAF destroyed a Japanese convoy which attempted to reinforce Lae. All eight transports and four of eight escorting destroyers were sunk. Nearly 3000 Japanese were killed and only 850 troops were landed at Lae. Throughout March, the RAAF continued its air attack on the Salamaua Isthmus. On 16 March, Flight Lt William Newton of 22 Squadron, RAAF flew his Boston bomber through intense and accurate shell fire and although his aircraft was repeatedly hit, he held to his course and bombed his target from a low level. The attack resulted in the destruction of many buildings and dumps including two 40,000 gallon fuel installations. Newton managed to fly his crippled aircraft back to base and successfully land. Two days later, he again attacked Salamaua at low level but this time was shot down and captured. On 29 March he was executed by the Japanese. For his ten months operational flying but particularly for his actions on 16 March he was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The citations states that:
'Flight Lieutenant William Ellis Newton served with No. 22 Squadron, Royal Australian Air Force, in New Guinea from May 1942 to March 1943 and completed 52 operational sorties. Throughout, he displayed great courage and an iron determination to inflict the utmost damage on the enemy. His splendid offensive flying and fighting were attended with brilliant success. Disdaining evasive tactics when under the heaviest fire, he always went straight to his objective. He carried out many daring machine-gun attacks on enemy positions involving low-flying over long distances in the face of continuous fire at point-blank range. On three occasions, he dived through intense anti-aircraft fire to release his bombs on important targets on the Salamaua Isthmus. On one of these occasions, his starboard engine failed over the target, but he succeeded in flying back to an airfield 160 miles away.
When leading an attack on an objective on 16 March 1943, he dived through intense and accurate shell fire and his aircraft was hit repeatedly. Nevertheless, he held to his course and bombed his target from low level. The attack resulted in destruction of many buildings and dumps, including two 40,000 gallon fuel installations. Although his aircraft was crippled, with fuselage and wing sections torn, petrol tanks pierced, main-planes and engines seriously damaged, and one of the main tyres fiat, Flight Lieutenant Newton managed to fly back to base and make a successful landing. Despite this harassing experience, he returned next day to the same locality. His target, this time a single building, was even more difficult but he again attacked with his usual courage and resolution, flying a steady course through a barrage of fire. He scored a hit on the building but at the same moment his aircraft burst into flames.
Flight Lieutenant Newton maintained control and calmly turned his air craft away and few along the shore. He saw it as his duty to keep the aircraft in the air as long as he could so as to take his crew as far away as possible from the enemy's positions. With great skill, he brought his blazing aircraft down on the water. Two members of the crew were able to extricate themselves and were seen swimming to the shore, but the gallant pilot is missing. According to other air crews who witnessed the occurrence, his escape hatch was not opened and his dinghy was not inflated. Without regard to his own safety, he had done all that man could do to prevent his crew from falling into enemy hands. Flight Lieutenant Newton's many examples of conspicuous bravery have rarely been equalled and will serve as a shining inspiration to all who follow him.' (London Gazette: 19 October 1943)
On 23 April, the 3rd Division under command of Major-General Savige assumed control in the Wau-Bulolo area and Kanga Force ceased to exist. Savige's force originally included only the 17th Brigade and three Independent Companies (2/3rd, 2/5th and 2/7th). Savige was instructed to turn the area into an active operational zone for mobile defence. It was estimated that there were 5,500 Japanese around Lae and Salamaua with between 6,000 and 8,000 at Madang and from 9,000 to 11,000 at Wewak. Savige, who was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, decided to establish firm bases as far forward as possible and to harass the enemy with patrols. However, only small forces could be maintained in the forward area and no useful military purpose was served by attacks and raids which were not properly organised, supported by superior fire and fully driven home.
The Japanese were dug in on the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On 24 April a company of the 2/7th attacked the Pimple and Green Hill, Four aircraft strafed the Japanese position and then the company advanced in two columns supported by mortar fire, but the enemy were firmly entrenched on the precipitous feature and the Australians were halted. Next day another attack, supported by aircraft and the 1st Mountain Battery, limited to fifty rounds a gun, also failed. On 7 May a company attack was again launched against the Pimple but again it failed. On 9 May the Japanese themselves attacked in the Pimple area and surrounded the forward Australian company, which was not relieved until the afternoon of the 11th, by which time it had withstood eight attacks by parts of two Japanese battalions.
The 2/3rd Independent Company had been probing deeply and seeing that the Japanese were only lightly holding Bobdubi Ridge obtained permission to attack it. On 3 and 4 May the Japanese were pushed off part of Bobdubi Ridge and in the following days drove back Japanese moving up to retake it. From Bobdubi, the 2/3rd Independent Company was able to severely harass the Japanese with raids and ambushes. So successful were the 2/3rd Independent Company's tactics that Savige felt constrained to warn them not to attempt too much; `premature commitments in the Salamaua area could not be backed at present by an adequate force', he signalled. The pressure was kept up round Bobdubi and on 11 May a patrol found the ridge to be abandoned, quickly occupied it, and exchanged fire with the enemy on Komiatum Ridge on which the main track travelled. The Japanese reacted strongly to this threat to their communications, launching a full-scale attack supported by guns and mortars on the 14th and forced the Australians to withdraw. On 15 May, over 100 Japanese aircraft attacked the Australian positions in three heavy raids. The Japanese maintained their air attacks in the following days, but generally against targets farther to the Australian rear. On 17 and 18 May large formations of Japanese aircraft raided Wau airfield.
In late May, the 2/6th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and the 15th Brigade headquarters and another battalion of that brigade began to arrive in Savige's area. During May Australian Beaufighters and Bostons with American Mitchells attacked Madang and Lae, maintaining steady pressure on these bases. The RAAF now had three squadrons tied more or less to the Salamaua operations with four squadrons based on Milne Bay and engaged chiefly in attacks on shipping and in reconnaissance. Two Catalina flying boat squadrons based on Cairns also played a part in the operations in New Guinea by dropping mines in the enemy's harbours, making night raids and supporting coast-watchers in enemy-held territory.
Instructions were issued for an advanced base on the coast to be seized within sixty miles of Lae, this being the farthest distance landing craft could carry troops in one night. Nassau Bay was chosen and its occupation would enable the force round Mubo to be at least partly supplied by sea. In addition to the bay, the high ground around Goodview Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridge running thence to the sea were to be seized. The focus of the operations towards Salamaua were to draw the Japanese away from Lae and Salamaua was not to be assaulted until after the Lae operation. Until the Lae offensive commenced, the Japanese were to be led to believe that Salamaua was the main objective.
On 19 and 20 June there were signs that the enemy was about to anticipate the allied attack. They were patrolling aggressively; during the 20th enemy aircraft made more than eighty bombing sorties against the Australian positions. The right forward company of the 2/6th, holding its wide area towards Nassau Bay, was under sharp fire on the afternoon of the 20th. Next morning an attack in strength was dispersed; in the afternoon a stronger attack was made and soon the Australians were closely engaged. A fresh company reinforced the one under attack. At nightfall the Japanese withdrew having lost an estimated 100 men, but they renewed the attack on the 22nd and 23rd, when the beleaguered troops were heartened by the sight of Beaufighters strafing along the track. That afternoon the Japanese attacks ceased. The 150 Australians on Lababia Ridge lost eleven were killed and twelve wounded. The had been attacked by two Japanese battalions, 1,500 troops, who lost forty-one killed and 131 wounded.
The 162nd US Regiment landed at Nassau Bay on the night of the 29/30 June and next morning moved out of the bridgehead. On 1 July the easternmost company of the 2/6th Battalion advanced to the coast along the south arm of the Bitoi driving off a company of Japanese. On the morning of the third day ashore, 2 July, the main American force remained clustered round the beach, but that afternoon one company advanced to the Bitoi. Next day four 75-mm guns were landed at Nassau, a most important reinforcement, and by the 4th more than 1,400 troops were ashore. Papuan soldiers advancing along the coast ahead of the 162nd US Regiment reached Lake Salus on 9 July and then pushed on to Tambu Bay.
On the morning of 7 July the 2/6th had attacked Observation Hill and by nightfall held most of it. Next day the leading Australian company advanced a stage farther towards a creek where it was to link with the Americans from the Bitoi. On the 9th, now supported by the American field guns whereas formerly there had been only two mountain guns behind them, five Australian companies pressed on with aggressive patrols until, on the 10th, only seventy-five Japanese survived in the area, and their line of retreat was cut. On the 12 May the Pimple was occupied. On 13 May there was a general advance and on 14 May Mubo airfield and Green Hill were taken. The Japanese still stoutly defended Old Vickers where they were strongly dug in to defend the track to Salamaua and on 7 and 9 July stopped attacks by the 58th/59th Battalion.
The US III/162nd Battalion (Major Archibald B Roosevelt) was assembled at Nassau Bay by 12 July as a preliminary move to establish artillery at Tambu Bay. On the 21st the American battalion reached Tambu Bay and supplies were being unloaded there. The Americans' task was to capture Scout Ridge, overlooking the bay. Attacks on the 22nd failed and a second battalion (the US II/162nd) was sent into reinforce the attack.
On 16 July a company of the 2/5th Battalion had assaulted Mount Tambu with great dash and captured all but the main northern knoll. The Japanese counter-attacked again and again that night, supported by mortar bombs and shells from a mountain gun. A second company reached the area next morning. On the night of the 18 May the Japanese attacked and almost encircled the two Australian companies on Tambu, and next day a fierce struggle developed. By 2.30 pm, after much slaughter of the Japanese, they accepted defeat and left the Australians in possession of the southern slopes. Farther north, on 15 July, after mortar and Vickers-gun fire, two platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company attacked Ambush Knoll south of Namling, while the 58th/59th Battalion attacked towards Bobdubi in another effort to cut the Japanese communications. One platoon of the Independent Company drove the Japanese from their forward positions, the other thrust them from Orodubi, and that night the Japanese abandoned Ambush Knoll. The attack by the 58th/59th was upset, however, by Japanese counter-moves. In a renewed attack on the 17th the Independent Company again carried out its task but the 58th/59th was held up.
The establishment of the Nassau Bay base had made it possible to bring in and supply a substantial quantity of artillery. By 23 May two US field artillery battalions, two Australian field batteries, the 1st Australian Mountain Battery, the 2/6th Australian Survey Battery, and four anti-aircraft batteries were in place. On the right flank the American regiment was still making little progress. In the fourth week of July the US II/162nd battalion completed its arrival at Tambu Bay and was given the task of capturing 'Roosevelt Ridge' as it was now named. The battalion attacked and gained and held a foothold on the ridge. The Japanese were well dug in and not to be driven out by frontal attacks. Roosevelt's battalion, aided by Papuan patrols, was now employed cutting the enemy's supply route to the west.
On 28 July a flanking attack by a company of the 2/6th took a feature forward of Ambush Knoll. The same day 58th/59th Battalion supported by artillery, mortar and machine-gun fire at last took the stubborn Old Vickers position and drove the Japanese from Bobdubi Ridge. It was estimated that in the six weeks to 6 August, the 15th Brigade had killed 400 Japanese for a loss of forty-six killed and 152 wounded, an indication of the increasing tactical superiority of the attackers.
The leading battalion of the 29th Australian Brigade, the 42nd, was moved forward into the Nassau Bay area and thence marched northward and at length went into position between the Americans on the right and the 17th Brigade, of which it became part. As a preliminary to the capture of Mount Tambu the 42nd Battalion occupied Davidson Ridge between Tambu and Roosevelt Ridge. Then on 13/14 August the II/162nd Battalion took Roosevelt Ridge after a heavy artillery barrage which bared it of vegetation. The 15th Brigade's attack opened on 14 August. Twenty-nine heavy bombers accurately bombed Coconut Ridge with devastating effect, and guns, mortars and machine-guns brought down a barrage. A company of the 2/7th Battalion then attacked up a cliff so steep that the men had to crawl on hands and knees, but by early in the afternoon they had gained the North Coconuts position. On the night of the 16/17 August the Japanese abandoned South Coconuts.
The 2/6th Battalion opened its attack on Komiatum Ridge on 16 August. After about 500 shells had been fired into the Japanese positions two companies attacked and in twenty-five minutes had occupied the objective. The enemy in the Mount Tambu area were now surrounded, their routes to the north being cut on Komiatum and Davidson Ridges. It was expected that lack of rations (patrols had discovered they were delivered every three days) would cause the Japanese to attempt the break out on the third night. On 19 August patrols of the 2/5th found Goodview Junction deserted and US I/162nd Battalion occupied Tambu without opposition.
The 15th Brigade now pressed in towards the track leading to Salamaua. On 17 August after a bombardment two platoons of the 2/3rd Independent Company advanced; one occupied the junction of the Bobdubi-Salamaua track and another track from the south without opposition, but the other was held. Heavy fighting developed, the Japanese launching strong counter-attacks. On 19 August Savige ordered that every effort must be made to close the enemy's avenues of escape between Komiatum and Bobdubi Ridges. Next day the brigade attacked on a wide front, and the 58th/59th succeeded in cutting the Komiatum track in several places.
In preparation for the new offensive, Savige was instructed that his force should be so organised that by 28 August it could be maintained from the sea without air supply. From 21 August the 29th Brigade began to relieve the 17th Brigade (excluding the 2/7th Battalion attached to the 15th Brigade) which had been fighting its way through the jungle-clad tangle of mountains from Wau towards Salamaua since January. The Australians rapidly advanced towards Salamaua but Savige ordered that the Japanese were not to be pressed so hard that would cause an early evacuation of Salamaua.
On 26 August, Savige and his 3rd Division headquarters were relived by General Milford and his 5th Division headquarters. The 5th Division conducted the final operations around Salamaua which was occupied by the 42nd Battalion on 11 September, a week after the Lae offensive opened and five days before the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions entered Lae.
The 3rd Division's long winter campaign of 1943 achieved impressive strategic gains. A great part of the strength of the XVIII Japanese Army had been diverted from the areas which were to be the objectives of the offensive which could not be mounted until the spring, when veteran divisions would be rested and retrained, landing craft available, and air superiority increased. At the same time immensely valuable experience had been gained in jungle tactics and in methods of supply. For the first time Australian infantry and independent companies had worked closely together in a lengthy campaign and each had learnt from the other. Artillery had been used on a scale hitherto unattained in mountain warfare in New Guinea. Doctrines were developed which gave the Australians decisive tactical and administrative superiority over the Japanese in bush warfare. In the six months to August 1943 the strength of the XVIII Japanese Army had been depleted and dispersed while, behind the front on which the 3rd Australian Division fought, the Allied strength in the South West Pacific had greatly increased.
The Japanese thrust towards Australia had been stopped by the Australian defence of the Kokoda Trail and the defeat of the Japanese landing at Milne Bay. Organised Japanese resistance in Papua ceased in January 1943 and the Australian and American forces advanced towards Salamaua. In mid-1943, General Sir Thomas Blamey's planned a major offensive in the New Guinea area with the immediate objective of seizing the airfields in the Lae-Markham Valley area and the overall objective of driving through the corridor running along the north coast of the island of New Guinea.
The offensive was to be conducted by Lt-General Sir Edmund Herring's New Guinea Force with the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions. The Huon Peninsula had been occupied by the Japanese for quite some time and the Japanese were well dug in, Lae and the Markham-Ramu Valley were within range of Japanese air bases at Boram and in the Wewak area. The allied command did not know how many Japanese troops were in the peninsula and the Japanese were capable of sending in reinforcements.
The mountain ranges of the Huon Peninsula rose to heights nearly twice that of Mount Koscuisko. There were few beaches and those that did exist were short and narrow and backed into mangroves. The mountain tops were often covered in rain mists and the humidity was oppressive all year round. The Huon Peninsula had a very small native population and virtually no food resources. The Australians would fight in overbearing continual perspiration and dampness and the extremely heavy rains dramatically affected visibility. Prior to the Japanese invasion there had probably been about 30 cows, 500 goats and several hundred chickens in the Peninsula. The insects and pests were abundant and there was little opportunity for the troops to give too much attention to personal hygiene. There was no shelter from the rain and the area above the tree line was covered with moss. The foothills mostly ran down to the sea and at times were engorged by the rain and turned into rivers flowing at fifteen knots. Behind the coastal hills were cliffs and gorges, with thin approaches strangled by scrub. Grass grew up to fifteen feet high and bamboo presented its own problems. Roads did not exist but there was a network of tracks and paths.
The 9th Division was commanded by Major-General George Wootten. It had behind it a record of great distinction in the Middle East, culminating in the actions at El Alamein. The Huon Peninsula would be its first jungle campaign. The 7th Division was commanded by Major-General George Vasey, and it had fought at Tobruk and in Syria. It was well-seasoned in jungle warfare having fought in the Owen Stanley and Buna-Gona campaigns. The 9th Division's plan was to capture Lae from the east while the 7th Division was to advance from Nadzab in the Markham Valley. After taking Lae and having acquired a main foothold, the two divisions were to surround the Peninsula, the 7th moving down the Markham-Ramu Valley on the west and the 9th proceeding along the Finschhafen coast until it linked up with the Markham Valley force. Once the Huon country was surrounded, any remaining Japanese troops could be dealt with relatively easily. The 7th Division was to be airlifted over the Owen Stanley's and land about 19 miles from Lae at Nadzab on the opposite side of that town from the landing place of the 9th Division. It was to become the first Australian division to be flown into battle.
Before the major offensive was to start, attempts were made to lull the Japanese into believing that Salamaua was the Australian objective. In effect, the intention was to persuade the Japanese that the Australians were fighting the decisive battle for Huon on the Salamaua front, and to have the Japanese denude the Lae area of its defensive strength while Lae was attacked and captured. This was achieved by constant attacks on Japanese outposts by troops who were operating from Wau in the Salamaua hinterland. Their skirmishes forced the Japanese to constantly transfer troops from Lae to Salamaua.
At 6.30 am on 4 September 1943, a short naval bombardment preceded the landing of the 9th Division's 20th Brigade on Red and Yellow Beaches. Both beaches were of firm black sand and about twenty yards wide. There was no opposition on the beaches and it was not until the fifth wave was landing that Japanese aircraft appeared. The 26th Brigade followed the 20th Brigade. The 2/17th Battalion (20th Brigade) and the 2/23rd and 2/24th Battalions (26th Brigade) commenced the advance towards Lae. The 24th Brigade disembarked at Red Beach on the night of 5 September.
On the morning of 5 September, 24 hours after the 9th Division landed on the beaches, the largest air armada seen in the South Pacific dropped 1720 men of the US 503rd Paratroop Infantry Regiment into Nadzab. Also dropped by parachute were 36 men of the 2/4th Australian Field Regiment with a field guns. The 2/6th Field Company meanwhile had built a footbridge across the Markham River and across this bridge poured the men of the aerodrome constructive company to begin work on the Nadzab airstrips. On 7 September, the first two brigades of the 7th Division, over 250 aircraft loads, were flown to Nadzab with its third brigade following a week later.
While the 9th Division moved west along the shore of Huon Gulf, the 7th Division struck south-east along the bank of the broad Markham River. The two divisions would converge at Lae. With the 24th Brigade carrying out a parallel movement inland, the 9th Division crossed the Burep River and faced the rushing waters of the Busu. Swollen by tropical downpours, the river presented a difficult barrier. It became clear that engineers, even under covering fire, could not build a bridge across the river without bringing up heavy equipment. A daylight frontal assault was led by the 2/28th Battalion, on 9 September, and after ferocious fighting, the Australians dug in on the Japanese side of the Busu. On 11 September, the 7th Division's 25th Brigade drove 200 Japanese from their trenches in Jensen's plantation and killed 33 of them. It was a fierce clash at a range of 15 metres with the 2/24th Field Regiment providing close artillery support. Having crushed many counter-attacks, the 25th Brigade engaged the Japanese force at Heath plantation which left 312 Japanese dead.
Lae was pounded from the air and from the 25 pounders of the approaching Australian divisions. On 16 September the 7th and 9th Divisions entered Lae and found the Japanese there weakened from lack of food and short of ammunition. The Japanese in falling back towards Lae had abandoned position after position. Never had the Japanese been pushed back so swiftly. However, the 9th Division lost 77 killed and the 7th Division 38 killed in the advance towards Lae.
With Lae in Australian hands, new tasks confronted the 7th and 9th Divisions. The Japanese line of withdrawal was along a track leading north, west from Lae via Bumbu and Boana and on up to the Rai coast. The main Japanese force was by now many days ahead in the mountainous country to the north and this force was to be hunted down by the converging thrusts of both divisions. The 7th planned to push through the Markham and Ramu valleys and the 9th intended to move along the coast to Finschhafen.
Kaiapit was 45 air-miles north-west of Nadzab and a Japanese force, equivalent to a brigade, moved down the valley in a last-ditch attempt to retake Nadzab. The 2/6th Australian Commando Squadron and B Company Papuan Infantry Battalion arrived at Kaiapit just before the leading elements of the Japanese force. The Japanese fanned out but was quickly routed and they withdrew up the Markham Valley to Dumpu. On 29 September 1943 the Australians entered the Ramu Valley. With Gusap in their hands, the Australians had a valuable advanced airfield and Dumpu was occupied without opposition on 4 October 1943.
Meanwhile, units of the 9th Division were pushing along the coast in their bid for Finschhafen. The 20th Brigade, which had been first ashore at Red Beach on 4 September, fought their way ashore at Scarlet Beach before dawn on 22 September. Scarlet Beach, six miles north of Finschhafen, consisted of a narrow sandy beach about 900 yards long and about 40 feet wide. Japanese fire came from well-constructed bunkers on the fringe of the jungle, causing casualties to the troops both in the landing craft and as they waded ashore.
The advance towards Finschhafen continued on the following day. Japanese defences barred the way with heavy bunker defences behind thickets of barbed wire near the mouth of the Bumi River. Wading the river under fire, the 2/15th Battalion forced a crossing on 24 September. A grim struggle for Kakakog, a commanding crest, marked the opening of the final drive. Having crossed the Bumi River, the 2/15th Battalion was confronted by a sheer cliff face and a wild tangle of jungle. Experienced Japanese marines defended the cliff top, behind machine guns in solidly sandbagged positions. This slope had to be climbed, on occasions with the Australians on their hands and knees. They had to use tomahawks and machetes and haul their way up using hanging vines and branches. Under continuous Japanese fire, the Australians gained the crest. They stormed the gun positions and fought the Japanese with bayonets and grenades. Kakakog was deserted by the Japanese on 2 October. The 2/17th advanced and reached Finschhafen late that afternoon and there it linked up with the 22nd Battalion of the 4th Brigade which had fought its way up the coast from Hopoi. By the next day Australian troops were in control of Finschhafen and all anchorages from Lae to Scarlet Beach.
As the 20th Brigade advanced on Finschhafen, which was taken on 2 October, the Japanese withdrew their forces from the area south of the Mape River via an inland track to Sattelberg. In early October, the Japanese at Sattelberg, estimated at 4700 men, posed a threat to the Australian supply lines between Scarlet Beach and Finschhafen. Substantial reinforcements on the coast indicated that the Japanese was preparing to attempt to recapture Finschhafen. Australian patrols designed to contain the Japanese around Sattelberg resulted in fierce clashes. On 16 October the Japanese launched a major counter-attack. The 2/17th Battalion at Jivevaneng were hit hard, and there was hand-to-hand combat at Scarlet Beach when the Japanese landed troops from barges. The Japanese attempted to establish a wedge between the 20th and 24th Brigades at a point near the mouth of Siki Creek. Heavy fighting continued for some days until the Japanese were forced to withdraw in the face of greater Australian fire-power and reinforcements from the 26th Brigade.
The defeat of the Japanese counter-attack paved the way for an assault on Sattelberg. The attack commenced on 17 November supported by strong air and artillery fire. The Australians pushed steadily forward, dislodging the Japanese from bamboo thickets and deep, concealed dug-outs. High above the climbing Australians was a strong force of Japanese and it was tough, uphill slogging on rain-drenched tracks. The Australians resisted two counter-attacks and by dark on 24 November were within 150 yards of the crest. Attacking from the east, south and south-east, three Australian battalions routed the Japanese garrison on Sattelberg peak at 9 am on 25 November. The capture of Sattelberg ended a sustained eight days attack through a well developed Japanese defensive scheme. For his gallantry in the final assault, Sergeant Tom Derrick was awarded the Victoria Cross. The citation for the award stated that:
'On 24 November 1943 a company of an Australian infantry battalion was ordered to outflank a strong enemy position sited on a precipitous cliff-face and then to attack a feature 150 yards from the township of Sattelberg. Sergeant Derrick was in command of his platoon of the company. Due to the nature of the country, the only possible approach to the town lay through an open kunai patch situated directly beneath the top of the cliffs. Over a period of two hours many attempts were made by our troops to clamber up the slopes to their objective, but on each occasion the enemy prevented success with intense machine-gun fire and grenades. Shortly before last light it appeared that it would be impossible to reach the objective or even to hold the ground already occupied and the company was ordered to retire. On receipt of this order, Sergeant Derrick, displaying dogged tenacity, requested one last attempt to reach the objective. His request was granted. Moving ahead of his forward section he personally destroyed, with grenades, an enemy post which had been holding up this section. He then ordered his second section around on the right flank. This section came under heavy fire from light machine-guns and grenades from six enemy posts. Without regard for personal safety he clambered forward well ahead of the leading men of the section and hurled grenade after grenade, so completely demoralising the enemy that they fled leaving weapons and grenades. By this action alone the company was able to gain its first foothold on the precipitous ground.
Not content with the work already done he returned to the first section, and together with the third section of his platoon advanced to deal with three of the remaining posts in the area. On four separate occasions he dashed forward and threw grenades at a range of six to eight yards until these positions were finally silenced. In all, Sergeant Derrick had reduced ten enemy posts. From the vital ground he had captured the remainder of the Battalion moved on to capture Sattelberg the following morning. Undoubtedly Sergeant Derrick's fine leadership and refusal to admit defeat in the face of a seemingly impossible situation resulted in the capture of Sattelberg. His outstanding gallantry, thoroughness and devotion to duty were an inspiration not only to his platoon and company, but to the whole battalion.' (London Gazette: 23 March 1944.)
After sixty-five days, the Japanese had been thoroughly defeated in the Finschhafen area and what was left of their forces retreated northward. While the 9th Division was pursuing the Japanese along the coast, the 7th Division was, on the other side of the Finisterre Range, preparing for an assault on Shaggy Ridge which would open the way to the sea and join up with the coastal drive at Bogadjim. Rising sharply against the skyline, Shaggy Ridge was a knife-edged mountain range broken by three conical outcrops. Of these, the most important tactically was known as The Pimple and it was a rocky pinnacle sprouting perpendicularly from the main mountain spur. Strong posts and foxholes made it a formidable fortress within which two other conical outcrops, a few hundred yards away, became known as Intermediate Snipers' Pimple and Green Snipers' Pimple.
On the morning of 27 December 1943 before the infantry attack, about 3500 25 pounder shells were fired at Shaggy Ridge. A squadron of Australian Boomerangs and American manned Kittyhawks bombed and strafed every Japanese strongpost. Men of the 2/16th Battalion (21st Brigade) began the ascent and crawled over loose shale along a track so narrow that it afforded barely enough room for two men to move abreast. The Japanese was fought hand to hand and from dug-out to dugout. The Australian attack was halted near the summit of The Pimple where a strong Japanese pillbox barred their approach. The next day the pillbox was blasted by high explosives supplied by the engineers and by the morning of 28 December the Japanese had been thrust from The Pimple but still held the northern half of Shaggy Ridge. In early January 1944, the 15th and 18th Brigades relieved the 21st and 25th Brigades. Following air and artillery support the 18th Brigade attacked on the morning of 20 January. The 2/12th Battalion moved up the steep ridge to assault Prothero I and, after close-range grenade duels, the 2/9th Battalion captured Green Snipers' Pimple. Fighting continued all night on the thickly wooded slopes and several counter-attacks failed to budge the 2/9th Battalion. The Japanese made a desperate attempt to escape from Shaggy Ridge but the escape bid failed in face of the steady fire of the dug-in Australians.
The capture of Shaggy Ridge completely eliminated Japanese domination of the Ramu Valley. The link up of Australian troops with American troops at Saidor on 10 February 1944 marked the end of the five month Huon Peninsula campaign. With the Huon Peninsula firmly in Australian hands the Americans began to assume an increasing role in the fighting in New Guinea. The 7th and 9th Division were withdrawn to Australia where after a well deserved rest they began preparations for the final campaigns in 1945.
