This chapter contains historical information relating to military operations and legislative change.
On 29 and 30 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire bombarded Russian ports in the Black Sea. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 November and Britain followed on 5 November. In early January 1915, Russia asked Britain for help to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. The British response was to attempt to force the straits of the Taradiddles which were like a long winding river between the narrow rugged Gallipoli peninsula and the neighbouring slopes of Asia Minor. The straits eventually opened into the Sea of Marmona at whose other end was the straits of Bosphorus which led to the Black Sea. On the straits was Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire. The naval attempt to force the Dardanelles on 18 March was called off after the lost of three Battleships. The military were then given the task of securing the Gallipoli peninsula.
Dawn on Gallipoli Peninsula on Sunday 25 April 1915 was due at 4.05 am. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps began landing in the inky darkness just before dawn at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. Further to the south, at the toe of the peninsula, the British 29th Division was also landing. In a diversionary attack the French landed some troops south of the entrance to the Dardanelles.
The 3rd Australian Brigade had been selected to land first and was told that there was open land between the beach and the comparatively low ridge that it would have to climb. However, the brigade landed a mile north of Gaba Tepe and the troops found themselves at the foot of a very steep, almost precipitous, 300 foot high hill. Stopping only for their breath, the Australians, who by this time were being fired on by the Turks, began the difficult climb to the summit which was quickly captured. The summit was found to be a small plateau, later named Plugge's Plateau, with its further edge also a very steep slope into a deep and tortuous valley rising to a second, slightly higher ridge 600 yards away. Hidden behind this second ridge was a third ridge which was the principal Australian objective for that first morning.
Six Turkish divisions were stationed on Gallipoli but most of these forces were in reserve. Only one Turkish battalion defended the coast where the Australians landed and despite the confusion caused by landing at the wrong beach and the subsequent intermixing of units, small parties of Australians began moving rapidly inland across difficult country. The first ridge was completely occupied shortly after sunrise and the Australians were moving across the second ridge and had reached the third ridge by 7 am. Two scouts of the 10th Battalion, Private A S Blackburn (who would win the VC at Pozieres in 1916) and Lance Corporal Robin, scouted Scrubby Knoll on the Third Ridge just as the first Turkish reserves were arriving. The Australian Official Historian, C E W Bean, credits Blackburn and Robin as coming nearer to the objective of the expedition than any other soldiers whose movements are known.
On the left of the perimeter, Australians reached the Nek by 8 am and then pushed forward, first to Baby 700 and then to the slopes of Battleship Hill. The next crest on this ridge was Chunuk Bair, the principal Australian objective for the first day. The Australians on Battleship Hill were so exposed that they had to withdraw to Baby 700. Throughout the morning and most of the afternoon a tense battle was fought with unsurpassed courage on both sides with the summit of Baby 700 changing hands no less than five times. Between 4.30 pm and 5 pm Turkish counter-attacks along the entire front forced the Australians back with Baby 700 being lost for the last time. By evening the Australian position was in jeopardy.
Australian and New Zealand reinforcements landed throughout the day but instead of a 4 mile front driven 1 1/2 miles inland, the troops were clinging to a foothold on the second ridge just half a mile inland on a front of one mile. Over 2000 casualties were suffered on the first day. Realising that the landing had achieved much less than had been intended, General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, after a conference with General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, recommended to the Anzac Corps Commander, General Birdwood that withdrawal be considered. Birdwood, at first shocked at the suggestion, passed it on to the Expeditionary Force commander, General Hamilton, who wrote back to Birdwood that there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out.
Nightfall on 25 April brought one of the rare wet spells of the whole campaign. The Turkish batteries ceased firing and the Turkish rifle and machine gun fire became relatively harmless. After being pinned down all day, the Australians were now able to stand up and dig trenches to provide protection. Both sides continued all night and several Turkish assaults in the dark were defeated. The expected major counter-attack at dawn on Monday, 26 April did not materialise since the Turks, who had lost very heavily, were as exhausted as the invaders. On the third day, 27 April, a general counter-attack by Turkish reinforcements was broken up by guns from the warships off-shore when they attacked down the exposed slopes of Baby 700.
The Anzac Corps bridgehead was firmly established by the end of April with the left third of the front held by the New Zealand and Australian Division and the remainder of the front held by the 1st Australian Division. On the night of 5 May, the New Zealand and the 2nd Australian Brigades moved to Helles to support a major attack towards Krithia. On 8 May, the 2nd Australian Brigade lost 1000 men in an hour for the gain of just 500 yards. The two Anzac brigades returned to Anzac Cove in mid May. At Anzac Cove, the fighting crystallised into trench warfare with snipers a constant danger. On 14 May, General Birdwood was grazed on the head by a deflected bullet and the following day, General Bridges was mortally wounded.
Ever since the landing, the two central sections of the Anzac line were deluged with a constant hail of rifle fire. The fire almost ceased on 18 May and the unaccustomed silence aroused suspicions which were soon confirmed by naval aircraft which detected Turkish troops massing for an attack. Four Turkish divisions, with 42 battalions and over 30000 men, attacked the Anzac lines in the early hours of 19 May. The attack, although badly co-ordinated in that it hit different Anzac positions at different times, was exceedingly brave and persistent. Line after line of Turks were cut down and they were only successful in entering the Anzac lines at one corner of Courtney's Post. This section of trench was single-handedly recaptured by Lance Corporal Albert Jacka of the 14th Australian Battalion who bayoneted two Turks and shot another five. Jacka won the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Australian in the 1914-18 War.
The Turkish losses were estimated at 10000 men of whom 3000 were killed. Anzac losses were only 628 hit and included Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick of the 3rd Field Ambulance who was killed by shellfire while evacuating a wounded man on his donkey. Such were the casualties that a short informal truce was held on 20 May to collect the wounded. A formal truce was organised for 24 May and from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm burial parties worked between the lines with each side interring the dead found in its half of no-man's land. The truce was honourably observed although both sides took the opportunity to thoroughly survey the territory held by their opponents.
In June and July, the British and French, despite improved artillery support, had little success in attacks towards Achi Baba. At Anzac Cove, the troops were never away from shellfire and had practically no chance to rest. Some battalions were taken, one at a time, to Imbross Island but only for 3 to 6 days rest. Until late in the campaign no regular canteen and no Red Cross stores reached Anzac Cove. The nights were pestilential with fleas and there was no delousing apparatus for lice. By the end of July, there were 25000 men at Anzac Cove but 200 sick were being evacuated each day.
The final attempt to seize the Dardanelles took place in August. The main attack was to be made by the New Zealand and Australian Division which was to capture the heart of the Turkish position, Chunuk Bair which was accessible and undefended. A series of Turkish outposts on the northern Anzac flank were seized after the fall of darkness on 6 August and two columns, one New Zealand and the other the 4th Australian Brigade, left Anzac to approach Chunuk Bair using separate routes. The Australian column lost its way in the maze of ravines and the New Zealand column halted for four hours waiting for one of its lost units. The delay was to have tragic consequences; the New Zealanders were not in position to support the Australian attack on the Nek and by the time the New Zealanders moved, the Turks had brought up reinforcements to defend Chunuk Bair. The fight for Chunuk Bair continued until 10 August when a Turkish counter attack pushed the New Zealand and British troops from Chunuk Bair to a lower spur.
In support of the thrust towards Chunuk Bair, diversionary operations were planned for Helles, Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove. The first diversion was at Helles on the afternoon of 6 August. The British attacked at The Vineyard where heavy hand-to-hand fighting raged for a number of days. The British IX Corps landed against negligible resistance at Suvla Bay, north of Anzac Cove on 7 August and then remained on the beaches for 36 hours. By the time the order to advance was given, Turkish reinforcements had arrived. After suffering 8000 casualties on 9 and 10 August, the British occupied positions only marginally different from those held at daybreak on 7 August.
At Anzac Cove, the 1st Australian Division was given the perilous task of attacking Lone Pine, justifiably considered as one of the strongest Turkish positions. The Turks had shown considerable ingenuity in making it almost impregnable. The plans for the Australian attack were laid with thoroughness, skill and imagination. Shortly before dusk on 6 August, an Australian assault succeeded in capturing the Turkish trenches. Turkish reserves were rushed to Lone Pine and the long Turkish attempt to retake the trenches by bombing began. From dark on 6 August until the night of 9 August a terrible exchange of handmade bombs went on almost continuously, flaring up four times into many hours of desperate fighting when successive Turkish reinforcements were thrown in. In four days, six Australian battalions lost 80 officers and 2197 men. Seven Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross.
Chunuk Bair was expected to be taken by dawn on 7 August so that the attacking troops could then mount an attack back towards Anzac Cove. The dismounted 8th (Victorian) and 10th (West Australian) Light Horse Regiments were to attack towards Chunuk Bair by assaulting the formidable position at the Nek. Such an attack was considered hopeless unless aided by the troops attacking from Chunuk Bair and by the seizure of three Turkish positions adjacent to the Nek. As the time for the assault approached, the adjacent positions were still held by the Turks and the New Zealanders were still approaching the summit of Chunuk Bair. It was decided that something had to be done to help the New Zealanders approaching Chunuk Bair and that the attack on the Nek was to go ahead primarily as a feint to keep the Turks off Chunuk Bair. The attack was made by four lines, each of 150 men. Tragically the preceding bombardment ceased seven minutes prior to the attack. 234 Light Horsemen were killed and 138 were wounded in an area no larger than a tennis court.
On 10 August, the allies faced the fact that the August offensive had failed. In four days of fighting at Anzac Cove, Australian and British troops had suffered 12000 casualties. The bridgeheads of Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay were connected only by a thin strip of foreshore and on 21 August and again on 27 August attacks were made to improve this junction. The 2nd Australian Division commenced landing at Anzac Cove in mid August and some of its troops were involved in the fighting on 27 August. With the failure of the August battles, the future of the campaign was questioned. London received a number of criticisms of the conduct of the campaign including Keith Murdoch's colourful and partially inaccurate but influential report. By the end of October military opinion favoured evacuation and after five weeks of hesitation, the British government decided on withdrawal on 7 December.
Even before London made its decision, preparations began at Gallipoli for the evacuation. The forces at Anzac Cove were reduced to 36000 men and 97 guns and those at Suvla Bay to 41000 men and 91 guns. The troops were told that preparations for winter and the severe blizzard in late November were responsible for these reductions while the Turks were deceived by the seeming normality. Once the order to evacuate was received, troops, stores and guns were withdrawn each night with the number of troops at each front being reduced to 20000 men. These men, 10000 on each night, were to be withdrawn on the nights of 18/19 and 19/20 December. The evacuation on 18/19 December was successful without the Turks being alerted and just 10000 men remained for the last day at both Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay. The final evacuation began after dark on 19 December with 4100 men leaving their posts at nightfall. In order to deceive the Turks it was decided to hold all the front line posts, however lightly, until the last possible moment which at Anzac Cove was 1.30 am after which the front was gradually uncovered. The last party left Anzac Cove at 4.10 am and Suvla Bay at 5.10 am. Two Australians were wounded at Anzac Cove and casualties at Suvla Bay were negligible. On the night of 8 January 1916, the British withdrew from Helles, also with negligible casualties.
During the campaign 7600 Australians and 2500 New Zealanders were killed and 19000 Australians and 5000 New Zealanders wounded. French casualties were nearly as great as the Australians and British casualties were three times as great.
By the middle of 1916, massive German and French armies had been locked in battle on the Western Front for nearly two years. In August 1914, the British had sent a small expeditionary force to assist France. The British regulars were supplemented by Territorial forces in 1915, but it was not until mid-1916 that the armies raised by Kitchener, after the commencement of hostilities, were ready for battle. In early 1916 the Germans had attacked the French forces at Verdun, not just to gain ground but to grind the French into submission by attrition. The French resisted and held their ground at great cost. However, French forces were so heavily committed to defending Verdun that the French-British summer offensive became a British offensive with some French support.
The 1916 summer offensive was preceded by a week long artillery barrage. The original attack date was put back from 29 June until 1 July because of bad weather and misgivings about the success of the artillery. 1 July 1916 was bright and cloudless, perfect conditions for defenders whose positions had in many cases withstood the artillery barrage. At 7.30 am, 120,000 British infantry commenced their attack across no-mans-land. The attack was repulsed with massive casualties. In the greatest tragedy in British military history, 60,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded or missing. The losses on 1 July 1916 have never been forgotten and have eclipsed the remainder of the battle that continued for five months.
The Anzacs, after being withdrawn from Gallipoli, returned to Egypt for rest and retraining. The seven Australian infantry brigades were expanded to twelve and the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions joined the 1st and 2nd Divisions. A fifth Australian division, the 3rd, was formed in Australia and would not see action in 1916. The structure of the AIF after the reorganisation was as follows:
Brigade | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion |
1st Division | ||||
1st Brigade | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th |
2nd Brigade | 5th | 6th | 7th | 8th |
3rd Brigade | 9th | 10th | 11th | 12th |
2nd Division | ||||
5th Brigade | 17th | 18th | 19th | 20th |
6th Brigade | 21st | 22nd | 23rd | 24th |
7th Brigade | 25th | 26th | 27th | 28th |
3rd Division | ||||
9th Brigade | 33rd | 34th | 35th | 36th |
10th Brigade | 37th | 38th | 39th | 40th |
11th Brigade | 41st | 42nd | 43rd | 44th |
4th Division | ||||
4th Brigade | 13th | 14th | 15th | 16th |
12th Brigade | 45th | 46th | 47th | 48th |
13th Brigade | 49th | 50th | 51st | 52nd |
5th Division | ||||
8th Brigade | 29th | 30th | 31st | 32nd |
14th Brigade | 53rd | 54th | 55th | 56th |
15th Brigade | 57th | 58th | 59th | 60th |
In March 1916, the Australian divisions in Egypt began moving to France and were initially stationed at Armentieres, a quiet sector near the Belgium border. On 7 July, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were ordered to move to the Somme. The Official Australian Historian, C E W Bean, writing after the war, said the fighting on the Somme was the hardest experienced by the Australians in France.
