On 29 and 30 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire bombarded Russian ports in the Black Sea. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 November and Britain followed on 5 November. In early January 1915, Russia asked Britain for help to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. The British response was to attempt to force the straits of the Taradiddles which were like a long winding river between the narrow rugged Gallipoli peninsula and the neighbouring slopes of Asia Minor. The straits eventually opened into the Sea of Marmona at whose other end was the straits of Bosphorus which led to the Black Sea. On the straits was Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire. The naval attempt to force the Dardanelles on 18 March was called off after the lost of three Battleships. The military were then given the task of securing the Gallipoli peninsula.
Dawn on Gallipoli Peninsula on Sunday 25 April 1915 was due at 4.05 am. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps began landing in the inky darkness just before dawn at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. Further to the south, at the toe of the peninsula, the British 29th Division was also landing. In a diversionary attack the French landed some troops south of the entrance to the Dardanelles.
The 3rd Australian Brigade had been selected to land first and was told that there was open land between the beach and the comparatively low ridge that it would have to climb. However, the brigade landed a mile north of Gaba Tepe and the troops found themselves at the foot of a very steep, almost precipitous, 300 foot high hill. Stopping only for their breath, the Australians, who by this time were being fired on by the Turks, began the difficult climb to the summit which was quickly captured. The summit was found to be a small plateau, later named Plugge's Plateau, with its further edge also a very steep slope into a deep and tortuous valley rising to a second, slightly higher ridge 600 yards away. Hidden behind this second ridge was a third ridge which was the principal Australian objective for that first morning.
Six Turkish divisions were stationed on Gallipoli but most of these forces were in reserve. Only one Turkish battalion defended the coast where the Australians landed and despite the confusion caused by landing at the wrong beach and the subsequent intermixing of units, small parties of Australians began moving rapidly inland across difficult country. The first ridge was completely occupied shortly after sunrise and the Australians were moving across the second ridge and had reached the third ridge by 7 am. Two scouts of the 10th Battalion, Private A S Blackburn (who would win the VC at Pozieres in 1916) and Lance Corporal Robin, scouted Scrubby Knoll on the Third Ridge just as the first Turkish reserves were arriving. The Australian Official Historian, C E W Bean, credits Blackburn and Robin as coming nearer to the objective of the expedition than any other soldiers whose movements are known.
On the left of the perimeter, Australians reached the Nek by 8 am and then pushed forward, first to Baby 700 and then to the slopes of Battleship Hill. The next crest on this ridge was Chunuk Bair, the principal Australian objective for the first day. The Australians on Battleship Hill were so exposed that they had to withdraw to Baby 700. Throughout the morning and most of the afternoon a tense battle was fought with unsurpassed courage on both sides with the summit of Baby 700 changing hands no less than five times. Between 4.30 pm and 5 pm Turkish counter-attacks along the entire front forced the Australians back with Baby 700 being lost for the last time. By evening the Australian position was in jeopardy.
Australian and New Zealand reinforcements landed throughout the day but instead of a 4 mile front driven 1 1/2 miles inland, the troops were clinging to a foothold on the second ridge just half a mile inland on a front of one mile. Over 2000 casualties were suffered on the first day. Realising that the landing had achieved much less than had been intended, General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, after a conference with General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, recommended to the Anzac Corps Commander, General Birdwood that withdrawal be considered. Birdwood, at first shocked at the suggestion, passed it on to the Expeditionary Force commander, General Hamilton, who wrote back to Birdwood that there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out.
Nightfall on 25 April brought one of the rare wet spells of the whole campaign. The Turkish batteries ceased firing and the Turkish rifle and machine gun fire became relatively harmless. After being pinned down all day, the Australians were now able to stand up and dig trenches to provide protection. Both sides continued all night and several Turkish assaults in the dark were defeated. The expected major counter-attack at dawn on Monday, 26 April did not materialise since the Turks, who had lost very heavily, were as exhausted as the invaders. On the third day, 27 April, a general counter-attack by Turkish reinforcements was broken up by guns from the warships off-shore when they attacked down the exposed slopes of Baby 700.
The Anzac Corps bridgehead was firmly established by the end of April with the left third of the front held by the New Zealand and Australian Division and the remainder of the front held by the 1st Australian Division. On the night of 5 May, the New Zealand and the 2nd Australian Brigades moved to Helles to support a major attack towards Krithia. On 8 May, the 2nd Australian Brigade lost 1000 men in an hour for the gain of just 500 yards. The two Anzac brigades returned to Anzac Cove in mid May. At Anzac Cove, the fighting crystallised into trench warfare with snipers a constant danger. On 14 May, General Birdwood was grazed on the head by a deflected bullet and the following day, General Bridges was mortally wounded.
Ever since the landing, the two central sections of the Anzac line were deluged with a constant hail of rifle fire. The fire almost ceased on 18 May and the unaccustomed silence aroused suspicions which were soon confirmed by naval aircraft which detected Turkish troops massing for an attack. Four Turkish divisions, with 42 battalions and over 30000 men, attacked the Anzac lines in the early hours of 19 May. The attack, although badly co-ordinated in that it hit different Anzac positions at different times, was exceedingly brave and persistent. Line after line of Turks were cut down and they were only successful in entering the Anzac lines at one corner of Courtney's Post. This section of trench was single-handedly recaptured by Lance Corporal Albert Jacka of the 14th Australian Battalion who bayoneted two Turks and shot another five. Jacka won the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Australian in the 1914-18 War.
The Turkish losses were estimated at 10000 men of whom 3000 were killed. Anzac losses were only 628 hit and included Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick of the 3rd Field Ambulance who was killed by shellfire while evacuating a wounded man on his donkey. Such were the casualties that a short informal truce was held on 20 May to collect the wounded. A formal truce was organised for 24 May and from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm burial parties worked between the lines with each side interring the dead found in its half of no-man's land. The truce was honourably observed although both sides took the opportunity to thoroughly survey the territory held by their opponents.