About the time the 7th Division was driving the Japanese from the Shaggy Ridge area, the 5th Division, was taking over from 9th Division at Sio the pursuit of the enemy along the coast. The experienced leader of the Fifth was Major General A H Ramsay, who had commanded the artillery of the 9th Division in the Middle East.
Up to this time the formation had not operated as a complete division. Elements of the division had gained battle experience in New Guinea in the action at Milne Bay in August 1942. In those early days the 7th Brigade, led by Brigadier J Field under command of the Eleventh Australian Division, played its part in the rout of the Japanese forces in that area. For the most part the men were raw troops, though their officers included several with experience in the Middle East. They acquitted themselves well. Other units of the division were blooded exactly one year later when the 29th Brigade participated in the Australian American action which drove the Japanese from Salamaua. On 20 January 1944, 5th Division with the 8th Brigade leading, began its advance up the coast from Sio on the heels the disorganised enemy believed to be making for the safety of his main base at Wewak. This difficult journey through rugged barely penetrable country called for the maximum of endurance, stamina and determination on the part of every officer and soldier of the division. Once more the wild and inhospitable terrain of New Guinea, now commonplace with the veteran soldier campaigning on the island, was to prove the major obstacle to the drive westward of Australian force. From Sio to Saidor, where on the 2 January 1944, American forces had established a perimeter defence, the country consisted of a narrow coastal belt extending inland no more than a mile in its widest part, and intersected with numerous rivers and swamps. A natural obstacle to heavily equipped Australian troops, the treacherous lip of land disappeared beneath the feet of rugged unmapped mountains, rearing up to heights of between 4000 and 6000 feet. When the division began its move, the "north-west" season had just begun. Aerial reconnaissance disclosed that all the rivers: swollen by torrential downpours, were in full flood. Tracks, the very few of them, were impassable to any form of wheeled traffic. The vital task of pushing forward the formation's supplies confronted the divisional commander. So it was decided to place under command for the purpose of the advance a company of American barges. This decision brought new problems in its train. Pilots of reconnaissance aircraft flying over the area reported that sheltered beach heads for barge landings along the proposed route were not plentiful. It was agreed finally that the advance should be made in a series of bounds--each designed to carry troops forward to secure beachheads. In this way a constant flow of supplies would be provided. That this plan did not always work was due to the vagaries of weather now notorious for unpredictability rather than to any breakdown in organisation. Major resistance from the Japanese was not expected. The primary object of the task set the 5th Division was to endeavour to maintain contact with the enemy, harrying and accelerating his retreat and allowing him no time to halt and consolidate defensive positions. Australian troops could look with confidence to full support from the air. The aggressive policy of smashing Japanese bases and airfields which formed so important a part of the general co ordinated plan of attack was bringing rich rewards as Australian forces pushed onward. Concentrated bombing had deprived the enemy of airstrips at Nadzab and Lae, and his army air arm was a pale shadow of a once powerful weapon.
On 21 January 1944, the 4th Battalion relieved the 2/17th Battalion. Three days later, supported by a troop of the 2/14th Field Regiment, and engineers of the 8th Field Company, the battalion and its attached troops began its long march. The men of the 4th Battalion were inexperienced in battle. This inexperience combined with the sheer difficulty of natural obstacles caused an initial delay of three days when they reached the Kwama River, which, swollen to almost double its width and crocodile-infested, had, somehow, to be crossed. Valuable time was lost in probing channels which might lead across the barrier. Finally, strong swimmers, dragging a tow-wire with them, battled their way to the far side, and hauled in their wire to which a rope had been attached. The rope was secured to trees on either side of the rapid Kwama, and so the remainder of the force crossed, clinging tenaciously to the slender thread which alone prevented their being swept away by the rushing waters. The battalion was quick to learn by this experience, and from this point on it maintained a rate of progress so rapid that the supply column found difficulty in keeping up with the forward troops. It was a miserable journey. Incessant rain pelted through the vegetation creating a morass underfoot. Some times, when they halted for the night, the men would find themselves literally floating out of their blankets. Heavy seas too were pounding the coastline and the supply barges, struggling to maintain supplies for the advancing land columns, were frequently unable to breast the beaches to land their precious supplies. Reserve stores had to be used, and, at one period, when supplies could not get through, the men were on reduced rations. This imposed added strain on troops who were at times struggling through mud that was waist-high.
During the move the unit signals performed yeoman service, maintaining contact with the rear at all times. They were the means of relieving the difficult supply position when they transmitted a request for the dropping of airborne supplies. The efficiency of air transport of army supplies was amply demonstrated here. There was an immediate response to an appeal for supplies from the air, and eighty-two per cent of all supplies dropped were recovered. Giant air transports dropped food, tobacco and copies of Guinea Gold. If anything, this little newspaper was more eagerly sought than rations. To troops practically marooned in the thick of the jungle swamps this link with news of the outside world came almost as tidings from another planet. So far slight contact only, mainly with stragglers, had been made with the enemy, but Japanese dead were numerous--all of them striking evidence of malnutrition and sickness. On 3 February the battalion was relieved at Malasanga by the 30th Battalion, also facing its first campaign. The 30th Battalion experienced the same conditions as its predecessor. It too was forced by bitter, heart-breaking circumstances to learn that only in the jungle can the soldier learn the real difficulties of jungle fighting. For the next stage of the advance, planning was similar, and called for a series of daily bounds designed to permit relief of the 30th Battalion by the 35th Battalion at the Yupna River. This was designed to provide all battalions with experience in actual operations. But a number of factors, not the least of which was the continued heavy weather, made it impracticable to carry out the relief and the 30th Battalion was ordered to continue the advance. For ten days the battalion ploughed through mud, rain, and thick undergrowth, the troops hacking their way through in a rapid advance. In their ninety-mile trek the advancing Australians crossed no fewer than sixty flooded streams. One, the Urawa River, was more than a hundred yards wide, and several men were swept nearly a mile downstream before they managed to struggle to the opposite bank. Sickness now began to take toll of the battalion's strength, and three men were lost from cerebral malaria. Others were suffering from dengue and all were weak with fatigue. Continuing its fast advance the battalion pushed on, and on 10 February made contact with American forces at the Yaut River. Despite its three days' delay at the Kwama River the brigade had arrived at the rendezvous on the appointed day. No pitched battle was fought, but the total enemy losses during the advance from the 24 January to the 3 February were 1291, of whom 300 were killed in running fights and the remainder found dead along the track. Many of the Japanese had been dead for some time. After contact had been made with the American forces at the Yaut River the 8th Brigade paused to rest the men. Then the 35th Battalion, relieving the 30th Battalion, continued patrolling the country inland from Weber Point. Japanese were known to have escaped into the hills, having bypassed the Americans at Saidor, and the 35th Battalion split into companies, and, assisted by a company of the Papuan Infantry Battalion, deployed into the mountains to comb out these stragglers. "A" Company of the 35th Battalion moved round in the direction of Gabutamon while "D" Company was assigned the task of completing the pincers through Ruange and Tapen. Members of the PIB. were attached to each company and their bush craft and native instinct proved invaluable; on several occasions Australian troops were saved from ambush by their uncanny knack of sensing the whereabouts of the Japanese. Inland from Weber Point the country is as rugged and precipitous as anywhere in New Guinea. But unlike most mountainous country the ranges are a poor watershed. This caused hardship for Australian patrols. There were no streams in the vicinity and once they were forced to boil muddy water from bomb craters to quench their thirst. Finally it was found necessary to supply the patrols with water transported from the coast--a journey of seven hours up and along a mountain footpad. At this time it was impossible to find enough native labourers to do the work, the natives having "gone bush" with the advent of the Japanese. So members of "C" Company became carriers and carried the water to their mates in the hills. Each man's pack was emptied to carry a two-gallon can. Each morning they began the long climb up from the river. Fortunately it was possible, some days later, to recruit sufficient natives for the job, but mean while the troops of "C" Company performed a back-breaking task. It was on these patrols that the only "pitched" battle was fought with the enemy. At Tapen, in a fifty-minute engagement, Australians wiped out 103 Japanese. One member of "D" Company, creased by a bullet from an enemy sniper, killing fourteen Japanese with his Bren. Tapen is 4500 feet above sea-level and the troops who had jettisoned weight, including their blankets, when the climb began, found the cold so intense that they were using mosquito-nets as covers for such extra warmth as they would give. During this time "A" Company, patrolling in the Gabutamon area had accounted for seventy Japanese, and when the patrols finally returned to their base camp on the coast, they had killed 467 of the enemy. Another 795 Japanese were found dead, and twenty-our prisoners of war were taken. The area had been cleared of the enemy. The arrival of the Fifth at Saidor marked the end of the first phase of its pursuit of the Japanese, an operation successfully carried out to schedule. But it was not without cost. Within a fort night of the completion of the operation more than thirty per cent of the troops were evacuated to hospital suffering mainly from malaria, dengue, and skin complaints.
On 8 April 1944, the 11th Division had assumed command from 7th Division of all units in the Ramu Valley. The headquarters of the 11th Division had just been established at Dumpu, detachments of the headquarters having been flown in from the former site at Dobodura. Elements of the 11th Division, Milne Force as it was then known, had taken a major part in the fighting in August 1942 when the Japanese were decisively defeated at Milne Bay. The GOC at that time was Major General C A Clowes. In January 1943, the division transferred to Moresby, remaining until July when it left Ward's Drome to fly to Dobodura, where it remained until the move to Dumpu. On 12 September 1943, the 11th Division came under command of Major-General A J Boase.
The aggressive patrolling which had been Australian policy in the Ramu Valley went on, and patrols from the 15th Brigade thrust forward along the Bogadjim road. Reports received at this time indicated that the enemy was thickening his outpost-line to a radius approximately five miles south-west and south-east of Bogadjim. These positions covered all tracks into Bogadjim south of the Gori River. One of Australian patrols pushed between enemy defensive positions, reaching a point half a mile from Bogadjim village without meeting any enemy. This lack of depth to his defences, coupled with native and other reports of activity in Erima Plantation, probably directed at shifting dumps of stores behind Madang, suggested that this movement would soon be complete. Natives from Bogadjim encountered about this time were found to be wearing Japanese clothing and equipment. They declared that there were no Japanese in Bogadjim, but many in Erima Plantation, a statement which was accepted with reservations.
On 13 April one platoon of the divisional carrier company was flown from Gusap to Kaiapit, then ferried by five Piper Cub aircraft to Wantoat to investigate reports of the presence of the enemy in the immediate vicinity. In a sharp clash next day the carrier company engaged approximately twenty Japanese. The enemy fled leaving four killed. One Australian was wounded. Further patrols were sent out to investigate a native report that large numbers of the enemy were in the fertile cultivated land at the headwaters of the Wantoat and Ikwap rivers. The patrol returned to Wantoat on 15 April to report that a small body of Japanese was moving north. Later the patrol captured four prisoners. Meanwhile patrols from the 57th/60th and 58th/59th Battalions were active over a wide area, on either side of and along the Bogadjim Road. Contact was made with the Americans at Sungum and communications established. New enemy positions were located at Rereo, Redu, Wenga and a village 1000 yards north-north east of Alibu One. One patrol, avoiding the enemy positions one mile south of Kaliko, reached the coastal track just east of Kaliko, and observed a small party of enemy approaching from the direction of Bonggu. Another patrol, using a devious route to the enemy position south of Kaliko, drew fire and then withdrew. On the return journey an enemy ambush 800 yards south of the position was observed and bypassed. It was evident that the speed of the advance of units of the 15th Brigade up the Bogadjim Road from Bridge Six had interfered with the enemy's evacuation of the area between the Kabenau and Mindjim rivers. Some, at least, of the rearguard troops from this area were taken out by barge from the vicinity of Kaliko, a course which could not have been over attractive to the enemy, because of fear of attack by aircraft and patrol torpedo boats. Reports also indicated that the enemy was reluctant to use the coast route for withdrawal from the Erima-Amele area. Instead he used a track from Amele to Rambu to Amron. Routine patrols from the 57th/60th Battalion entered Bogadjim on 17 April to find an American patrol examining gun-positions in the abandoned enemy beach defences. Routine patrols were, at this stage, operating throughout the Bogadjim area. On 22 April patrols of the 57th/60th Battalion discovered six six-wheeled ammunition trucks, and fifty cases of ammunition at Balama, while between the Palpa and Gori rivers sixteen trucks, wrecked by Allied strafing, were located.
On 23 April approximately 450 troops of 8th Brigade landed at Bogadjim and amalgamated with a patrol from the 15th Brigade, thus uniting coastal forces of the 5th Division and inland forces of the 11th Division. Extensive patrolling continued throughout the Bogadjim area, each successive patrol getting nearer and nearer to Madang. No enemy opposition had been encountered north of Bogadjim. All eyes were now focused on Madang. On 25 April a patrol of the 57/60th Battalion, with one platoon from the 30th Battalion, entered and occupied Madang. South of Madang resistance came from a small rear party of Japanese equipped with automatic weapons and one horse-drawn mountain-gun. Australian patrol engaged the enemy, forcing him to withdraw. The mountain-gun, because of insufficient depression, was ineffective, the shells whistling harmlessly over the heads of the advancing Australian troops. On entering Madang the patrol found abandoned dumps of ordnance and signals stores and equipment, as well as a hospital and its medical equipment. Evidence of the eagerness of the Japanese to escape is shown in the fact that in the advance from Bogadjim to Madang only two were encountered. These were taken prisoner. Madang had been well plastered by Australian aircraft and showed every sign of a hasty departure. Australian bombing had been, if any thing, too good, and rather defeated Australian purpose as the aerodrome was unserviceable for Australian own aircraft. On 27 April the 15th Brigade began to move, its headquarters and some units travelling by air to Saidor, and other groups on foot to Bogadjim. The air moves were completed by 3 May, and on that day the brigade passed from the command of the 11th Division to the 5th Division. Advice was received from New Guinea Force on 15 May that the Ramu Valley was to be cleared of Australian units with the exception of 11th Division Carrier Company, which was to move from Gusap to Dumpu. The 11th Division was to move to Wau, which it did, via Lae, four days later.
The 5th Division forged along the coast, the 8th and 15th Brigades proceeding to Madang, the intention being to give the battle-weary 15th Brigade a well-earned rest if conditions permitted. The 30th Battalion continued up the coast in the direction of Alexishafen. From Madang to Alexishafen the road had been well mined by the retreating Japanese, resulting in casualties to Australian troops. The battalion entered Alexishafen on 26 April, and here again was evidence of the enemy's singleness of thought--escape. Again great quantities of stores, much undamaged was left behind. Here, too, for the first time in New Guinea, the Japanese had adopted a policy of deliberate destruction of airstrips by blowing craters with unexpended aerial bombs. By the capture of Madang and Alexishafen the Australians had possession of two first-class, deep, well-sheltered harbours.
Without pause pursuit of the enemy continued, the 35th Battalion moving rapidly up the coast. On 2 June a landing was made by the 37th/52nd Battalion on Kar Kar Island and, from information received from Chinese found there, it was learned that the Japanese had left some time in March. This further strengthened the earlier belief that after the fall of Finschhafen the enemy had no idea but to retreat to his foxhole at Wewak. On 12 June patrols of the 35th Battalion reached Hansa Bay and this, with patrols probing forward as far as the Sepik River, completed the second and final phase of the advance. At Hansa the enemy had abandoned stores equal in quantity to any material captured in the New Guinea campaign. With the landing of American forces at Aitape, and with Australian forces grouped as a bulwark to the east, the fate of the starved and weakened Japanese garrison in Wewak was sealed, despite a desperate attempt to fight its way out.
Late in 1944 Australian forces began relieving American garrisons in Australian New Guinea, New Britain and Bougainville (all of which now form part of Papua New Guinea). General Headquarters moved from Brisbane, and the Commander-in-Chief Australian Military Forces (General Sir Thomas Blamey) moved his Advanced Land Headquarters to Hollandia, and later to Morotai, to control the operations of all Australian forces in the South West Pacific Area.
General Blamey directed that all operations by Australian forces in Papua New Guinea would be under command of HQ First Australian Army, commanded by Lt-General V A H Sturdee, located at Lae. First Army comprised the 6th Division in the Aitape-Wewak area, 8th Brigade in the Madang area which later moved to Wewak, 5th Division (later replaced by 11th Division) in New Britain, and II Corps (including 3rd Division and 11th and 23rd Brigades) in Bougainville and adjacent islands. Under direct command of GHQ was Lt-General Sir L Morshead's I Corps (7th and 9th Divisions) which was to be involved in operations in Borneo from May 1945.
The American forces which landed at Torokina, in Empress Augusta Bay, on 1 November 1943 established a shallow beachhead inside which three airstrips were constructed. This provided air bases only 200 miles from Rabaul which at that time was the principal Japanese base in the South-west Pacific area. Relieving troops pushed out the perimeter a little more, and at certain points outposts were manned beyond the boundaries to deny vital ground to the Japanese. The island had not been an objective in itself; it was merely a stepping stone for the northward advance of the Allies. The American operational role was therefore strictly limited. After the crushing repulses of two large-scale counterattacks the Japanese commander withdrew his forces and concentrated them in three main areas--Buka Passage in the north, Numa Numa and Kieta in the east, and the Buin-Mosigetta plains in the south.
The two American divisions were gradually withdrawn for operations in the Philippines; and by the time the first of them--the 37th --had quitted Bougainville the Australian campaign was under way.
When the Australians, under Lt General S G Savige, Commander of the II Corps, assumed responsibility in November/December 1944, the main Japanese force was known to be concentrated in the south. From there the Japanese 17th Army Group controlled all Japanese forces on Bougainville and the outer islands.
With the relief of the Americans the campaign developed into three separate drives, controlled and co-ordinated by II Corps. In the north it was planned that the Japanese should be forced into the narrow Bonis Peninsula and contained there. In the centre the seizure of Pearl Ridge would give command of the east-west trails and protection against any repetition of the vicious counter-attacks launched against the Americans in March 1944. At the same time it would open the way for a future drive to the east coast. The decisive battle, however, would occur in the south where the bulk of the Japanese force was located.
Under the command of General Savige were five Australian infantry brigades--the 7th, 15th and 29th (comprising the 3rd Division) and the 11th and 23rd, the last named brigade being disposed as garrison troops on the islands of Emirau, Green and Treasury and at Munda in New Georgia. The 3rd Division was commanded by Major-General W Bridgeford. Air support came from the American First Marine Air Wing, the RAAF and the RNZAF.
The first operational role undertaken by the Australians fell to the 2/8th Cavalry Commando Squadron which, took over the routine weekly patrol to Cape Moltke on 7 November 1944. On 23 November, the 9th Battalion (7th Brigade) took over from the Americans in the Doiabie area, some eight to eleven miles inland along the Numa Numa trail. This placed the Australian troops in typical ridge country. The role of the battalion was to exert continual pressure on the Japanese and to make local advances towards Pearl Ridge, the commanding high ground in the area. Possession of this feature, with a force at Sisivie on the left flank, would give the Australians control of the only inland approach to Torokina.
The Australian force at Sisivie remained static except for the usual patrolling. The advance to Pearl Ridge stemmed from the important Piaterapaia Ridge which rose out of the Doiabie River valley. This was the logical point for any forward movement as along it ran part of the Numa Numa trail leading from Torokina to the Japanese base at Numa Numa on the east coast. It was on Piaterapaia that the 9th Battalion struck the first blow of the Australian campaign. On 29 November a platoon of D Company moved across the fifty yards between their position on George Hill to attack the Japanese on the next knoll, Little George. In an hour's sharp fighting they took the position.
This success was followed by another on 18 December when "C" Company of the battalion, in a company attack, stormed the important Artillery Ridge--the next high feature before Pearl Ridge. The Japanese were present in considerable strength. The once dense tree and secondary growth had been blasted away over a long period by the concentrated fire of American 155 mm. guns back in the Laruma River valley. With the binding vegetation gone, the shelling started landslides which made the already precarious slopes more difficult to traverse.
The only line of approach was along a single track on either side of which the ridge fell sheer away. The start line, where the ridge splayed out, was reached without opposition owing to the effective neutralising fire of the artillery, mortars, and medium machine guns. As the ascent proceeded, the support lifted. The loose soil on the slopes gave scant foothold on the flanks and the attackers floundered and scrambled, rather than climbed. Three Vickers on neighbouring ridges kept firing until the last minute.
With the Australians only ten yards away the Japanese jumped from their pillboxes to man open weapon pits running along the entire rim of the knoll. Because of the steepness of the slope the attacking force could not bring fire to bear; north of could the Japanese to any extent, without exposing themselves. The action quickly developed into a grenade battle. A hail of grenades rained down as the two platoons clambered to the summit. The attackers worked in twos and threes, with Owen guns and grenades. Selecting a weapon pit the Owen gunners heaved themselves over the rim and poured in fire while The other man moved in and threw grenades. It was intense, bitter fighting. The new phosphorus grenades were used, their smoke blanketing the pillboxes while the infantry closed in for the kill. After nearly an hour's fighting the position was Australians. Japanese killed during the attack numbered thirty-five; and about twenty unburied and partly buried bodies were found. Australian losses were five killed and ten wounded.
In the southern sector it was planned to make an early advance from Australian forward positions at the Jaba River against the main Japanese concentrations in the south. But it was necessary first to find out where the Japanese were located and in what strength they were. To do this it was decided to push down the coast towards the Japanese roadhead at Mawaraka and at the same time extend inland to test the Japanese strength along the few existing tracks leading to the south. Troops of the 15th Battalion (29th Brigade) had taken over the Jaba River line from the American division. On the northern bank of the river they faced the Japanese on the other side.
On 19 December the 29th Brigade commander (Brigadier R. F. Monaghan) pushed his troops across the Jaba without opposition and made a landing from three barges some 4000 yards down the coast. It was the first move of the campaign proper. The coastal drive to Mawaraka was on. At the end on 1944, the Australians began to meet well equipped infantry who had evidently moved up from the south. The spearhead of Australian advance was provided by the 15th Battalion with the 42nd and 47th Battalions pushing inland to establish firm bases on the south bank of the Jaba.
The country there was flat, with thick jungle, swamps, and a multitude of small streams criss-crossed by native pads. In the New Year the characteristic Japanese tactics of infiltration, ambush and attack came to the fore and the fighting began in earnest. Twenty-five-pounders came in as support but the flat nature of the country prevented the setting up of observation posts, and most of the shooting was done by forward observation officers working with infantry patrols.
On 7 January the 61st Battalion (7th Brigade) relieved the 47th Battalion on the Jaba so that it could take the lead in the brigade advance. At the Adele River Australian troops came within range of Japanese artillery for the first time. On l2 January, preceded by an air strike, the 47th Battalion seized the mouth of the Hupai River and a log-crossing 800 yards inland. The brigade now began patrolling and consolidating, and patrols pushed forward to a sunken barge a few hundred yards north of Mawaraka. The 42nd Battalion took over and by 18 January Mawaraka was occupied without opposition but heavy fighting took place before the Japanese were cleared from the Pallisade area along the road towards Mosigetta. The following day the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion pushed round Gazelle Harbour, turned Motupena Point, and overcame an Japanese observation and listening post. The door was open for the drive inland.
While the resistance in the southern sector was increasing daily, although without sign of the formation of any general defensive line, the Australians turned once more to the inland sector about Doiabie. On the 30 December 1944, all four rifle companies of the 25th Battalion (7th Brigade) which had taken over from the 9th Battalion converged on Pearl Ridge, the focal point. Two companies attacked from Artillery Ridge on the right flank, one in the centre, and the fourth to the rear to sit astride the Japanese line of communication with Numa Numa.
Japanese fire pinned down the forward company advancing along Artillery Ridge. The men dug in and reorganised. The following day the main attack developed from the left and by mid-afternoon the Japanese had been cleared. Five days later the 11th Brigade (under Brigadier Stevenson) took over the central and northern sectors and 26th Battalion took over the line.
With the fall of Mawaraka the next step was to clear the way to the Puriata. The task fell to 7th Brigade (under Brigadier J Field) and on 23 January the 29th Brigade was relieved. The first move was an inland thrust to secure Mosigetta and drive the Japanese from the area. On 25 January Twen Force, comprising "C" and "D" Companies of 61st Battalion, pushed inland along the Pagana River in the direction of Kupon. Farther inland the commandos were denying the Japanese the track system running through Mosina, Nigitan, and Sisiruai. The 9th Battalion left Mawaraka next day and struck east towards Mosigetta along the south bank of the Hupai.
Within a fortnight 61st Battalion had penetrated Nigitan and Mosina, and turned south towards the 9th Battalion objective. Seven days down the track from Mosina saw the 61st poised near Mievo, a few hundred yards north of Mosigetta. Meanwhile along the Mawaraka-Mosigetta Road the going had not been easy for the 9th Battalion. Feeling a way through jungle swamps often shoulder-deep, pinned down in the mud, sleeping in water, and hampered by a supply line kept open only by the sweat of the native carriers and by the tractor towed jeep trains, they broke into Mosigetta on 16 January, half an hour ahead of the force moving down from Kupon.
On 24 January, the 25th Battalion relieved the 47th on the Tavera River. The same day a platoon from "D" Company landed at Motupena Point and set off down the coast towards Toko. By 3 February the platoon had closed to within half a mile of Toko and established itself on a lagoon. That day another platoon landed from a barge and the force, carrying the sandbar at the point of the bayonet, swept into the area which was to become the base for divisional operations in southern Bougainville.
From Toko a reputedly "jeepable" track ran inland a few hundred yards above the Puriata in the direction of Darara on the No. I Government Road to Buin. This road was a continuation of the track south from Kupon through Mosigetta to Darara and on to the main Puriata ford. An eastward move from Toko towards Darara would close the river crossing, cutting the escape route of the Japanese retreating before the two battalions reorganising at Mosigetta for the Darara drive.
On the 10 February "D" Company was ordered to take Darara. At first the push was one of platoon strength; two others remaining at Toko to assist unloading through the heavy surf. It was not until the arrival of "A" Company and a platoon of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion that the position improved and the whole company got under way. It was a nerve-racking job. Twice the force was ambushed and attacked, and once while split into groups the Japanese swept in between. All the way the men had had to cut their own jeep track and on 23 February "A" Company pushed through and drove the Japanese from Darara. Patrols reached the Puriata and sealed the southern fords. The Japanese moved inland to escape across the northern fords, falling to the commandos in twos and threes. The way had been cleared for a shortened line of communication. Within a fortnight 7th Brigade established headquarters at Toko.
More and more air dropping came to the fore. At Piva strip, Torokina, the men of the Air Maintenance Platoon worked late into the night stowing the para-packs and free-drop rations. To maintain the road between Torokina and Toko engineers struggled against floods and a pounding surf which gnawed away at the coastline, washing out the road and breaking through the swamps. With Toko-Darara in Australian hands Brigadier Field prepared to cross the Puriata. On 25 February 9th Battalion was withdrawn for a well-earned rest at Motupena Point. From Mosigetta the 61st Battalion fought its way south-east, crossed the Puriata, and by 15 March was established in the Horinui region, threatening the approaches to No. 2 Government Road.
Early in January, 11th Brigade in the northern sector established a base at Amun and moved on towards Puto. The capture of Pearl Ridge in the central sector, the appearance of bulldozers, and the progress of Australian supply road led the Japanese to expect an eastern drive to Numa Numa. Natives from Teop on the Japanese -held north-east coast reported the evacuation of troops from the important northern bases of Ratsua and Pora Pora down the coast to Numa Numa. These reports and the fact that 11th Brigade had reached Puto without opposition suggested that the Japanese intended to evacuate the north entirely. However, by the middle of the month, the 31st/51st Battalion, between Puto and the Genga River, struck a hard crust of Japanese resistance.
In a series of sharp engagements the Japanese were driven north on to Tsimba Ridge to, the Amphitheatre, a curved knoll where the mountains pushed the coastal track into a narrow bottleneck against the sea. Here the ground, rising some sixty feet, runs inland over two hundred yards to a feature known as the Pimple. Before the ridge lay a native garden, behind was swampland. The Japanese had constructed 300 yards of defensive positions with fire lanes covering every approach. Despite artillery concentrations from guns of the 4th Field Regiment, the Japanese delayed the Australian advance for three grim weeks. On 23 January the Australians brought up a mountain gun and ripped away at the ridge. The Japanese replied by shelling Australian forward troops. The fighting was intensified and two days later, after a wide flank move, we succeeded in establishing a force on the northern bank of the Genga River. For nearly two weeks this force held out in the face of repeated counter-attacks. On the 6 February, under an artillery barrage and vicious fire from Japanese guns, the Amphitheatre was forced and the way opened to Matchin Bay.