Before the first Australian attack was launched on the Somme, Australians were to suffer severe losses as a direct consequence of the battle. Forces holding the rest of the British line were ordered to pin down the German divisions on their front in order to prevent the enemy reinforcing the Somme. A major feint was planned for Armentieres and was conducted by the 5th Australian Division and the British 61st Division. In the battle of Fromelles, on 19 July, the Australians managed at great cost to seize part of the German trenches but by the night of 20 July the position was so perilous that they were withdrawn. The 5th Australian Division lost 5533 men in less than 24 hours and was unable to be used for offensive action for many months.
The next major British attack on the Somme, on 14 July, achieved some fairly deep gains into the German lines but again failed to achieve a break-through. The Germans still held Pozieres which was strung out along the old Roman highway from Amiens to Bapaume. The village was a an well-defended outpost in front of a German defence works known as the OG Lines, an immensely strong system comprising two parallel trenches which ran along the crest of Pozieres ridge about 500 yards behind the village. The Australians were given the task of taking Pozieres village. The attack was preceded by a thorough bombardment which methodically pounded the village and the OG Lines for several days. The bombardment stripped away the trees that screened the village and the few broken walls that remained became more visible. The final bombardment began at dusk and, occurring before the moon had risen, was visible for 20 miles around. At 12.30 am on Sunday, 23 July, the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Australian Division attacked. The advance succeeded in reaching the main road through the village. The Germans counter-attacked at dawn but were defeated by machine-gun fire.
The Australians captured all their objectives except for the OG Lines where the trenches and the area surrounding them were so cratered by shellfire that the troops had difficulty locating their objective. The front trench, OG1, and the support line 100-200 yards to the east, OG2, were in some places untraceable and in others merely a depression among the holes and mounds. However, the area contained deep dug-outs which held German garrisons skilled in the use of grenades and supported by efficient machine-gunners. In a drawn-out struggle, Pte John Leak and Lt A S Blackburn won the Victoria Cross. OG1 was captured and held but OG2 was unable to be found. During daylight on 23 July, the forward troops deepened their new trenches and that night a reinforcing battalion pushed through and secured most of the remainder of the village.
The pressure on the Somme forced the Germans to diminish their attacks on Verdun and was materially wearing down the German Army. The Germans were being strained on the Somme but the British were was not immediately in a position to launch a major offensive. While the British were building up men and supplies in the rear, the Germans were to be kept under pressure by constant local assaults. The Australian task was to take Pozieres ridge. However, Pozieres being a key position, the German staff was determined that it should be regained. Three early attempts failed and at 7 am on 24 July, as soon as the loss of the village was certain, the Australian position was methodically bombarded. The Germans still held parts of two trench systems along the western edge of Pozieres, and the OG Lines east of the village. The Australians were to attack at night so that the Germans would be unable to see the assault forming and therefore unable to concentrate their artillery and machine-guns.
On the night of 24/25 July 1916 the Australian troops marched up for an attack on a crest where most landmarks had been pounded out of recognition. Only one of the two assaulting battalions for the attack against the OG Lines was in position by zero hour and only after a difficult search in confusion and uproar did the battalion find its objective. The Germans counter-attacked and only a portion of the trenches captured were retained after a furious bomb-fight. On the western side of Pozieres, a brilliant advance seized the German trenches and Pozieres cemetery. The German bombardment on 25 July increased in weight in preparation for an attempt to retake Pozieres. The attack was to be launched at 4.30 pm but the fresh German regiment was already worn out from that morning's bomb-fight in the OG Lines, the repeated changes of orders by the German staff and the dreadful approaches under artillery fire. After many reports that the task was hopeless the German order to attack was countermanded. However, the 1st Australian Division after three days' bombardment was also exhausted. The division had lost 5285 officers and men and was relieved by the 2nd Division.
The 2nd Division's attack on Pozieres ridge began at 12.15 am on 29 July. German artillery hindered preparations for the attack and the British artillery did not batter down all of the wire. Preparations were generally poor and except on the extreme left the attack failed with heavy loss. The 2nd Division in its next attack formed up just before dusk on 4 August without being detected by the Germans. The OG lines along the Pozieres crest were firmly seized and the Germans were swept away by the vigour of the attack which had been preceded by a four day bombardment. The 2nd Division was now more exhausted than the 1st had been and had suffered heavier losses than any Australian division was to suffer in one tour in the line although some British divisions suffered heavier losses. In twelve days, the 2nd Division had lost 6848 officers and men with five of its battalions each losing between 600 and 700 men. The relief by the 4th Australian Division took place under intense bombardment.
From Pozieres crest the Australians could at last look over the wide, shallow valley behind the ridge and observe the tree-tops and roofs of Courcelette and the woods in front of Bapaume about five miles distant. The Germans, aware that their convoys, troops and guns could be seen were greatly disturbed by the loss of the Pozieres heights and ordered their immediate recapture. The Australians had gradually pushed a big bulge into the German lines which permitted the enemy artillery to shell them from Thiepval in the rear, as well as from the front and both flanks. A great part the Australian front line was now completely enfiladed by German batteries. The bombardment was so heavy on the night of 6 August that the 4th Division was largely kept in the deep old German dug-outs. The Germans attacked in the dawn of 7 August, passed through the lightly held OG2, overran several of the deep dug-outs in OG1, captured some of the garrison, and moved down the slope towards Pozieres on a 400 yard front. At the critical moment, Lt. Albert Jacka, who had won the Victoria Cross on Gallipoli leapt from a position behind the Germans and charged them. Jacka's platoon, waiting in a deep dug-out, had been surprised by the attack. The enemy had bombed the dug-out and left a sentry over the stairway. Jacka rushed the sentry and with his surviving men attacked the Germans from behind together with other Australians scattered across the slope and on the flanks. The German attack was stopped with most of the captured Australians freed and many Germans captured. The lost ground was retaken and the Germans did not repeat their attempt to retake Pozieres heights.
The Australians now thrust north along the ridge on which the OG trenches continued, while on the left the British kept pace by seizing, one after another, the old communication trenches running between the old German front and second lines. The first step was taken on the night of 8 August and on the night of 10 August, patrols pushed out and established posts in the valley south of the mound of rubble which appeared to be all that remained of Mouquet Farm. On the night of 11 August, after preparations of dreadful difficulty, a formal attack was made, bringing the Australians and the British on their left to a line directly facing the German position running through Mouquet Farm. An attack on the farm itself was planned for 13 August. A quarry near the farm was captured and a company under Capt. Harry Murray seized part of the German Fabeck trench, north-east of the farm. Here Murray and his men were outflanked by the Germans, C E W Bean wrote `this former miner, who was to become known as a most famous fighting leader, fought his way back with his men in one of the most ably conducted actions in Australian experience'. The attempt to drive the salient deeper was continued in attack after attack for another month, but its ultimate achievement was to secure no more than part of the Fabeck trench reached by Murray's company that night. The 4th Division was now relieved after a loss of 4649 men.
The 1st Australian Division, with its battalions brought up to two-thirds strength by reinforcements, was put in again. After another 2650 casualties, the 2nd Division took up the task and tried with larger forces to seize Mouquet Farm, which was by then realised to contain very large and deep dug-outs. The 4th Australian Division was brought back and delivered attacks on the nights of 27 and 28 August. The strategy of slowly pushing a salient behind an enemy salient had come to a halt. At the cost of another 2409 casualties, the 4th Division had driven the salient as far as it ever went. In early September, the Australians moved to a quiet area at Ypres. Between July and September Pozieres ridge was the only sector on the Somme in which the British forces had steadily pushed ahead. The German artillery was free to concentrate as it wished and although the Australians suffered other intense bombardments in France, there was never anything comparable in duration or effect to that suffered on the Somme. In seven weeks, the Australians launched 19 attacks, all except two on narrow fronts. 23,000 Australian officers and men were killed or wounded at Pozieres, a place C E W Bean said was `more densely sown with Australian sacrifice that any other place on earth.'
The fighting on the Somme highlighted the essential problem of the 1914-18 War. Modern technology had brought mass armies to the battlefield and was able to supply and maintain those armies in the field for an indefinite period but the technology to move the armies on the battlefield and to break though the trench lines still awaited development. The horse was still invaluable in moving supplies up to the front lines but was obsolete on the battlefield. On 15 September, the replacement for the horse on the battlefield, the tank was first used by the British. From Pozieres and other points along the line, tanks heaved their monstrous shapes forward among British, Canadian and New Zealand infantry, and succeeded in driving the enemy almost to the bottom of the valley on which the Australians had looked out. Mouquet Farm finally fell on 28 September.
On 9 October the Australians were ordered to return to the Somme but by the time they arrived the autumn rains had turned the fields ploughed up by the massed artillery into a sea of mud. The broken ground was passable in dry weather, but with the rains it became a bog. Preparations had not been made for these conditions and both the trenches and the tracks leading to them became impassable. It took five or six relays of stretcher-bearers, each team, six or eight strong, many hours to get a wounded man from the front line to an ambulance, a few miles back. The roads leading to the front gave way under the heavy traffic. In these conditions, the worst experienced by the First AIF, two attempts were made to carry the line forward. On 5 and 14 November, portion of the attacking troops entered the German trenches which were held for some hours until the impossibility of keeping the partial gains were realised. The mud of the Somme meant that major offensive action would have to wait until the spring
Winter on the Somme was a battle against mud, rain, and frost-bite. Road repairs commenced miles behind the front lines and slowly inched forward until material finally reached the trenches and the dreadful conditions at that front began to slowly improve. Thousands of duckboards were laid to enable supplies and material to be moved forward. In January and February 1917, four weeks of cold weather froze the mud and water and covered the trenches with snow.
The Germans were hard tried but not broken by the Battle of the Somme. The losses on all sides were heavy. For the Germans, it was the beginning of the end. The Chantilly conference in November 1916 had already decided to strike at the Germans from all directions in the spring of 1917. The Germans realising that another offensive was in the offering when the weather improved, played out the last act of the battle when, in March 1917, they withdrew to the Hindenburg. line giving up more territory than they had lost during all of the 1916 fighting.
The German Army, in February 1917, commenced a withdrawal from the Somme battlefields to prepared fortified position known as the Hindenburg line. The Germans implemented a scorched earth policy, and all trees or poles over six feet tall were cut down and villages razed. The 5th Australian Division entered the burning town of Bapaume on 17 March and in the following days, troops from the 2nd and 5th Divisions were involved in sharp clashes with German rearguards. Heavy fighting took place through the several fortified villages left by the Germans to delay the advance.
On 15 April 1917, the Germans counterattack at Lagnicourt with 16,000 troops. The attack was repulsed by fewer than 4,000 men of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions.
On 11 April 1917, the 4th Australian Division attacked towards Bullecourt in support of the offensive that had opened at Arras on 9 April. At the suggestion of the Tanks Corps, a mass concentration of tanks were to precede the infantry and break down the wire and seize the Hindenburg Line. The tanks, which were slower than walking men and with thin steel failed with none reaching the wire before the infantry and only four reaching the wire at all with just one reaching the first trench in the Australian sector. Despite no artillery barrage and the failure by the tanks, the 4th Division achieved through sheer bravery and magnificent leadership what was then regarded as impossible - they broke into the Hindenburg Line. Owing to mistaken reports, mainly from air and artillery observers, they were left without support. At first the artillery did not fire because of misleading reports, then it fired on its own infantry and finally German machine-gunners closed the gate behind the Australian infantry. The 4th Division suffered more than 3,000 casualties including 1170 officers and men, captured.
From 3 until 26 May the 1st, 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions made a another attempt to seize Bullecourt. The Australians established a two mile gap in the Hindenburg Line became two miles wide and withstood counterattacked by elite German troops on 15 May.
The Battle of Menin Road was a well planned and well executed battle with limited but reasonable objectives which were achieved. Two Australian divisions formed the centre of the attacking force of eleven Divisions of the Second and Fifth Armies. This was the first time two Australian divisions attacked side by side. Lieutenant F Birks, MM of the 6th Bn won the VC when he rushed a pill-box and captured it, enabling his battalion to advance. He was killed the following day, about the time that Lance-Corporal R R Inwood, 10th Bn, was performing the gallant actions which were to win him the VC.
Following the success at Menin Road on 20 September and similar success at Polygon Wood on 26 September a third major assault on German positions near Passchendaele was launched on 4 October 1917. The main assault included the 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealander Division. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and more than 5,000 prisoners were captured. In bitter fighting against German pillboxes the 1st Division, 2nd Division and two brigades of the 3rd Division lost 6,432 men, but with their allies inflicted on the Germans what their official history calls "the black day of October 4". Lance-Corporal Walter Peeler of the 3rd Pioneer Bn attached to the 37th Bn and Sergeant Lewis McGee of the 40th Bn both won the VC in this battle.