In June and July, the British and French, despite improved artillery support, had little success in attacks towards Achi Baba. At Anzac Cove, the troops were never away from shellfire and had practically no chance to rest. Some battalions were taken, one at a time, to Imbross Island but only for 3 to 6 days rest. Until late in the campaign no regular canteen and no Red Cross stores reached Anzac Cove. The nights were pestilential with fleas and there was no delousing apparatus for lice. By the end of July, there were 25000 men at Anzac Cove but 200 sick were being evacuated each day.
The final attempt to seize the Dardanelles took place in August. The main attack was to be made by the New Zealand and Australian Division which was to capture the heart of the Turkish position, Chunuk Bair which was accessible and undefended. A series of Turkish outposts on the northern Anzac flank were seized after the fall of darkness on 6 August and two columns, one New Zealand and the other the 4th Australian Brigade, left Anzac to approach Chunuk Bair using separate routes. The Australian column lost its way in the maze of ravines and the New Zealand column halted for four hours waiting for one of its lost units. The delay was to have tragic consequences; the New Zealanders were not in position to support the Australian attack on the Nek and by the time the New Zealanders moved, the Turks had brought up reinforcements to defend Chunuk Bair. The fight for Chunuk Bair continued until 10 August when a Turkish counter attack pushed the New Zealand and British troops from Chunuk Bair to a lower spur.
In support of the thrust towards Chunuk Bair, diversionary operations were planned for Helles, Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove. The first diversion was at Helles on the afternoon of 6 August. The British attacked at The Vineyard where heavy hand-to-hand fighting raged for a number of days. The British IX Corps landed against negligible resistance at Suvla Bay, north of Anzac Cove on 7 August and then remained on the beaches for 36 hours. By the time the order to advance was given, Turkish reinforcements had arrived. After suffering 8000 casualties on 9 and 10 August, the British occupied positions only marginally different from those held at daybreak on 7 August.
At Anzac Cove, the 1st Australian Division was given the perilous task of attacking Lone Pine, justifiably considered as one of the strongest Turkish positions. The Turks had shown considerable ingenuity in making it almost impregnable. The plans for the Australian attack were laid with thoroughness, skill and imagination. Shortly before dusk on 6 August, an Australian assault succeeded in capturing the Turkish trenches. Turkish reserves were rushed to Lone Pine and the long Turkish attempt to retake the trenches by bombing began. From dark on 6 August until the night of 9 August a terrible exchange of handmade bombs went on almost continuously, flaring up four times into many hours of desperate fighting when successive Turkish reinforcements were thrown in. In four days, six Australian battalions lost 80 officers and 2197 men. Seven Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross.
Chunuk Bair was expected to be taken by dawn on 7 August so that the attacking troops could then mount an attack back towards Anzac Cove. The dismounted 8th (Victorian) and 10th (West Australian) Light Horse Regiments were to attack towards Chunuk Bair by assaulting the formidable position at the Nek. Such an attack was considered hopeless unless aided by the troops attacking from Chunuk Bair and by the seizure of three Turkish positions adjacent to the Nek. As the time for the assault approached, the adjacent positions were still held by the Turks and the New Zealanders were still approaching the summit of Chunuk Bair. It was decided that something had to be done to help the New Zealanders approaching Chunuk Bair and that the attack on the Nek was to go ahead primarily as a feint to keep the Turks off Chunuk Bair. The attack was made by four lines, each of 150 men. Tragically the preceding bombardment ceased seven minutes prior to the attack. 234 Light Horsemen were killed and 138 were wounded in an area no larger than a tennis court.
On 10 August, the allies faced the fact that the August offensive had failed. In four days of fighting at Anzac Cove, Australian and British troops had suffered 12000 casualties. The bridgeheads of Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay were connected only by a thin strip of foreshore and on 21 August and again on 27 August attacks were made to improve this junction. The 2nd Australian Division commenced landing at Anzac Cove in mid August and some of its troops were involved in the fighting on 27 August. With the failure of the August battles, the future of the campaign was questioned. London received a number of criticisms of the conduct of the campaign including Keith Murdoch's colourful and partially inaccurate but influential report. By the end of October military opinion favoured evacuation and after five weeks of hesitation, the British government decided on withdrawal on 7 December.
Even before London made its decision, preparations began at Gallipoli for the evacuation. The forces at Anzac Cove were reduced to 36000 men and 97 guns and those at Suvla Bay to 41000 men and 91 guns. The troops were told that preparations for winter and the severe blizzard in late November were responsible for these reductions while the Turks were deceived by the seeming normality. Once the order to evacuate was received, troops, stores and guns were withdrawn each night with the number of troops at each front being reduced to 20000 men. These men, 10000 on each night, were to be withdrawn on the nights of 18/19 and 19/20 December. The evacuation on 18/19 December was successful without the Turks being alerted and just 10000 men remained for the last day at both Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay. The final evacuation began after dark on 19 December with 4100 men leaving their posts at nightfall. In order to deceive the Turks it was decided to hold all the front line posts, however lightly, until the last possible moment which at Anzac Cove was 1.30 am after which the front was gradually uncovered. The last party left Anzac Cove at 4.10 am and Suvla Bay at 5.10 am. Two Australians were wounded at Anzac Cove and casualties at Suvla Bay were negligible. On the night of 8 January 1916, the British withdrew from Helles, also with negligible casualties.
During the campaign 7600 Australians and 2500 New Zealanders were killed and 19000 Australians and 5000 New Zealanders wounded. French casualties were nearly as great as the Australians and British casualties were three times as great.
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