In the last week of February the 31st/51st Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion, fresh from the central sector, and the next day contact was resumed. By 1 March forward elements were on the Compton River. The primary objective of the battalion was to clear the Japanese from Soraken Peninsula which protruded northward some two miles into Matchin Bay.
On 3 March an urgent message from a Corsair pilot patrolling the Ruri Bay area brought eight more planes roaring north from the Piva strip. After fifteen months of concealment, Japanese medium tanks had appeared! Heading across the Bonis Peninsula they were spotted on the road to Soraken plantation. By accurate bombing with thousand-pounders three tanks were destroyed and there were twenty Japanese killed in the strafing. In a matter of hours the tanks would have menaced Australian forward troops. A potential threat to the Australian flank was posed by Japanese artillery from the offshore islands of Saposa and Taiof.
On the night of 5 March "A" Company of the 26th Battalion embarked on the first of a series of amphibious operations which were to culminate in the crushing of Japanese resistance on the Soraken Peninsula. Troops went ashore on Saposa Island and within two days it was cleared. On 10 March they withdrew, leaving behind an infantry protected artillery observation post. The same night, farther to the north, native police cleared the Japanese from Taiof. The threat to the flank disappeared.
In the meantime the 31st/51st Battalion attacking up the coast had squeezed the main force into the defensive positions between the sea and where the Compton River turned parallel to it. Under a withering fire "D" Company attacked the centre, gained some ground and dug in. The 25-pounders of 4th Field Regiment settled down to blast the Japanese who withdrew on the night of 16/17 March. Meanwhile "A" Company again went ashore unopposed, this time near the base of the plantation. The following day contact was made with "C" Company which had pushed in from the south. The Compton River was crossed and the Japanese line of communication cut.
On 4 March in the southern sector fire from mortars and medium machine guns supported "A" Company of the 25th Battalion to breach the Puriata at Galvin's Crossing and to establish themselves two hundred yards south along the main road to Buin. At noon the following day the Japanese shelled the area and the battalion suffered its first artillery casualty Pte Slater, after whom the knoll was named. For several days "A" Company attempted to move down the road without success. It was decided to send "B" and "C" Companies across the river on the right flank to establish firm bases in gardens around Old Tokinot. Such a move would cut the Buin Road in the rear of the Japanese and secure the Hatai track junction for a possible move up the track to link with the 61st Battalion in the Horinui region. At the same time, "A" Company would, within two days, clear the road and contact the outflanking companies near the junction. "B" and "C" Companies crossed the river and gained their objectives on the second day.
Experience at Tavera River, and along the track from Toko, had shown the Japanese policy to be comprised of sporadic small-party attacks, evacuation under artillery pressure, and a general attitude of "a live soldier is better than a dead one". With this in mind "A" Company struck out for the Hatai track to receive the first indication that the Japanese 6th Division, under Major-General Kanda, had swung over to the attack.
While in the north in the first two weeks of March the Japanese were being forced back on the Compton River, he seized the initiative in the south and gathered momentum for the drive which culminated in the attacks of Easter week.
North of Galvin's Crossing a patrol reported a four-days-old bivouac area estimated to have held eighty Japanese troops. A jeep was ambushed. The Japanese refused to budge under shelling. This had not happened before. On 15 March "A" Company fought its way across Kero Creek and with "D" Company in the rear held off three counter-attacks and a fourth the following day. It was now apparent that the road was solidly blocked. Though patrols from "B" Company at Tokinot had reached "A" Company a permanent line of communication could not be maintained. The time had come to make a determined thrust down the road. "A" Company on the east and "D" Company on the west were to move down the axis and contact a force moving up from "B" Company. After fierce fighting contact was made on the 19th. "A" Company went into a perimeter defence and "B" Company, turning about, made back for its firm base.
Within sight of the junction the force bumped into Japanese of unknown strength on the east of the road. The company commander went in to attack. The force, in patrol formation, was without bayonets, but they were borrowed from "D" Company platoons which were brought in behind. The Japanese were in a deep defensive position, crescent-shaped. Attacking with bayonet, rifle, Bren and grenade, the first row was cleared and the Japanese were forced to retire from the second to the third before halting the Australians. It was then too late in the afternoon to increase the scale of attack, and although skirmishing continued for the next two days it was not until the 22 March, after an Auster pilot had dropped an area sketch and the position had been plastered by artillery and air, that "A" Company cleared the position. In this attack Corporal Rattey won the Victoria Cross. The citation states:
'In the South-West Pacific, on 22 March 1945 a company of the 25th Australian Infantry Battalion was ordered to capture a strongly held enemy position astride Buin Road, South Bougainville. The attack was met by extremely heavy fire from advanced enemy bunkers, slit trenches and foxholes sited on strong ground and all forward movement was stopped with casualties mounting rapidly among our troops. Corporal Rattey quickly appreciated that the serious situation delaying the advance could only be averted by silencing enemy fire from automatic weapons in bunkers, which dominated all the lines of approach by our troops. He calculated that a forward move by his section would be halted by fire with heavy casualties and he determined that a bold rush by himself alone would surprise the enemy and offered the best chance for success. With amazing courage he rushed forward firing his Bren gun from the hip into the openings under the head cover of three forward bunkers. This completely neutralised enemy fire from these positions. On gaining the nearest bunker he hurled a grenade among the garrison, which completely silenced further enemy aggressive action. Corporal Rattey was now without grenades but without hesitation he raced back to his section under extremely heavy fire and obtained grenades with which he again rushed the remaining bunkers and effectively silenced all opposition by killing seven of the enemy garrison. This led to the flight of the remaining enemy troops, which enabled his Company to continue its advance.
A little later the advance of his Company was again held up by a heavy machine-gun firing across the front. Without hesitation Corporal Rattey rushed the gun and silenced it with fire from his Bren gun used from his hip. When one had been killed and another wounded, the remainder of the enemy gun-crew broke and fled. The machine-gun and 2,000 rounds of ammunition were captured and the Company again continued its advance, and gained its objective, which was consolidated. The serious situation was turned into a brilliant success, entirely by the courage, cool planning and stern determination of Corporal Rattey. His bravery was an incentive to the entire Company, who fought with inspiration derived from the gallantry of Corporal Rattey, despite the stubborn opposition to which they were subjected.' (London Gazette: 26 July 1945.)
The following week the Japanese began to reconnoitre all the approaches to the Puriata. Jeeps were ambushed. Rear echelons and a gun position were raided. After diversionary attacks on Australian positions along the Puriata the first blow fell on "B" Company of 25th Battalion, dug in hard against Anderson's Junction, the corner of the Buin Road and the track to Hatai. The night before Good Friday booby-traps were exploded about the "A" Company perimeter, some two hundred yards in the rear. The next morning the water patrol south to Dawe Creek was fired on and a patrol of twelve went out to investigate. This patrol was still away when the attack broke, and after several attempts to regain its perimeter was eventually ordered to "A" Company. Thirty-one remained in the "B" Company pits.
Towards the middle of the morning sixteen Japanese approached up the Buin Road. The first three were killed by the corner Bren-gunner. The remainder jumped into old Japanese pits on the south-west side of the road. Half an hour later a shower of grenades poured in from both sides of the junction. The Japanese opened up with everything. There were four attacks that morning; each one was pepped up in intensity. For the fourth the Japanese fixed bayonets and made an abortive banzai charge.
Reduced to twenty-eight and with ammunition low the defenders fell back on the "A" Company perimeter with the Japanese hard on their heels. The Vickers stopped the rush and the men, piling into the communication trenches, began to dig in furiously. That afternoon the Japanese again staged four attacks but all were repulsed. At night the Japanese set up the abandoned "B" Company mortars, and by tapping Australian wires managed to range on "D" Company which they plastered until morning. Night attacks continued on the encircled companies whose combined strength totalled eighty-three. Later estimates placed the attacking force at 550. All lines to battalion headquarters were cut.
At 9 am on Thursday and again on Good Friday advance tanks of "B" Squadron 2/4th Armoured Regiment went ashore at Toko from LCTs. On Thursday night Brigadier Field ordered the tanks to the Puriata. The following morning engineers of the 15th Field Company closed the three-ton truck bridge at Combes Crossing to traffic, and by 2.30 pm had a "tankable" bridge across the ditch. The tanks were delayed fifteen minutes. But the Puriata had flooded and although the level had fallen on Friday it was too high to ford the Matildas. The crews got to work and in half the time prescribed had waterproofed their vehicles. By 4.45 pm they were ready to cross. The first tank bogged and had to be abandoned. The other three crossed with the aid of a bulldozer, and moved on to 25th Battalion behind Slater's Knoll.
Next morning the tanks, escorted by infantry, engineers, and a bulldozer, set off for the invested companies. After surmounting all kinds of heart-breaking difficulties the track began to improve and the force pushed forward. In the perimeter the hard-pressed troops heard the engines roaring above the firing. Churning down the road the Matildas went in. Near the road the Japanese broke, and sweeping into the open, were mown down by the infantry. Moving closer in, the tanks' guns blew open the fox-holes and flayed the area with automatic fire while the infantry moved their wounded to the road. Here the force split, one tank escorting the wounded back towards Slater's Knoll, the others advancing with "B" Company to its old position to recover the heavy equipment. The force turned back and reached the other tank in time to beat off an attack on the wounded at a point where, earlier that afternoon, a jeep train had been ambushed. Too late to move farther, the men sheltered in the gutter along the road with the tanks drawn into the centre. The night passed quietly. The following day the weary companies returned to settle about the knoll, "C" Company withdrawing across the river from Old Tokinot to the Darara track.
The Japanese had shown his hand. Barbed wire was rushed from Toko and a further supply air-dropped. Above battalion headquarters "B" Company set about digging in on the knoll. Down the west bank to the south "D" Company went into the perimeter with "A". They did not have long to wait. At 5 am on 5 April the Japanese struck in force. Slater's Knoll, split left of centre by the Buin Road, is hard against the west bank of the Puriata bend. Approaching from the south, or Japanese side, the terrain descends to gully and rises quickly some thirty feet to a plateau approximately the size of two tennis courts. At the rear of the knoll the country drops abruptly to almost water-level; here battalion headquarters was established.
Striking in from the west a diversionary force hit battalion headquarters behind the knoll. It was quickly hurled back as the main attack developed. For an hour and twenty minutes the Japanese swept up in waves. Forcing the centre, he came within four yards of the forward pits. The company held firm. The troops, determined not to let the Japanese come any closer, fired standing upright in their pits. A small party attempting to cross the river were shot climbing the bank. Twenty-five-pounders joined in and by first light the sting had gone from the assault. The Japanese, pinned down along the wire, could be heard digging in the gully. An Japanese mortar opened close in, to be silenced by a Pita. All morning mortar bombs and grenades crossed and criss-crossed the wire. Sporadic attacks were broken up and the wounded were cleared away.
Below at headquarters the Japanese had long broken contact. A little after midday two Matildas moved through the cutting and the men of "B" Company came out to mop up. Small Japanese parties broke cover and were cut down. Japanese dead lay in heaps along the wire; they were found in an area two hundred yards square. The Puriata line was held. Farther inland after wide patrolling, the 9th Battalion (which had relieved 61st Battalion in the Horinui area) moved towards Rumiki and by 27 April was established on the next water barrier, the Hongorai, near the northern ford. After four months of fighting the weary 7th Brigade was relieved, and from 13 April the 15th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier H H Hammer, was set the task of clearing to the Hari. The initial step was to secure Anderson's Junction. With Matildas in support the 24th Battalion pushed down the road to Dawe Creek, and by 17 May the junction was in Australian hands. The advance moved on towards Shindou River and the 58th/59th Battalion sent patrols along the Hatai track to contact the 9th Battalion in the Rumiki area.
Fresh to Bougainville, the 2/11th Field Regiment came in with "U" Heavy Battery to strengthen the artillery support already being given by the 2nd Field Regiment. The 24th Battalion then began a series of tank-supported company leaps down the Buin Road and by the 7 May was established on the west bank of the Hongorai River at the Buin Road ford. The advance was forced against positions which had to be blasted by artillery, tanks and Corsairs of the RNZAF. Japanese 75 mm. guns appeared as anti-tank weapons, usually manned by suicide crews. Land mines, booby-traps and shells buried nose-uppermost were also planted along the tracks. When these proved ineffective an unsuccessful banzai attack was made on "D" Company of the 24th Battalion.
Meanwhile in the Rumiki area 57th/60th Battalion had relieved the 9th Battalion and was deploying west of the Hongorai on the axis of Commando Road. All battalions had been most active in their patrols and the area between Commando Road in the north and for several miles south of the Buin Road had been made untenable by the Japanese. Thus he was forced to concentrate his troops along the two main tracks. This was greatly to Australian advantage for they now became excellent targets for Australian planes and artillery.
Towards the end of May the 15th Brigade prepared to strike for the Hari River down the axis of the Buin Road and down Commando Road simultaneously. The Japanese had every intention of holding the Hari, but threatened with a bold wide outflanking movement on the northern axis by 57th/60th Battalion, continually battered by Australian artillery and planes, and unbalanced by a series of outflanking moves along the main: road, by the 24th and 58th/59th Battalions, his defences collapsed and a spectacular advance took Australian forces across the Hari to the Ogorata to within striking distance of the Mobiai.
On 13 May a company from the 24th Battalion crossed to the east bank of the Hongorai and dug in near the ford. The 15th Brigade decided to hold the Japanese at the ford and create a diversion north of the junction of the Hongorai and Pororei rivers while at the same time the 24th and 58th/59th Battalions were to cross the river south of the Buin Road and attempt to come in behind the main Japanese defences which dominated the ford. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th Battalion would continue the advance down Commando Road and link up with the battalions advancing along the Buin Road. On 17 May the 57th/60th Battalion began its advance after an air attack by thirty-two aircraft and preceded by successive artillery concentrations. After some resistance the Japanese withdrew to the south.
The forward company settled down and the rear advanced through it to Huda River. Another force, completing a wide outflanking move, came in from the north to attack a strong position astride the road about half a mile south-east of the Huda. The Japanese resisted fiercely and the position was occupied only after a fierce fight. A third force moving to cut the line of retreat broke through to the Torobiru, completing an advance of 3700 yards in one day. Two days later, the battalion, entrenched along the river, threw out a company to within 500 yards of the Uso-Oso junction and Winchester junction. Another patrol moving back cleared Tiger track to the Hongorai.
In the meantime, on the Buin Road, the company of 24th Battalion across the Hongorai on the main road was confronted with a strong force dug in on Egan's Ridge. Against the ridge Corsairs of the RNZAF. mounted an eight-day attack which put 381 aircraft over the area. The Japanese were led to expect a frontal assault down the road and an outflanking move to the north via Martin's crossing, but under cover of the intense air and artillery attacks on Egan's Ridge, a bulldozer cleared a secret track to Mayberry's crossing south of the river junction. The Japanese failed to discover the presence of the track, the noise of the 'dozer working being covered by the air and artillery bombardments. On the 20th the 24th Battalion with a troop of tanks crossed the river north of Mayberry's crossing and advanced north-east to cut the Buin Road on either side of the Pororei ford. Next day the 58th/59th Battalion with two troops of tanks crossed the river at Mayberry's crossing, and, advancing over difficult country against determined opposition, reached Aitara track to cut the road on the Japanese side of the Pororei. "B" Company settled down at the Aitara junction and an armoured force moved back along the Buin Road to contact "A" Company of 24th Battalion at the Pororei ford. En route the point tank opened up on the Japanese position and when the infantry went in they found a 7S-mm. gun sighted in the direction of Egan's Ridge. The Japanese had been taken in the rear. In the meantime, another armoured force in the 24th Battalion area cleared back towards the Hongorai, and after a preliminary bombardment "C" Company, which had crossed at the ford, moved up to the ridge. In a two-days' sweep the Hongorai and Pororei had been crossed, the track cleared to Rusei, and the southern end of Hammer Road secured.
In the north the 57th/60th Battalion had cleared the Uso-Oso track junction and the lateral link was opened when patrols from 24th and 58th/59th Battalions contacted 57th/60th Battalion near Winchester junction. The opening of this lateral link increased the effectiveness of the force pushing along the Commando Road. Medical evacuation was reduced by eight hours and it was now possible to supply the 57th/60th Battalion from the main artery. Further, it enabled tanks to move up in support for the drive on the Tai Tai gardens.
Around Tai Tai the Japanese had some 3000 acres under cultivation. On 2 June the 57th/60th Battalion took the first step in its capture. Employing the same tactics of direct approach and flank attack the force swept down on the Tai Tai track junction and on 10 June came out below Amio.
On the Buin Road the 58th/59th was jabbing for the Mamagota junction. Subject to daily attacks and a host of obstacles including mines, booby-traps, tank ditches, and rough terrain, the troops gained a position west of the Tomoi. For the first time in the campaign the bridge-laying Scissors tank was employed. On the 3 June the Tomoi was crossed and the battalion moved to within I500 yards of Mamagota junction. Two days later it was in Australian hands, and by the end of the week the northern and southern forces had made contact. The brigade poised before the Hari.
With prisoners reporting 1500 Japanese dug in east of the Han, supporting arms began plastering known positions. As at the Hongorai River another encircling move was planned with a frontal assault along the road by 58th/59th Battalion. From the north the 57th/60th was to go through the jungle to the east and south in a wide arc to cut the Japanese line of retreat on the east of the Ogorata River near Rusei. Farther still to the north, an armoured patrol known as Scott Force was to thrust along Commando Road in the direction of Kingori as north flank protection.
The frontal assault met tenacious resistance from strong Japanese rearguards and the advance was halted. "A" Company, after clearing many mines and booby-traps, crossed the Peperu, but struck the Japanese on an escarpment and came under heavy fire. A 'dozer, trying to clear a path, might have had to be abandoned if it were not for the covering artillery support during which a tank retrieved it. Towards dusk the company pushed up and occupied the ridge temporarily evacuated by the Japanese. Both "B" and "D" Companies struck trouble. Although "B" Company broke through on the following day to the main Hari ford no further progress could be made. So, on the 7 June the 58th/59th Battalion was occupying the west bank of the Hari river from the ford northwards to Hari No. 3, and was opposed by the Japanese in strong positions along the east bank.
The companies settled down to patrolling and a new plan was evolved. This aimed at pushing Pike Force ("A" and "C" Companies) across the river near Pepib with the object of descending on the road at Hari No. I. "B" Company would then move through and open the road. Finally "D" Company, with tanks, would cut the axis between Pike Force and the ford. The attack fell as planned. The fords were subjected to bombardment from artillery, mortars and planes, while the 24th Battalion and tanks were sent south across the river--a move calculated to delude the Japanese into thinking that the Hongorai crossing was about to be repeated. Pike force cut the road without sighting a single Japanese. "D" Company forced the steep bank at Hari No. 3, and, cutting the road, moved back to trap the Japanese at the main ford. "B" Company crossed the river, linked with "D" and the battalion moved through to consolidate on the Ogorata. The entire operation lasted three days. The Hari had been crossed.
Simultaneously in the north 57th/60th Battalion cut a path through unmapped territory east towards the Ogorata. At 8 am on the second day the force struck Barret's track and a two-hour fight with the Japanese ensued. Troops were deployed to hold the lateral tracks and while the fighting was hottest the main body crossed into the jungle on the far side, moved 500 yards farther east and wheeled to the south. Farther to the north Scott Force had been ordered to slow down in order not to warn the Japanese of the move. The force turned down Barret's track with orders to find the 57th/60th communication wires and rejoin.
Brushes with the Japanese continued and on the night of 13 June the weary battalion settled down to sleep in the water, the ground being too boggy for digging in. In thirteen days the force had moved 13000 yards, and the next day the road was cut without opposition east of Rusei.
By 16 June the two battalions had linked on the road, with the 24th Battalion moving up in rear. Stores came down the road and the 57th/60th, supported by tanks and 2/11th Field Regiment, prepared to thrust for the Mobiai.
Late in the afternoon "B" Company set off. Four hundred yards from the start point the leading tank, tracking round a corner, received three direct hits from a 150-mm. gun. The Japanese then began shelling the road. The company reorganised and struck at the high ground on the left, only to be forced back. All night artillery and mortars pounded the defences across the depression. Next day the bulldozer broke down, and while it was being repaired patrols combed the area. A two company right flank encirclement got under way after the usual air bombardment. Without much opposition it cut the road behind the defence position. The following day the advance continued under heavy Japanese mortar fire. On the 23 June "A" Company of the 57th/60th dug in on the Mobiai.
Meanwhile, far to the north above Musakaka, and near the commandos at Morokia-mori, a self-contained force known as Atkinson Force had been patrolling across the Mobiai and Mivo. Operating since 7 June, in country thick with Japanese, the force continued to supply valuable information of Japanese movement on the outer flank. "C” Company of the 24th Battalion (Grahame Force) was five days late relieving them, due to continual Japanese attacks. In the last prolonged attack "C" Company, down to its last grenades, was ready to retire when the "sky train" came over and dropped ammunition into the perimeter.
The 58th/59th Battalion relieved the 57th/60th which returned to Rusei. The following day engineers threw a tank crossing over the Mobiai and cut a path to Killen's track. On 28 June the force moved forward to an assembly area, and the next day under a lifting barrage, the road was cut and cleared east and west. By the last day of the month the troops were on the Mivo River, and the relief of the 15th Brigade by the 29th Brigade began.
As soon as the relief had taken place the Japanese made several determined attack s across the river. In the north, on Killen's track, the 47th Battalion repulsed four vigorous attacks, and, on the Buin track just west of the Mivo ford, the 15th Battalion defeated three more.
From the time the 29th Brigade under Brigadier Simpson took over, the story of south Bougainville was one of constant struggle against waterlogged tracks and supply difficulty. From 11 July until early August very heavy rains restricted activities. By the 22nd all rivers were in flood, the Mivo rising to seven feet at the ford and flowing between twelve and fourteen knots. During July twenty-six days were wet and 2193 points of rain fell. Both sides settled down to deep offensive patrolling, with the Japanese pushing a strong force back into the Tai Tai garden area to harass Australian lines of communication.
Meanwhile in the northern Bougainville, the 26th Battalion, following the Compton River defeat of the Japanese, quickly cleared the Soraken Peninsula. In April the 23rd Brigade, which had been in the outer islands, took over on the central sector, enabling the 11th Brigade to move a second battalion forward in the north. The 55th/53rd Battalion sent one company over a rough track along the mountains to close in on Pora Pora while the rest of the battalion pushed along the axis of the coastal track, encountering strong Japanese opposition at first. Finally the Japanese withdrew and Pora Pora was occupied on 3 May. One company then moved west and seized Ratsua jetty. By 11 May the road junction at Ruri Bay was secured and the Japanese were contained within the Bonis Peninsula by a line of defended localities between Ratsua and Ruri Bay. On 19 May 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion and on the 3 June the 31st/51st Battalion came forward from Torokina to assist in strengthening the line across the base of the peninsula.
The Japanese were holding Buoi plantation in strength and in an attempt to outflank it by movement from the sea one company from the 31st/51st Battalion landed at Porton plantation at 4 am on the 8 June. Unfortunately the second wave of landing craft stuck fast on the reef about seventy-five yards offshore. The landing party penetrated into the plantation but immediately met withering fire from Japanese machine guns fired at close range. At the same time machine-gun fire was directed from the northern foreshores on to the stranded landing craft, preventing the unloading of stores and ammunition. Patrols inland were unable to make head way against the heavy fire of the now reinforced Japanese who next surrounded the perimeter and heavily attacked it from the north and east simultaneously. Forward observation officers brought down heavy supporting fire from Australian artillery, many of the shells falling as close as twenty-five yards in front of the defending troops. During the night further attempts were made to land ammunition and supplies on the beach, but all night long the shore was swept with murderous Japanese fire and the stranded barges were continuously the target for intensive bursts from machine guns. The troops manning the small perimeter were attacked many times, but they gallantly resisted all Japanese attempts to break their line. Ammunition was quickly running out and it was decided to withdraw the force the next night but, after a night spent in repulsing counter-attacks, a very heavy attack early in the morning penetrated the perimeter and forced a withdrawal to near the beach. The withdrawal was now more urgent and the vessels of the 42nd Landing Craft Company were sent in to run the gauntlet in daylight of increased Japanese fire. They succeeded in withdrawing sixty of the garrison. During the night further attempts were made to take off the remainder but only partial success was achieved. On 10 June under cover of a heavy bombing attack and a continuous artillery barrage, craft made the beach in the late afternoon and during that night the withdrawal was completed. The Japanese strength had been greater than was anticipated, and they were able to reinforce the threatened area quickly. In the many vicious attacks on the perimeter the Japanese suffered heavily from the fire of Australians fighting one of the toughest defensive actions of the campaign. The 23rd Brigade,under Brigadier A. W Potts) began the relief of 11th Brigade on 23 June and 11th Brigade moved back to Torokina for a well-earned rest. Following the Porton operation the Japanese became very aggressive and ambushed the Australian supply routes. In southern Bougainville the time was fast approaching when the Japanese would be forced to fight the decisive battle and every opportunity was being taken to build up supplies and to rest troops in preparation for this. Little help could therefore be given to reinforce our troops in the north to protect their supply lines and it was decided to withdraw the 8th and 27th Battalions to an area near Ratsua, where supply problems would be more easily met and where patrols, operating from these bases, would effectively prevent the free movement of Japanese troops in or out of the Bonis Peninsula. The last series of actions in which Australians were engaged on Bougainville were fought by the 8th Battalion, operating in the northern section with the object of sealing off the enemy in the Bonis Peninsula area. On the afternoon of 24 July two platoons attacked Base 5 after a bombardment in which 900 shells and mortar bombs were fired. The advancing troops reached the first ridge without difficulty, but then ran into heavy fire from well-camouflaged bunkers. At this point Private Frank John Partridge of the 8th Battalion on his own initiative single handedly assaulted the Japanese positions. The citation for the Victoria Cross awarded to Private Partridge states:
'On 24 July 1945 two fighting patrols, 8th Australian Infantry Battalion, were given the task of eliminating an enemy outpost in Bougainville which denied any forward movement by our troops. The preliminary artillery concentration caused the enemy bunkers to be screened by a litter of felled banana plants, and from these well concealed positions to their front and left the patrols came under extremely fierce machine-gun, grenade ' and rifle fire. The forward section at once suffered casualties and was pinned down together with two other sections. Private Partridge was a rifleman in a section which, in carrying out an encircling movement immediately came under heavy medium machine-gun fire. He was hit twice in the left arm and again in the left thigh, while the Bren gunner was killed and two others seriously wounded, leaving only the section leader unwounded, but ~ another soldier began to move up from another position.
Private Partridge quickly appreciated the extreme gravity of the situation and decided that the only possible solution was personal action by himself. Despite wounds and with complete disregard to his own safety, Private Partridge rushed forward under a terrific burst of enemy fire and retrieved the Bren gun from alongside the dead gunner, when he challenged the enemy to come out and fight. He handed the Bren gun to the newly arrived man to provide covering fire while he rushed this bunker, into which he threw a grenade and silenced the medium machine-gun. Under cover of the grenade burst, he dived into the bunker and, in a fierce hand-to-hand fight, he killed the only living occupant with his knife. Private Partridge then cleared the enemy dead from the entrance to the bunker and attacked another bunker in the rear; but weakness from loss of blood compelled him to halt, when he shouted to his section commander that he was unable to continue. With the way clear by the silencing of the enemy medium machine-gun by Private Partridge, the Platoon moved forward and established a defensive perimeter in the vicinity of the spot where Private Partridge lay wounded. Heavy enemy medium machine-gun and rifle fire both direct and enfilade from other bunkers soon created an untenable situation for the Platoon, which withdrew under its own covering fire. Despite his wounds and weakness due to loss of blood Private Partridge joined in this fight and remained in action until the Platoon had withdrawn after recovering their casualties. The information gained by both patrols, and particularly from Private Partridge, enabled an attack to be mounted later. This led to the capture of a vital position sited on strong defensive ground and strengthened by 43 bunkers and other dug-in positions from which the enemy fired in panic. The serious situation during the fight of the two patrols was retrieved only by the outstanding gallantry and devotion to duty displayed by Private Partridge, which inspired his comrades to heroic action, leading to a successful withdrawal which saved the small force from complete annihilation. The subsequent successful capture of the position was due entirely to the incentive derived by his comrades from the outstanding heroism and fortitude displayed by Private Partridge.' (London Gazette: 22 January 1946.)