With the withdrawal of Russia from the first world war in 1917, the German High Command reinforced for a massive assault on the western front. The German commander, Ludendorff, considered a breakthrough unlikely but felt enough progress could be made to place Germany in a dominant position during peace negotiations. The great offensive, code named 'Michael', began on 21 March 1918 at St Quentin, and within three days the British 5th army was in semi-chaotic retreat. The principal aim of the German attacks was to drive a wedge between the British and French armies by capturing the channel ports. all territory gained by the allies during the bloody confrontations of 1916 and 1917 on the Somme were surrendered within weeks. The 3rd and 4th Australian divisions were resting when ordered to proceed to Amiens with all haste. The 4th brigade from 4th division was the first unit to arrive and checked the German advance at Hebuterne, some 18 miles north-east of Amiens. catching the weary but victorious German troops in open country, the 4th brigade quickly proved that the best form of defence was swift but limited counter-attacks. for almost two weeks this brigade successfully held a section of the line normally held by two divisions. Ten miles east of Amiens, the 3rd division dug in on Morlancourt ridge, just behind the old 1916 Somme battlefield. before the Germans could close on them, the Australians counter-attacked, checked the German advance and recaptured some territory. With the arrival of the 5th division in support of the Morlancourt position, the 9th brigade from 3rd division crossed the Somme river to the south to assist in the defence of Villers Bretonneux. over the next three months a series of limited attacks, combined with the tactic of peaceful penetration gradually succeeded in regaining allied initiative in the area.
The Australians with both American and tank support made great gains at Hamel on 4 July 1918. This was the first major action by General Sir John Monash since taking command of the Australian Corps the previous month and was the model for the offensive of 8 August.
The British Fourth Army which included both the Australian and Canadian Corps commenced the final advance of the First World War at dawn on 8 August 1918 with the assistance of 430 tanks. The British plan of attack was meticulous and the leading troops including the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions cut a clear path through the forward German defences. General Ludendorff, the German commander, later described the attack on 8 August as the black day of the German army. The attack was resumed next morning on the Australian front by the 1st and 2nd Divisions and further territory was gained. In the following eight weeks Australian troops successfully breached a succession of German defence lines including Mont St Quentin in early September and the Hindenburg line at the end of the month.
The Light Horse Brigades were organised as follows by 1918:
Brigades | Regiment | Regiment | Regiment |
1st | 1st | 2nd | 3rd |
2nd | 5th | 6th | 7th |
3rd | 8th | 9th | 10th |
4th | 4th | 11th | 12th |
5th | 14th | 15th |
|
Divisional and Corps Troops came from the 4th and 13th Regiments.
The expulsion of Turkish forces from Egypt in late 1916 led to the establishment by the Turks of a line of fortifications guarding entry into central Palestine. The line extended for more than 24 miles from Gaza on the coast to the town of Beersheba. Following two unsuccessful attempts to turn the western flank at Gaza in March and April 1917, a plan was developed to attack and turn the eastern part of the line at Beersheba. The Desert Mounted Corps under the command of Australian General H G Chauvel was given this responsibility. By 30 October Chauvel's forces were in position in the desert east of the town. On 31 October, two divisions of infantry began a diversionary frontal attack on Beersheba whilst Chauvel's horsemen attacked Turkish positions in the hills north-east of the town. The Turks resisted strongly and it was not until 3 pm that the main position on Tel-el-Saba hill was overcome. Despite the lateness in the day Chauvel ordered a cavalry charge against the heavily defended town of Beersheba whose wells held the key to success or failure of the battle. The Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, under Brig-Gen Grant began moving towards the Turkish lines at 4.30 pm with only bayonets either attached to their rifle or in their hands. As the Brigade advanced it was subject to machine-gun and shrapnel fire but the Light Horsemen pressed forward and two Turkish trenches were cleared at the gallop. Some light horsemen dismounted and engaged the Turkish defenders in hand-to-hand fighting, while others galloped ahead into the town where the Turks were overwhelmed by the ferocity of the assault and soon surrendered.
The first operational group dispatched was the half-flight sent to the Mesopotamia. Some excellent reconnaissance work was completed despite poor machines and appalling conditions. Three of the four pilots were killed or captured and a number of ground crew were captured at Kut-el Arama and died in captivity.
1 Sqn, Australian Flying Corps, of 28 officers and 195 other ranks, departed for Egypt in early 1916. The squadron flying Be2c's initially operated out of an airfield near Heliopolis. They assisted in reconnaissance and bombing raids against Turkish forces attacking the canal in august 1916 and accompanied the advance into Palestine and Syria. During a bombing attack on Turkish positions at Gaza in March 1917, Lt F N McNamara won the only VC awarded to an Australian airman in the war by landing his plane and rescuing another pilot who had be forced down.
Three Australian squadrons became operational on the Western Front in late 1917. 3 Sqn, AFC had been raised in Egypt by December 1916 while 2 Sqn, AFC and 4 Sqn, AFC were formed in Australia and arrived in England in January and March 1917. The leading Australian air ace in France was Capt A H Cobby who was credited with destroying 29 aircraft and 13 balloons. The operational squadrons were supported by three training squadrons in England.
Over 2000 Australian nurses served abroad in every major theatre of conflict in the 1914-18 War. At Gallipoli, nurses served in hospital ships off the coast and in primitive hospitals on Lemnos. By 1916 in France, the AANS reserve provided enough nurses to staff no 1 Australian general hospital at Rouen and no 2 Australian general hospital at Wimeraux. They remained in France until the end of hostilities, and continued to minister to the men in hospitals and on troop ships back to Australia.
Schedule 2 of the VEA defines the operational areas for the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. There are five items in Schedule 2 that describe different operational areas and periods.
Operational Area | Time Limits |
Item 2 - Malaya and waters up to 18.5 kilometres from the coast. | 29 June 1950 - 31 August 1957 |
Item 3 - Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore. | 1 September 1957 - 31 July 1960 |
Item 5 - Malay/Thai Border. | 1 August 1960 - 16 August 1964 |
Item 6 - Borneo (Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei) and the adjacent sea up to 80.5 kilometres from the high water mark. | 8 December 1962 - 16 August 1964 |
Item 7 - Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (excluding the northern states area above) and the waters around the Malayan States up to 80.5 kilometres from the high water mark. | 17 August 1964 - 14 September 1966 |
This section provides historical notes on the Malayan emergency and confrontation.
Smith, E D Counter-Insurgency Operations 1: Malaya and Borneo, Ian Allan Ltd, 1985
James, H & Sheil-Small, D. The Undeclared War, Leo Cooper Ltd, 1971
Miller, H. Jungle War in Malaya, The Campaign against Communism 1948?1960, Arthur Barker Ltd, 1972
Clutterbuck, R. The Long War, The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. Cassell & Co Ltd, 1966
Members of the Australian Defence Force serving in what is now known as the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei had coverage under the VEA for specified periods between 1950 and 1966.
To have qualifying service for a service pension a veteran must have:
Between 1950 and 1966 Australian units were allotted for duty under Items 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule 2 [40] of the VEA.
Copies of allotment certificates are in the Service Eligibility Assistant [41] in the Legislation Library.
Item 2 of Schedule 2 [40] covers the area of Malaya, including the waters contiguous to the coast of Malaya for a distance of 18.5 kilometres seaward from the coast for the period from 29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957. Singapore is not included in the Item 2 operational area. Units stationed in Singapore during this period were allotted for duty in the Item 2 operational area but the individual must enter the Item 2 operational area to have qualifying service.
Item 3 of Schedule 2 covers Malaya and Singapore from 1 September 1957 to 31 July 1960.
From 1 January 2001, ships of the Royal Australian Navy that served with the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) between 2 July 1955 and 31 July 1960 have been allotted for duty under Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2.
More ? [42]
The Malayan Emergency officially ended on 31 July 1960. Security operations against Communist Terrorists (CTs) continued to be conducted intermittently on the Malay/Thai border in the northern parts of the states of the Perlis, Kedah, Perak and Kelantan.
Item 5 of Schedule 2 [40] covers the period from 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964. Operations after 16 August 1964 are included in Item 7.
From 1 January 2001 service on the Malay/Thai Border for the period 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964 has qualifying service. The applicant's service records will probably not indicate service on the Malay-Thai Border. An advisory to assist delegates in determining claims for qualifying service has been issued.
More ? [43]
Item 6 of Schedule 2 [40] covers service in Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah) for qualifying service purposes from 8 December 1962 to 16 August 1964.
Item 7 covers service in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei and the waters adjacent to those countries is covered for qualifying service purposes from 17 August 1964 to 30 September 1967. Please note that the instrument covers only the period 17 August 1964 to 14 September 1966.
From 1 January 2001 Army and RAAF units stationed in Malaya and Singapore have qualifying service. (RAN ships have been covered since 1966.) Coverage was extended from 17 August 1964 the date of the first Indonesian landing on the Malay Peninsula to 11 August 1966 the date of the Treaty of Bangkok that ended Confrontation. Units that have the later date of 14 September 1966 are Army units in Borneo and RAN ships at sea that have been covered for VEA benefits since 1966.
More ? [44]
Members of the Australian Army, RAN or RAAF on staff, equipment, public relations, familiarisation or welfare visits to or inspections of Australian Forces in the operational area have not been allotted for duty and do not have qualifying service although they entered the operational area.
Australian Army, RAN and RAAF units serving on the Malay Peninsula from 1955 until 1971 were part of the Far East Strategic Reserve. From 1997 operational service was extended to RAN ships for the period 1955 to 1963. From 1 January 2001 qualifying service was extended to RAN ships from 1955 to 1960.
More ? [45]
Servicepersons who were allotted for duty and who served in the following operational areas have both qualifying service and operational service;
In addition servicepersons who served in units listed on the allotment instruments for the following operational areas have operational service but not qualifying service:
Please note that from 1997 until 2001 Army and RAAF units were covered by Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 and RAN units were covered under s.6D of the VEA. From 1 January 2001, all services were listed in Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 and s.6D of the VEA. The end date of Item 3 of Schedule 2 was amended from 1963 to 1960. Army and RAAF units previously covered by Item 3 of Schedule 2 are now covered by s.6D.
Subsection 13(6) [40] VEA provides for claims in respect of death or incapacity to be accepted in limited circumstances where the person did not render operational service in an operational area.
The provision was introduced when cross-border operations were being conducted in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) by the Australian Defence Force during Indonesian Confrontation. Since Australia retained diplomatic links with Indonesia throughout this period, Kalimantan was not included within the operational area of Item 6 of Schedule 2 [40]. Cross-border operations (known as claret operations) were conducted by 3RAR and 4RAR as well as the SAS. In mid 1965 an SAS patrol was attacked by a rogue elephant while operating in Kalimantan. One of the patrol was badly gored and died before help could be summoned.
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 1 [46]
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 3 [47]
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 1 [46]
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 3 [47]
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 1 [46]
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Part 1\Chapter 4\Section 3 [47]
Commonwealth countries:
Allied countries:
Schedule 2 of the Act defines the operational area as the southern zone of Vietnam and the waters up to 185.2 kilometres from the shore of Vietnam other than the land or waters forming part of Cambodia or China.
The period in which this was an operational area was 31 Jul 62 to 11 Jan 73, the date when the troops were withdrawn following the election of the Whitlam Government on 2 Dec 72.
Last amended: 25 June 2012
Service with the RAAF at Ubon during the period from and including 31 May to and including 27 July 1962 is operational and qualifying service for members of the following allotted units:
Service in North East Thailand (not including Ubon) is operational service only during the period from and including 31 May to and including 27 July 1962 for members of the below units:
Service in North East Thailand (including Ubon) is operational service only during the period from and including 28 July 1962 to and including 24 June 1965 for members of the below units:
Australian Army
RAAF
Service in North East Thailand (including Ubon) is operational and qualifying service during the period from and including 25 June 1965 to and including 31 August 1968 for members of the following allotted units:
Australian Army
RAAF
The relevant instruments can be found under the tab 'Thailand' in the Service Eligibility Assistant [57] in the CLIK Legislation Library.
Last amended: 13 June 2013
The following table provides information on units allotted for duty in connection with the Vietnam conflict.
Army [59]
Navy [59]
Air Force [59]
Unit | From | To |
Headquarter Units |
|
|
AATTV | 31 Jul 62 | 19 Dec 72 |
AAAGV | 6 Mar 72 | 23 Dec 72 |
Aust Embassy Guard Pl (from AAAGV/ personnel) | 18 Dec 72 | 1 Jul 73 |
HQ AAFV redesignated as HQ AFV (Army Component) | 25 May 65 3 May 66 | 2 May 66 15 Mar 72 |
HQ 145 Sig Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
709 Sig Tp | 25 May 65 | 20 Nov 67 |
527 Sig Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 5 Jul 67 |
581 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
552 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
506 Sig Tp (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
520 Sig Tp (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
Det 547 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
547 Sig Tp (less Det) (op Tp (Type A)) | 2 Mar 67 | 23 Dec 71 |
HQ 110 Sig Sqn | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
110 Sig Sqn | 21 Nov 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
704 Sig Tp (less Det) | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
557 Sig Tp (less Det) | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
561 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
532 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
503 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
Fd Op Research Sect | 29 Nov 65 | 6 Mar 72 |
HQ AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 2 Mar 72 |
1 Aust CA Unit | 2 Mar 67 | 25 Nov 71 |
Det 198 Wks Sect | 9 Jan 67 | 1 Mar 67 |
198 Wks Sect | 2 Mar 67 | 23 Dec 72 |
Det 11 MC Gp | 1 Apr 66 | 12 Mar 72 |
HQ 1 TF | 1 Apr 66 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 APC Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 APC Sqn (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Jan 67 |
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 23 Dec 69 | 16 Dec 70 |
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt LAD | 23 Dec 69 | 16 Dec 70 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 16 Jan 67 | 12 May 69 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 7 Jan 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 7 Jan 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
B Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 11 Feb 69 | 22 Dec 69 |
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 13 May 69 | 6 Jan 71 |
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 13 May 69 | 6 Jan 71 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 29 Jan 68 | 10 Feb 69 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 17 Dec 70 | 30 Sep71 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt LAD | 17 Dec 70 | 30 Sep 71 |
104 Fd Bty | 5 May 71 | 20 Dec 71 |
105 Fd Bty | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar66 |
1 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
1 Fd Regt (Restd) | 25 Feb 69 | 10 May70 |
4 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 2 Mar 67 | 28 May 68 |
4 Fd Regt | 24 Feb 70 | 18 Mar 71 |
12 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 29 Jan 68 | 11 Mar 69 |
12 Fd Regt | 27 Jan 71 | 20 Dec 71 |
Det 131 Div Loc Bty | 1 Apr 66 | 19 Aug 71 |
3 Fd Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 Fd Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 | 30 Nov 67 |
1 Fd Sqn (Restd) | 1 Dec 67 | 18 Nov 71 |
21 Engr Sp Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 9 Dec 71 |
Det 1 Topo Svy Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
A Sect 1 Topo Svy Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 7 Oct 71 |
103 Sig Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
104 Sig Sqn (TF) | 2 Mar 67 | 15 Dec 71 |
Det 152 Sig Sqn (SAS) | 31 Aug 66 | 15 Oct 71 |
1 RAR | 25 May 65 19 Jan 68 | 14 Jun 66 28 Feb 69 |
2 RAR | 2 Mar 67 28 Apr 70 | 18 Jun 68 4 Jun 71 |
3 RAR | 12 Dec 67 12 Feb 71 | 5 Dec 68 19 Oct 71 |
4 RAR | 29 Jan 68 1 May 71 | 30 May 69 12 Mar 72 |
5 RAR | 1 Apr 66 28 Jan 69 | 5 Jul67 5 Mar 70 |
6 RAR | 1 Apr 66 7 May 69 | 5 Jul 67 28 May 70 |
7 RAR | 2 Mar 67 10 Feb 70 | 26 Apr 68 10 Mar 71 |
8 RAR | 18 Nov 69 | 12 Nov 70 |
9 RAR | 5 Nov 68 | 5 Dec 69 |
1 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 2 Mar 67 3 Feb 70 | 18 Feb 68 18 Feb 71 |
2 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 29 Jan 68 18 Feb 71 | 4 Mar 69 15 Oct 71 |
3 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 3 Feb 69 | 5 Jul 67 20 Feb 70 |
Det 1 Div Int Unit | 1 Apr 66 | 11 Nov 71 |
1 Tpt Pl | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
2 Tpt Pl | 21 Apr 67 | 12 Nov 70 |
Det 1 Fwd Del Tp | 29 Jan 68 | 21 Jul 71 |
Det 1 OFP | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
Det 6 OFP | 2 Mar 67 | 31 Jan 68 |
1 OFP | 1 Feb 68 | 12 Feb 72 |
106 Fd Wksp Stores Sect | 15 Nov 68 | 25 Sep 71 |
Det 131 Div Loc Bty Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Aug 71 |
1 Fd Sqn Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 30 Oct 71 |
106 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 15 Nov 68 | 7 Oct 71 |
1 TF HQ LAD | 1 Apr 66 | 19 Oct 71 |
Det 1 APC Sqn LAD | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Jan 67 |
Det A Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 16 Jan 67 | 12 May 69 |
Bty Sect 4 Fd Regt LAD redesignated as 105 Fd Bty Sect 12 Fd Regt LAD | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 Fd Regt LAD | 1 Apr 66 25 Feb 69 | 5 Jul 67 10 May 70 |
4 Fd Regt LAD | 2 Mar 67 24 Feb 70 | 28 May 68 18 Mar 71 |
12 Fd Regt LAD | 29 Jan 68 27 Jan 71 | 11 Mar 69 20 Dec 71 |
Det 1 Div Cash Office | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Jan 67 |
1 Det AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 27 Feb 72 |
Sect 1 Div Pro Coy redesignated as Pro Sect 1 Pro Coy | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Jan 67 |
AFV Pro Unit | 1 Feb 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 Aust Rft Unit | 1 Apr 66 | 29 Sep 71 |
|
|
|
Logistic Support Units |
|
|
Aust Log Sp Coy | 25 May 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
HQ 1 Aust Log Sp Gp | 1 Apr 66 | 16 Oct 71 |
Det 55 Adv Engr Stores Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 16 Feb 68 |
Det 55 Engr Wksp and Pk Sqn | 17 Feb 68 | 14 Jun 71 |
55 Engr Wksp and Pk Sqn | 15 Jun 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
17 Const Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
17 Const Sqn | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Feb 72 |
Det 30 Terminal Sqn | 9 Jan 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
161 Recce Flt | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
161 (Indep) Recce Flt | 1 Apr 66 | 8 Mar 72 |
Det 8 Pet Pl | 9 Jan 67 | 26 Aug 68 |
8 Pet Pl RAASC | 27 Aug 68 | 12 Feb 72 |
HQ 26 Coy RAASC | 8 Jan 68 | 31 Oct 69 |
HQ 26 Tpt Coy RAASC | 1 Nov 69 | 30 Jun 71 |
HQ 1 Coy RAASC | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
21 Sup Pl RAASC | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
87 Tpt Pl | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
Det 52 Sup Pl | 18 Dec 67 | 5 May 71 |
3 Small Ship Tp (AV 1355 Vernon Sturdee) | 11 Apr 66 23 Jan 67 | 25 Jun 67 14 Dec 67 |
1 Small Ship Tp (AV 1356 Clive Steele) | 26 Jun 66 3 Dec 66 17 Jan 67 29 Jan 68 21 Jul 69 11 Jul 70 2 Mar 71 | 23 Nov 66 9 Jan 67 16 Mar 67 27 Apr 69 2 Mar 70 3 Sep 70 12 Mar 71 |
2 Small Ship Tp (AV 1353 Harry Chauvel) | 23 Oct 67 21 May 70 | 21 Mar 68 6 Jun 70 |
4 Small Ship Tp (AV 1354 Brudenell White) | 22 Sep 70 | 24 Oct 70 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AS 3051 John Monash) | 5 May 66 29 Jul 66 3 Dec 67 17 Feb 68 16 Dec 68 20 Feb 69 25 Oct 69 27 Jul 71 | 14 May 66 20 Sep 66 31 Jan 68 31 Mar 68 26 Dec 68 4 Mar 69 7 Dec 69 14 Oct 71 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AV 1356 Clive Steele) | 23 Feb 71 | 20 Mar 71 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AV 1353 Harry Chauvel) | 11 Nov 70 | 15 Dec 70 |
HQ 5 Coy RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
86 Tpt Pl RAASC | 9 Jan 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
85 Tpt Pl (Tipper) RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 16 Sep 71 |
25 Sup Pl RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 176 AD Coy | 1 Apr 66 | 31 May 67 |
176 AD Coy | 1Apr 67 | 18 Nov 71 |
1 Aust Fd Hosp | 13 Nov 67 | 14 Dec 71 |
8 Fd Amb | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
2 Fd Amb (less one Coy) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
33 Dental Unit (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
Det 1 Fd Med and Dental Unit | 20 Nov 67 | 6 Mar 68 |
Det 1 Fd Med and Dent Eqpt Dep | 7 Mar 68 | 25 Nov 71 |
33 Dental Unit | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 1 Fd Hygiene Coy | 5 Dec 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
HQ 2 Comp Ord Depot (Type A) | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Nov 67 |
2 Adv Ord Dep | 16 Nov 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
both the above units included the following sub-units: a. 13 Ord Sup Con Pl b. 16 Ord Veh Pl c. 14 Ord Stores Pl d. 18 Ord Dep Ldy Sect e. 15 Ord Ammo Pl f. 19 Ord Sup Con Pl g. 20 Ord Stores Pl
|
|
|
1 Indep Armd Sqn Wksp | 29 Jan 68 | 2 Feb 68 |
1 Armd Sqn Wksp (absorbed by 106 Fd Wksp - details above) | 3 Feb 68 | 14 Nov 68 |
17 Const Sqn Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 25 Nov 71 |
Det 1 Div St Wksp - redesignated as: | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Oct 69 |
5 Coy RAASC Wksp | 1 Nov 69 | 25 Nov 71 |
101 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
102 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
2 Det AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 27 Feb 72 |
Det 1 Div Post Unit - absorbed by: | 1 Apr 66 | 8 Nov 67 |
Det 1 Comm Z Postal Unit | 19 Oct 66 | 28 Feb 72 |
Det 5 ASCO Unit - redesignated as: | 1 Apr 66 | 26 Feb 68 |
HQ 2 AFCU | 27 Feb 68 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 2 Aust Fd Canteen Unit - redesignated as 1 Pl 2 AFCU | 27 Feb 68 | 12 Mar 72 |
67 GL Sect | 1 Apr 66 | 2 Dec 71 |
1 Aust Rest and Con Centre - redesignated as: | 11 Feb 66 | 7 Dec 67 |
AFV Amenities and Welfare Unit | 8 Dec 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 Psy Ops Unit | 13 Apr 70 | 25 Nov 71 |
Ships and units allotted for duty in Vietnam
Ship | From | To |
HMAS Brisbane | 20 Mar 69 16 Mar 71 | 13 Oct 69 11 Oct 71 |
HMAS Perth | 2 Sep 67 19 Sep 68 14 Sep 70 | 10 Apr 68 12 Apr 69 8 Apr 71 |
HMAS Hobart | 7 Mar 67 22 Mar 68 16 Mar 70 | 27 Sep 67 11 Oct 68 9 Oct 70 |
HMAS Vendetta | 15 Sep 69 | 11 Apr 70 |