The 8th Battalion attack evidently shook the Japanese, and after cautious patrolling Base 5, which was renamed "Part Ridge", was occupied on 5 August after only slight opposition. There were more than sixty bunkers in the area. On 11 August active patrolling ceased in this and other sectors, and four days later the war ended.
At the same time, however, offensive patrolling continued, always with the object of collecting information which would ultimately enable the 23rd Brigade to come to grips with the determined Japanese in the peninsula. The end of hostilities came before this could be put into effect.
The 23rd Brigade along the Numa Numa trail had continued the aggressive patrolling policy of previous brigades.
This continued offensive harassing reduced the morale of the Japanese troops. When it was known that many of the Japanese from the Bonis Peninsula were withdrawing along the eastern coast to Numa Numa, the time seemed opportune to increase the pressure along the Numa Numa trail and to attempt to reach the coast. The 7th Battalion entered into the operation with a will and, ably supported by mountain guns, captured Smith's Hill on 12 May and by 18 July had driven the Japanese from Berry's Hill, Wearne's Hill and Tiernan's Spur and had established a company locality on the rolling ground on the far side of the dividing range from which patrols frequently reached the east coast to annoy and harass the surprised Japanese.
As part of a plan to advance Allied air bases closer to Rabaul, Americans had seized and established bases at Arawe and Cape Gloucester on the west end of New Britain and at Hoskins on the north coast. By July 1944 parties of Allied Intelligence Bureau, using natives, had cleared the Japanese from the north coast to Ulamona and from the south coast to the western shores of Wide Bay. No roads existed along either coast and, if the Australians were to maintain contact with the Japanese by operating from American bases, the only way would be by water. But there were few vessels available and it was therefore necessary to establish a base closer to the Japanese. Jacquinot Bay, a wide deep harbour on the south coast, abandoned by the Japanese, was selected as the future base. The 36th Battalion Group from the 6th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R L Sandover) was sent to relieve the American regiment at Hoskins, landing on the 8 October 1944. This was the first step of the left foot in an advance which was to move along both sides of the island until the Australians stood astride the entrance to Gazelle Peninsula--one foot in Open Bay on the north coast and the other in Wide Bay on the south. Across the narrow neck of land separating the two bays the Australians were to establish a holding line to prevent the Japanese moving west. A month later the rest of the 6th Brigade landed at Jacquinot Bay. The march had begun.
Building of the base at Jacquinot began under hampering rain. Base and divisional areas were spread out around the bay The only means of moving from one point to another was by barge, and these were fully employed unloading the larger ships. Company "B" of the US 594 Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, the only American unit in the operation, was doing invaluable work.
While work on the base progressed, preliminary operations had begun. Patrols were busy on both sides of the island. On the north coast a patrol of the Allied Intelligence Bureau moved east to Panda River and discovered a large number of Japanese concentrated on the east bank. Australian patrol withdrew after inflicting casualties. Japanese activity seemed to be more marked on the north coast than on the south. Submarines were sighted several times in Open Bay.
On the south coast the Australians continued to move east, still without contacting the Japanese. A patrol from the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion moved along to Baien, a small native village. Other patrols had gone inland from Jacquinot but all reported "No movement seen".
By the end of November 1944, advanced headquarters of the Fifth Division, under the command of Major-General A H Ramsay, had been set up at Jacquinot, and 6th Brigade had handed over the defence of the area to 13th Brigade, recently arrived from the Northern Territory. The 6th Brigade, less the 36th Battalion, which was on the north coast, moved east to Cutarp, the first step in its strike up the coast to Wide Bay.
Air strikes were being carried out against Rabaul and other targets by RAAF and RNZAF planes. There was no attempt at interception by the Japanese whose known number of serviceable aircraft was thirteen. There were reports that indicated that near Rabaul the Japanese had sixty aircraft which they were feverishly attempting to make air worthy. Intelligence established that the Rabaul garrison was the Eighth Area Army commanded by Lt-General lmamura consisting of about 38,000 troops. RAN Fairmile launches were patrolling east as far as Wide Bay, but the Japanese confined its submarine activity to the north coast.
On the evening of 27 December two companies of the 14th/32nd Battalion piled into barges at Cutarp in drizzling rain and next morning landed at Sampun. The troops were met ashore by a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion which had come overland from Baien. Next day "C" Company of the 14th/32nd Battalion advanced as far as Gnet River. On New Year's Eve a party from the battalion moved on to Lampun and held Australian most forward approach to Rabaul.
In the first week of the New Year the Australians' first offensive operation instruction was issued. Up to that period Australian forces had been limited to patrols and, because of numerical inferiority, had instructions to avoid heavy clashes. The new instruction allowed for concentration of the 14th/32nd Battalion and a troop of artillery at Sampun in the Wide Bay area, and for patrols to contact the Japanese. On the north coast the 36th Battalion was to move to Nantambu, with orders to contact the Japanese by patrolling. By the end of January 1945 movement of the whole of the Fifth Division to New Britain was practically complete. The 6th Brigade was at Cutarp, the 13th Brigade,commanded by Brigadier E G H McKenzie) was settled in at Jacquinot, and advanced elements of 4th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier C R V Edgar) had arrived from Australia after a spell following its part in the 1944 New Guinea campaigns.
The Australians pushed forward on both sides of the island The 14th/32nd Battalion had moved from Sampun to Kiep, and the 19th Battalion was preparing to leave Cutarp to take over the small base which had been established at Sampun. Patrols from the 14th/32nd reached Ip River in Wide Bay and on the north coast a company of the 36th Battalion went on from Nantambu to Baia, on the shores of Open Bay.
The first notable clash occurred on 3 February when a platoon from "D" Company of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion was moving along the north coast towards Mavelo plantation, about a mile south of Watu Point, was attacked by 200 to 300 Japanese troops. They came in behind a screen of rebel natives, yelling and shouting in an attempt to demoralise the natives of the New Guinea Infantry Battalion platoon. But their noise had no effect. The platoon killed twenty of the Japanese before it withdrew without a casualty.
On 9 February a platoon from "C" Company of the 36th Battalion and a platoon from "D" Company of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion were attacked by about eighty Japanese. The ensuing battle lasted for half an hour until the Australians withdrew to avoid being encircled. On the morning of 15 February RAAF Beauforts, led in by a Boomerang, bombed and strafed Japanese positions on the north edge of Kalai plantation. They attacked for half an hour and, as they pulled out and headed home across the bay, Australian artillery opened up for the first time in the campaign. The 2/14th Field Regiment pumped a thousand rounds into the plantation and, when the 14th/32nd Battalion moved into occupy, the Japanese had withdrawn. From Kalai the battalion moved on and consolidated positions around Kamandram, a peace-time trading station with a fairly good anchorage. They stayed there only two days and then moved inland along the Japanese tracks. On the 17 February, "B" Company of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion, moving along one of these tracks, clashed with an Japanese party sixty strong. A running fight developed; two NGIB soldiers were lost but the battalion accounted for twenty-five Japanese.
On 18 February the 14th/32nd Battalion, which had been forward battalion since the landing in November, was relieved by the 19th. On the same day the 6th Brigade headquarters were set up in Kamandram. On the north coast Australian troops were exploring and patrolling the hundreds of tracks which branched and disappeared in all directions from the main paths. "A" Company of the 36th Battalion had moved forward to the Sai River on the east side of Open Bay and on 18 February repulsed three attacks by a strong Japanese party. The rest of the battalion group had moved up from Baia and was concentrating at Watu Point.
The stiffening Japanese resistance gave an indication of the determination to defend the narrow neck between Open and Wide Bays to prevent penetration into Gazelle Peninsula. In view of the comparatively low strength of Australian forces in the area, it became necessary to define the limit to which the advance would proceed. In the Wide Bay area this was fixed as the mouth of Bulus River. It involved first the seizure of Japanese positions in the Waitavalo-Tol plantation area.
On 5 March, the Australians attacked the Waitavalo defences. The Japanese positions were on a long low narrow mountain ridge running as a natural fortress wall around the area. At 9 am "A" Company of the 19th Battalion made two attempts to cross the Henry Reid River near the mouth. Sustained fire drove them back Moving upriver about 300 yards, the crossing was made unopposed. The company then moved downstream in an attempt to outflank the Japanese, but they had withdrawn.
In the afternoon the Japanese began to use heavy mortars to effect. The Australians, who had discarded entrenching tools to lighten their loads for the attack, had to dig fox-holes with their hands and bayonets. There was a lull during the night, but at first light on 6 March the Australian gunners opened up again and the infantry followed for the attack proper. "A" Company of the 19th Battalion passed through "C" Company and, meeting only slight opposition, advanced towards the first objective, a feature known as Cake Hill. At 11 am the company met its first serious opposition. From positions on a companion feature in the south known as Lone Tree Hill the Japanese pinned the company down with machine-gun and rifle fire. The advance was halted for an hour there; then the troops began moving forward again. The Japanese had evidently fallen back to further prepared defences and "A" Company occupied Cake Hill. "C" Company of the 19th then came up and consolidated the area while "A" Company moved into a less exposed position. Throughout the day the Japanese had concentrated on battalion headquarters with mortars, and Australian guns were still trying to silence them.
During the next three days the Australians continued to attack but they met only slight opposition. They were, however, suffering casualties from Japanese mortars and their artillery was constantly engaged in harassing tasks. On the north coast the lull was broken early on the morning of the 8 March, when a party of seventy Japanese attacked a platoon of "C" Company of the 36th Battalion on Mavelo River. The attack was repulsed and the Japanese dug in fifty yards outside the Australian perimeter. Shortly after 7 am they attacked again, this time supported by a 70-mm. gun. When they withdrew they left fifteen dead.
On the south coast, moving on from Lone Tree Hill Australian troops occupied a higher feature above the Waitavalo ridge known as Moose Hill. There they came under harassing fire from Japanese mortars, and suffered casualties. Rain now set in. On the north coast operations were at a standstill, and in the Wide Bay area there was a lull while the troops were regrouped and supply lines were organised. This was no easy task. Heavy rain had made the steep tracks to the tops of ridges as treacherous as ice, and the tracks themselves were subject to mortar fire. On the flat jeep tracks were mud streams, and the bridge over Mavelo River had been washed away. During this period the 19th Battalion was relieved by the 14th/32nd Battalion.
On the morning of the 16 March the Australians attacked again. RAAF Beauforts went in on low-level bombing runs and as they drew out, artillery began shelling the Japanese positions. As the artillery closed down "B" Company of the 14th/32nd Battalion, which had relieved a forward company of the 19th Battalion, advanced northwards to the high ground of Bacon's Hill. Two platoons were held up by machine-gun and mortar fire, so a third platoon moved around the left flank and took up a position only fifty yards from the Japanese perimeter. The Japanese were well dug in, and his cross-fire was well planned. Next day the attack was renewed. During the night, however, the Japanese had moved out, though his mortars still plugged away, this time from new positions. It was during this attack only that made use of planes against Australian ground troops. Two came in over the bridge crossing the Walnut River, dropped two heavy bombs and a number of anti-personnel bombs. They caused a few casualties. From then on the Japanese began to withdraw and Waitavalo was occupied without further opposition.
The first task had been completed. The Australians were firmly planted on each side of the island, straddling the completed neck of the peninsula, and patrols were going inland from both coasts trying to find a potential track across the neck.
On the 4 April, Major-General H C H Robertson took over command of the Fifth Division from Major-General Ramsay who transferred to the Eleventh Division.
The situation was generally quiet throughout June. The battalions established their perimeters at Wide and Open Bays, and engineers widened and surfaced the roads around Tol and Waitavalo. The relief of 36th Battalion from Open Bay, which had been going on since 10 May, was completed on the 6 June after the 37th/52nd Battalion had marched across Gazelle Peninsula. The 36th had been at Open Bay for eight and a half months.
On 5 June, the 2/2nd Commando Squadron arrived at Wide Bay and established headquarters at Lamarien near Henry Reid River. This squadron had previously fought in Timor and the Ramu Valley. By this time a section of the RNZAF was established at Jacquinot Bay. It consisted of two squadrons of Corsairs and one of Ventures. The main advance party of headquarters of the Eleventh Division, which was to relieve the Fifth of command in New Britain, arrived by flying boat from Cairns on the 23 June. The following day the plane returned to Australia with the advance party of the Fifth, which was to establish a camp on the Atherton Tableland. In the last week of June, the monsoon rains began. During the last two days of the month about twenty inches of rain fell. The sea was too rough for barge traffic and planes could not find their way in or out of the bay. Despite the weather, forward battalions continued patrolling, although most of their work was reconnaissance. On the Open Bay side of the island the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion patrolled forward to the north-east side of Cooper's Clearing.
The RNZAF was most active. On every fine day the New Zealanders bombed and strafed Japanese positions on each coast. Towards the end of the month land patrols became more active, but there was still no attempt to contact the Japanese in strength. Australian forces were pinning the Japanese down and that was the task which they had been allotted. Refugee natives, coming in from the top of the island, moved into Wide and Open Bays where they were recruited into ANGAU camps for work.
On the l0 July the Japanese made a half-hearted harassing attack for the first time in the month. They were forced to withdraw when Australian artillery pin-pointed them on the Moondei River. Back at Jacquinot Bay Major-General K. W. Eather,promoted from the command of 2sth Brigade, 7th Division) had arrived to take over the division from Major-General H. C. H. Robertson who had been given command of the 6th Division on the New Guinea mainland. Another important administrative change was also in progress--the change-over of the headquarters staff from Fifth Division to Eleventh Division. The greater part of the Eleventh's staff had arrived from Australia on the 11 August, a few days before the Japanese surrendered.
In April 1944 United States forces landed without opposition in the Aitape area, in conjunction with a landing at the main Japanese air base at Hollandia. The object of this operation was to secure and hold the Tadji airfield and to establish light naval facilities at Aitape to support further operations against the Japanese. The primary task of the ground forces was the defence of the airfield and harbour, and ground operations were limited to those necessary for the adequate protection of the area.
Only minor actions took place up to July 1944, but the US garrison was then reinforced and a strong defensive position was organised on the Driniumor River to meet an expected Japanese attack. This came in mid-July and the US troops were forced to withdraw. However, repeated counter-attacks restored the position and the Japanese sustained heavy casualties. In further attacks during August the Japanese forces around Aitape were thoroughly defeated, and the scattered remnants fled to the east and south to join the main Japanese force between the mouth of the Sepik River and Wewak. From August to October 1944, when Australian forces began to take over, activity was confined to patrolling.
The 6th Division,commanded by Maj-General J E S Stevens) was to take over the American role of airfield and harbour defence and to carry out active patrolling. The advance unit of the division arrived late in October 1944. This was the 2/6th Cavalry Commando Regiment comprising the 2/7th, 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons. It took over from the Americans at Babiang and occupied outpost positions at Aiterap, Kanti and Palauru. The Americans in the Driniumor River area were relieved by the 2/4th Battalion towards the end of November.
On the 3 November the Australians accounted for their first Japanese in the Aitape area. It was found that the Japanese were in poor condition and that he was carrying out foraging patrols near the coast. Other parties had left the coastal area and had moved up into the foothills of the Torricelli mountains. Patrols extended to the Suain plantation, Luain and as far east as the Danmap River. Continuous contact quickly brought Japanese casualties to sixty-four killed and seven captured at a loss of one killed and one wounded. The Japanese were not anxious to stay and fight, and when he did was hopelessly outclassed.
RAAF bombers of 71 Wing were flying long hours on army co-operation strikes. Daily raids were made on the main supply bases of Wewak, Kairiru and Dagua, and soon the Japanese were unable to use transport in daylight. With increased activity on the coastal area, the Japanese began to move into the foothills, and it was obvious that an offensive would have to be launched to drive him out. In the middle of November the arrival in the coastal area of the 2/4th Battalion of the 19thBrigade,commanded by Brigadier J E G Martin) released the 2/7th Commando Squadron to move up the newly established line of communication from Nialu to Tong. The natives in this area were friendly and provided the long supply trains needed to get equipment and food to the troops. With a base established at Tong, the 2/7th Commando patrols moved into the villages and soon cleared a large area of the Japanese who were then forced to move farther into the mountains. The villages of Yambes were captured, and the patrol base moved forward. The Japanese launched a number of unsuccessful day and night attacks on Middle Yambes in an attempt to regain the village, which was one of the vital outposts of the main Japanese force in the Maprik area.
Having cleared the Danmap area on the coast, and as far as Idakaibul, the 2/4th Battalion crossed the Danmap River on 17 December and began to drive the Japanese towards the main positions on the Anumb River. The battalion pushed down the coast as far as Rocky Point, but a large party of the Japanese were found in the rear. They occupied a position on high ground about 800 yards from the east bank of the Danmap River, menacing Australian supply line. An air strike was made and the Japanese, vacating the positions, ran into a standing patrol and were annihilated.
As the supply position presented difficulties in the central sector, so it did on the coastal strip. The only road in the area was an old German one in a bad state of disrepair. The divisional engineers were faced with the difficult task of establishing an efficient line of communication down the coast. The monsoon rains had started and the creeks and rivers were rising rapidly, making bridge-building a hazardous business. A road had to be made and widened to carry the heavy vehicles of the supply units. In a very short time a useable road was constructed. Temporary bridges to be replaced by permanent ones when time and opportunity permitted were built. Extensive damage was done to these temporary structures when the rivers and creeks rose after heavy rain in the mountains. The sappers were often working in floodwaters up to their necks repairing the damage.
The remainder of the 19th Brigade had arrived in the Aitape area while 2/4th Battalion was pushing down the coast to the Danmap River and had reached the Driniumor River. Patrols of the 2/8th Battalion moved up the last named as far as Afua. Owing to bad weather the activity on the coast was limited to patrolling but, in the central sector, the 2/7th Commando Squadron was increasing its tally of Japanese killed. Two companies with support detachments from the 2/5th Battalion, known as Piperforce) moved up from the coast on the 16 November and established a headquarters in the Yambes villages. They relieved the 2/7th on 21December.
In the latter half of December, the relief of 2/4th Battalion by the 2/11th was begun and the 2/8th moved forward from its base on the Driniumor River to Suain plantation. From its headquarters at Rocky Point the 2/11th Battalion sent strong fighting patrols as far as Matapau and on 1 January this feature was secured. A squadron of the 2/4th Armoured Regiment had moved up the coast from the Aitape area and was in reserve at Rocky Point. The country was not well suited for tanks but they proved useful for clearing small bodies of Japanese snipers from the escarpment overlooking the beach.
The 25 pounders of 2/3rd Field Regiment were in position to give covering fire from the Rocky Point area. In the early hours of 2 January they were called on to support the infantry at Matapau. A small party of Japanese had attempted to infiltrate the positions held by the 2/11th Battalion, and, when this had been proved impossible, launched a full-scale attack. Artillery and concentrated small-arms fire broke up the Japanese attack. The Australians, quickly following up their advantage, pursued the fleeing Japanese and drove them from their positions.
In the Yambes area Piperforce was carrying out long-range patrols and, assisted by Beauforts of 71 Wing, had cleared a number of villages, driving the main body of the Japanese to the Perembil group, where heavy bombing and strafing attacks were being made daily. The remainder of the 2/5th Battalion had moved up and the force was able to carry out a larger patrol programme. Clearing of the villages continued, but the farther the Japanese were driven into the Torricellis, the harder the terrain and the more tenuous the lines of supply became. The Douglas transports carrying out the air dropping were working overtime, making five or six flights a day. Large parties of refugee natives as well as troops and the natives working on the supply lines had to be provided with food.
To have easier access to the native gardens the Japanese were keeping to the villages, which were mostly situated on the ridge-tops. This made the task of the infantry a little easier, for while there were passable tracks on the ridges, the tangled undergrowth of the val1cys was almost impenetrable.
On the coast patrols had penetrated as far as Niap, Malin and Walum, some miles in land on the Danmap River. These patrols were forming a link-up between the 19th Brigade troops on the coast, the 2/7th Commando Squadron which had moved to Lambuain and had begun patrolling east to Walum, and the 2/5th Battalion of the 17th Brigade, under the command of Brigadier M J Moten) in the Yambes area.
In that area the Japanese were holding the Perembil villages in strength. The RAAF continued their softening up and on the 3 January, following a heavy air strike and mortaring, the infantry moved into Perembil. The Japanese fled after a brief encounter. The equipment left in the village was in excellent order, and the dead Japanese were found to be in good physical condition--a contrast to the troops on the coast. The Australians were consolidating when the Japanese launched the first of a number of heavy counter-attacks. This was successfully beaten off and the Japanese withdrew leaving a number of dead. During the night three more counter-attacks were repulsed and the Japanese finally withdrew from the vicinity of Perembil having lost another of the outpost villages.
The 2/11th Battalion captured Cape Djueran on the 6 January and, supported by accurate artillery fire and Matilda tanks of "C" Squadron, 2/4th Armoured Regiment, pushed on to attack a strongly defended position forward of the cape. Again the Japanese were driven back. Patrolling continued from the bases at Walum and Idakaibul and a strong line of communication was established between these points and the Yambes area. Captured documents revealed that this line was to be denied to the 6th Division, but the Japanese were not sufficiently strong to fulfil his intention.
In the mountains the 2/5th Battalion had pushed forward their patrols. Two more of the Japanese strong points had been overcome and the garrisons forced to withdraw from positions at Asiling and Selni to Selnaua, where they were digging in. The evacuation of wounded from the Walum area was proving more difficult than expected. The main patrol route was a two-day march over steep mountains and the alternative route was a four-day carry.
Tanks and artillery fire aided the 2/11th Battalion in the capture of Niap on the western extremity of Dogreto Bay. This bay was later to play a big part in the push down the coast towards Wewak. Although the Japanese were contesting the ground fiercely they was gradually being forced back to bases on the Anumb River. These bases were receiving constant attention from the Beauforts, and their store dumps were being systematically destroyed. In the Torricellis the 2/5th Battalion captured Samisa. The battalion, based on Perembil, now had its companies and platoons disposed in a number of the villages surrounding the headquarters, and in this manner a large area was subjected to daily patrolling. The villages were yielding a considerable amount of food to the Japanese, but the natives, being deprived of their food, were seeking the protection of the Australians.
By 16 January the division had killed more than a thousand Japanese, while a large number of others had wandered off into the jungle to die. Australian casualties had been remarkably light, and the rate of sickness from tropical diseases was low. On the coast the 2/11th Battalion pushed on and the Japanese strong point of Abau fell after heavy fighting. In the Malin area patrols of the 2/9th Commando Squadron pushed east to cut the Japanese lines of communication from the Anumb River through Mipel to Maprik, the main base in the Torricelli mountains.
Units of the 16th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier R King) were now moving down the coast to relieve the 19th Brigade, which had been fighting for nearly ten weeks. The battalions were moving into position when heavy rain set in, and on 26 January, when the relief was almost completed, the Danmap River rose to an alarming degree and changed its course. The river was running at twenty knots and a wall of water about two feet high swept through a defended area of the 2/3rd Battalion leaving men struggling for life in the water. This was the worst blow the elements had inflicted and the loss of life and equipment was heavy. Great damage had been done to the bridges and roads and the lines of communication down the coast were completely disrupted.
The supply problem was acute. The two Douglas transports allotted could not be expected to keep the supplies up to the brigades, as they were already fully occupied in dropping to the 2/5th Battalion and the commando squadrons as well as to scattered standing patrols. Consequently the LCTs which were being used to off load shipping at Aitape were called on to do the job. These craft could carry l00 tons on each trip and made two or three trips weekly. This interfered considerably with the port working and they were withdrawn and the smaller LCMs were called forward, with the LCTs running only emergency supplies.
In view of the uncertainty of the supply position, the coastal campaign was restricted to patrol activity and no further advances were made until the engineers opened a road. On 29 January the 16th Brigade relieved the 19th in the coastal area; 2/3rd Battalion took over the patrol bases of the 2/8th; and 2/lst from the 2/11th.
As the 2/1st Battalion moved down the coast resistance stiffened and they were held down on the west side of Nimbum Creek by Japanese in positions on the forward slopes of Nambut Hill, or Hill 800. The Japanese launched a number of unsuccessful attacks, but finally withdrew to the hill. Attacks failed to dislodge the Japanese, and it was decided to take the ridge with two companies. One was to move along Nimbum Creek taking the Japanese in the rear, and the other to move up the slopes of the feature in a frontal attack. Unfortunately the company moving along the creek was held up by heavy fire and forced to withdraw. More air strikes were made, and artillery and mortar fire brought down. Following the heavy barrage the infantry moved forward and drove the Japanese back on to his second line of defence on the feature. Australian troops consolidated their gains. A fierce counter-attack was repulsed with losses to the Japanese. Australian casualties were negligible.
The Japanese withdrew down a gully and up another steep feature which became known as Japanese Knoll. It was slightly lower than Nambut Hill, but was covered with heavy scrub. It was subjected to a number of air strikes, and again the infantry drove the Japanese out. He withdrew again, this time to a feature known as Bunker Hill. One side was fairly steep with a track which could be covered easily by fire from the Japanese positions which overlooked it. The other side was considered by the Japanese to be unassailable, as it was a fifty to sixty foot rock-face dropping away sheer. The Japanese did not even worry to site weapons to cover it, but concentrated on the only logical line of approach - the track. A platoon of the 2/lst Battalion was sent around the base of the hill to the foot of the cliff and then began a perilous climb up the cliff-face using trailing vines as assault ladders. Reaching the top they attacked the Japanese from the rear and completely wiped out the holding force. To distract attention during the ascent, covering fire was brought to bear from in front of the position. The clearing of Nambut Ridge and satellite features had taken three weeks. With this important feature clear, the 2/2nd Battalion pushed forward on to the high ground around the Anumb River.
After the fall of Samisa the headquarters of 2/5th Battalion moved to this village and long-range patrols to the outlying villages continued. The advance was slow in the thick country, mainly because supplies could not be kept up to the forward troops in sufficient quantity. It was impossible to provide sufficient native carriers to bring the supplies up from the coast, and the two transport planes were insufficient to meet the requirements of the units working away from the coastal roads. As the Japanese were forced back resistance. became stiffer and better organised. The smaller bodies of troops were amalgamating into one command, and new troops had arrived, contesting Australian advance to a much greater extent than previously. The general trend of Japanese movement was towards Luwaite and Selnaua. Much information was being received from the natives who were coming to the Australians for food and help. There were other factors which contributed to this swing to Australian side.
Reports from patrols and natives stated that the Japanese had withdrawn in the direction of Balif and preparing defences there. On the 15 January a party of between eighty and one hundred Japanese had been forced out of the village of Maharinga by heavy air attacks and mortaring, and one platoon of 2/5th Battalion occupied the village. It was only on rare occasions that forces larger than one platoon were used to take a village.
A detachment of Far Eastern Liaison Office, which had been operating in the area for some time, prepared surrender leaflets and these were dropped on the Japanese around Balif. These told the Japanese that they had been deserted by their commanders and that it was useless to continue the resistance. Surrender and propaganda leaflets were also fired from mortars. The 2/7th Commando Squadron which had been operating in the Walum area for some time moved to Amam and contact patrols were sent out to link up with the 2/5th Battalion. More villages were cleared of the Japanese, Bullamita, Alumi and Hambini, and again the Japanese line of withdrawal was in the direction of the Balif group of villages.
Tactical reconnaissance by aircraft revealed Japanese in almost every village as far as Maprik. It was estimated that there were about 2000 in the Balif-Maprik area. Heavy air strikes were carried out on these villages daily, and in many cases the Japanese evacuated them afterwards, leaving numbers of dead. The RAAF bombers of 71 Wing were receiving help from the Combat Replacement Training Centre,American) at Nadzab, whose aircraft were bombing targets daily along the coast from Wewak and in the Balif area.