Clearance Diving Team 3* |
|
|
Contingent 1 | 5 Feb 67 | 29 Aug 67 |
Contingent 2 | 12 Aug 67 | 11 Mar 68 |
Contingent 3 | 11 Feb 68 | 3 Sep 68 |
Contingent 4 | 12 Aug 68 | 4 Mar 69 |
Contingent 5 | 10 Feb 69 | 21 Aug 69 |
Contingent 6 | 12 Aug 69 | 10 Mar 70 |
Contingent 7 | 10 Mar 70 | 29 Oct 70 |
Contingent 8 | 14 Oct 70 | 5 May 71 |
RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) (a detachment of No 723 Squadron)* |
|
|
Contingent 1 | 15 Oct 67 | 17 Oct 68 |
Contingent 2 | 9 Sep 68 | 11 Sep 69 |
Contingent 3 | 9 Sep 69 | 10 Sep 70 |
Contingent 4 | 9 Sep 70 | 16 Jun 71 |
RAN Element of No 9 (Helicopter) Squadron, RAAF | From date of departure from Australia to date of arrival in Australia. | |
Notes:
Ships and units allotted for duty in Vietnam - support or logistic roles
Ship | Last Port Of Call
| Date | In Port Vietnam | First Port Of Call | Date |
HMAS Anzac | Sydney | 20 May 68 | 1 Jun 68 | Darwin | 7 Jun 68 |
HMAS Boonaroo | Cairns | 13 Mar 67 | 28 Mar-2 Apr 67 | Darwin | 13 Apr 67 |
HMAS Derwent | Manila Singapore Singapore | 26 May 66 10 Feb 69 4 Nov 71 | 6-8 Jun 66 15 Feb 69 6-7 Nov 71 | Singapore Singapore Singapore | 13 Jun 66 18 Feb 69 8 Nov 71 |
HMAS Duchess | Sydney Manus Island Singapore Sydney Singapore Singapore | 27 May 65 20 Sept 65 18 Nov 68 16 Nov 69 3 Apr 71 17 May 71 | 8-11 Jun 65 28-30 Sep 65 20 Nov 68 28 Nov 69 5 Apr 71 22-23 May 71 | Fremantle Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore Hong Kong Hong Kong | 26 Jun 65 3 Oct 65 25 Nov 68 29 Nov 69 8 Apr 71 1 Jun 71 |
MV Jeparit (RAN personnel only) | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Newcastle Sydney Sydney Sydney
| 11 Mar 67 28 Apr 67 9 Jun 67 27 Jul 67 13 Sept 67 30 Oct 67 18 Dec 67 9 Feb 68 23 Mar 68 10 May 68 21 Jun 68 6 Aug 68 22 Sept 68 4 Nov 68 28 Dec 68 14 Mar 69 24 Apr 69 4 Jun 69 16 Jul 69 7 Sept 69 22 Oct 69
| 27 Mar-4 Apr 67 12-16 May 67 24 Jun-2 Jul 67 11-18 Aug 67 27 Sep-5 Oct 67 13-22 Nov 67 2-11 Jan 68 24-27 Feb 68 6-15 Apr 68 24-29 May 68 5-11 Jul 68 21-27 Aug 68 7-12 Oct 68 19-25 Nov 68 12-19 Jan 69 29 Mar-3 Apr 69 8-12 May 69 19-23 Jun 69 30 Jul-6 Aug 69 24-29 Sep 69 9-13 Nov 69 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Newcastle Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 21 Apr 67 2 Jun 67 19 Jul 67 4 Sept 67 22 Oct 67 9 Dec 67 26 Jan 68 14 Mar 68 1 May 68 15 Jun 68 28 Jul 68 13 Sept 68 29 Oct 68 17 Dec 68 5 Feb 69 19 Apr 69 29 May 69 10 Jul 69 25 Aug 69 13 Oct 69 29 Nov 69 |
HMAS Jeparit | Sydney Darwin Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 19 Dec 69 16 Feb 70 26 Mar 70 16 May 70 6 Jul 70 18 Aug 70 | 4-10 Jan 70 25 Feb-3 Mar 70 13-18 Apr 70 8-13 Jun 70 22-27 Jul 70 4-7 Sep 70 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 26 Jan 70 21 Mar 70 6 May 70 28 Jun 70 12 Aug 70 23 Sept 70 |
| Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Townsville Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney
| 1 Oct 70 15 Nov 70 4 Jan 71 16 Feb 71 2 Apr 71 13 May 71 7 Jul 71 20 Aug 71 11 Oct 71 25 Nov 71 10 Jan 72 | 21-25 Oct 70 3-8 Dec 70 21-24 Jan 71 8-12 Mar 71 19-22 Apr 71 30 May-2 Jun 71 21-25 Jul 71 8-15 Sep 71 29 Oct-3 Nov 71 13-18 Dec 71 3-6 Feb 72 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Townsville Sydney Townsville Brisbane Sydney
| 8 Nov 70 23 Dec 70 8 Feb 71 26 Mar 71 7 May 71 26 Jun 71 8 Aug 71 30 Sept 71 14 Nov 71 31 Dec 71 11 Mar 72 |
HMAS Melbourne (1) | Subic Bay Singapore Manila
| 31 May 65 25 Apr 66 25 May 66 | 7-8 Jun 65 3-4 May 66 6 Jun 66 | Sydney Hong Kong Penang | 22 Jun 65 6 May 66 9 Jun 66 |
HMAS Parramatta | Tawau Singapore Bangkok
| 25 May 65 5 Apr 68 15 May 71 | 8-11 Jun 65 9 Apr 68 22 May 71 | Singapore Singapore Subic Bay | 14 Jun 65 17 Apr 68 24 May 71
|
HMAS Queenborough | Hong Kong
| 27 Jan 63 | 29 Jan-4 Feb 63 | Singapore | 6 Feb 63 |
HMAS Quiberon | Hong Kong | 27 Jan 63 | 29 Jan-4 Feb 63 | Singapore | 6 Feb 63 |
HMAS Quickmatch* |
|
| See note at bottom of tables |
|
|
HMAS Stuart | Sydney Singapore
| 16 May 67 25 Jan 68 | 30 May 67 3 Feb 68 | Darwin Singapore | 8 Jun 67 5 Feb 68 |
HMAS Swan | Singapore Singapore
| 4 Oct 71 6 Dec 71 | 6-7 Oct 71 8-9 Dec 71 | Manila Subic Bay | 14 Oct 71 11 Dec 71 |
HMAS Sydney
| Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Singapore Sydney Fremantle Sydney Sydney Sydney Fremantle Fremantle Townsville Brisbane Sydney Fremantle | 27 May 65 14 Sept 65 22 Apr 66 25 May 66 8 Apr 67 28 Apr 67 19 May 67 20 Dec 67 17 Jan 68 27 Mar 68 21 May 68 13 Nov 68 8 Feb 69 8 May 69 17 Nov 69 16 Feb 70 21 Oct 70 | 8-11 Jun 65 28-30 Sep 65 4-6 May 66 6-8 Jun 66 20 Apr 67 30 Apr 67 30 May 67 27 Dec 67 3 Feb 68 9 Apr 68 1 Jun 68 20 Nov 68 15 Feb 69 19 May 69 28 Nov 69 27 Feb 70 31 Oct-1 Nov 70 | Fremantle Sydney Sydney Hong Kong Singapore Sydney Brisbane Fremantle Sydney Sydney Brisbane Fremantle Townsville Brisbane Fremantle Fremantle Brisbane | 26 Jun 65 20 Oct 65 18 May 66 11 Jun 66 22 Apr 67 12 May 67 14 Jun 67 3 Jan 68 16 Feb 68 26 Apr 68 13 Jun 68 28 Nov 68 25 Feb 69 30 May 69 5 Dec 69 5 Mar 70 12 Nov 70 |
| Port Adelaide Port Adelaide Townsville Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 15 Feb 71 26 Mar 71 13 May 71 20 Sept 71 26 Oct 71 24 Nov 71 14 Feb 72 1 Nov 72 | 25 Feb 71 5 Apr 71 22-23 May 71 6-7 Oct 71 6-7 Nov 71 8-9 Dec 71 28-29 Feb 72 23-24 Nov 72 | Fremantle Hong Kong Townsville Port Adelaide Sydney Townsville Townsville Hong Kong | 4 Mar 71 8 Apr 71 1 Jun 71 16 Oct 71 18 Nov 71 17 Dec 71 9 Mar 72 30 Nov 72 |
Unit | From | To |
Helicopter Flights Embarked in HMAS Sydney |
|
|
725 Squadron
| 20.04.67 30.04.67 30.05.67 | 20.04.67 30.04.67 30.05.67 |
817 Squadron | 27.12.67 03.02.68 09.04.68 01.06.68 20.11.68 | 27.12.67 03.02.68 09.04.68 01.06.68 20.11.68 |
Ship | Last Port Of Call
| Date | In Port Vietnam | First Port Of Call | Date |
HMAS Torrens | Manila
| 16 Feb 72 | 28-29 Feb 72 | Hong Kong | 3 Mar 72 |
HMAS Vampire (2)* |
Subic Bay Manus Island Manus Island Singapore Singapore Pulau Air
|
31 May 65 27 Apr 66 13 Apr 67 28 Apr 67 14 May 69 21 Nov 72 | See note at bottom of table 7-8 Jun 65 4-6 May 66 20 Apr 67 30 Apr 67 19 May 69 23-24 Nov 72 |
Sydney Hong Kong Singapore Singapore Manila Pulau Tioman |
22 Jun 65 9 May 66 22 Apr 67 5 May 67 25 May 69 26 Nov 72 |
HMAS Vendetta (3) | Manus Island Sydney Manila
| 20 Sept 65 25 May 66 28 Oct 70 | 28-30 Sep 65 6-8 Jun 66 31 Oct-1 Nov 70 | Hong Kong Hong Kong Colombo | 3 Oct 65 11 Jun 66 9 Nov 70 |
HMAS Yarra (2) | Singapore Manila Singapore Singapore Singapore
| 25 Apr 66 26 May 66 22 Dec 67 22 Feb 70 22 Feb 71 | 4-6 May 66 6 Jun 66 27 Dec 67 27 Feb 70 25 Feb 71 | Hong Kong Penang Singapore Singapore Hong Kong | 9 May 66 9 Jun 66 1 Jan 68 1 Mar 70 1 Mar 71 |
RAN Band |
|
| 26 May-5 Jun 70 |
|
|
*HMA Ships Vampire and Quickmatch visited Saigon during the period 25 – 29 January 1962. This service is covered under section 6E [40] of the VEA and is operational but NOT qualifying service.
Notes:
(1) The aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne with HMA Ships Vampire and Yarra escorted HMAS Sydney to Vietnam. HMAS Sydney docked in Vung Tau harbour. The other ships did not enter harbour but were well within the Vietnam operational area before being detached for other duty.
(2) HMAS Vendetta did one tour of duty in Vietnam between October 1969 to March 1970 and on three occasions in 1965, 1966 and late 1970 escorted HMAS Sydney to and from Vietnam.
(3) RAN CLearance Divers Team 1 (CDT1) during SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT, Vietnam.
Policy Advice:
This policy advice was provided to DVA by the Nature of Service (NOS) Directorate, Department of Defence, and reflects information available to the NOS Directorate from the RAN Sea Power Centre; 'Reports of Proceedings' for CDT1 for the period from the Australian War Memorial; and the United States Navy History and Heritage Command website that contains the monthly reports of the US Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam at the time.
The 'Reports of Proceedings' were compiled on a monthly basis by the Commanding Officer of CDT1 and record the activities undertaken by the team each month.
The 'Reports of Proceedings' reveal that CDT1 embarked on USS CATSKILL for the period 29 May to 7 June 1969 for a mine countermeasure phase of the SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT.
USS CATSKILL was on passage from Manila Bay (Philippines) to Sattahip in Thailand and on the night of 31 May 69 closed with the coast of Vietnam for a rendezvous with the USS Peacock. There was no CDT operational activity involved in this manoeuvre.
The mine countermeasure phase of the exercise was conducted over 3-4 June 1969 in the vicinity of Sattahip and involved the clearance of part of 'Channel E-F' leading into the Sattahip Area of Operations.
There is no evidence that the mine countermeasure phase of the exercise was connected to the conduct of the Vietnam War. In a covering letter on the Report of Proceedings for June 1969 to the Secretary of the Navy, the Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet advised that.....'CDT1 gained considerable experience from the SE Asian visit and acquitted themselves well'.
Australian Defence Force members who enter a declared operational area for the sole purpose of participation in an exercise, including participation in SEATO exercises in the vicinity of Vietnam, are not eligible for allotment for duty to the operation in respect of which the operational area has been declared.
Further, the Sea Power Centre advise that CDT 3 (not CDT 1) was normally activated for the purpose of overseas active service and at the end of that service it was deactivated.
(4) Midshipmen undergoing training during the Vietnam War
Policy Advice:
Where documentation is available to support the applicant's assertion, then a Midshipman undergoing training on an allotted vessel in an operational area during the Vietnam War, may be considered to be a member of that ship's company for the purposes of Repatriation benefits, notwithstanding that their service records may reflect a posting to a different unit.
(5) Table of Royal Australian Navy vessels in Vietnamese estuarine waters during the Vietnam War.
This Table lists all RAN vessels in Vietnamese estuarine waters during the Vietnamese War. It provides the date/s of arrival and departure from Vietnamese waters for each ship, and the time-period/s when the potable water supply may be expected to include water distilled from Vietnamese estuarine waters.
SHIP | Arrival in Vietnamese estuarine waters | Departure from Vietnamese estuarine waters | Time period when distilled water was in potable water tanks | Period when no distilled water in potable water tanks |
HMAS Anzac (II) | 01/06/1968 | 01/06/1968* | From and including 01/06/1968 to and including 01/06/1970 | Before 01/06/1968 and After 01/06/1970 |
HMAS Brisbane (II) | 01/04/1969 | 09/04/1969 | From and including 01/04/1969 to and including 16/08/1973 | Before 01/04/1969 and After 16/08/1973 |
16/04/1969 | 17/05/1969 | |||
16/04/1971 | 19/04/1971 | |||
15/05/1971 | 15/05/1971 | |||
17/05/1971 | 17/05/1971 | |||
19/05/1971 | 19/05/1971 | |||
23/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
28/05/1971 | 28/05/1971 | |||
31/05/1971 | 31/05/1971 | |||
12/06/1971 | 12/06/1971 | |||
25/06/1971 | 25/06/1971 | |||
16/08/1971 | 16/08/1971 | |||
HMAS Derwent
| 06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | From and including 06/06/1966 to and including 08/06/1968 and From and including 15/02/1969 to and including 15/02/1971 and From and including 06/11/1971 to and including 06/11/1973 | Before 06/06/1966 and From 09/06/1968 to 14/02/1969 and From 16/02/1971 to 05/11/1971 and After 06/11/1973 |
15/02/1969 | 15/02/1969* | |||
06/11/1971 | 06/11/1971* | |||
HMAS Duchess | 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 and to and including 30/09/1967 and From and including 20/11/1968 to and including 23/05/1973 | Before 08/06/1965 and From 01/10/1967 to 19/11/1968 and After 23/05/1973 |
28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | |||
20/11/1968 | 20/11/1968* | |||
28/11/1969 | 28/11/1969* | |||
05/04/1971 | 05/04/1971* | |||
22/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
HMAS Hobart (II) | 15/04/1967 | 15/04/1967 | From and including 15/04/1967 to and including 17/09/1972 | Before 15/04/1967 and After 17/09/1972 |
26/05/1968 | 26/05/1968 | |||
28/07/1968 | 28/07/1968 | |||
15/08/1968 | 15/08/1968 | |||
17/08/1968 | 17/08/1968 | |||
19/08/1968 | 19/08/1968 | |||
23/08/1968 | 23/08/1968 | |||
25/08/1968 | 25/08/1968 | |||
27/08/1968 | 27/08/1968 | |||
29/08/1968 | 29/08/1968 | |||
25/04/1970 | 27/04/1970 | |||
15/06/1970 | 16/06/1970 | |||
20/08/1970 | 22/08/1970 | |||
26/08/1970 | 26/08/1970 | |||
28/08/1970 | 29/08/1970 | |||
14/09/1970 | 14/09/1970 | |||
17/09/1970 | 17/09/1970 | |||
HMAS Parramatta (III)
| 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 to and including 11/06/1967 And From and including 09/04/1968 to and including 09/04/1970 and From and including 22/05/1971 to and including 22/05/1973 | Before 08/06/1965 and From 12/06/1967 to 08/04/1968 and From 10/04/1970 to 21/05/1971 and After 22/05/1973 |
09/04/1968 | 09/04/1968* | |||
22 /05/1971 | 22/05/1971* | |||
HMAS Perth (II) | 19/11/1968 | 19/11/1968 | From and including 19/11/1968 to and including 16/01/1973 | Before 19/11/1968 and After 16/01/1973 |
25/11/1968 | 25/11/1968 | |||
12/12/1968 | 14/12/1968 | |||
21/12/1968 | 21/12/1968 | |||
23/12/1968 | 23/12/1968 | |||
25/12/1968 | 25/12/1968 | |||
09/01/1969 | 16/01/1969 | |||
03/03/1969 | 05/03/1969 | |||
03/10/1970 | 04/10/1970 | |||
04/11/1970 | 05/11/1970 | |||
07/11/1970 | 08/11/1970 | |||
16/11/1970 | 16/11/1970 | |||
18/11/1970 | 18/11/1970 | |||
21/12/1970 | 21/12/1970 | |||
16/01/1971 | 16/01/1971 | |||
HMAS Queenborough | 31/01/1963 | 04/02/1963 | From and including 31/01/1963 to and including 04/02/1965 | Before 31/01/1963 and After 04/02/1965 |
HMAS Quiberon | 31/01/1963 | 04/02/1963 | From and including 31/01/1963 to and including 04/02/1965 | Before 31/01/1963 and After 04/02/1965 |
HMAS Stuart (II) | 30/05/1967 | 30/05/1967* | From and including 30/05/1967 to and including 03/02/1970 | Before 30/05/1967 and After 03/02/1970 |
03/02/1968 | 03/02/1968* | |||
HMAS Sydney (III) | 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 to and including 24/11/1974 | Before 08/06/1965 and After 24/11/1974 |
28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | |||
04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | |||
06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | |||
20/04/1967 | 20/04/1967* | |||
30/04/1967 | 30/04/1967* | |||
30/05/1967 | 30/05/1967* | |||
27/12/1967 | 27/12/1967* | |||
03/02/1968 | 03/02/1967* | |||
09/04/1968 | 09/04/1968* | |||
01/06/1968 | 01/06/1968* | |||
20/11/1968 | 20/11/1968* | |||
15/02/1969 | 15/02/1969* | |||
19/05/1969 | 19/05/1969* | |||
28/11/1969 | 28/11/1969* | |||
27/02/1970 | 27/02/1970* | |||
31/10/1970 | 01/11/1970 | |||
25/02/1971 | 25/02/1971* | |||
05/04/1971 | 05/04/1971* | |||
22/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
06/10/1971 | 07/10/1971 | |||
07/11/1971 | 07/11/1971 | |||
08/12/1971 | 09/12/1971 | |||
28/02/1972 | 29/02/1972 | |||
23/11/1972 | 24/11/1972 | |||
| ||||
HMAS Swan (III) | 06/10/1971 | 07/10/1971 | From and including 06/10/1971 to and including 09/12/1973 | Before 06/10/1971 and After 09/12/1973 |
08/12/1971 | 09/12/1971 | |||
HMAS Torrens (II) | 29/02/1972 | 29/02/1972 | From and including 29/02/1972 to and including 28/02/1974 | Before 29/02/1972 and After 01/03/1974 |
HMAS Vampire (II) | 04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | From and including 04/05/1966 to and including 30/04/1969 and From and including 19/05/1969 to and including 19/05/1971 and From and including 23/11/1972 to and including 24/11/1974 | Before 04/05/1966 and From 01/05/1969 to 18/05/1969 and From 20/05/1971 to 22/11/1972 and After 24/11/1974 |
20/04/1967 | 20/04/1967* | |||
30/04/1967 | 30/04/1967* | |||
19/05/1969 | 19/05/1969* | |||
23/11/1972 | 24/11/1972 | |||
HMAS Vendetta (II) | 28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | From and including 28/09/1965 to and including 08/06/1968 And From and including 02/10/1969to and including 01/11/1972 | Before 28/09/1965 and From 09/06/1968 to 01/10/1969 and After 01/11/1972 |
06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | |||
02/10/1969 | 06/10/1969 | |||
12/10/1969 | 19/10/1969 | |||
23/11/1969 | 24/11/1969 | |||
31/10/1970 | 01/11/1970 | |||
HMAS Yarra (III) | 04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | From and including 04/05/1966 to and including 27/12/1969 From and including 27/02/1970 to and including 25/02/1973 | Before 04/05/1966 and From 28/12/1969 to 26/02/1970 and After 25/02/1973 |
27/12/1967 | 27/12/1967* | |||
27/02/1970 | 27/02/1970 | |||
25/02/1971 | 25/02/1971 | |||
Source: Royal Australian Navy advice to DVA provided 20 October 2015
** No end date or other explanatory information provided by Department of Defence – assume ship departed on the same day as it arrived
Air Force units
Unit | From | To |
RAAF Tpt Flt Vietnam (RTFV) became: | 30 Jul 64 | 1 Jun 66 |
No 35 Squadron | 1 Jun 66 | 26 Feb 72 |
RAAF Element HQAFV | 13 Jun 66 | 26 Feb 72 |
Known as RAAFHQAFV, and included Movement Control Office Vietnam and Air Movement Section Tan San Nhut | ||
Headquarters RAAF Contingent, Vung Tau (included RAAF Element Advanced Tactical Operations Centre (ATOC) Nui Dat) | 27 Jun 67 | 29 Feb 72 |
No 2 Squadron, Phan Rang | 19 Apr 67 | 9 Jun 71 |
No 9 Squadron, Vung Tau | 12 Jun 66 | 24 Dec 71 |
Base Support Flight, Vung Tau (includes Air Movements Sect, Vung Tau) became | 14 May 66 | 18 Sep 68 |
No 1 Operational Support Unit, Vung Tau | 19 Sep 68 | 7 Mar 72 |
No 5 Airfield Construction Squadron (5ACS) Detachment B | 25 Jan 67 | 17 Feb 68 |
RAAF Element, 161 Recce Flt (Army) - renamed | 10 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
161 (Indep) Recce Flt | 1 Apr 66 | 6 Nov 68 |
Individual Members Allotted for Operational Service
Additional to RAAF units assigned to 'special duty' in Vietnam, aircrews of Nos 36 and 37 Squadrons, ex RAAF Richmond, NSW, flew continual air transport tasks of supply support and medical evacuation missions. Also involved in Vietnam was the Dakota Flight of No 2 Squadron, Butterworth.
This was renamed Transport Support Flight, Butterworth, on 1 Mar 67. Dakota aircraft of the latter Flights carried out ambassadorial flights and supply tasks into Vietnam and aircrew, flight crew and ground staff could qualify for 'special service' if certified as having participated in operations in Vietnam. This will be indicated on each member's Record of Service.
Aircrew of the Australian Air Force Detachment, Sangley Point
Aircrew of the Australian Air Force Detachment, Sangley Point are allotted.
The Repatriation Commission made a decision in September 2011 to concede entry into the Vietnam operational area for aircrew members of RAAF Detachment Sangley Point who served in Operation Trimdon.
More ? [60]
22Sydney departed Sydney on 3rd voyage.
4Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
17 MV Boonaroo left Sydney on 1st Vietnam voyage.
18Sydney returned to Sydney.
25Sydney departed Sydney on 4th voyage.
6Boonaroo arrived in Vietnam.
6Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
17 — MV Jeparit left Sydney for Vung Tau on 1st Vietnam voyage.
Sydney returned to Sydney. Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau. Boonaroo returned to Sydney.
22Jeparit departed Sydney on 2nd voyage.
15Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
16Jeparit departed Sydney on 3rd voyage.
1Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
3Jeparit departed Sydney on 4th voyage.
17Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
21Jeparit departed Sydney on 5th voyage.
6 — First Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
18 — CDT3 assumed Operation Stabledoor and EOD responsibilities at Vung Tau.
22Boonaroo left Sydney on 2nd voyage to Vietnam (via Melbourne).
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
1 — White Ensign hauled down at 0900 and new Australian White Ensign hoisted in RAN ships and establishments.
1 — HMAS Boonaroo commissioned at Melbourne.
7 — HMAS Hobart departed Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
9 — RAN detachment joined Jeparit at Sydney
10Boonaroo departed Melbourne for Can Ranh Bay, continuing her 2nd voyage.
11Jeparit departed Sydney on 6th voyage (1st with RAN detachment).
15Hobart joined US Seventh Fleet at US Naval Base, Subic Bay.
27Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Boonaroo arrived at Cam Ranh Bay.
31Hobart on station off Quang Ngai province, I Corps Tactical Zone, for - NGFS.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau, operations in III Corps.
1-15Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
8Sydney departed Sydney on 5th voyage: 7RAR embarked.
16-23Hobart in Operation Sea Dragon.
20Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 7RAR landed, 5RAR embarked.
21Hobart received enemy fire north of Cap Falaise (first time under fire).
22Hobart under fire near Song Ma river (second time).
22Sydney arrived at Singapore.
23Hobart left Sea Dragon for destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk.
28Jeparit departed Sydney on 7th voyage.
28Sydney departed Singapore on 6th voyage.
29Boonaroo arrived Sydney.
30Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
6-8Hobart in destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk
8Boonaroo paid off at Melbourne.
8-26Hobart in Operation Sea Dragon.
11Hobart under fire near mouth of Kien Giang (third time).
12Sydney arrived at Sydney: 5RAR disembarked.
12Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
17Hobart under fire while bombarding Truc Li ferry (fourth time).
18Hobart provided - NGFS for Operation Beau Charger.
19Sydney left Brisbane on 7 — th voyage with 2RAR embarked.
24Hobart under fire twice near Hon Matt island (fifth and sixth times).
30Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 2RAR disembarked, 6RAR embarked.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
9Jeparit left Sydney on 8th voyage.
14Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 6RAR disembarked.
15-22Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
18Hobart in support of Operation Beacon Torch.
22Hobart on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
24Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol and in destroyer screen of USS Forrestal
27Jeparit left Sydney on 9th voyage.
29Hobart joined USS Forrestal which was on fire in the Tonkin Gulf.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. Hobart in northern Sea Dragon patrol.
2Hobart, USS St Paul and USS Blue received enemy fire while bombarding Cong Phu railway spur (Hobart's seventh time under fire).
9Hobart and USS Boston under fire near Sam Son (eighth time for Hobart).
11Hobart and Boston under fire north of Hon Me island (ninth time for Hobart).
13 — Second Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
26 — Able Seaman D C Trompp wounded in action in Phuoc Tuy province - first RAN casualty of Vietnam War.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
2 — HMAS Perth left Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
6-12Hobart - NGFS northern I Corps.
14Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
26-29Perth provided - NGFS for Operation Pershing in northern I Corps.
27Hobart returned to Sydney, ending first deployment.
30Perth - NGFS near DMZ.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
3 — First Naval Staff Officer joined HQ Australian Force Vietnam in Saigon.
16 — 1st Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '67) joined US Army 135th Aviation Company at Vung Tau.
17Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
18Perth and USS Newport News under fire near Sam Son. Perth hit by one shell with four sailors injured. (Perth first time under fire).
24Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
30Jeparit left Sydney on 10th voyage.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
1Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
2 — 135th Assault Helicopter Company began combat operations.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
27Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Perth assigned to northern Sea Dragon.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.*
3Perth and USS Newport News under fire in Bay of Brandon (Perth second time).
13Perth in southern Sea Dragon patrol.
16 — 135th AHC experienced first night combat operations.
16Sydney left Adelaide on 8 — th voyage with 3RAR embarked.
17Perth and USS Hamner under fire off Dong Hoi. (Perth third time).
18Jeparit left Sydney on 11th voyage.
27Sydney arrived Vung Tau; 3RAR disembarked.
31 — 135th AHC began operating from Camp Blackhorse near Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
3Sydney arrived Fremantle.
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
9Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
17Sydney left Sydney on 9 — th voyage.
20Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
25Perth and USS Bordelon under fire near Cap St. Anne. (Perth fourth time).
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
3Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
9Jeparit left Sydney on 12th voyage.
12 — Third Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
14Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
16Sydney returned to Sydney.
22 — Lieutenant Commander P J Vickers killed in action, near Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
24Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
11Perth 011 southern Sea Dragon patrol.
22Hobart left Sydney for second Vietnam deployment.
23Perth left Sea Dragon.
23Jeparit left Sydney on 13th voyage.
27Sydney left Sydney on 10 — th voyage with 1RAR embarked.
31Perth turned over to Hobart at Subic Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
9Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 1RAR disembarked, 7RAR embarked.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10Perth returned to Sydney ending first deployment.
13-18Hobart - NGFS off northern I Corps.
18Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
22Hobart and USS Collett under fire near Dong Hoi. (Hobart tenth time).
23Hobart and Collett under fire near Ke Anh (Hobart eleventh time).
26Sydney arrived in Sydney: 7RAR disembarked.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in Ill Corps.
10Jeparit left Sydney on 14th voyage.
20Hobart - NGFS off northern I Corps.
21Sydney left Brisbane on 1 — 1 — th voyage with 4RAR embarked.
24Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps. Sydney arrived at Vung Tau; 4RAR disembarked, 2RAR embarked.
11Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
13Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 2RAR disembarked.
14Hobart and USS Chandler under fire north west of Cap Lay (Hobart twelfth time).
17Hobart hit by three missiles fired by a USAF aircraft north of Cap Lay. Chief Electrician R H Hunt and Ordinary Seaman R J Butterworth were killed and three sailors seriously injured.
21Jeparit left Sydney on 15th voyage.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III and IV Corps.
6Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
25Hobart took up - NGFS station off Da Nang in I Corps after repair of missile damage at Subic Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
6Jeparit left Sydney on 16th voyage-.
13 — Fourth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
14-22Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps, south west of Vung Tau.
21 — Lieutenant A A Casadio and Petty Officer 0 C Phillips killed in action near Camp Blackhorse, Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
23-28Hobart - NGFS off coast of Phuoc Tuy, III Corps.
26Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
9 — Second contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '68) arrived in Vietnam.
14-21Hobart t - NGFS between Da Nang and Hue, I Corps.
19Perth left Sydney on second Vietnam deployment.
22-25Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps.
22Jeparit left Sydney on 17th voyage.
29Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
7-9Perth - NGFS near Da Nang, I Corps.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
9-10Perth on Sea Dragon patrol.
10Perth and USS Leonard F Mason under fire (Perth fifth time).
11Hobart returned to Sydney ending second deployment.
20-23Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
24-27Perth - NGFS in northern I Corps.
27Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Perth - NGFS in northern I Corps.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
1 — US Joint Chiefs of Staff announced all sea, air and land bombardment of North Vietnam to cease at 2100 that night. Sea Dragon task units disbanded.
4Jeparit left Sydney on 18th voyage.
9Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 2 — th voyage with 9 RAR embarked.
12-17Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
17-30Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
20Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 9RAR disembarked.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
23 — 135th AHC moved to Bearcat in Bien Hoa province.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
5Sydney arrived at Sydney.
12-17Perth - NGFS in I Corps.
18Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
19Perth- NGFS in III Corps.
20-26Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
28Jeparit left Sydney on 19th voyage.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
3 — Sub-Lieutenant A J. Huelin killed in aircraft accident near Saigon.
9-17Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
14Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Perth joined destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
3Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 3 — th voyage with 5 RAR embarked.
11 — Fifth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 5RAR disembarked.
22Perth - NGFS in I Corps.
28Sydney returned to Sydney.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
7-16Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
14Jeparit left Sydney on 20th voyage.
20Brisbane left Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
30Brisbane relieved Perth at Subic Bay.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
15-30Brisbane - NGFS in IV Corps.
20Perth returned to Sydney completing second deployment.
24Jeparit left Sydney on 21st voyage.
CDT3 Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-17Brisbane - NGFS in IV Corps.
5Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 4 — th voyage with 6RAR embarked.
l0Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
19Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 6RAR disembarked 4RAR embarked.
30Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 4RAR disembarked.
31 — Leading Aircrewman N. E. Shipp killed in action near Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong province.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
2Jeparit left Sydney on 22nd voyage.
10-14Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
15-16Brisbane - NGFS in I Corps.
18-19Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
20Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
30Brisbane attempted salvage of MV Sincere on fire in South China Sea.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-3Brisbane stood by MV Sincere.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
16Jeparit left Sydney on 23rd voyage.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau: operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-2Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
3-6Brisbane - NGFS in III Corps.
13 — Sixth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
23-31Brisbane in destroyer screen of USS Oriskany.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-13Brisbane in destroyer screens of USS Oriskany and USS Constellation.
7Jeparit left Sydney 011 24th voyage.
10 — Third Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '69) arrived at Bearcat.
15Vendetta left Sydney on Vietnam deployment.
26Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Brisbane turned over to Vendetta at Subic Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
2-19 — Vendetta - NGFS in I Corps.
13 — Brisbane returned to Sydney ending first deployment.
20-24Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
22Jeparit left Sydney on 25th voyage.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
9-10 — Vendetta - NGFS in III Corps.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
11-25Vendetta - NGFS in I Corps.
16-29Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
17Sydney left Brisbane on 1 — 5 — th voyage with 8RAR embarked.
28Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 8RAR disembarked 9RAR embarked.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
9Sydney arrived at Adelaide: 9RAR disembarked.
11Jeparit commissioned at Sydney.
19Jeparit left Sydney on 26th voyage.
21-31Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
l-14Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV operations in IV Corps.
5Jeparit left Sydney on 27th voyage.
16Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 6 — th Vietnam voyage with 7RAR embarked.
18-20Vendetta - NGFS in III Corps.
21-28Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
27Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 7RAR disembarked, 5RAR embarked.
28Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-4Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
5Sydney arrived at Fremantle: 5RAR disembarked.
11 — Seventh Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15-16Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
16Hobart left Sydney on third Vietnam deployment.
17-23Vendetta - NGFS in IV Corps.
26Jeparit left Sydney on 28th voyage.
28Vendetta returned over to Hobart at Subic Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6-21Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
11Vendetta returned to Sydney, ending Vietnam deployment.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
22-30Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
11-14Hobart - NGFS in lI Corps.
15Jeparit left Sydney on 29th voyage.
15-22Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
22-24Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6-9Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10-21Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
22 — Able Seaman B. K. Wojcik killed in accident at Cam Ranh Bay.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6Jeparit left Sydney on 30th voyage.
9-11Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
11-21Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps.
21-23Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
22Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
23-31Hobart - NGFS in 1I Corps.
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region Corps tactical zones renamed Military Regions.
1-4Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 2.
14 — CDT3 relinquished responsibility for Operation Stabledoor at Vung Tau.
14-29Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 1.
15 — CDT3 left Vung Tau to join USN Support Facility at Da Nang.
18Jeparit left Sydney on 31st voyage.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
6 — 135th AHC moved from Bearcat to Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong province.
10 — Fourth Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '70) arrived at Dong Tam.
12-23Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 3.
14Perth departed Sydney on third Vietnam deployment.
28Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
30Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 7 — th voyage via Singapore.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4
1Jeparit left Sydney on 32nd voyage.
3-24Perth - NGFS in Military Region 1.
16 — Eighth Contingent CDT3 arrived at Da Nang.
17Hobart arrived in Sydney, ending third deployment.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
31Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 8RAR embarked.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4-16Perth - NGFS in Military Region 1.
12Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 8RAR disembarked.
15Jeparit left Sydney on 33rd voyage.
17-18Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
2-4Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
5Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
5-20Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
21-22Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4 Jeparit left Sydney on 34th voyage.
10-15Perth in destroyer screen of USS Hancock
16-17Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
17-31Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
1-2Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
15Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 8 — th voyage with 3RAR embarked.
16Jeparit left Sydney on 35th voyage.
22-23Perth - NGFS in Military Region 2.
23-28Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
25Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 3RAR disembarked, 7RAR embarked.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang, operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
1-2Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
2-4Perth - NGFS in Military Region 2.
5Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
7-11Perth in destroyer screen of USS Ranger and USS Kitty Hawk
8 Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10Sydney returned to Sydney: 7RAR disembarked.
16Brisbane left Sydney on second Vietnam deployment.
26Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 9 — th voyage.
29Perth turned over to Brisbane at Subic Bay.
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang, operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
2Jeparit left Sydney on 36th voyage.
5Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
5-6Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
8Perth returned to Sydney, ending third deployment.
8-15Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
17-21Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
19Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
19 CDT3 relinquished responsibility for EOD at Da Nang to US Army.
23Sydney returned to Sydney.
30 Minister for Navy announced CDT3 and RANHFV would be withdrawn from Vietnam.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
5 — Eighth Contingent CDT3 returned to Australia.
13Sydney departed Townsville on 20 — th voyage: 4RAR embarked.
13Jeparit departed Sydney on 37th voyage.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 1.
22Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 4RAR disembarked, 2RAR embarked.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
1Sydney arrived at Townsville: 2RAR disembarked.
8 — RANHFV pilots ceased flying operations.
16 — Fourth Contingent RANHFV returned to Australia.
24-26Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
27-30Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
1-21Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
3Jeparit departed Sydney on 38th voyage.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
22-23Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
12 — Naval Staff Office, HQ Australian Force Vietnam closed.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 1.
18 — Prime Minister announced withdrawal of all remaining Australian combat forces in Vietnam. Brisbane not to be replaced.
20Jeparit departed Sydney on 39th voyage.
1-6Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 2.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
20Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 1st voyage.
6-7Sydney at Vung Tau: 3RAR embarked.
11Jeparit left Sydney on 40th voyage.
15Brisbane returned to Sydney, ending second deployment.
19Sydney arrived at Sydney.
26Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 2nd voyage.
27Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
6Sydney at Vung Tau; final army units embarked.
18Sydney arrived at Sydney.
24Sydney departed Sydney on 23rd voyage.
25Jeparit departed Sydney on 41st voyage.
8-9Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
17Sydney arrived at Townsville.
10Jeparit departed Sydney on 42nd voyage.
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
14Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 4th voyage.
29Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: embarked 457 soldiers.
11Jeparit returned to Sydney.
12Sydney returned to Sydney.
15Jeparit paid off in Sydney
1Sydney departed Sydney on 25th voyage.
23-24Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
30Sydney arrived at Hong Kong.
12 — 3RAR Advance Party flew from Adelaide to Saigon.
16 — 3RAR Main Body departed Outer Harbour Port Adelaide on HMAS Sydney.
27 — 3RAR Rear Party departed Adelaide by air.
27 — 3RAR Main Body disembarked at Vung Tau and moved to Nui Dat
28 — 3RAR Rear Party arrived at Vung Tau and moved to Nui Dat.
6 — 3RAR Op Balaklava
9-11 — 3RAR Op Bordertown.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR moved to FSPB Harrison, Bien Hoa Province (Op Coburg) .
31 — Enemy Lunar New Year (Tet) Offensive commenced with widespread attacks on major cities and installations in South Vietnam.
1 — Task Force Base mortared. Viet Cong battalion (D445) in occupation of Phuoc Le (Baria) .
l-2 — A Coy, 3RAR in action at Baria with 3 Troop A Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment.
3-6 — D Coy, 3RAR in action in Long Dien with 2/52 ARVN Rangers.
5 — B Coy, 3RAR in contact in Hoa Long.
7-9 — B Coy, 3RAR in action in Baria and Long Dien.
10 — 3RAR relieved 7RAR in Bien Hoa province (Op Coburg)
18 — Mortar and ground attack on FSPB Andersen.
28 — Mortar attack on FSPB Andersen.
1 — 3RAR returned to Nui Dat from Op Coburg.
3 — Commemorative service for 3RAR and supporting arms members killed in action in Long Dien and during Op Coburg.
8 — 3RAR, less D Coy, commenced Op Pinnaroo.
17 — D Coy, 3RAR joined Op Pinnaroo.
9 — Main Body 1RAR arrived in South Vietnam. Main Body 7RAR departed for Australia.
12 — D Coy, 3RAR returned from Op Pinnaroo.
15 — Op Pinnaroo completed.
21 — 3RAR commenced Op Toan Thang (Phase 1)
3 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Toan Thang (Phase 1)
10 — 3RAR continued Op Toan Thang (Phase 1) relieving 2RAR at FSPB Andersen
13 — 3RAR occupied blocking position 20 miles north-north- east of Saigon. Mortar and ground attack on FSPB Coral.
16 — Enemy regimental mortar and ground attacks on FSPB Coral.
24 — 3RAR moved to FSPB Balmoral.
26 — Mortar attack on FSPB Coral. Mortar and battalion ground attacks on FSPB Balmoral.
28 — Regimental mortar and ground attacks on FSPB Balmoral by 165 Regiment 7th North Vietnamese Army Division.
1 — Main Body 4RAR arrived in Vung Tau on HMAS Sydney. Main Body 2RAR departed for Australia.
5 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Toan Thang (Phase 1).
14 — D Coy, 3RAR cordon and search in Long Dien.
25-30 — B Coy, 3RAR participated in Op Ulladulla with C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment.
3 — 3RAR relieved 1RAR in AO Birdsville Op Toan Thang (Phase 2).
18 — 3RAR redeployed into AO Yass to commence Op Merino.
24 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Merino.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR cordon and search north-east Hoa Long.
2-13 — 3RAR Op Platypus.
22 — Outskirts of Saigon rocketed. 1RAR and tanks in contact with Viet Cong occupying Long Dien.
23 — 3RAR Op Magnetic, Long Son Island.
28 — 3RAR Op Diamantina (until 5 Sep)
6 — B and D Companies relieved 1RAR companies in defensive tasks in the vicinity of Baria and Long Dien (Op Nowra).
10 — A Coy, 3RAR relieved C Coy 1RAR on land-clearing Ops in AO Warburton.
15 — B Coy, 3RAR returned from Baria Stadium defence task.
19-25 — C Coy, 3RAR Route 2 security Op Ngai Giao area.
24 — D Coy, 3RAR returned from Long Dien.
28 — 3RAR tactical HQ, B and D Companies inserted into FSPB Cedar to commence Op Windsor.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR flown in to join Op Windsor.
2 — A Coy, 3RAR returned from land-clearing Ops AO Warburton.
6 — A Coy, 3RAR flown in to join Op Windsor.
12 — Op Windsor concluded, 3RAR redeployed into AO Garran to commence Op Capital.
21 — A, B and D Companies returned from Op Capital.
22 — 3RAR HQ and C Coy returned from Op Capital. 161 Fd Bty redeployed to FSPB Wilton.
25 — C Coy, 3RAR commenced Op Harvest.
27 — 3RAR HQ group and D Coy joined Op Harvest.
29 — 3RAR Advance Recce Party returned by air to Australia.
30 — A Coy, 3RAR deployed into AO Rapier on Op Diamond Pin.
2 — 3RAR HQ, C and D Companies returned from Op Harvest. A Coy, 3RAR returned from Op Diamond Pin.
5 — 9RAR Advance Party (150) arrived at Nui Dat. 3RAR Advance Party (146) returned to Australia by air.
19 — 9RAR Rear Party (40) arrived at Nui Dat. 3RAR Rear Party (40) returned to Australia by air.