On the 10 February a platoon of 2/5th Battalion occupied the village of Balaga. Malahum, to the south-east of Balif, was also captured and held despite heavy counterattacks. The Japanese employed about fifty troops in this series of counter-attacks. After Balif had fallen the main pocket of resistance moved in an easterly direction towards Maprik, but small parties were still to be found in almost every village. With Nambut Hill clear of the Japanese, the Australians began a drive along the coast towards the Anumb River. On the 26 February the 2/2nd Battalion crossed the river without opposition and, after patrolling the area, reported the west bank clear for some 1500 yards from the coast. Shortly after the crossing a Japanese 75-mm. opened up on the patrols at point-blank range from near the Sowom villages. With this exception Japanese opposition was negligible. A large ammunition dump was captured on the east bank of the river. It appeared that the Japanese had withdrawn to the Sowom villages to reorganise his defences.
Patrols of 2/3rd Machine Gun Battalion, which had been operating for some time as infantry, reported that the Japanese -named village of Arohemi, former headquarters of Major-General Aozu, the infantry group commander of 41st Division) was clear of the Japanese. Its evacuation indicated the intention of the Japanese to fall back on his defences to the east of the Anumb River. On the 25 February HMAS Swan bombarded Japanese positions in the Sowom area, and on the night of 26/27 February shelled targets around But. During the latter shoot Swan moved in close to the shoreline and used her secondary armament, and the Japanese replied with 75-mm. fire without effect. On the morning of the 27 February Swan engaged targets in the Kauk area, and Beauforts of 71 Wing dealt with the 75-mm. gun.
In the period 3 November I944 to 27 February I945, the 6th Division had killed 1776 Japanese and captured thirty-seven. Allowing for wounded, total Japanese casualties could be set down at about 2500.
On 21 February the 2/5th Battalion was relieved by the 2/7th Battalion which immediately took over the extensive patrolling programme, and within a few days cleared out a large pocket in the Malahum-Ilahop area, where between two and three hundred obstinate and well-armed Japanese had been holding up Australian advance. Natives stated that the Japanese were occupying and fortifying villages to the west of Maprik. This indicated an intention to oppose the Australian advance to the south where there were a number of well-stocked native gardens. Food had become the chief Japanese consideration as it was now impossible for supplies to be brought into the area owing to the patrolling of the infantry and the 2/7th Commando Squadron. These patrols were rapidly raising the total number of Japanese casualties. In four patrol clashes in two days, fifty-three Japanese were killed of seventy-three encountered.
The advance down the coast from the Anumb River continued. The 2/2nd Battalion captured the Sowom villages and moved forward to Simbi Creek, where some opposition was encountered. The clearing of this obstacle left only one large waterway--the Ninahau River--before But. A patrol moving towards the coast from the south passed through the But-Ninahau River area and encountered only a few small parties of Japanese. It appeared that the Japanese were evacuating the But positions and was retiring towards Dagua.
The main body of the 2/2nd Battalion moved forward and concentrated in the Sowom villages; patrols pushed across the Ninahau River and as far east as Gilagmar Creek. Crossing the flooded river was hazardous. After a number of heavy patrol clashes over the river the battalion fought its way through to But, captured the jetty, the airstrip and the mission. The position was secured on the 17 March. The capture of this important area yielded a large amount of equipment, artillery pieces, arms and stores, and a large dump of oil and petrol. With the capture of the But jetty LCMs came ashore and unloaded stores. The beach at But was ideal for landing barges, and the supply dump grew rapidly.
In the inland sector the 2/7th Commando Squadron which had moved back into the hills after a brief spell on the coast, was in position at House Copp, against which the Japanese launched a number of counter-attacks. One company of the 2/6th Battalion took over on 16 March. The 2/10th Commando Squadron had arrived in the Milak villages and ran into heavy opposition. Strong attacks were thrown against them and, although these were repulsed, they sustained a number of casualties. This squadron was also relieved towards the end of March by a company of 2/6th Battalion. Heavy fighting continued in the area for some time before the Japanese were driven back into the Kuminibus group due north of Mapnk.
The 2/7th Battalion continued its patrolling in the Balif-Suanambe-Ami area. Tactical reconnaissance planes of the RAAF reported large bodies of Japanese troops on the Sepik River. The RAAF carried out a successful attack on an unusual target on the Sepik: a canoe-building yard. The Maprik area was still the scene of intense patrol activity and a number of heavy clashes occurred, but the Japanese still held many closely linked villages in the Kuminibus group and around Maprik itself. Activity around Milak increased and the Japanese threw fresh troops into his fierce counterattacks with no result except the whittling down of his strength. By 20 March the number of Japanese killed had reached 2200 with forty-two prisoners.
On 21March the 2/2nd Battalion on the coastal strip pushed through and captured the Dagua airstrip which was littered with wrecked planes. This rapid advance bypassed a number of Japanese positions in the coastal ranges between But and Dagua. As this ground was vital to the Japanese defence opposition was expected. Reports came in from natives to confirm that there were large broken parties of Japanese troops in the area and an important headquarters at the Wonginara Mission, the last named protected by about 200 troops. Captured documents had stressed the importance of this area and the bulk of the 2/3rd Battalion was dispatched into the hills to deal with the opposition.
The defence of the mission was well planned. The Japanese were dug in on five knolls commanding the Dagua-Wonginara Mission track and had artillery which continually harassed Australian troops. The track led through Tokoku pass, and all tracks leading into it were defended with fixed positions and ambushes. After heavy artillery fire and raids by Beauforts, four of the five positions were captured by 2/2nd Battalion. In the battle for one of these positions, a Victoria Cross was won posthumously awarded to Lieutenant Albert Chowne MM. The citation stated that the award was for:
'For most conspicuous bravery, brilliant leadership and devotion to duty during an attack on an enemy position on a narrow ridge near Dagua, New Guinea, on 25th March 1945. After the capture of Dagua, the main enemy force withdrew southwards from the beach to previously prepared positions on the flank of the Division. Further movement towards Wewak was impossible while this threat to the flank existed and the Battalion was ordered to destroy the enemy force. "A" Company, after making contact with the enemy on a narrow ridge, was ordered to attack the position. The leading Platoon in the attack came under heavy fire from concealed enemy machine-guns sited on a small rise dominating the approach. In the initial approach one member of this Platoon was killed and nine wounded, including the Platoon Commander, and the enemy continued to inflict casualties on our troops. Without awaiting orders, Lieutenant Chowne, whose Platoon was in reserve, instantly appreciated the plight of the leading Platoon and rushed the enemy's position. Running up a steep, narrow track, he hurled grenades which knocked out two enemy Light machine-guns. Then, calling on his men to follow him, and firing his sub-machine-gun from the hip, he charged the enemy's position. Although he sustained two serious wounds in the chest, I the impetus of his charge carried him 50 yards forward under the most intense machine-gun and rifle fire. Lieutenant Chowne accounted for two more Japanese before he was killed standing over three foxholes occupied by the enemy.
The superb heroism and self-sacrifice of this officer culminating in his death, resulted in the capture of this strongly-held enemy position, ensured the further immediate success of his Company in this area and paved the way directly for the continuance of the Division's advance to Wewak.' (London Gazette: 6 September l945.)
Patrols of 2/3rd Battalion penetrated to the west and rear of Tokoku pass and cleared the Wonginars Mission area, forcing the Japanese to withdraw in the direction of Liwo, where he had a large number of reserve troops. By 6 April the pass had been cleared.
In the Maprik area the Japanese continued strongly to resist the division's advance and progress was slow. The patrols had cleared the Japanese from the villages of Ilaheta, Suanambc and Lahinga 2 and held off heavy counterattacks. On 26 March, moving in after a heavy mortaring of the village, the Australians drove the Japanese the strong point Aupik 2. The Japanese continued to fall back on Maprik taking care not to be outflanked. The Japanese appeared to be concentrating west of Maprik, but a rapid advance by Australian troops through Abungai forced them to withdraw and take up positions only 2000 yards from the Maprik Government Mission.
In the Dagua area Australian troops had consolidated and were mopping up stragglers of the force which had defended the Tokoku pass and Wonginara Mission, before continuing the drive down the coast to the main Japanese stronghold of Wewak. The 2/lst Battalion, which had taken over as the forward battalion, now began to push down the coast. After some opposition Cape Karawop and the village itself were captured on 13 April; a couple of days later Wisling and Old Kumudu. Wisling had at one stage been the headquarters of General Adachi, commander of the 18th Japanese Army. Patrols from the 2/1st Battalion pushed forward as far as Boiken, the site of an old German mission. Wewak's days were numbered. In the hinterland mountains security patrols continued to account for stragglers in the rear areas and they recovered ten escaped Indian prisoners.
Meanwhile in the Maprik area Australian patrols were closing in on the mission from three sides. Wora had been reoccupied by the Japanese, but was again cleared, and the Japanese were driven from Gwanginan, Kulkuil and Chiginambu. Finally, on 22 April, patrols moved into Maprik, encountering little opposition. The RAAF had softened up the villages and the area was pitted with bomb craters; the emergency landing ground was overgrown with heavy kuna1 grass. The Japanese were still gradually withdrawing towards the Sepik River, where large concentrations of troops and numerous camps had been reported. Aircraft from the Combat Replacement Training Centre at Nadzab were devoting much attention to this area.
By 19 April Japanese casualties had risen to more than 3000 killed and fifty-nine prisoners. Intelligence estimated his strength then as 9650 combat and 6000 base troops, of which 11,000 were "effectives".
A number of islands off the coast near Wewak were occupied by the Japanese. Some sheltered heavy artillery, including a battery of naval guns on Kairiru Island. These were sited within range of the mainland and it was important that as many as possible should be silenced before the main advance on the fortress of Wewak was undertaken. Royal Australian Navy sloops, corvettes and motor launches, in conjunction with the RAAF, were used to neutralise these guns. At a later date I55-mm. "Long Toms" were brought up on the mainland and they added their heavy fire. An effort had been made earlier to estimate the strength of the Japanese on Muschu Island, and a small party of special troops was landed by night. Unfortunately, they were intercepted and forced to fight it out. They were unable to get back to their boats and all but one were captured or killed. The survivor brought back information of considerable value.
The area near Wewak has a number of important topographical features. The coastline is irregular, with capes jutting out from the shoreline, and the Japanese had prepared extensive defensive positions on these headlands. Bunkers had been constructed and the natural caves reinforced to provide strong fire positions. Artillery had been brought up and sited to cover the limited approaches. Large quantities of stores were being poured into the supply dumps at But and Karawop, and a large assortment of supporting arms was brought forward, including tanks, flame-throwers and heavy artillery. The 16th Brigade still provided the forward troops, but the 19th was moving up to take over the offensive in the Hawain River area for the final advance into Wewak itself. The 2/6th Commando Regiment had been brought up from Aitape and was training around But for an amphibious attack on Dove Bay, to the east of Wewak.
On 27 April the infantry crossed the Hawain River, where the 2/4th Battalion passed through the bridgehead which the 2/2nd Battalion had established. This brought them within twelve miles of Wewak in an advance supported by Matilda tanks. Around Maprik the I7th Brigade battalions were driving the Japanese to the east and south. Reliable native information indicated that the main body of the 4Ist Division was concentrating in the villages to the east.
The advance on Wewak began on the 3 May. By 1 pm the troops had moved from the Hawain River to Cape Pus and captured it with little opposition. About a mile farther on the first real contact was made. The Japanese fled. On 4 May Cape Wom fell. In the advance from Cape Pus to Cape Wom about a hundred graves had been found, and also the bodies of fifty recently killed Japanese : evidence of the accuracy of Australian artillery, bombing and naval fire.
The advance of the coastal force had reached the Minga Creek crossing by the 8 May. The bridge had been destroyed and was under fire from Japanese guns on Wewak Point. There was also considerable small-arms fire. Despite this the sappers carried on with the job of erecting a temporary bridge to enable the tanks to get through.
A patrol of the 2/4th Battalion moved out on the night of the 8th/g May to reconnoitre approaches to Wewak Point. The patrol report stated that the only possible line of approach was up a sand spit twenty yards wide, bordered on one side by sea and on the other by an impassable swamp. This spit was under direct fire from a 20-mm. gun sited on the side of Wewak Point. If the attack was to be carried out with few casualties it was imperative that this position should be captured as soon as possible after the lifting of the preliminary barrage. On the night of 9/10 May bridging of the creek was completed and the tanks moved into position.
The attack on Wewak Point was timed for first light, but heavy rain and bad light put the start time back to 6.10 am. Under a barrage by tanks and artillery the infantry moved up, crossed the narrow spit and over-ran the 20-mm. gun before it had time to open fire. By 7 am the first objective had been gained and rapid exploitation quickly secured a strong platoon position at the south-eastern base of the headland.
The Japanese were well dug in and was resisting strongly. But the infantry, supported by tanks and flame-throwers, wiped out the pockets. Snipers were very active. Positions which could not be reached from the land were dealt with by the naval force. In some cases the cliff-face was collapsed on the defenders, sealing them in the vaults they themselves had constructed. By nightfall the greater part of the headland had been seized. The attack was renewed at first light on 11 May, and by noon the headland had been cleared.
Of the Japanese garrison which had been defending this stronghold only three escaped. Resistance had been fierce and fanatical. The men of the 2/4th Battalion who had carried out the final assault were justly proud when they hoisted the Union Jack on a shell-scarred observation tower over-looking what had once been a strong Japanese base.
After the fall of Wewak and its airstrip infantry patrols pushed forward as far as Wirui Creek. From here an attack was to be launched on the second strongpost, Wirui Mission, from which the Japanese had been shelling Australian troops during the advance on Wewak Point and the capture of the airstrip. The 2/4th Battalion attacked towards Wirui Mission on 15 May. When the attack was held up Private Edward Kenna took the initiative and was awarded the Victoria Cross for his gallantry. The citation for his award states:
'In the South West Pacific at Wewak on 15 May 1945 during the attack near the Wirui Mission features, Private Kenna's Company had the task of capturing certain enemy positions. The only position from which observation for supporting fire could be obtained was continuously swept .by enemy heavy machine-gun fire and it was not possible to bring Artillery or Mortars into action. Private Kenna's platoon was ordered forward to deal with the enemy machine-gun post, so that the Company operation could proceed. His section moved as close as possible to the bunker in order to harass any enemy seen, so that the remainder of the platoon could attack from the flank. When the attacking sections came into view of the enemy they were immediately engaged at very close range by heavy automatic fire from a position not previously disclosed. Casualties were suffered and the attackers could not move further forward. Private Kenna endeavoured to put his Bren gun into a position where he could engage the bunker, but was unable to do so because of the nature of the ground. On his own initiative and without orders Private Kenna stood up in full view of the enemy less than 50 yards away and engaged the bunker, firing his Bren gun from the hip. The enemy machine-gun immediately returned Private Kenna's fire and with such accuracy that bullets actually passed between his arms and his body. Undeterred, he remained completely exposed and continued to fire at the enemy until his magazine was exhausted. Still making a target of himself, Private Kenna discarded his Bren gun and called for a rifle. Despite the intense machine-gun fire, he seized the rifle and, with amazing coolness killed the gunner with his first round. A second automatic opened fire on Private Kenna from a different position and another of the enemy immediately tried to move into position behind the first machine-gun, but Private Kenna remained standing and killed him with his next round.
The result of Kenna's magnificent bravery in the face of concentrated fire, was that the bunker was captured without further loss. The company attack proceeded to a successful conclusion, many enemy being killed and numerous automatic weapons captured. There is no doubt that the success of the company attack would have been seriously endangered and many casualties sustained, but for Private Kenna's magnificent courage and complete disregard for his own safety. His action was an outstanding example of the highest degree of bravery.' (London Gazette 6 September 1945)
On 11 May, at the same time as the battle for Wewak Point was in progress, "Farida Force", comprising commandos, artillery, medium machine guns and mortars, made a seaborne landing in Dove Bay, some miles to the east of Wewak, with the intention of seizing the coast road, thereby cutting one of the possible lines of withdrawal of the Japanese from the Wewak area. The landing was supported by units of the Royal Australian Navy including HMAS Hobart, Warramunga, Arunta, Swan, and Colac; five motor launches and HMS Newfoundland from the Royal Navy; Beaufort air support was provided. Heavy bombers and strafing planes from Combat Replacement Training Centre at Nadzab had also been an important factor in the preliminary bombardment. H-hour was fixed at 8.30 am on the 11 May. Before the first wave went ashore the shoreline was heavily bombarded, and during the actual operation the small craft closed in to the shore subjecting the Japanese defences to a hail of fire. The first wave grounded on time, a bridgehead was rapidly seized and the second and third waves set off for the shore.
Patrols immediately pushed out from the beachhead and cut the road. Simultaneously another patrol pushing west along the coast encountered a force of about fifty Japanese in the vicinity of Forok Point. With supporting fire from the Navy, the Australians attacked and drove the Japanese from the position.
On 14 May, Farida Force, moving west along the coast to link up with the 19th Brigade, captured Mandi village and patrolled as far as the Forok village. The advance continued in the direction of the Brandi River, where the link-up was to take place.
Before the attack on Wewak Point a force was sent inland to cut the main road from Wewak to Sauri--another line of withdrawal. The units which carried out this task were the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th Commando Squadron. This force had been successful in cutting Big Road one mile north-east of the Sauri villages, which were strongly defended.
The troops which had advanced down the coast from Wewak Point moved into position to attack the Japanese in Wirui Mission on 13 May, and next day a successful attack was launched on Mission Hill, which commanded the whole of the Wewak plantation, the airstrip and the ground to the foot of Wewak Point. Resistance here was also particularly stubborn, but fortunately the ground permitted the use of tanks. When the summit of Mission Hill was captured, it was found that the Japanese were even more strongly dug in on a spur running north-west on the main feature, and it was not until the Is May that the whole area was reported clear. The Japanese garrison was annihilated. Australian casualties were light.
Forces moving east between Wirui and Sauri encountered stubborn resistance on a feature known as 710. After a heavy artillery barrage an attack was launched. The Japanese repulsed it, but was unable to cope with another later in the day. He counter-attacked fiercely but unsuccessfully.
Kreer was captured on the 16 May, but casualties were suffered when an electrically controlled minefield of aerial bombs was exploded by the Japanese. A further attack on the Sauri villages was made with the support of flame-throwers, and the Japanese were driven from the area. On the 17 May, the 2/8th Battalion, which had taken over the coastal strip from the 2/4th, moved in with the support of tanks and artillery and captured Cape Boram. The Boram 'drome and mission were captured by the 20 May, after meeting strong opposition from the high ground south of the 'drome.
The area in and around Wewak now came to life. Engineers toiled at bridges and pushed roads through the tangled undergrowth. Bulldozers scraped great loads of coral for road surfacing into lines of waiting trucks, camp sites were surveyed and buildings begun. The hard beach back to Cape Wom became a busy highway. On Boram strip the Japanese soon began harassing tactics from nearby bunker positions on high ground to the south and it was not until a heavy mortar and artillery concentration had been loosed on the position that an attack could be made. This was successful. On 22 May patrols from the main force and Farida Force linked up at the mouth of the Brandi River.
The Australians now concentrated on Koigin and, although reports indicated that the village was strongly held, it was captured on the 2s May by the 2/4th Battalion. The Japanese left behind another radio station and much signal equipment. More shells fell among Australian troops near Wewak strip; later in the day the Japanese shelled the strip itself and Brandi plantation. Barges unloading at the newly established Wewak beachhead also came under fire.
In clashes on the 710 feature a force of seventy Japanese withstood assaults, but a final attack resulted in twenty being killed and the capture of more machine guns. In the Mandi area a patrol was ambushed, but a later Japanese attack was repulsed with losses. The Japanese were extremely aggressive. Back in the Koigin area further Japanese positions were attacked and cleared after Australian guns had blasted them. At Mandi, however two heavy assaults were needed to clear another strong point, thirty-two Japanese were left dead. The summit of a feature known to the Japanese as South-west Mountain was the next position to be captured.
In this phase of operations--covering two weeks--the Japanese consistently harassed Australian positions by small raiding parties and patrols. The Japanese gave no thought to surrendering, although a few sick and wounded stragglers wandered into Australian positions. An important event in the inland war was the building of Hayfield airstrip. This had long been one of the main objects of Australian operations because Douglas transports could then land supplies and fly out in less than an hour the sick and wounded across the mountains to 2/11th General Hospital at Aitape. The march out took about nine days. The strip was built with picks, shovels and entrenching tools. Some improvised rollers were put into service, dragged by manpower. Australian troops and native men and women toiled on day after sweltering day. The first plane landed on the almost completed strip early on the morning of 7 June.
Meanwhile the Australian advance continued eastward across the back-breaking razor-backs of the Torricelli mountains to within l000 yards of the important Yamil group of villages. The war here was another battle of the ridges; each ridge formed a natural defensive position for the Japanese. Australian troops had to fight for every inch of ground. As each position became untenable the Japanese withdrew to the next spur, where he took up similar positions.
The drive on the Yamil-Ulupu area was also strongly opposed by the Japanese. It was necessary to drive them from numerous well prepared and well-sited positions and the advance was slowed down. 2/7th Battalion, relieved by 2/5th Battalion towards the end of May, advanced eastwards from Maprik towards Yamil and Ulupu, while 2/6th moved on Yamil from the north.
Dogged fighting continued. The most important objective was the Yamil group of villages with its potential landing ground. On 20 May after continual harassing by patrols, the Australians attacked Jamei 2 and gained a footing on the ridge. However, the defending Japanese pinned them down and it was not until five days later that intensive patrolling to the flanks and rear of the position made possible another attack which resulted in the capture of the cliff-top and enabled the troops to exploit north-east along the ridge to within l000 yards of Jamei 1.
Mendamen and the Kalabo group were cleared in quick succession, but further advances were resisted by the Japanese holding positions to the north-east. Troops of 2/1st Tank Attack Regiment, acting as infantry, attacked sixty Japanese in the Mirau area on 24 May. They met with determined resistance, but thirty-two Japanese were killed by the gunners and the position occupied. North of Kalabo a large village was cleared, followed by the remainder of this group.
Patrols probing towards Yamil reported that every line of advance was guarded. On 31 May some high ground overlooking Yamil was, however, occupied without opposition, although the Japanese made two attacks on discovering the Australian move. On 4 June the main track to Yamil was cut.
Infantry of 17th Brigade, advancing from the north-west and south-west, closed in on Yamil 1. Early in the morning of the 9 June "A" Company of 2/6th Battalion, less two platoons, moved in suddenly and occupied a position on a spur which commanded Yamil 1. Next day, after an attack by Beauforts, the assault began. Australian troops attacked with heavy mortar and Vickers gun support, eventually capturing the village and ground overlooking Yamil 2 and other Japanese -held areas in the vicinity.
Yamil 3 was the objective on the l2 June when troops of 2/5th Battalion closed in. By nightfall the operation had been successful and a patrol operating to the north reported that the northern end of the emergency landing ground was clear. This strip was important. Its capture meant a sorely needed air link with Hayfield.
Main drives in the coastal sector were in the first few days of June directed towards the Japanese principal positions patrolling on Mount Tazaki and Mount Shiburangu. Aggressive patrolling resulted in the capture of an extensive position l000 yards south-west of Koigin by troops of 2/4th Battalion, which on 6 June stormed and captured another elaborately constructed strong point.
Patrols kept up pressure on the Japanese on the rugged slopes of Tazaki and Shiburangu, and with air strikes and accurate bombardment destroyed many isolated strong points. On 14 June 2/4th Battalion attacked and occupied a strongly held position; Hill 2, an important feature l000 yards north of Shiburangu, was attacked by a company of 2/8th Battalion. Heavy fighting continued during the morning, but the position was finally taken. Five days later 2/4th Battalion captured another Japanese hill position 1200 yards south-east of Koigin.
At Yamil the Hayfield airstrip link with Aitape had enabled artillery to be brought in by plane. The Japanese first felt its presence when his positions around Yamil 2 and 4 were shelled. On 15 June the 2/5th Battalion attacked Yamil 2. The defenders resisted stubbornly but finally withdrew to new positions on high ground south of the village, from which they were driven. Village after village fell in the path of the Australian advance; bitter patrol clashes took place over a wide area.
The way was now open for the assault on Mount Tazaki and Mount Shiburangu and the attack was opened in the early hours of 22 June by two companies of 2/4th Battalion. The Japanese offered fierce and determined resistance as the Australians advanced after the bombardment by artillery and RAAF Beauforts. The first objective, a crest 300 yards north-west of the main feature, was taken by "B" Company. From this point the Japanese were engaged to screen a flanking movement by "D" Company which developed into the final phase of the attack. After some hours of close fighting the Japanese were driven from the position. Tazaki was completely in Australian hands at 6 pm.
The 2/8th Battalion then began preparing to move against Shiburangu, the highest feature in the Prince Alexander Ranges south of Wewak. It not only commanded the whole area but included strong positions west of Big Road, thus depriving the Australians of the use of the road to any extent farther south than Wirui Mission. Shiburangu was the key position for the Australian drive inland to link up with the inland force. On 19 June Middle Knoll, south-east of Sauri, was captured and patrolling towards the main feature became aggressive. In the Yamil area Australian operations continued with the capture of Yamil 4. The emergency landing ground was also completed and light aircraft began using the strip.
On the morning of 26 June thirty-six Beauforts attacked Mount Shiburangu. At 7.30 am next morning the Beauforts again roared in, but this time when the bombing had finished the Japanese received no respite. Artillery at Wewak opened fire, and in thirty minutes more than 5000 shells from forty-eight guns screamed into the positions. Then "C" Company of 2/8th Battalion moved to the foot of the feature. The first opposition was encountered shortly after the climb began, when heavy fire from bunker positions atop the mountain pinned down the whole company. To counter this a platoon was ordered to work around to the right flank, climb the cliff-face and storm the position. As the platoon set off heavy fire was directed at the Japanese from the temporary company position. while simultaneously "C" Company of 2/2nd Battalion made a diversionary move south along Big Road. The men of the platoon climbed 700 yards in a circling movement up the tangled mountainside-a grade of about one in three. Without losing a man they reached the top and bore down on the surprised Japanese with machine guns and grenades. This was the signal for a general advance by the remainder of "C" Company.
By 12.30 pm the top of the feature was finally occupied. The remaining Japanese hurriedly withdrew to another lower hill feature which was named The Blot. From the top of Shiburangu it was possible to see as far north as Aitape and southwards to the Sepik River-a distance of about 200 miles.
The inland force was reinforced at this stage by 2nd New Guinea Infantry Battalion, a native unit led by Australian officers and NCOs. On 2 July Kunvingi Mission, twelve miles south of Maprik, was attacked and occupied by these troops. The battle in the coastal sector continued. The 2/8th Battalion paused for the night on The Blot before pushing on down Big Road. On the morning of 15 July they left The Blot, crossed Big Road and by nightfall were atop a new height dubbed Snow Knoll. In the Maprik area 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions, supported by Beauforts, were converging on the Ilipem villages. On the afternoon of 16 July the 2/5th Battalion moved in on Ilipem 2. At nightfall the action was still locked, the Japanese resisting stubbornly from strong defensive positions. Next morning more ground was slowly gained but the Japanese were clinging tenaciously to his positions. North-east of Ilipem the 2/6th Battalion was also meeting an Japanese determined to stand and fight. Air support was called in and Australian troops moved in to take an important knoll.
Meanwhile in the coastal sector Australian troops had come to the main Japanese positions barring progress along Big Road. The 2/8th Battalion had occupied Ambrauri I and the following morning-17 July-patrols pushed a thousand yards down the road towards Ambrauri 2. At a feature known as St Patrick's they received their first setback for the last few days. The Japanese were well dug in and had the road taped with well-directed fire. The patrols withdrew. In the afternoon they again went forward but were repulsed. On the morning of 21 July artillery and mortars saturated the Japanese positions. The infantry moved through St Patrick's and pushed on for another 600 yards. Some 400 yards away across a deep ravine, perched on a razor-back ridge, was the main Ambrauri village. It was the next stop.
Back inland the battle for Ilipem was still being bitterly fought, but on the morning of 18 July the village was finally cleared. Farther to the south of Ilipem, 2/5th Battalion was probing the defences of the Ulupu villages. In both sectors the Australians were encountering stiff opposition, but the Japanese determination not to give ground was proving costly. In two days' fighting, on 21 and 22 July, they lost ninety-seven killed and two prisoners, for one Australian killed and twelve wounded.
On the drive in from the coastal area along Big Road, 19th Brigade handed over to the 16th and returned to the beaches for a well earned rest. The 2/2nd Battalion moved into the Ambrauri area, sending out patrols to clear the approaches. Inland 17th Brigade was still on the heels of the retreating Japanese. By the end of July the 16th were in complete control of its area, and were ready to begin the advance to meet the 17th. There had been a fortnight of fine weather during which the engineers pushed the roads into the mountains back of Wewak. A well-surfaced road stretched to the crest of the Prince Alexanders, only a few thousand yards behind the main forward troops. Three weeks before, the infantry had fought their way up steep slopes to take this crest. Now three-ton trucks drove up the same slopes to keep the infantry supplied.
Beyond the roadhead, well down the southern slopes of the Prince Alexanders, 2/2nd Battalion was in fast pursuit of the Japanese. On 4 August they came up against the first organised resistance at a feature known as Rindogim, meeting fire from a heavy machine gun and mortars. The infantry spread out and, having located the machine gun, knocked it out with accurate Bren fire. The Japanese withdrew. During the night they came back in nuisance raids sneaking close to the perimeter and hurling grenades.
The advance now lay parallel with the Prince Alexanders, rising steeply on the right, and headed due west to link up with 17th Brigade moving east from Maprik. 2/2nd Battalion crossed Tambafain Creek, and came under heavy fire from two positions on the eastern slopes of the Numoikum feature. On the 6 August artillery poured shells into the Numoikum group, and following the barrage "A" Company, using flame-throwers, attacked and cleared four villages. Next day the remaining two villages of the group were occupied.
Farther to the east, on the front of the 8th Brigade, commanded by Brigadier M A Fergusson), covering the MandiBrandi-Mount Tazaki area, Australian troops were in-almost constant contact with small parties of the Japanese. In the Mandi sector the Japanese were still using a 105-mm gun, but their shelling was ineffective.
Moving east from Maprik, 17th Brigade was making steady progress against determined opposition. 2/5th Battalion came up against strong defences on Gwenik Hill, just before the Kaboibus village group. Air support was called in and on 31 July, following a strike by thirteen Beauforts, the Battalion attacked and took the feature. From here the advance continued westward and on 2 August, after driving the Japanese from a well-sited line of up to l50 fox-holes, Australian troops captured the Kaboibus group. North of this group 2/6th Battalion was making steady progress through difficult country and against stubborn pockets of resistance. In the first week of August 2/7th Battalion moved south-east from the Ulebilum villages to Sigora. Keeping clear of Japanese occupied villages, and preceded a day's march by a company of 2nd New Guinea Infantry Battalion, which had control of the area, the force passed through Gwalip, maintaining a steady rate of progress. Boomerangs roved ahead watching for Japanese movement, giving warning by dropped messages so that it could be bypassed.
The third night out heavy rains fell, and all the next day the journey was across flooded creeks. But there was no slackening in the speed, and on the 8-August-five days after leaving Ulebilum-the Battalion had reached and captured the landing strip and village at Kairivu. They were astride the Japanese main line of communication, and watching him being pushed from the east and the west. The link-up of the brigades was almost complete when the Japanese ' surrender talks began.
Late in March 1945, planning elements of the 9th Australian Division, commanded by Major-General G F Wootten left the Atherton Tableland in advance of the rest of the division, and emplaned for Morotai. They were followed by 26th Brigade Group, which moved from Australia prepared for an immediate operation-the capture of Tarakan, a small island off the east coast of Borneo. The principal object was to capture the airfield for development and use in future operations on the mainland.
Tarakan Island is situated off the delta of Sesa River in north-eastern Borneo. Before the war its oil fields produced yearly 6,000,000 barrels of what was reputed to be the world's purest oil. Fringed with mangrove swamps and a few sandy beaches, it has an interior of rolling wooded hills. The town of Tarakan has for its port Lingkas, on the south-west coast, with docking facilities and a safe harbour. Japanese strength at Tarakan was estimated at between 1500 and 4000 troops including l000 naval personnel. Subsequent to the landing it was considered that the Japanese force on Tarakan consisted of 1750 combat troops plus 350 Japanese civilians who were impressed for military duty at the time of the landing. The plan envisaged a landing on Tarakan Island by 26th Brigade Group, commanded by Brigadier D A Whitehead. Included under his command were two RAAF Airfield Construction Squadrons, one boat company of US 593 Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, and one company of US 727 Amphibian Tractor Battalion and one company of a Netherlands East Indies infantry Battalion. Transport was supplied by ships of Amphibious Group Six and support by units of Task Group 781 and RAAF Command, with 13th US Army Air Force in support.
It was decided to make the landing at Lingkas beach. This would enable heavy mechanical equipment to be hurried up to the airfield along an existing surfaced road linking the port and field. There were several difficulties to be overcome. In addition to offshore obstacles, the gentle slope of the beach and the depth of mud would not permit the landing of heavy vehicles and guns until pontoon causeways had been placed and extensive beach exits constructed. In order to provide artillery support for the actual landing, the brigade commander decided to land one field battery at Sadau Island the day before the main landing, with a protective force made up of 2/4th Commando Squadron. Sadau Island lies some 6000 yards to the north-west of Lingkas beach. As the island had a good landing beach, no known obstacles and was believed to be very lightly held, little difficulty was expected in landing the battery. In fact, the island was found to be bare of Japanese troops.
In outline the brigade commander's plan was as follows: On P-day minus one day, the landing of the field battery on Sadau Island and the breaching of the beach obstacles by the engineers; on P-day, the name given to the day of the landing) an assault landing by two Battalions,2/23rd and 2/48th); 2/24th Battalion and the remainder of the force to be on call. Mine sweeping was to be undertaken during the four days before the operation. It was anticipated that the Japanese would endeavour to use burning oil in his defence of the beaches, but systematic bombing destroyed or breached every oil tank on the island.
P-day was originally fixed for 2g-April but was postponed to the1 May because of more favourable tides. Rehearsals for the operation were held at Morotai and on Kokoja Island off the coast. On 26-April the force allotted for the Sadau Island landing and the breaching of the obstacles sailed from Morotai followed the next day by the main assault convoy. It was not troubled by Japanese aircraft, and the only attempted naval interference was one submarine, which was believed to have been sunk on the night before the main landing) and shore-based torpedoes fired into the transport area early on P-day. One of these torpedoes grazed a ship but did not explode.
The landing at Sadau Island went according to plan, and in three hours the guns of a battery of 2/7th Field Regiment were firing in support of the engineers at Lingkas.
The breaching of the obstacles at Lingkas was a triumph for the sappers. Demolition parties drawn from 2/l3th Field Company were given the task of making eight 30-foot gaps in four rows of underwater obstacles on Red and Green beaches, to let the assault troops through; and four 60-foot gaps on Yellow Beach for the passage of LSTs. Two breaching operations were made on the morning and afternoon of the day before the landings. The sappers moved to the beaches in L.C.V.Ps and LVTs and struggled waist-deep through mud to place their charges. Detachments from 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion acted as gun crews on the LVTs, and covering fire was also given by 25 pounders from Sadau Island and warships Smoke-laying aircraft were also used. Despite the heavy mud and sporadic sniping and mortar fire from the shore, the task was successfully carried out and the thoroughly exhausted sappers were evacuated without casualty. This achievement was one of the most vital contributing factors to the success of the whole operation.
On P-day, for an hour and a half, from first light, cruisers and destroyers poured shells into the beach area. From the land came flashes as rocket-firing gunboats ran close inshore to cover the assault craft, while four flights of heavy bombers dropped their bombs along the foreshore. On both beaches the leading waves of the assault Battalions moved through the gaps in the obstacles to land practically dry-shod. There was no opposition from the beach itself or within the limits of the first objective. It was apparent that the Japanese had withdrawn inland, although he could obviously have put up a very effective resistance to the landing on the beach itself from strongly built concrete pillboxes dug into the embankment.
Within an hour of landing 2/48th Battalion struck some slight opposition on the feature immediately north-east of Lingkas tank farm, but continued to advance and secured its portion of the covering position later in the day. Stiff resistance held up 2/23rd Battalion on a ridge north-west of Milko, which was captured the next day. This enabled the Battalion to advance northward and eastward, one company overcoming Japanese resistance in the King's Goss area. By nightfall on the second day, apart from isolated pockets, the only part of the covering position not held was Hospital Ridge, where the Japanese were strongly entrenched in bunkers and tunnels. This hold-up seriously affected the development of the beach maintenance area, as the road to the north of the contested feature was needed to complete a traffic circuit. The same day 2/48th Battalion occupied Lyons. Against some opposition 2/24th Battalion advanced rapidly through Sturt, Wills, Frank and Essex, making successful use of tanks and flame-throwers. Many mines and booby-traps were encountered-on a far greater scale than previously encountered by Australian troops in the Pacific theatre-and in addition to a bomb-disposal platoon, sappers and RAAF engineers were kept busy clearing mined areas.
In the airfield area the going was hard owing to the terrain, stiff resistance, and the great number of mines and booby traps. One company overcame these difficulties and occupied Airstrip Ridge. Another company cleared Anzac Highway, where the Japanese ineffectively fired oil in a ditch as a defensive measure. In the Peningki-Baroe area two tanks silenced a troublesome nest of heavy and light machine guns which had menaced vehicles moving along a section of Anzac Highway. The Japanese fought desperately and the position was not finally cleared out until the next day. The 2/48th Battalion had patrols advancing on Peter, Sykes and Butch. It was at Sykes that the Japanese made one of his strongest counterattacks, but "C" Company held the ridge. The main feature in the centre of Tarakan township was strongly attacked by 2/4th Commando Squadron and occupied after two days' heavy fighting. Hospital Ridge was finally cleared on the third day, tanks assisting the infantry. This completed the occupation of the covering position, and opened up Collins Highway as a traffic circuit. On the same day, Brigadier Whitehead obtained approval to withdraw 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion from 2nd Beach Group to relieve 2/23rd Battalion, which then moved to the airfield area and came in contact with the Japanese to the east and north-east.
In the afternoon a patrol of 2/24th Battalion worked round to the west of Rippon, the dominating feature north of the airfield, and reported that the Japanese had apparently abandoned it after two days of heavy artillery fire, giving the Australian control of the airfield. Work began immediately to clear the field of bombs and mines in preparation for the use of mechanical equipment. This ended the first phase of the operation, after four days of hard fighting. The next phase began with 2/4th Commando Squadron and 2/48th Battalion advancing in conjunction to clear the features Jones, Peter and Otway, and the low ground between Otway and the Tarakan feature. A simultaneous attack was then made on the high ground, the commandos moving along Snags Track to reach the objective without opposition; but 2/48th's northward thrust was stopped at a difficult point along the ridge leading to the objective. After patrolling the area for some days, the Battalion outflanked the Japanese positions and in the subsequent attack occupied the ridge.
At the same time 2/3rd Pioneer Battalion advanced with two companies eastward along John's Track and found Japanese positions in depth on each side. Persistent attacks by the pioneers, supported by heavy artillery and naval concentrations and Napalm bomb air strikes, had their reward on 14-May when the features Helen and Sadie were occupied. At the same time elements of the pioneers reached the coast and seized the Japanese defences. In the fight for the Helen feature the Victoria Cross was posthumously won by Corporal John Bernard Mackey. The citation for his award states that:
'Corporal Mackey was in charge of a section of the 2/3rd Australian Pioneer Battalion in the attack on the feature known as Helen, East of Tarakan town. Led by Corporal Mackey the section moved along a narrow spur with scarcely width for more than one man when it came under fire from three well-sited positions near the top of a very steep, razor-backed ridge. The ground fell away almost sheer on each side of the track making it almost impossible to move to a flank so Corporal Mackey led his men forward. He charged the first Light machine-gun position but slipped and after wrestling with one enemy, bayoneted him, and charged straight on to the Heavy Machine-Gun which was firing from a bunker position six yards to his right. He rushed this post and killed the crew with grenades.
He then jumped back and changing his rifle for a sub-machine-gun he attacked further up the steep slope another Light Machine-Gun position which was firing on his platoon. Whilst charging, he fired his gun and reached within a few feet of the enemy position when he was killed by Light Machine-Gun fire but not before he had killed two more enemy. By his exceptional bravery and complete disregard for his own life, Corporal Mackey was largely responsible for the killing of seven Japanese and the elimination of two machine-gun posts, which enabled his platoon to gain its objective, from which the Company continued to engage the enemy. His fearless action and outstanding courage were an inspiration to the whole battalion.' (London Gazette: 8 November 1945.)
Patrols of 2/24th Battalion fanned out over a wide area to the west, north and east. Within four days one platoon had penetrated along the Anzac Highway as far as Djoeata, where they encountered Japanese troops but cleared the village without much trouble. The Netherlands infantry company had advanced southward along the road from Peningki area to Karoengan and by 10 May had reached the sawmills at Karoengan without seeing the Japanese. This meant that the right flank was clear from District IV to Karoengan. On 13-May the company landed at Cape Pasir jetty without opposition and cleared the features Spike, Spear and Peach. Sixteen days after the landing the Australian forces had cut through to the east coast, the Netherlands East Indies troops occupied the southern peninsula, and two-thirds of the island, including the Pamoesian and Djoeata oil fields, was in Australian hands.
At this stage a policy of extensive patrolling and ambushes coupled with harassing fire had the effect of confining Japanese activities to very definite and limited areas, and threatening his freedom of movement above ground. A feature of the attacks on Japanese strongholds was the co-operation and accuracy of supporting aircraft and artillery, and naval bombardment. In particular the dropping of inflammable belly tanks on Japanese positions proved very effective as large burnt-out patches in vacated areas testified. At night the Japanese employed infiltration attacks extensively. Small parties, usually armed with explosives, endeavoured to pierce Australian lines with the intention of damaging installations, but they had very little success. Japanese positions were steadily and progressively overcome, and by the end of May the Japanese had been beaten back to the Fukukaku positions. On 30-May the brigade came under direct command of First Corps, as the 9th Division was about to undertake the invasion of the Brunei Bay area on the north-west coast.
After a period of softening up a general advance began in all sectors on 14-June. The main drive from the south-west by 2/23rd Battalion penetrated the area, while co-ordinated attacks from the north-west by 2/24th Battalion and from the south-east by 2/48th Battalion cleaned out remaining Japanese positions. By the evening of the Is-June the Fukukaku area was completely over-run and mopping up was almost complete. Organised resistance by the Japanese as a force was ended and survivors retreated in independent groups to the north and the north-east. The remaining Japanese were hunted by patrols, and many were captured attempting to leave by improvised rafts.
On the morning of 27-June a colourful religious ceremony was held in the Pamoesian oil fields at the first pump to be restored. In accordance with the native practice a cow was slaughtered and its head buried near the pump house, the object of this being to bury all the evil spirits and ensure that no bad accidents occurred in the field. Shortly after 10 am on 29-June, the first plane-excluding the tiny Auster reconnaissance aircraft-landed on the Croydon strip, to be followed during the day by twenty Kittyhawks. Next day twelve Spitfires arrived, while two Lightnings, which had been providing air cover for the great 7th Division convoy en route to Balikpapan came in to refuel. In two months of unrelenting fighting 26th Brigade had achieved its main objects, and by 31 July, 1499 Japanese dead had been counted, with an estimated additional dead of 235. Guerrilla forces dispatched thirty-nine and 314 had been taken prisoner, a total of 2087.
The cost to Australian forces, however, had been considerable. The killed, (including Lt T C Derrick, VC, DCM of 2/48th Battalion) totalled 233, wounded 644, while 1434 had been evacuated through sickness.
The next task of the 9th Division was to capture and hold the Brunei Bay-Miri-Seria area of North Borneo to permit the establishment of an advanced fleet base in Brunei Bay, to recover and protect the oil and rubber resources there and re-establish British Government control in the occupied areas. The operation was to be carried out by the division, less the 26th Brigade. Placed under command were certain corps, British and US troops, and units of the RAAF and US Air Force and Navy. The landing in the Muara-Brooketon area was to be made by 20th Brigade,commanded by Brigadier W J V Windeyer) with 24th Brigade, Brigadier S H W C Porter) making a simultaneous landing on Labuan Island, prior to operations on the nearby mainland.
The embarkation of the force called for considerable organisation. In all, five convoys left ports in the Philippines and Halmaheras to converge on Brunei Bay. The main assault convoy sailed from Morotai on the 4 June 1945 and completed the voyage without incident. First light on Z- 10 June) saw two striking forces standing off the shores of Brunei Bay-long lines of ships stretching beyond the horizon, poised for an amphibious landing against Japanese -held British possessions.
For the landing on Brunei Peninsula the beach at Brooketon, designated Yellow Beach) was the best available. However, to reach it assault craft would have to pass through a narrow channel in Muara harbour, which meant that Muara Island would first have to be cleared of the Japanese. It was finally decided to land near Brunei Bluff, Green Beach), and to take Yellow Beach by movement overland; also to make a simultaneous assault landing on the south-east end of Muara Island, White Beach), moving overland immediately to capture Red Beach, the most suitable for unloading stores.
The next phase of the brigade commander's plan called for the capture of Brooketon and the rest of Muara Island, followed by a drive along the road from Brooketon to Brunei. After the landing of heavy equipment and bulk stores on Yellow Beach, a detachment in small craft was to seize a suitable position on the banks of Brunei River to enable artillery to be landed to support a land advance from Brooketon to capture Brunei town.
2/l7th Battalion was selected to land on Green Beach, 2/l5th on White Beach, and 2/l3th was to be held in reserve. The Muara-Brooketon area is sandy and flat, with casuarina trees and some rain forest, but to the west are steep slopes covered with vegetation. Between these hills there is considerable cultivation including coconut and rubber plantations. Native villages are numerous, but there are few towns of any size or importance. Brunei, the capital of the State and seat of the Sultan, had a pre-war population of l200, of whom only fourteen were Europeans. It was difficult to estimate Japanese strength, but the maximum was reckoned to be 2000 to 2500. In fact, it was found to consist of two depleted independent infantry Battalions, amounting to about 450 men, with service units bringing the total to about 800. Japanese air and naval activity was negligible.
Naval and air support for the operation was on a comparatively large scale. The naval force included one light cruiser, four destroyers, gunboats and rocket-boats. Following the usual pattern there was to be a heavy bombardment of both assault beaches for one hour before the landing, followed by close support fire from the smaller craft just before the assault troops hit the shore. Air support was the responsibility of RAAF Command with elements of 13th US Air Force.
Both landings were unopposed. At 9.15 am on 10-June, 2/15th Battalion landed on White Beach at the south-east end of Muara Island and found the Japanese defences abandoned. The Battalion pushed west and by last light was established at Ledong Point. At Green Beach, Brunei Bluff) 2/l7th Battalion also met no organised opposition. Brooketon was captured, and at the end of the day the Battalion had cleared all the area east of the general line Brunei-Yellow Beach. 2/l3th Battalion, the brigade reserve, had also landed at Green Beach and was established in the area Foochow-Derby.
The first night a truck containing eight Japanese drove straight into 2/l7th Battalion's forward company positions on the Brunei-Brooketon road. After Australian machine guns had dispatched seven of the occupants, the survivor informed his captors that the men in the truck had been ignorant of the landing. They had apparently regarded the naval and air bombardment as normal. The advance of 2/l7th Battalion proceeded rapidly down the road towards Brunei, with two platoons of 2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion and a troop of tanks in support. The tanks did not get far, being too heavy for the culverts. The marching infantry found the weather more troublesome than the Japanese.
A water patrol of three barges manned by detachments of 2/15th Battalion, engineer and artillery reconnaissance parties, and detachments of signals, medical and British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit moved up the Brunei River and landed three and a half miles east of Brunei. The next day a troop of 25 pounders was landed there and by noon the guns were in action. Continuing its advance 2/l7th Battalion occupied the Brunei airfield. By the afternoon of the I3-June 2!l7th had captured the town of Brunei, mopping up small parties. The town had suffered severe damage from Allied air raids and Japanese demolition. Patrols released several natives found chained to stakes; eight others had died.
On the l6-June a platoon of 2/15th Battalion moving southward along the Limbang road ran into an ambush and suffered two casualties. The Japanese position was shelled and the patrol continued until it reached Limbang River. A waterborne patrol then moved up the Pandaruan River accompanied by two American gunboats with orders to raid Limbang. It reached Terumi without contact and at 9.30 am on 17-Tune it landed unopposed at a village, which for this operation was named Gyro. "A" Company, advancing along Limbang road, had sent a patrol forward to a village designated Gasolene. The next day the remainder of "B" Company moved by landing craft to Gyro. Late in the afternoon Limbang was occupied without contacting the Japanese.
On 15 June a new phase of the Brunei operations had begun with the advance southward along the coast. Under orders to exploit along the road Brunei-Tutong, two companies of 2/l7th Battalion moved out of Brunei. Brigade headquarters was established in the residency at Brunei.
A rapid advance on foot was made towards Tutong. With "B" Company leading, and no opposition met with, eight miles along the road was covered on the Is-June. Next day this company in trucks and jeeps advanced about twenty miles in less than six hours. By night Tutong was occupied.
The advance was resumed on 17-June. Next day "C" Company passed through "B" Company and with a platoon of 2/2nd Machine Gun Battalion, raced on towards Seria, where natives had reported the presence of Japanese troops. During the day the company caught up with rear elements of the Japanese, who fled on the appearance of Australian troops.
On 16-June "C" Company reached the mouth of the Lumut River without opposition. They continued the advance and made contact with the Japanese late in the afternoon. By 8 pm the bridges over the Bira River on the outskirts of Seria had been secured, and on 21 June Seria was occupied again, without opposition. Seria presented an amazing sight. The Japanese had fired the oil fields shortly after the landing at Brooketon, and columns of black smoke could be seen from twenty miles away. In the town area the air was filled with smoke and a fine spray of oil, and there was a continuous hissing and rumbling from the fires, which burned like great blow-torches. At one stage thirty-one fires were counted. On 24-June "A" Company resumed the advance and occupied Kuala Belait without opposition.
Back at Brooketon 2/l3th Battalion and two companies of 2/l5th had been held in preparation for a coastal operation to outflank the Japanese retreating from Brunei. At 9.30 am on 20-June they made an unopposed landing at Lutong and by 3 pm had occupied the town and the peninsula to a point 3000 yards south of the airstrip. For two days patrols searched the area without making contact with the Japanese. They found the bodies of Javanese who had been bayoneted, and three Japanese killed by natives. On 23 June Miri was occupied without opposition by troops moving down from Lutong. As extensive patrolling around Miri yielded nothing it was clear that the Japanese had evacuated before the landing, moving along the old Riam road. This marked the limit of 20th Brigade's southward thrust. The advance had been so rapid that at this stage, a fortnight after the landing, the brigade held ninety miles of coast and had moved round Brunei Bay as far as Limbang. Nowhere had the Japanese made any attempt to put up a determined resistance. A feature of the campaign was the co-operation of the natives, who appeared to have a fervent hatred of the Japanese. The Dyaks, a primitive people living in the hills, were enthusiastic and successful guerrillas. Another feature of the operation was the unexpected number of Japanese prisoners taken-at this stage totalling fifty. Counted dead were 122, while natives were reported to have killed between 75 and 100 in the Limbang area. Despite the low casualty rate, medical units were kept busy owing to the numbers of natives requiring attention. At Brunei, within five days of the landing, a detachment of 2/l3th Field Ambulance was treating 500 patients a day.
The rapid advance of 2/l7th Battalion and the wide dispersal of the brigade was a heavy strain on Signals resources, and introduced many supply problems. By putting a number of captured vehicles into running order, workshop units were able to assist in getting supplies to the troops. Some of the recaptured vehicles bore the emu sign of the 8th Australian Division. The operation now entered into a phase of extensive patrol activity in all sectors. Parties moved by land and water along the coast and inland seeking the Japanese, but in most cases the challenge remained unanswered. On the s-July, however, a mobile patrol in sandbagged jeeps with artillery support left Miri on a long-range reconnaissance of Riam road and was held up at a point 7000 yards south-east of Miri by a force of nearly l00 Japanese. Heavily armed, the Japanese were very aggressive, leaving their dug-in position and attacking several times over open ground in attempts to outflank the patrol. After killing an estimated twenty-five Japanese Australian troops withdrew, and the position was heavily shelled. When later examined by Australian troops it was found to have been occupied by approximately one company.
By the end of July patrols of 2/l3th Battalion had penetrated twelve miles along the Riam road, and had moved down to Dalam and Liku pumping stations and along Miri River without seeing any movement. In 2/l7th Battalion's area patrols pushed inland along the Belait River to Balai, where a patrol base was established. From this point Australian troops penetrated eight miles up the Menderam River without making contact, and along the Telingan River as far as Simpang. From here a patrol reached Menderam and moved on to Ridan on the l2-July. On the Belait River Australians travelling in native canoes had reached Usong and found it deserted. On 15 July a strong patrol, with HMAS Tigersnake and aircraft in support, pushed up the Barroom River and landed unopposed at Ridan. The force then advanced to Marudi to find that the Japanese had again decamped. A river patrol supported by a gunboat moved from Marudi and occupied Bakoeng without opposition. The patrols based on Marudi and Ridan were very active, and there were minor clashes with the Japanese at points along the river.
In the Brunei-Limbang sector 2/15th Battalion at Limbang quickly spread long tentacles inland along river and tracks covering a wide area. Patrols penetrated south-west along the winding Limbang River as far as Ukong. Farther west troops moving overland reached Abang and proceeded up Tutong River by native prahu to reach Rambai on 13-July. To the south-east, troops moved to Bangar on the Temburong River and patrols were sent east to Labu Estate. East of Limbang patrols ranged the Trusan and Lawas rivers from the two villages bearing those names. Company patrol bases were established at Bangar and Lawas, and parties scoured, l the surrounding tracks and waterways.
By the end of July patrols from 2/l5th Battalion had reached up the Temburong River as far south as Anggun, and to the north-east one of the patrols based on Lawas had made contact with troops of 2/3rd Tank Attack Regiment at Sindumin, thirty-five miles across the map from Limbang and on the boundary of the two brigade areas. Despite the continuous and vigorous long-range patrolling which had been maintained throughout the whole brigade area during this period, there had been little contact with the Japanese, and it was evident that the Japanese had decided on a policy of evacuation of their areas as they came within the range of Australian patrols.
Simultaneously with 20th Brigade landing, 24th Brigade went ashore on Labuan Island, strategically important because of its dominating position in the bay and the presence of an airfield built by the Japanese.
The island is roughly triangular, with the apex to the north and two large inlets in the base. The eastern inlet is Victoria Harbour, a sheltered deep-water port suitable for flying boats. The area of about thirty-five square miles is made up of hilly forest land to the west, grasslands and scrub to the east, and swamps to the south. Japanese land forces were estimated at 650, but information after the landing suggested 550 as being nearer the mark. Japanese air strength in the area was known to be limited, and it was expected that activity would be restricted to possible nuisance raids.
The Australian forces consisted of two Battalions of the 24th Brigade, the third being in reserve), a commando squadron, an armoured squadron, a field regiment including one troop of 4.2inch mortars, a light anti-aircraft troop, a field company, a machine-gun company and service troops. Also under command was a detachment of the US 727 Amphibian Tractor Battalion, and, for the landing only, a number of corps, divisional, base, RAAF and US units, and1st Beach Group less a detachment with 20th Brigade.
The brigade commander planned a landing on a beach on the south coast, designated Brown Beach with a direct approach to the airfield up the peninsula. Two assault Battalions were to be used, 2/43rd Battalion on the right and 2/28th Battalion on the left, supported by tanks and with the commando squadron in brigade reserve. Sappers from 2/7th Field Company were to be included in the first assault wave to make a mine reconnaissance of the landing beach and beachhead. Intensified air attacks began some weeks before the operation on an increasing scale. Naval bombardment began two days before Z-day and went on to culminate in a fierce barrage on Z-day itself with concentrated fire from rockets and mortars immediately before the landing.