20 — 9RAR Main body arrived at Nui Dat ex HMAS Sydney. 3RAR Main Body (417) departed on HMAS Sydney for Australia.
2 — 3RAR Main Body disembarked Outer Harbour Port Adelaide, South Australia
In Vietnam, the Tet celebrations usher in the lunar New Year and are the most important festive celebrations of the year. Tet began on 30 Jan in 1968 and was to be the start of week-long holidays with families reuniting and South Vietnamese soldiers granted leave to return home. The Viet Cong announced a 7 day ceasefire to commence from 27 Jan 68 but the South Vietnamese Government, concerned that a long truce would only give the enemy freedom of movement, restricted the ceasefire to thirty-six hours from 6pm on 29 Jan. Tet leave for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was limited, with a minimum strength of 50 per cent of troops in all units on full alert. The ceasefire was cancelled entirely in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces because of the strong military pressure from North Vietnamese forces surrounding the US Marine base at Khe Sanh.
Intelligence reports expected a major enemy offensive in early 1968. The main enemy units were identified and a date early in Feb was predicted. There was some warning that attacks would be launched against the cities and towns of Vietnam, but the magnitude and ferocity of the attacks that eventually took place was not anticipated. Tet-1968 swept the length of South Vietnam in a three day cataclysm that saw the national capital, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 36 of 44 provincial capitals and 64 of 242 district capitals attacked. The brunt of the assault was borne by half strength ARVN units assigned to defensive duties near population areas. The very shock of such a massive attack produced incredulity before a rational response. However, nobody in Saigon or Washington anticipated even remotely the psychological impact the offensive would have in the United States. The sheer audacity of the offensive destroyed the credibility of the American military among it own people and strengthened the anti-war movement in the United States.
The main provincial towns in Phuoc Tuy came under heavy attack on 31 Jan. Ba Ria, the capital of Phuoc Tuy, was occupied by a reinforced Viet Cong battalion (D445 Provincial Battalion which had seen heavy contact with the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) since Aug 66). Early the next day, A Company, 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), and 3 Troop, A Squadron 3rd Cavalry reached Ba Ria to assist the hard pressed ARVN forces in clearing the Viet Cong from the province capital. Savage fighting immediately broke out and forty Viet Cong were killed in the following 24 hours. Fire fights were sharp and intense and ranged from street to street among the tightly packed buildings of the town. The enemy fought tenaciously from well-prepared positions with rockets, small-arms and machine gun fire. Armoured personnel carriers (APCs) provided heavy and accurate machine gun fire and also assisted in the evacuation of Australian and Allied wounded. A Sioux helicopter pilot from 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight landed his helicopter three times under enemy fire in the town square to evacuate the more serious casualties. The Viet Cong attack on Ba Ria was repelled by the afternoon of 2 Feb.
3RAR supported the 2/52 ARVN Ranger Battalion from 3 to 6 Feb to clear Long Dien, 5km east of Ba Ria. The Australian battalion saw heavy fighting on 4 Feb in clearing the Viet Cong from a number of entrenched positions during which the battalion, which had arrived in Vietnam the previous Dec, suffered its first fatality. From 5 to 9 Feb, 3RAR twice cordoned off Hoa Long, situated just south of Nui Dat and also assisted in securing the eastern approaches to Ba Ria. On 8 Feb at Long Dien, a platoon of B Coy 3RAR was engaged with heavy fire from entrenched positions. The platoon went to ground to return fire and was immediately assaulted by the Viet Cong. The attack was thrown back by rifle and machine gun fire with 9 enemy killed and 6 more who were seen to fall. Three Australians were killed in action.
The Tet-1968 fighting cut the road from Vung Tau to Nui Dat in the first week of Feb. Supplies that normally were brought by road convoy were instead lifted in by Caribou aircraft from No 35 Squadron, RAAF. A total of 482,907 lbs of freight were flown into Nui Dat in three successive days. As in all Tet-1968 attacks, the timing of the offensive in Phuoc Tuy province coincided with the holiday leave of the bulk of ARVN troops and National Police. The Viet Cong targets in Tet-1968 were the cities and towns of South Vietnam and not the military bases which were well defended by the full strength US, Australian and Korean units on full alert. While Australian troops rushed to support ARVN units in Phuoc Tuy, in other provinces US and allied troops also offered assistance to the ARVN who bore the brunt of the fight. It was not surprising that the Viet Cong were able to infiltrate men, equipment and supplies into position for the attack. Attacking under the cover of the Tet holidays, against population centres when ARVN units were at half strength, was an ideal opportunity. What was surprising was that the Viet Cong, which had for so long been elusive and extremely reluctant to take casualties, put themselves into a situation where half the attacking force was eliminated. Tet-1968 was over within days in Phuoc Tuy and most other provinces. However, it took weeks to be contained in Saigon, Hue and Khe Sanh.
The Saigon area in 1968 was defended by the South Vietnam 5th Ranger Group and seven regional, service and police battalions. However, there were also two elite airborne battalions on hand when Tet-1968 erupted. The Viet Cong's simultaneous rocket, mortar and ground attacks against many installations and buildings throughout the national capital achieved complete tactical surprise. The most important mission - seizing the United States Embassy - was given to 19 members of the C10 VC City Sapper Battalion which was composed of Saigon inhabitants. Viet Cong sappers breached the Embassy wall with satchel charges but the US Marine guard prevented them taking the main Chancery building. US reinforcements landed on the Chancery roof by helicopters and by 9am had killed the sappers attacking the Embassy. Other targets such as the ARVN General Staff compound were also quickly cleared but fighting was to continue for weeks around the Phu Tho racetrack, involving heavy street to street fighting. The Viet Cong renewed its assault on 17-18 Feb when 57 rocket shellings and ten firefights erupted inside Saigon and Cholon. The final Saigon battle of Tet-1968 was a fierce battle between ARVN rangers and main force Viet Cong in Cholon on 7 Mar.
Australian troops were not involved in the Tet-1968 battles in Saigon. However 1ATF which, since its formation in May 66, had operated exclusively in Phuoc Tuy province, commenced its first operation outside the province a week prior to Tet-1968. Operation Coburg began on 24 Jan and lasted until 1 Mar. Two battalions, 2RAR and 7RAR were deployed in the area where 1RAR had operated in 1965/66, east of the major US logistical complex in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to protect the base from rockets and mortars. 7RAR was relieved on 10 Feb by 3RAR which established Fire Support Base (FSB) Andersen close to well known Viet Cong lines of communications. Late in Feb, FSB Andersen was attacked on three occasions - the first attacks by ground assault on an Australian FSB. They were not to be the last.
The third largest city in South Vietnam, the ancient walled capital of Hue was infiltrated and seized by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese just after the Tet New Year midnight rites. By daybreak, the Viet Cong flag was flying from the masthead of the Imperial Palace where it would fly for twenty-five days until pulled down by ARVN troops. The struggle for Hue lasted nearly five weeks with two NVA regiments and two Viet Cong sapper battalions pitted against eight US and 13 South Vietnamese infantry battalions in one of the most savage and prolonged battles of the Vietnam War. The NVA/Viet Cong forces were outnumbered by vastly superior forces, but continued to hold onto the city because of the propaganda value of seizing and holding, even temporarily, the cultural and religious centre of South Vietnam. The hard and bitter fighting to defeat the NVA/Viet Cong forces was mainly done by the ARVN soldiers of 1st Corps who, after Tet-1968, attained a new found esprit de corps. There were a number of Australian advisers from the Australian Army Training Team and the ARVN units that retook Hue. Their story is recounted in The Team by Ian McNeill. In retaking the city of Hue which had been previously unscarred by the war, extensive damage occurred. Some 30,000 artillery rounds were fired during the battle and whole blocks of the city were reduced to rubble. Thousands of citizens became refugees but this was not the only price paid by the people of Hue. The NVA, with lists provided by the Viet Cong, undertook a campaign of extermination of school teachers, government officials, and those who refused to rise up against the government. Bodies later exhumed revealed that nearly 5000 were executed. In the battle to regain Hue, RAAF Canberra bombers from No 2 Squadron flew missions in support of troops within the city itself and the surrounding countryside.
From 30 Jan 68 until the end of Apr 68, RAAF Canberra bombers flew many strikes in support of the besieged US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.
The siege of Khe Sanh began on 19 Jan 68 when a US Marine platoon was ambushed just west of the base. Two reinforced NVA divisions, the 304th and 325C commenced an extended siege of the base which lasted for 77 days. They constructed entrenched approach works, with snipers patiently waiting for careless targets while constantly shelling the marines who struggled to keep the base supplied. The weather and hostile fire dictated 679 supply drops in addition to the 455 aircraft that landed during the siege. With the easing of the monsoon, the US 1st Cavalry Division re-established the land route to Khe Sanh in early Apr.
In May 68, a further offensive was launched against Saigon and a dozen other cities were attacked with rockets and mortars in what became known as Mini-Tet. On 6 May attacks were launched against Tan Son Nhut air base and on 7 May fighting erupted again in Cholon. During this fighting three Australian and one British pressmen were killed when their jeep drove into a Viet Cong ambush. Australian troops were again moved out of Phuoc Tuy to help block the routes taken by the Viet Cong in and out of Saigon. On 13 May and 16 May, 1RAR and the 12th Field Regiment were severely tested at FSB Coral when the base was assaulted by what was assumed to be a North Vietnamese regiment. On 26 and 28 May 3RAR, with the help of Centurion tanks, repulsed two further attacks on FSB Balmoral. In a little over two weeks, lATF lost 26 killed and 110 wounded.
In retrospect, General Westmoreland the US Commander in Vietnam in 1968, said he and officials in Washington should have tried more to alert the American public to the coming of a major enemy attack. In 1976, he wrote in his autobiography, A Soldier Reports: "No one to my knowledge foresaw that, in terms of public opinion, press and television would transform what was undeniably a catastrophic military defeat for the enemy into a presumed debacle for Americans and South Vietnamese, an attitude that still lingers in the minds of many."
Fairfax, Denis, Navy in Vietnam, AGPS, 1980
Frost, Frank, Australia's War in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, 1987
Hopkins, Maj-Gen R N L, Australian Armour, AWM & AGPS, 1978
McNeill, Ian, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam 1962?1972, UQ Press and AWM, 1984
Oberdorfer, Don, Tet!, 1971
Odgers, George, Mission Vietnam: RAAF Operations 1964?1972, AGPS, 1974
Stanton, Shelby L, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, Presido Press, 1985,
Stanton, Shelby L, Vietnam Order of Battle, US News Books, 1981
Stuart, Major R F, 3RAR in South Vietnam 1967?1968
Westmoreland, General William C, A Soldier Reports, Doubleday, 1976
Service rendered as a member of the ADF assigned for service on or after 24 July 2003 with OPERATION ANODE in the specified area is non-warlike service under subsection 5C(1) [40] of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986.
The specified area comprises of the total land areas, territorial waters and superjacent airspace boundaries of the Solomon Islands.
This determination was made by the Minister for Defence 31 — st July 2003.
View copy of instrument in the Service Eligibility Assistant in the Legislation Library here [41].
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[19] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80444%23comment-form
[20] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80445%23comment-form
[21] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80423%23comment-form
[22] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80446%23comment-form
[23] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80447%23comment-form
[24] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80424%23comment-form
[25] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80448%23comment-form
[26] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80449%23comment-form
[27] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80450%23comment-form
[28] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80425%23comment-form
[29] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80451%23comment-form
[30] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80452%23comment-form
[31] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80426%23comment-form
[32] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80427%23comment-form
[33] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80404%23comment-form
[34] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80405%23comment-form
[35] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80406%23comment-form
[36] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80459%23comment-form
[37] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80460%23comment-form
[38] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80461%23comment-form
[39] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80462%23comment-form
[40] https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant-updates/all-determinations-order-date-signed-oldest-most-recent/determinations-under-vea
[41] https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant-0
[42] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#tgt-history_part1_ftn1
[43] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#tgt-history_part1_ftn2
[44] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#tgt-history_part1_ftn3
[45] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#tgt-history_part1_ftn4
[46] https://clik.dva.gov.au/history-library/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-1-units-allottedassigned-operational-service
[47] https://clik.dva.gov.au/history-library/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-3-historical-notes
[48] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#ref-history_part1_ftn1
[49] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#ref-history_part1_ftn2
[50] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#ref-history_part1_ftn3
[51] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#ref-history_part1_ftn4
[52] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80407%23comment-form
[53] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80453%23comment-form
[54] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80455%23comment-form
[55] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80456%23comment-form
[56] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80465%23comment-form
[57] https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/region/thailand-including-ubon
[58] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80467%23comment-form
[59] https://clik.dva.gov.au/history-library/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-3-units-allotted-operational-service/vietnam-war
[60] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#tgt-history_part1_ftn5
[61] https://clik.dva.gov.au/compensation-and-support-policy-library/part-1-service-requirements/14-service-post-world-war-2/141-post-world-war-2-operations/service-vietnam
[62] https://clik.dva.gov.au/book/export/html/82212#ref-history_part1_ftn5
[63] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80457%23comment-form
[64] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80468%23comment-form
[65] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80469%23comment-form
[66] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80471%23comment-form
[67] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80472%23comment-form
[68] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80473%23comment-form
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[78] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80412%23comment-form
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[80] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80414%23comment-form
[81] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80384%23comment-form
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[84] https://clik.dva.gov.au/user/login?destination=comment/reply/80387%23comment-form