Soon after dawn the bombardment began, first an hour's barrage from cruisers and destroyers, then rocket and mortar ships raced inshore ahead of the assault waves, firing on a fixed range so that their fire swept inland from the beach as the craft neared the shore. Escorted by fighters, medium and heavy bombers blanketed the target area. The first waves beached at 9.15 am on time. The landing was unopposed and the infantry quickly pushed inland against slight opposition, and by 10.30 am the battered town of Victoria was in Australian hands. Shortly after 11.30 am the Commander-in-Chief South-west Pacific Area, General MacArthur) went ashore from a US cruiser, accompanied by the GOC First Corps, Lt-General Sir Leslie Morshead) and high-ranking officers of the three services.
The advance was maintained by both Battalions, and by last light the airfield and Government House area had been secured, with the reservoir and pumping station intact. One troop of 2/11th Commando Squadron had landed unopposed on Hamilton Peninsula after naval bombardment and occupied the Ardie and Horel localities. 2/12th Field Regiment had all its guns ashore and three troops were in action at points within 1000 yards of the beach. On the second day 2/28th Battalion attacked on the left to clear the Japanese from an area west of Flagstaff to MacArthur Road, while the 2/43rd Battalion moved to clear the area east of Labuan airfield. No opposition was encountered and forward elements of the Battalion pushed north along Coal Point Road, two miles beyond the airfield. Although the Japanese resisted stubbornly throughout the day, 2/28th Battalion advanced and prepared to attack an Japanese position between MacArthur Road and the airfield. Darkness delayed the attack until first light on the following day, when the Battalion moved in with Matilda tanks to capture the position and continue the advance through to MacArthur Road.
Tanks were also used by 2/43rd Battalion in a successful attack on an Japanese position several hundred yards north-west of the airfield. After consolidating, the Battalion spread to the west, one company capturing the junction of Hamilton and MacArthur roads. By last light the airfield was secured to east and west and the divisional covering position was held, with the Japanese contained in a small area between the airfield and the mangrove swamps to the west. It was apparent that the bulk of Japanese forces on the island had withdrawn to prepared positions along a ridge in this area in readiness for a last stand. During the day RAAF Beaufighters gave close support to the attack.
On the fourth day 2/28th Battalion cleared the area through to the mangrove swamp, two companies containing the Japanese position on the ridge while two more advanced north beyond the divisional covering position. The 2/43rd Battalion moved west to take Timbalai airstrip, capturing three features on the way, and finally patrolling to the coast. At one point elements of the Battalion linked up with the commandos who had moved north after clearing Hamilton Peninsula. From this day onwards extensive patrolling of the whole island was carried out while the Japanese pocket north of the town was subjected to several attacks.
On 15-June "A" Company of 2/28th Battalion in a determined attack succeeded in driving the Japanese off the ridge, killing thirty, but the Japanese still held a knoll dominating the ridge. "A" Company was later relieved by "C". On 16-June heavy air, naval and artillery bombardment was brought down on the position but the Japanese clung tenaciously to well-prepared defences and only small advances were made. The infantry was handicapped by the exposed nature of the approaches to the ridge, and the fact that the surrounding swamps and heavy jungle prevented the use of tanks. For the next two days the pounding from the air and ground continued, but the Japanese fought back stubbornly.
On the night of 17/l8 June several Japanese attempts at infiltration were frustrated. Five Japanese attacked a platoon of "C" Company and three who were killed had 3o-pound aerial bombs strapped to their backs. The Japanese also made use of aerial bombs as booby-traps suspended in the trees. Pressure on the pocket was intensified, and on 19 June eighty 8-inch shells from HMAS Shropshire rained down on the position, with another forty-eight rounds the following day. This was followed by low-lying Mitchells dropping Napalm and 500 pound high-explosive bombs. Little change took place during the day, but that night the Japanese commander apparently realised that the situation was hopeless and decided on a desperate attempt to break out with the idea of inflicting a maximum of damage before the inevitable end.
At 10 pm on the night of 20/2l June two suicide parties, each about fifty strong, crept out of the pocket down to the town area, one party moving along the edge of the Swamp and down North Road, the other across to the airfield and then south. At 4 am an attack was made on the beach maintenance area. The Japanese achieved surprise and managed to inflict some casualties but the Australian troops quickly recovered and wiped them out before much damage could be done. At daylight the beach area was littered with the bodies of forty-nine Japanese. Other Japanese troops were killed near the airfield.
The day after the suicide attack the pocket was entirely reduced in an attack by the infantry with flame-throwing tanks and artillery support. A total of ninety Japanese dead was counted, and there was hardly a tree or square yard of ground which was not scarred from the terrific weight of fire power which had been concentrated on this last Japanese strong. Apart from isolated and disorganised parties of Japanese which were later quickly mopped up, the capture of the island was complete. Preparations were immediately made for further operations on the mainland. Landings were to be made next at two points along the northern reaches of Brunei Bay for a drive on Beaufort-terminus of the railway lines from Weston and Jesselton.
On 17 June a force made up of 2/32nd Battalion Group, the division reserve which had remained afloat for some days after Z-day, moved from Labuan to land unopposed at Weston. Moving inland Australian troops found signs of recent occupation, but no Japanese were seen up to a point 2000 yards south-west of Weston. A patrol to Lingkungan reported the village clear of Japanese and natives. During the next week water craft patrols reached along the Bukau River and up the Padas River to a point beyond Karang, while land patrols reached as far north as Naparan without contacting the Japanese. Two days after the Weston landing a force went ashore unopposed on Mempakul beach at the northern tip of Brunei Bay, preceded by an artillery bombardment of a troop of 3.7 anti-aircraft guns and one battery of 25 pounders firing from Labuan.
This force, which was to form the northern arm of the drive on Beaufort, consisted of the 2/43rd Battalion less two companies, 2/11th Commando Squadron, one troop of 2/12th Field Regiment and a detachment of 2/16th Field Company. A covering position was quickly obtained from Menumbok through to the coast, and the commandos moved ahead to contact the Japanese about a mile beyond. The Japanese withdrew overnight. Portion of Australian force moved by barge up the Klias River to land at a point near Menumbok. Other troops pushed forward overland, the commandos reaching Malikai in two days.
On 23 June a further landing was made, this time by a patrol from "D" Company of 2/43rd Battalion at Sabang on the west coast of Klias Peninsula, to establish a base for exploitation farther north. They moved inland to link up at Karakan with 2/11th Commando Squadron which had reached the village by an overland route. An amphibious patrol travelling north from Sabang landed near Cape Nosong, and one section moved east to Kuala Penyu, the other north to Tidong, without sighting the Japanese. On the night of 23/24 June part of the force moved up the Klias River to Kota Klias and overland to Kandu, in a direct line north-west of Beaufort. Only a few Japanese were encountered. On 25-June patrols of 2/43rd Battalion moved unopposed to reach Woodford Estate, to the west of Beaufort, and also a point on the railway line three miles to the south-west of the town.
The stage was now reached for a regrouping of Australian forces for the attack on Beaufort. A beachhead was established on the Padas River at a point a few miles west of Beaufort to which Brigade Tactical Headquarters had advanced, and the Padas River became the line of communication for the brigade. On 27 June Japanese resistance, not co-ordinated, nevertheless stubborn, was encountered north-west of the ferry across the Padas River, and on the railway line south of Bingkul. Troops moved north of Beaufort in a wide outflanking movement, and others struck bitter resistance from the Taps in positions north-east of the town. For his gallantry during this fighting Private Leslie Thomas Starcevich was awarded the Victoria Cross. His citation stated:
'Private L Starcevich was a member of 2/43rd Australian Infantry Battalion during the capture of Beaufort, North Borneo. During the approach along a thickly wooded spur, the enemy was encountered at a position where movement of the single track leading into the enemy defences was difficult and hazardous. When the leading section came under fire from two enemy machine-gun posts and suffered casualties, Private Starcevich, who was Bren gunner, moved forward and assaulted each post in turn. He rushed each post, firing his Bren gun from the hip, killed five enemy and put the remaining occupants of the posts to flight. The advance progressed until the section came under fire from two more machine-gun posts which halted the section temporarily. Private Starcevich again advanced fearlessly firing his Bren gun from the hip and ignoring the hostile fire captured both posts single-handed, disposing of seven enemy. These daring efforts enabled the Company to increase the momentum of its attack and so relieve pressure on another Company which was attacking from another direction. The outstanding gallantry of Private Starcevich in carrying out these attacks single-handed with complete disregard of his own personal safety resulted in the decisive success of the action.' (London Gazette: 8 November 1945.)
Before midday on 28-June all organised resistance in Beaufort ceased, and 2/43rd Battalion fought into the town, capturing much Japanese equipment. While mopping up was still going on Australian forces began to spread along the railway lines, 2/28th Battalion pushing north and 2/32nd Battalion patrolling southward on the Weston line.
Our forces regrouped on the 5 July and advances continued along the three railway lines. The following day, elements of 2/32nd Battalion reached Membakut and patrolled along the Damit River to the mouth, thence along the coast to the Bongawan River. On the 9 July a landing was made on the coast a few miles north of Kimanis, and two days later they were joined by troops who had followed the railway without contacting the Japanese. At the same stage, the troops advancing east along the Beaufort-Tenom line had reached the southern bend of the line, where they killed a small party of Japanese. To the south Australian troops had been attacked in the Lumadan area, but the Japanese were driven off.
The Japanese opposed Australian advance all the way from Beaufort to the east, and in many encounters he suffered heavy losses. Reserve forces in the Beaufort area had a few minor clashes with the Japanese. Very few Japanese were now reported to be in the Klias and Weston areas. In the north, at the same time that Australian forces linked at Kimanis, a company landing from LCMs brought the advance to within five miles of Papar. Two days later this coastal force reached the mouth of the Papar River while troops advancing overland from the south occupied the deserted village of Papar, where opposition was negligible. This area was consolidated and before long standing patrols were established in the north and east of the village. Papar marked the limit of the brigade's exploitation to the north.
By the end of July the brigade was in a static position in control of a coastal strip seventy miles long, with continuous patrolling going on in several sectors. The Japanese had been forced inland into difficult country and denied access to supplies. At the cessation of hostilities the division had begun the next task of moving inland to regain control of all productive areas such as rice fields and rubber plantations, and to consolidate these areas so that the native population could be returned to their villages to assist in food production. With the division was the British Borneo Civil Affairs Unit, which had detachments operating with units to organise local resources and to help rehabilitate the native population.
During May and June I945, Australian bombing -which had begun in October 1944-was intensified to become the softening up for a seaborne assault by the Seventh Australian Division under the command of Maj-General E J Milford. The object of the operation was to capture and hold the Balikpapan-Manggar area of eastern Borneo for the establishment of air and naval facilities in the area and to conserve the petroleum producing and processing installations. The Japanese had had plenty of time to fortify Balikpapan-they had held it since January 1942 The 9th Division landings at Tarakan, Brunei and Labuan had warned them of the type of assault to expect. Aerial photographs and information through intelligence channels showed powerful defences. An offshore underwater obstacle of coconut logs laced together, three deep, starting north of Manggar, had been extended westward along the coast to include Klandasan. Extensive anti-tank ditches had been constructed. Trench networks on the ridges north of the beaches had been extended and improved. In the Klandasan area alone fifty tunnel entrances had been detected. Extensive land mines and booby-traps were expected. Several heavy coast defence guns had been located. Japanese anti-aircraft defences-described by Australian Air Force as the heaviest yet encountered in the South-west Pacific area-had already taken toll of Australian bombers. The majority of the weapons were of a dual-purpose type, capable also of being used for coastal defence.
There was a strong possibility of the Japanese using a burning-oil defence on the beaches. The pipeline from Sambodja to Balikpapan runs parallel to and within 300 yards of the beach. Flows of oil from points along this pipeline, and from the refineries themselves, could be ignited and directed to the beaches with devastating effect. To counter this Australian bombers were directed to destroy large sections of the pipeline before the landing. A triple minefield protected the harbour and sea approaches. The latest Allied acoustic mines had been dropped from the air to complicate the existing Dutch and Japanese fields. It meant a long and hazardous job for the mine sweepers because Australian mines are particularly difficult to sweep. Japanese strength in the Balikpapan area was estimated to be 3900 with reinforcements of another l500 at Samarinda, sixty miles to the north-east. In addition to these troops 4500 civilian labourers, made up of Japanese, Formosans and Indonesians, were thought to be in the Balikpapan-Samarinda localities.
The initial planning for the operations was carried out at Kairi on the Atherton Tableland. Here, during April and May 1945, a small team, under the direction of Major General Milford, made plans for the initial assault. Four possible landing beaches were in the area. Of these Manggar and Klandasan were the most suitable.
There were two ideas about how Balikpapan should be taken. One was to land on the coast at Manggar and advance along twelve miles of narrow coastal plain to the main objective, the other to land right in the thick of the Japanese defences at Klandasan, two miles from Balikpapan. Less resistance was expected in the first stages at Manggar, but the Japanese would then adjust his defences against a threat from a known direction, thus prolonging the campaign. The more daring alternative-to land in the heart of the Japanese defences at Klandasan-was chosen, while an alternative plan allowed for a landing at Manggar should Klandasan prove to be too powerfully defended. At Klandasan it was hoped to achieve quick results by seizing the key point of the Japanese defences in the initial assault, thus disorganising his force, shortening the campaign and saving lives.
Three brigade groups of the 7th Division were to be committed-the first time in its history that the complete division had fought as one force. 18th Brigade, Brigadier F O Chilton) and 21st Brigade, Brigadier I N Dougherty) were to land side by side in the initial beach assault, while 25th Brigade, Brigadier K W Eather) was to remain offshore as a floating reserve. These Brigades were commanded by, and respectively. The target date for the landing was fixed for the1 July-F-day.
The 7th Divison staged at Morotai during June where the planning for the invasion was finalised. Almost on arrival, troops began to re-embark on ships of the assault convoy. Day by day thousands of soldiers went on to diesel-driven barges which scurried across the bay to the three LSIs, HMAS Manoora, Kanimbla and Westralia, or to LSTs or the many other types of craft. Heavy field guns, flame-thrower tanks, Matilda tanks, motor vehicles, heavy engineering equipment all went the same way. On 24 June, two days before setting off for Borneo, the assault convoy steamed a short way up the coast from Morotai to rehearse on a smaller scale the amphibious landing. About midday on 26 June the largest convoy to carry an Australian invasion force left Morotai and sailed due west for the coast of Borneo. There were more than 200 ships sailing in battle formation.
The troops were told about the strength and weight of Australian assault, armour, support, even the number of rounds of shellfire to be laid down on the objectives before the landing. They were kept informed of the progress made by the mine sweepers and the underwater demolition teams. Sixteen days before the target date mine sweepers had begun the hazardous task of sweeping a passage through the triple minefield off Balikpapan. They came under constant fire from the Japanese heavy guns. Australian destroyers engaged the Japanese shore guns and the mine sweepers carried out their task successfully, but not without loss.
Although Australian sappers had been trained in underwater demolition tasks, the Navy had taken over responsibility for all obstacles below high-water mark. Two days before F-day specially trained US underwater demolition teams blasted a gap 800 yards wide and another 600 yards to 650 yards in the three rows of the offshore timber obstacle. This was accomplished by approaching in a landing craft, transferring to rubber boats and then swimming the last 300 yards to the obstacle, taking explosives and other equipment with them. The explosives were attached to the timber barricade and detonated electrically. The same day Australian engineer parties ensured that the beach was free of mines. At 3 am on the1 July a dull red glow on the horizon a few points to starboard could be seen. from the armada-it was Balikpapan on fire-a result of the rapidly increasing tempo of Australian air and naval bombardment. A few miles to go and "action stations" sounded-day was breaking. Before dawn the thunder of guns from combined Australian, American and Dutch warships and the drone of heavy bombers overhead told of the opening of Australian assault.
Dawn unveiled a terrifying scene. The whole shoreline was blanketed in smoke patterned with tongues of flame shooting hundreds of feet upwards. The beachhead and rolling inland hills were erupting and rocking under the impact of hundreds of tons of high explosive shells and aerial bombs. H-hour for the beach assault was set for 9 am At 7 am the assault troops descended to the landing craft by rope nets. They were eight and a half miles from the shore at the entrance to a 500-yard-wide channel through the minefields. For two hours the sea was a congested mass of small craft manoeuvring into their respective assault waves. Then rocket ships went into action. In two sweeps along the waterfront they plastered 2000 yards of landing beach. As H-hour drew closer Australian barrage increased. To every 230 square yards of the actual landing beach the Navy hurled an average of one shell or rocket. Never before in the Pacific had Australians seen such a tremendous and spectacular display. There was some ineffectual reply to Australian shellfire. Flak from Japanese anti-aircraft fire patterned the smoke shrouded sky.
Five minutes before 9 am the first assault wave of three infantry Battalions hit the beach, 2/10th and 2/12th Battalions of the 18th Brigade on the left, and beside them 2/27th Battalion of 21st Brigade. Ramps of the assault craft banged down on a bewildering scene of desolation. Against a background of black smoke and burning oil stood shell-splintered coconut Palms and the rubble of brick buildings, while native huts were burning fiercely. A few scattered shots harassed the beachhead but the landing was practically unopposed. The Japanese had withdrawn to his tunnels, pillboxes and entrenchments which pockmarked the dominating features some hundreds of yards inland. Troops and heavy mechanical equipment poured on to the narrow beachhead. Every man knew his job, every vehicle and piece of heavy equipment had its allotted place. Engineers were looking for and delousing mines; signallers were running telephone wire; wireless sets were in operation. Matildas and flame-thrower tanks ploughed across the beach and inland to support the infantry.
Bridge laying tanks and bridging equipment capable of spanning I 60-foot gaps were brought ashore in early waves. Bulldozers cleared passages from the beach to the main highway which runs parallel to the beach from the town proper to the airstrips, and on to the oil fields of Sambodja. The late Maj-General George Alan Vasey, loved by every man who had fought with him, was remembered here. The highway was given his name -Vasey Highway. For the first time Australian short 25-pounders complete with ammunition and gun crews were landed in DUKWs (amphibious craft) which rapidly moved to the areas already selected for gun positions. AD hour after landing, shells from eight 25-pounders were whistling over the heads of Australian advancing infantry to thicken up the naval fire. In direct wireless communication with the warships were Naval Bombardment Shore Fire (Control Parties. From vantage points with Australian forward troops these parties accurately directed broadsides from cruisers and destroyers on to the Japanese defensive positions.
Six-pounder tank attack guns and 4.2-inch. mortars, manned by gunners of 2/2na Tank Attack Regiment, were brought ashore in LVTs which hit the beach with the assaulting infantry. They were in action forty minutes later. The 4.2-inch mortars blasted the Japanese on dominating features farther inland while the 6-pounders closely supported the infantry in knocking out bunker positions at a few hundred yards' range. To protect the rapidly expanding mass of equipment in this confined area the infantry. The advance was advancing faster against opposition which was lighter than expected. Only fifteen minutes after landing the three assaulting infantry Battalions had penetrated 800 yards across the beach plain to the pipeline running parallel to the beach. This marked the first phase of the operation: the beachhead had been secured. On the left flank nearer the town proper and the oil refineries, 2/10th Battalion swung to the west, advancing through the rubble of houses on the outskirts of the residential area, Klandasan. The objective was an abrupt feature named Parramatta-a ridge 300 feet high, running IS00 yards due north, on which the Japanese defences commanded the entire Klandasan beach.
Parramatta Ridge was a Japanese fortress. At the top was a cunning trench system, while a hundred feet below were vast intercommunicating honeycomb tunnels. On the seaward side, sheltered in concrete and armoured emplacements, were two I 20-mm. naval guns. Australian shells had shaken the Japanese out of this fortress, razed every vestige of forest, pitted it from top to bottom with craters, and made the way easy for the infantry. At the southernmost point of Parramatta Ridge was Hill 87. "C" Company of the 2/10th Battalion launched an attack against the Japanese on this feature. With tank support the advance would have been difficult enough, but the tanks of 2/1st Armoured Regiment had bogged down near the beach and could not be brought forward in time. With heavy support of 25 pounders and 4.2-inch mortars, "C" Company captured Hill 87 by I pm The Japanese had been strongly emplaced in tunnels on this hill and their sniper fire was accurate.
By this time the tanks had passed the boggy ground near the coast by moving along Vasey Highway through Petersham Junction, reaching Hill 87 in time to support "C" Company's further advance north along Parramatta Ridge. While the infantry were mopping up around Japanese bunker positions and native huts, two tanks-a Matilda and a flame-thrower-moved forward I00 yards in front of a platoon of "C' Company. The Matilda blasted open bunker positions with its 2-pounder gun and through the openings the second tank shot jets of flame. Infantry cleaned up what was left. Japanese opposition was determined, but by 2.20 pm Parramatta Ridge was completely in Australian hands.
During the afternoon 2/9th Battalion progressively relieved the remainder of 2/10th in the initial beachhead area, allowing them to concentrate on Parramatta Ridge with "C" Company. Meanwhile, in the centre between 2/10th and 2/27th Battalions, 2/12th Battalion had cleared the firmly entrenched Japanese from prominent features to a depth of 1500 yards. On the right flank the 2/27th Battalion had advanced forward of the pipeline to capture features Romilly and Rottnest, which menaced the beachhead. One company then swung to the east dealing with isolated bunker positions, while patrols cleared the area to the Klandasan Besar River. 2/16th Battalion landed on the heels of 2/27th Battalion and passing through the captured Romilly feature occupied ridges to the north and east of Rottnest against mortar and machine-gun fire. Stray Japanese with rifles scattered throughout the area had to be dug out before the advance could continue. From these captured features 2/16th launched attacks against firmly entrenched Japanese on Malang feature, 2000 yards north of the beachhead. Malang was in Australian hands by 4 pm.
During this time 2/14th Battalion and 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment had landed and passed through 2/27th Battalion, swinging east to cross the Klandasan Besar River. A high feature on the far bank was captured by 2/14th against light opposition, while 2/7th Commando Regiment advanced to the north-east occupying the same ridge I000 yards farther inland. Sappers moved with the attacking infantry, marking minefields to allow the infantry to advance freely. Behind the advancing troops more engineers were finding and delousing numerous heavy mines and booby-traps. So thorough was their work that these Japanese defences caused few casualties among Australian troops. When night fell on the battlefields at Balikpapan after that first day's fighting the 7th Division had over-run numerous heavily defended localities, captured many Japanese antiaircraft and machine guns, denied him the high ground from which serious interference could have been caused to the unloading of stores, and split open the crust of defences protecting the town itself and the docks area. Only spasmodic shells and mortar bombs harassed the beachhead and few found their mark. The bold strategy had been eminently successful, and careful planning had saved casualties during that vital first day. Australian casualties were twenty-two killed and seventy-four wounded. The Japanese had suffered ten times that number, and more.
Then followed a thunderous night of naval and artillery shelling, night bombing, mortar and machine-gun fire to which the Japanese sporadically replied. The whole northern half of the sky was bright, then brilliant red. Star shells illuminated the battle areas, revealing infiltrating parties of Japanese which clashed with Australian patrols. As dawn broke more than 300 Japanese dead lay scattered about Parramatta Ridge many as the result of the night's patrol clashes. Beside some of the bodies were long wooden spears with sharp points of metal-a primitive weapon, but efficient in the dark. Below Parramatta nestles the former lovely Dutch suburb, Klandasan, with street upon street of neat brick villas, now shell-splintered ruins. It was thought that the Japanese would fight house-to-house and street-to-street, but less than a dozen remained with a few natives in ruined Klandasan that morning. The natives, pitifully emaciated from starvation, lay exhausted among their own dead, too weak to move. The few stray Japanese were mopped up by 2/9th Battalion, which had advanced through the Santosa barracks area. Many tunnel entrances led into the hills near Santosa barracks and Klandasan. Some of these tunnels, particularly those of the Japanese commanders, were comfortably furnished. The bypassing of these tunnels would have left Australian rear open to attack. Matildas and a flame-throwing frog, supporting 2/9th's advance, supplied the answer: fierce jets of flame from the frog roared into the dark openings, while the Matildas demolished the entrances with 2-pounder shells, bottling up the occupants. Silhouetted on a ridge against an oil-blackened sky to the west of Parramatta were the blasted and tangled installations of the oil-cracking plant. Along this ridge to the right, large squat oil storage tanks were set on a tabletop feature: Tank Plateau. Not one of these tanks had escaped Australian bombardment.
During the second morning's fighting a large storage tank burst. A great sea of blazing oil roared down the valley between Tank Plateau and Parramatta Ridge, where Australian patrols were active. The whole valley became an inferno. So terrific was the heat that Australian men on the ridge threw themselves on the ground, pressing their faces against the earth and escaping the fire. Following a heavy artillery and mortar concentration that afternoon a company of 2/10th Battalion skirted the valley and mounted the southern slopes of the cracking-plant feature. A 6-pounder tank-attack gun supporting this attack accurately sniped four machine-gun posts, destroying them with direct hits. North of Parramatta two companies of 2/10th Battalion had pushed the Japanese from a high feature overlooking ! the town and harbour: Newcastle feature. The division was now well placed to launch an attack on Balikpapan itself.
Morning of 2 July had seen the reserve infantry brigade 25th-beaching and moving inland to relieve units of the two assault brigades in the central sector. This enabled 18th to concentrate its entire force for an attack on the town, and 21st to make a successful thrust east along Vasey Highway. With 2/7th Commando Regiment protecting its left flank, 2/14th Sepmggang Battalion rapidly advanced along Vasey Highway against scattered opposition. On the left flank Australian dismounted cavalry was held up by strongly entrenched Japanese in the foothills about I000 yards north of the highway, but 2/l4h continued to advance, enveloping Sepinggang airstrip by 11 am on 2 July. The airstrip was soon secured. It was badly cratered, but work began immediately and it was serviceable for Auster scout planes by midday the following day. Back on the Klandasan beach and for some distance inland huge ordnance and engineer dumps were rapidly expanding. Vehicles of all descriptions-bulldozers, Alligators, graders, heavy trucks and jeeps-cluttered the roads awaiting movement to the dispersal areas.
Large floating docks which had been brought 800 miles in the assault convoy, now spanned the shallow water between the beach and the landing ships. All day and most of the night landing craft ferried equipment ashore, while LSTs and LCTs disgorged hundreds of tons of cargo. On the 18th Brigade front, 2/12th Battalion had relieved 2/10th's companies on Newcastle feature-our foremost point to Balikpapan township. From this 300-foot eminence, through gaps in the smoke on the morning of that third day's fighting, one could look down on the devastated thoroughfares and built-up areas less than half a mile away. In the left foreground was the thousand-yard-long Tank Plateau, smoking after its terrific pounding. Across the town the harbour front with its many broken piers; rising above the outrunning tide were the funnels and masts of a Japanese warship and the broken hulls of many small craft. To the right, beside a muddy inner harbour, was old Kerosene Tank Farm. On the far right, two miles away, the old Dutch Barracks, and on the far left, Cape Toekoeng and Signal Hill.
At 9 am the 18th Brigade launched a three pronged attack on Balikpapan. On the left, supported by a troop of Matildas and a flame throwing frog, 2/9th Battalion captured a Japanese radar station on Signal Hill, and advancing around Cape Toekoeng, cleared the harbour front north to the old oil refinery. Advancing through the twisted, white-hot refining installations, and across Tank Plateau, 2/10th Battalion occupied the town area at the power-house, north of 2/9th. To complete the occupation of Balikpapan 2/12th Battalion had pushed north-west from Newcastle to clear the industrial area, Pandansari. Heavy mortaring and shelling from dual-purpose anti-aircraft guns on two nearby features, Nail and Nurse, delayed 2/l2th's advance to Pandansari. The Japanese fire was quickly silenced by naval fire and the 25 pounders of 2/4th Field Regiment. A company of 2/12th Battalion with tank 6upport then attacked Nail feature, securing it during the late afternoon.
Except for a few scattered Japanese snipers in bunker positions, who were routed by flame-throwers and mopped up by the infantry, Balikpapan had been evacuated by the Japanese. All that remained was an eerie, deserted mass of crumbling mortar and the charred skeletons of power plants, factories and business houses. Huge storage tanks had collapsed centrally and lay flattened. Telephone posts and broken wires drunkenly lined the main highway along the waterfront and there were many damaged motor cars; locomotives used for hauling long lines of coal to the wharves had been brought to a standstill. Beside the road were shattered oil-pipes from which oil still dribbled to feed the diminishing flames.
With Auster scout planes using the Sepinggang strip, 21st Brigade's next objective lay six miles to the north-east Advance to Manggar airfield, the second largest in Borneo. Relieved by 2/27th Battalion at Sepinggang on 3 July, 2/l4th Battalion advanced farther along Vasey Highway. The bitumen surface of this coastal road was badly cratered and bridges over the many small streams had been blown. The area between the road and the coast had been heavily mined and booby-trapped. As the infantry advanced these were deloused by engineers, who immediately began to repair the bridges and road. On the far bank of Batakan-ketjil 2/14th Battalion encountered a small Japanese force in two pillboxes. With naval-fire support "C" Company of 2/l4th quickly drove the Japanese from their pillboxes, and the following morning Australian advance continued. Based at Sepinggang with 2/27th Battalion, 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment was patrolling vigorously inland to a depth of 2000 yards giving left flank protection to 2/l4th.The 2/14th Battalion met little opposition approaching the Manggar Besar River during late afternoon of the 4 July. On the northern bank of this river the airstrip runs parallel to the coast and beside the Vasey Highway. The bridge spanning Manggar Besar had been demolished at both ends, but two companies of 2/14th Battalion pushed across the river. "B" Company secured the bridgehead on the northern bank while "A" Company advanced to the far end of the airstrip, quickly setting up a road block.
Then the Japanese staged his first determined stand in this sector. From many gun emplacements, set in a group of ridges overlooking the northern end of the airstrip, he opened fire on the Australians. "A" Company had established a perimeter at the northern end of the for strip, and held it despite the shrapnel bursting low over their heads, fired from an Japanese anti-aircraft gun only 800 yards away. "B" Company moved back across the Manggar Besar and established a firm block on the southern side of the river. The guns of a small naval unit, standing offshore, quickly countered the Japanese artillery. A naval bombardment officer, in direct wireless communication with the warships, had climbed a rickety I00foot control tower on the airstrip and, from this vantage point, accurately directed the gunfire. Meantime 25-pounders of 2/5th Field Regiment had been hauled forward and joined in the fierce duel between the Navy and the Japanese heavy shore guns.
At nightfall "B" Company of 2/14th was able to move forward again to occupy the western side of the strip, protecting Australian left flank. For five days the battle raged-five days of heavy shelling and counter-shelling, both the Japanese and Australian guns firing over open sights. Three Matilda tanks, put ashore from LCMs on the beach east of the Manggar Besar, during the second day of the battle, were hit by the Japanese heaviest gun, a 155-mm, at point-blank range. One Matilda was badly damaged while the other two were destroyed in flames. This 155-mm coastal defence gun was set into the hillside and protected by heavy steel doors, against which Australian shells were at first ineffective. But Australian artillery were not to be beaten. During the night they moved a 25-pounder forward to within 800 yards of the Japanese gun. At first light they opened fire, placing direct hits through the steel doors of the emplacement and destroying the gun and crew.
Then "D" Company of 2/14th Battalion, relieving "A" Company at the far edge of the airstrip, assaulted and captured the gun emplacement. Twice during the night that followed the Japanese counter-attacked the newly won gun position, one attack lasting an hour and a half. Twice he was repulsed by the Australians. Five minutes after midnight the Japanese vainly counter-attacked Australian other forward company, "C" Company, which had advanced 1000 yards along Vasey Highway to the end of the strip during the day. Even more formidable were the Japanese counter-attacks during the following night between 8 pm and 1 am. Torrential rain had filled the fox-holes and shell-holes. Australian infantry beat off these attacks although many Japanese got to within a few yards of Australian fox-holes. The Japanese heavy shelling had prevented repair work on the bridge over the Manggar Besar. With some ingenuity the sappers had partly solved the problem by building a wire-mesh foot-bridge underneath the actual bridge, slung from girders between the pylons.
On 9 July the Navy and artillery continued to hammer the Japanese positions. Then, guided by mortar smoke bombs, Liberators blasted their defences with 1000-pound bombs. The planes were scarcely off the area when Australian mortars and artillery opened up again, quickly followed by fire from a cruiser and two destroyers. After a brief lull six Lightnings flashed over the ridge in a trial run, circled and then returned, diving steeply. Belly tanks of Napalm tumbled down. There was a vivid flash and a deluge of fire enveloped the Japanese held area. The Lightnings came back at treetop level in a strafing run. The Japanese resistance at Manggar had been overcome and a patrol of 2/14th Battalion went in without firing a shot.
While the battle for Manggar strip had raged, the other two Battalions of 21st Brigade-2/16th and 2/27th-made further advances to the north-east of Sepinggang, and with 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment had patrolled vigorously north of Vasey Highway.
A mile and a half across the harbour from Balikpapan lies Cape Penadjam, a swampy area with a ruined sawmill, forty to fifty houses, and an oriental theatre. Penadjam was not important commercially, but it posed a threat to shipping in Balikpapan Bay. It 's strategic value to the Japanese as an antiaircraft centre to protect Balikpapan was lost when the Australians captured the oil refineries. Although it was reported that the Japanese had evacuated Penadjam two days previously no chances were taken, and it was subjected to a terrific pounding before the landing. Seaplanes strafed the township and the Navy bombarded the beach. Artillery from Balikpapan laid down a heavy creeping barrage as 2/9th Battalion and men of 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment in Alligators streamed across the bay in single file a mile long. About 200 yards from the shore the Alligators wheeled and sped towards the beach in waves at two to three minute intervals. Tank support had been given to 2/9th Battalion, but two Matildas bogged down in twelve feet of mud in the swampy beach area. The troops landed at 1 pm and the town was occupied without loss. Within an hour the infantry had fanned out, securing all initial objectives. The Japanese had not been sighted, but a 5-inch coastal gun opened up on Australian forces. This gun was knocked out by naval fire and captured by "C" Company of 2/9th Battalion that afternoon. Patrols pushed a mile to the north and south without contacting the Japanese.
Patrols south of the Sesoempoe River during the following day located deserted machine guns, while patrols to the west captured a single Japanese. In this area the Japanese were withdrawing by launch and barge along the Riko River. By now the Japanese had been ousted from all positions menacing the harbour. He had been pushed out of the town and had lost the two airstrips. in action It was apparent that he was trying to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batochampar area on the road to Samarinda-Milford Highway.
Milford Highway was a road of craters and shattered houses, lined with burnt-out cars and trucks. On the features beside the road were knocked-out heavy guns and searchlights. Cultivation frequently lined the sides of the low hills and spurs of this terrain but many were bald from mortaring, bombing and shellfire. The Japanese were strongly entrenched on these hills and spurs. Here 25th Brigade struck and kept on striking, day after day. Australian tactics were hit and probe, hit hard with the full weight of Australian artillery and air strength, then probe with infantry and dismounted cavalry patrols to ascertain Japanese strength and positions. Australian artillery fired at the rate of 5000 shells a day, while 2/25th, 2/31stand 2/33rd Battalions of 25th Brigade were closely supported by 6-pounder tank attack guns and heavy mortars.
The Japanese stayed in their bunker positions during the day, but at night small parties infiltrated through Australian lines. During the night of 17/18 July a party of Japanese approached the headquarters of 2/33rd Battalion by creeping down Milford Highway. As they entered the area they fired a flare to give them visibility. A sharp hand-to-hand skirmish developed. Here again the Japanese used their long spears, but to no effect. Dawn disclosed thirteen Japanese bodies. Japanese infiltration in another Battalion area met a similar fate that night.
For three days the Japanese stood in his strong positions running across Milford Highway. Then they cracked and 9 July saw one of the biggest advances since first Australian assault. Probing slowly forward in the morning the advance gathered momentum and by 4 pm 3000 yards had been covered on a 2000-yard front, placing Australian forward troops some five and a half miles north of Balikpapan. Faster than the advance was the Japanese retreat. By nightfall they was moving so fast that contact had been lost. Large quantities of food and equipment were captured in the day's advance. Two heavy anti-aircraft guns which had been hurling shells at Australian forces were captured. They had been knocked out by direct hits in a duel with 25 pounders of 2/4th Field Regiment. Results of the accuracy and weight of the artillery barrage were borne out by the number of Japanese dead throughout the captured area.
Milford Highway was extensively mined and booby-trapped. On the evening of 9 July three 1000 pound bombs were exploded simultaneously in the middle of the road as an infantry platoon of 2/3Ist Battalion was advancing. Many other heavy bombs lay beside the road but the Japanese did not get a chance to use them against us. The engineers hastily repaired the section of Milford Highway captured and their tireless work sappers kept the road open to jeeps and tracked vehicles at all times. Not once were the rations and stores held up.
On the left flank a squadron of 2/7th Cavalry Commando Regiment patrolled east to harass the Japanese s lines of communication. Farther to the left Netherlands East Indies troops were unopposed in a 3000-yard advance to a position four miles north of Pandansari. 25th Brigade pressed its advantage the following morning. Set on a jungle-clad hill, to the left of the road, were the Cello barracks. Supported by Matilda tanks and a flame-throwing frog, "D" Company of the 2/3lst Battalion stormed this hill killing fifty Japanese without suffering a fatality. Right of Milford Highway "C" Company of the same battalion occupied another high feature. That afternoon artillery, mortars and tanks paved the way for a further half-mile advance by "D" Company. In the day's advances two tanks had knocked out three gun positions, and Japanese in six bunkers had been ousted by the flame-throwing frog.
Later in the afternoon "A" Company was to attack another dominating feature, Coke Spur. A two and a half hours' barrage by 25 pounders and a close supporting 6-pounder tank attack gun, combined with 4.2 and 3 inch mortars, opened the attack. On a lower explosive key crackled the 2-pounders and machine guns of two Matilda tanks, lined up on the highway with the flame-thrower. The barrage cut out and the three tanks crawled forward. Bunched close behind them were three infantry sections. A short distance ahead the road turned to the left, went down through a small cutting and on to a level at the bottom of Coke Spur. From both sides of the jungle and from Coke Spur itself the road was swept by Japanese machine-gun fire. The infantry could not advance. To retreat meant being caught and hemmed in by the cutting, through which the Japanese had allowed them to advance. The artillery re-opened and the tanks blazed away at close range, but the Japanese were strongly emplaced. The battle continued for an hour and a half. Practically the whole infantry platoon was wiped out in that confined ambush area. One tank stood by giving covering fire, while one Matilda, and then the other, crawled back, each carrying three wounded men on the deck. Back on the other side of the cutting the tank commander had been killed. The Australian attack was brought to a standstill and the dead were left where they lay on the road. Lives were not wasted in another assault against Coke Spur and the artillery were given the job to blast the Japanese from his bunkers.
On Milford Highway The Australian northerly advance was held up. For twelve days the Japanese clung tenaciously to his strong pillbox and bunker positions strategically placed between the commanding features Chair and Coke, on either side of the highway. It was twelve days of heavy shelling, constant patrolling and nerve-racking infiltration at night. A slow grinding-down process was involved. The infantry could have pushed the Japanese from his pillboxes and bunkers days before they eventually over-ran them, but were not prepared to waste lives in doing it. While the artillery and mortars pounded the Japanese defences and lines of communication, the infantry began to outflank him in preparation for a general squeeze. On 14 July the 2/25th Battalion, after relieving the 2/31st as point battalion astride Milford Highway, pushed two companies around the Japanese flanks on both sides of the road. The envelopment continued during the following day with the two companies firmly established on Cart and Calm features, to the outside and slightly in rear of the Japanese on Chair and Coke.
The 2/33rd Battalion moved forward on 16 July taking over responsibility for the east side of the highway, allowing the 2/25th to concentrate on its outflanking movement to the west. To the rear of the Japanese defences the Australian commandos were active. Pushing through the thick rain forest and tangled vegetation on the 13 July a commando patrol had skirted the Japanese right flank and reached a point overlooking his line of communication on Milford Highway. Late that afternoon a Japanese patrol twenty strong approached the position. The Australians withdrew and ambushed the Japanese, killing nine without loss. Day after day the Australian ambush parties took toll of the Japanese along his lines of communication. Farther west and nine miles north of Balikpapan, Netherlands East Indies troops were steadily moving along a water pipeline to a pumping station on the Wain Besar River. No Japanese had been contacted in this area.
The Japanese reacted violently to the Australian encircling pressure on his positions astride Milford Highway. By day he sent out strong fighting patrols; by night suicide parties charged the forward companies with swords and spears. All attacks were repulsed with heavy casualties to the Japanese. The night of 17/l8 July saw the fiercest night attack. Two 2/25th Battalion company fronts and the headquarters of the 2/33rd Battalion were scenes of bloody hand-to-hand clashes. The Japanese succeeded in knocking out one 4.2-inch mortar and inflicted some casualties, but the count of Japanese dead the following morning showed no fewer than fifty-three, with an estimated additional sixteen.
The Australian pressure on the Japanese gradually increased. Slowly an encircling movement squeezed them from there bunkers and pillboxes astride the highway. Pockets of resistance were cleared. One of these pockets on the left flank contained ten Japanese in a cave. Infantry of the 2/25th Battalion quickly cleared this with a flame-thrower. Then on the 22 July after a twelve day stand, the Japanese broke contact. Patrols from the 2/25th and 2/33rd Battalions found their positions unoccupied and the 2/31st Battalion advanced 2000 yards north along Milford Highway. This placed the battalion outside the perimeter which had been laid down in the original order: "to capture and hold Balikpapan area". Though no further advances were ordered, the only means of securing this perimeter was by constant offensive patrolling. The Japanese had not evacuated the area. Every day there were patrol clashes, and at night continued their infiltration tactics.
North of Manggar the 21st Brigade had pushed farther along Vasey Highway on the way to Sambodja, the third largest oil field in Borneo. Covered by a smoke screen, three more Matildas tanks had been landed at Manggar to support the advance. When the Japanese guns had been silenced, engineers quickly repaired the demolished portions of the Manggar Bridge and supplies were brought forward by jeeps.
In the area north-west of the Sepinggang airstrip the 2/16th Battalion had advanced 1000 yards against heavy opposition. An interesting series of moves and counter-moves preceded this advance. Two miles from the airstrip in a maze of steep hills the Japanese had held a feature called Gate. After a heavy concentration of mortars and machine guns the Japanese had withdrawn on the evening of 8 July.
An Japanese counter-attack forced the 2/l6th to retire, but soon after the Australian artillery brought down heavy fire on the feature, ousting the Japanese. The battalion again occupied Gate the following morning and probed forward.
The Japanese were encountered on many other features in this area, but artillery was directed on his positions and infantry cleared the remaining Japanese. The Australian advance in this area had forced back the left flank of the Japanese retreating on Batochampar.
On Vasey Highway the 2/27th Battalion had relieved the 2/14th as point battalion and had advanced beyond the Adjiraden River. Only native refugees flocking to the Australian lines were met by the 2/27th. Many had come from Sambodja, fifteen miles from Manggar. A number of them were suffering from gunshot wounds and burnt feet-a Japanese method of preventing them from being of use to us.
The 2/27th continued their unopposed advance during the following days, reaching the village of Bangsal and patrolling forward to Amborawang, eleven miles along the coast from Manggar and twenty-three miles from Balikpapan. Patrols inland from Vasey Highway failed to find the Japanese.
A special reconnaissance party penetrated the heart of Sambodja on the 14 July and observed a party of Japanese supervising the burning of the village by pro-Japanese police-boys.
Four days later a patrol in strength occupied Sambodja, while another strong patrol cut their way through the jungle west of Amborawang to build a road block on a track leading from Sambodja to the Batochampar area.
Long-range patrols secured the Australian perimeter in the Sambodja area and parties of Japanese were mopped up behind the Australian lines in the vicinity of Manggar. The Japanese continued to infiltrate at night and harass the Australian lines of communication, but caused little damage and invariably suffered losses.
Based on Penadjam, across the bay from Balikpapan, the 2/9th Battalion and elements of the 2/7th Commando Regiment were patrolling extensively to secure the harbour for shipping. Overland patrols probed south to the Bandjermasin Road, while water patrols scoured the Riko River and upper reaches of Balikpapan Bay.
Supplied by barge along the river and waterways leading into it, scattered parties of Japanese still resisted in the Riko area. LCM gunboats carrying out river patrols were successful in sinking many Japanese barges, and his water activities were confined to the hours of darkness.
One river patrol set an unusual ambush for the Japanese river movement by night. The patrol had captured a 300-ton ship, laden with a cargo of coal and oil, where it had run aground some six miles up the Riko River. An armed party was left aboard the captured vessel that night. The ruse worked-a large Japanese barge carrying about forty Japanese and towing five prahus approached the stranded vessel, and at close range the Australian patrol opened up. Bombs from a Pita gun gutted the barge and the Japanese craft was swept by small-arms fire.
On the northern point of the Riko River mouth elements of the 2/8th Battalion landed a Djinabora during 8 July. Some 600 natives and Chinese were reported in this area but no Japanese. This force was withdrawn to Penadjam on the 14 July.
Opposite Djinabora, on the Balikpapan side of the bay, a company of the 2/8th Battalion made another unopposed landing at a small settlement about 1500 yards north of Cape Teloktebang. One platoon was left to occupy the area and the remainder of the company returned to Penadjam. From these positions, eight and a half miles north of the harbour entrance, any Japanese attempt to penetrate Balikpapan Bay by launch or barge from the rivers to the north could be forestalled.
Upper Balikpapan Bay is a network of waterways, which the Japanese were using as evacuation and supply routes for his scattered force in the Penadjam and Riko area. He had also appreciated their value to us as a potential line of advance to outflank his force astride Milford Highway. To prevent the Australian use of the area the Japanese had established a block near Tempadoeng at the mouth of the Balikpapan River where it flows into the upper reaches of the bay.
A force known as Buckforce, which consisted of a tactical headquarters and two companies from the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion, and elements of supporting arms, occupied Djinabora on the 20 July. This force moved to Tempadoeng the next day. From this forward base? patrols operated throughout the area, particularly to the east towards Milford Highway, to harass the Japanese lines of communication in front of the 25th Brigade.
In an area called Tandjoeng Batoe a scout plane checking a report about Indian prisoners saw a white sheet stretched on the ground bearing the inscription: `Indian PW'. A patrol of the Pioneers was sent out. Guided by the plane they found sixty-three Indian prisoners, who had suffered badly in Japanese hands for three and a half years.
It became increasingly evident that the Japanese were withdrawing its entire force north from the Balikpapan-Manggar area to a concentration area in the vicinity of Sepakoe. The Japanese had fallen back on the Manggar and Batochampar fronts and were evacuating the remnants of its Penadjam force via the Sepakoe and Semai rivers. An evacuation route to Samarinda, farther north, had been prepared, and under pressure he would, perhaps, have made full use of it. The Australian long-range patrols throughout the area constantly clashed with delaying parties of the Japanese which were covering the main withdrawal. It was not the Australians' intention to advance farther or to extend their perimeter. Long-range patrols operated to gain information and to maintain offensive action against the Japanese so that the perimeter would be secure. This was the situation when hostilities ceased.
For the first week or two in August news of the Japanese ' expected acceptance of the surrender terms, formulated at Potsdam, resulted in a slackening down of offensive operations. It was designed to avoid as much as possible loss of valued Australian lives: the "Cease Fire" might be sounded at any time. This was, roughly, the position when, on the 15 August, at 9 am Australian Eastern Standard time, the announcement of surrender was made by the leaders of the Allied nations.
Preparations for the occupation of Japan were put in hand and on 28 August Allied naval forces steamed into Tokyo Bay. Among them were the Australian cruisers Shropshire and Hobart and the destroyers Warramunga, Bataan, Nizam and Napier. World War II ended in a ceremony of historic importance lasting only a few minutes. Aboard the 45,000 ton battleship USS Missouri representatives of the Japanese Emperor, the Japanese Government and the Imperial High Command signed the surrender documents gold-edged for the Allies, black-edged for the Japanese. They were completed by the signature of General MacArthur for all the nations at war with Japan. His signature was witnessed by Lt-General Percival, commander of the British forces which surrendered to the Japanese at Singapore, and Lt-General Wainwright, who became a captive of the Japanese following Bataan and Corregidor.
Signatures were appended by the representatives of the following countries-United States of America, China, United Kingdom, Russia, Australia, Canada, France, Netherlands and New Zealand. Australia's representatives were headed by the Commander-in-Chief (General Sir Thomas Blamey) who afterwards quickly planned the arrangements for the surrender of Japanese forces in the areas where Australian troops had been fighting.
First of these took place on the 6 September in St George's Channel between New Britain and New Ireland in the Royal Navy aircraft carrier HMS Glory. The General Officer Commanding First Australian Army (Lt-General V A H Sturdee) accepted the surrender of Lt-General Imamura and Vice-Admiral Kusaka, who were in command of about 139,000 Japanese in New Britain, New Ireland, New Guinea, the Solomons and adjacent islands.
At the head of the gangway the Japanese party was met by the deck officer (Lt-Colonel L K Shave), the master-at-arms and a guard of Royal Marines. The party was disarmed and their name cards collected. Soon afterwards the ship's company paraded in two ranks on the flight deck of the carrier. On the starboard side of the flight deck had been placed a table and behind it stood General Sturdee. On either side of him and a little to the rear were Major-General K W Eather, General Officer Commanding Eleventh Division, and the commander of the Glory (Captain W Buzzard, RN). Near by were the interpreter (Captain Worth) and Major N J F Wright, personal assistant to the GOC, holding the surrender documents, and high-ranking Navy, Army and Air Force officers.
General Imamura, a squat, middle-aged officer, halted before the table and saluted. He was instructed to hand over his sword, which he did by placing it on the table in front of General Sturdee.
The terms of surrender, other orders, and instructions were then read and translated. On receiving orders to sign the document General Imamura explained through interpreters that he could not sign also for the Japanese Navy. This point was quickly settled by the ordering of Admiral Jininchi Kusaka to sign for the Navy. The Japanese were handed Japanese lettering brushes for signing. General Imamura added his signature in English, below the Japanese characters.
Three copies were signed, one for Australia, one for HMS Glory, and the third for the Japanese. The document was completed by the affixing of General Sturdee's signature. General Imamura made a speech in Japanese which was translated sentence by sentence. It was to the effect that the Japanese appreciated the consideration which had been shown to them and that they would immediately implement the orders given by the Australian commander. During the ceremony the flag of the Australian general (a Union Jack with the Royal Cipher centred) flew from the mast-an unusual sight on a British ship.
In the Balikpapan area, under the control of the General Officer Commanding 7th Division (Maj-General E J Milford), the whole of the Japanese forces in Dutch Borneo, led by a naval officer, Vice-Admiral Kamada, complied with the surrender orders on 8 September. Representatives of all the Allied services operating in Balikpapan were aboard the Australian frigate HMAS Burdekin at the rendezvous fifty miles north of Balikpapan, off the mouth of the Mahakam River delta. The Japanese emissaries arrived on time, passed between the lines of the cutlass party and stood before the official table. General Milford, accompanied by the commander of the Burdekin, Lt-Commander T S Marchington, RNR, walked briskly to the table, returned the salutes of the staff officers, turned and faced the Japanese. The Japanese stood rigidly to attention in their dirty jungle uniforms and saluted the leader of the men who had helped to bring about their defeat. The Japanese Admiral intimated that he understood and was prepared to accept the surrender terms. He was ordered to sign the document and to place his sheathed sword on it in token of surrender.
On Morotai Island, headquarters of the Australian forces in the Netherlands East Indies, before an assembly of more than l0,000 Australian and allied troops the Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Military Forces (General Sir Thomas Blamey) accepted on the 9 September the formal surrender of all Japanese in the eastern half of the Netherlands East Indies. The instrument of surrender was Japanese signed by Lt-General Teshima, commander of the Japanese Second Army, comprising about 126,000 Japanese.
The ceremony was staged at the fourth side of a hollow square wherein the Japanese entourage, dwarfed by their stalwart guard, waited in crestfallen silence. General Blamey, accompanied by his senior staff officers, arrived and read the terms of surrender to the Japanese. On being ordered to sign the document General Teshima saluted, unbuckled his sword and, after bowing, proffered it as the token of a beaten foe. He sat down and signed deliberately and unhurriedly, rose and again saluted. Signatures were then added by the Japanese naval officers Captain Toru Oyama and Captain Minoru Toyama.
General Blamey then signed, indicating acceptance of the surrender, and made a strong speech, directed at the delegation but his words expressed the feelings of the Australian army. He said:.
In receiving your surrender I do not recognise you as an honourable and gallant foe, but you will be treated with due but severe courtesy in all matters.
I recall the treacherous attack on Australian ally, China. I recall the treacherous attack upon the British Empire and upon the United States of America in December 1941, at a time when your authorities were making the pretence of ensuring peace between us. I recall the atrocities inflicted upon the person of Australian nationals as prisoners of war and internees, designed to reduce them by punishment and starvation to slavery.
In the light of these evils I will enforce most rigorously all orders issued to you, so let there be no delay or hesitation in their fulfilment at your peril.
The Japanese navy has been destroyed. The Japanese merchant fleet has been reduced to a mere fraction. The Japanese armies have been beaten everywhere and all that remained for them was to await their total destruction. Japanese cities lie in waste and Japanese industry has been destroyed. Never before in history has so numerous a nation been so completely defeated.
To escape the complete destruction of the nation, the Emperor of Japan has yielded to the Allied forces, and an instrument of total surrender has been signed in his name. He has charged you to obey the orders which I shall give you.
In carrying out these orders the Japanese army and navy organisation will be retained for convenience. Instructions will be issued by the designated Australian commanders to the commanders of the respective Japanese forces, placing upon you and your subordinate commanders the responsibility for carrying out your Emperor's directions to obey all orders given by me to you.
You will ensure that all Allied personnel, prisoners of war or internees in Japanese hands are safeguarded and nourished and delivered over to Allied commanders. You will collect, lay down and safeguard all arms, ammunition and instruments of war until such time as they are taken over by the designated Australian commanders. You will be given adequate time to carry this out.
An official date will be named and any Japanese found in possession, after that date, of any arms, ammunition or instrument of war of any kind will be dealt with summarily by the Australian commander on the spot.
Next of the Japanese forces required formally to accept the surrender terms was the Japanese Thirty-seventh Army led by Lt-General Baba Masao. Twelve minutes were all that was required for the purpose.
Major-General G. F. Wootten, General Officer Commanding 9th Division, was seated in his residence on Labuan with senior members of his staff when the Japanese were presented to him. He ordered the surrender of their swords and the signing of the document accepting the terms.
With the Japanese signatures affixed, General Wootten ordered a victory salute of 101 guns. On the order the salute was fired in each centre occupied by Australian forces throughout British Borneo.
Surrender was made by the Japanese forces in Dutch Timor to Brigadier Lewis Dyke, who was the commander of a force sent to occupy the island. Arrangements had been made for the Japanese leader and his staff to come aboard HMAS Moresby, the flagship of the convoy bearing the force, in Koepang Harbour. Colonel Kaida Tatsuichi, in command of the Timor Japanese, signed the document, seated at a table on the quarter-deck of the ship. He gripped his sword between his knees, listened to the orders and instructions read out to him. After the signing he and his officers surrendered their swords.
On l2 September, General Itagaki, the Japanese commander in Malaya, signed the surrender of all Japanese forces in South-east Asia at the behest of Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten in Singapore.
The General Officer Commanding 6th Division (Major-General H. C. H. Robertson) called a parade of representatives of every unit of his division on the 13 September, when a simple ceremony was staged on the Wom airstrip. The Japanese, headed by the commander of the Japanese Eighteenth Army, Lt-General Adachi, arrived in jeeps at the southern end of the strip and moved slowly forward until they were twenty yards in front of the table at which General Robertson was seated. The instrument of surrender was read by the interpreter to Adachi, who then affixed his signature. It was completed by the addition of the Australian general's signature. The Japanese officers then handed over their swords, placing them on the table.
The final surrender ceremonies in which Australians were prominently concerned were those in which the Japanese commanders at Nauru and Ocean Island surrendered their forces to Brigadier J R Stevenson (11th Brigade) on the quarter-deck of HMAS Diamantina. On the 13 September Captain Hisayuki Soeda, in command of Japanese forces on Nauru, and five staff officers surrendered their swords to Brigadier Stevenson who read the terms of surrender and had them translated into Japanese. The document was signed by the Japanese and Brigadier Stevenson who accepted it on behalf of the Commonwealth of Australia. At Ocean Island on the 1 October the brigadier accepted Lt-Commander Nahoomi Suzuki's surrender of the Japanese garrison.
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