On 29 and 30 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire bombarded Russian ports in the Black Sea. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 November and Britain followed on 5 November. In early January 1915, Russia asked Britain for help to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. The British response was to attempt to force the straits of the Taradiddles which were like a long winding river between the narrow rugged Gallipoli peninsula and the neighbouring slopes of Asia Minor. The straits eventually opened into the Sea of Marmona at whose other end was the straits of Bosphorus which led to the Black Sea. On the straits was Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire. The naval attempt to force the Dardanelles on 18 March was called off after the lost of three Battleships. The military were then given the task of securing the Gallipoli peninsula.
Dawn on Gallipoli Peninsula on Sunday 25 April 1915 was due at 4.05 am. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps began landing in the inky darkness just before dawn at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. Further to the south, at the toe of the peninsula, the British 29th Division was also landing. In a diversionary attack the French landed some troops south of the entrance to the Dardanelles.
The 3rd Australian Brigade had been selected to land first and was told that there was open land between the beach and the comparatively low ridge that it would have to climb. However, the brigade landed a mile north of Gaba Tepe and the troops found themselves at the foot of a very steep, almost precipitous, 300 foot high hill. Stopping only for their breath, the Australians, who by this time were being fired on by the Turks, began the difficult climb to the summit which was quickly captured. The summit was found to be a small plateau, later named Plugge's Plateau, with its further edge also a very steep slope into a deep and tortuous valley rising to a second, slightly higher ridge 600 yards away. Hidden behind this second ridge was a third ridge which was the principal Australian objective for that first morning.
Six Turkish divisions were stationed on Gallipoli but most of these forces were in reserve. Only one Turkish battalion defended the coast where the Australians landed and despite the confusion caused by landing at the wrong beach and the subsequent intermixing of units, small parties of Australians began moving rapidly inland across difficult country. The first ridge was completely occupied shortly after sunrise and the Australians were moving across the second ridge and had reached the third ridge by 7 am. Two scouts of the 10th Battalion, Private A S Blackburn (who would win the VC at Pozieres in 1916) and Lance Corporal Robin, scouted Scrubby Knoll on the Third Ridge just as the first Turkish reserves were arriving. The Australian Official Historian, C E W Bean, credits Blackburn and Robin as coming nearer to the objective of the expedition than any other soldiers whose movements are known.
On the left of the perimeter, Australians reached the Nek by 8 am and then pushed forward, first to Baby 700 and then to the slopes of Battleship Hill. The next crest on this ridge was Chunuk Bair, the principal Australian objective for the first day. The Australians on Battleship Hill were so exposed that they had to withdraw to Baby 700. Throughout the morning and most of the afternoon a tense battle was fought with unsurpassed courage on both sides with the summit of Baby 700 changing hands no less than five times. Between 4.30 pm and 5 pm Turkish counter-attacks along the entire front forced the Australians back with Baby 700 being lost for the last time. By evening the Australian position was in jeopardy.
Australian and New Zealand reinforcements landed throughout the day but instead of a 4 mile front driven 1 1/2 miles inland, the troops were clinging to a foothold on the second ridge just half a mile inland on a front of one mile. Over 2000 casualties were suffered on the first day. Realising that the landing had achieved much less than had been intended, General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, after a conference with General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, recommended to the Anzac Corps Commander, General Birdwood that withdrawal be considered. Birdwood, at first shocked at the suggestion, passed it on to the Expeditionary Force commander, General Hamilton, who wrote back to Birdwood that there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out.
Nightfall on 25 April brought one of the rare wet spells of the whole campaign. The Turkish batteries ceased firing and the Turkish rifle and machine gun fire became relatively harmless. After being pinned down all day, the Australians were now able to stand up and dig trenches to provide protection. Both sides continued all night and several Turkish assaults in the dark were defeated. The expected major counter-attack at dawn on Monday, 26 April did not materialise since the Turks, who had lost very heavily, were as exhausted as the invaders. On the third day, 27 April, a general counter-attack by Turkish reinforcements was broken up by guns from the warships off-shore when they attacked down the exposed slopes of Baby 700.
The Anzac Corps bridgehead was firmly established by the end of April with the left third of the front held by the New Zealand and Australian Division and the remainder of the front held by the 1st Australian Division. On the night of 5 May, the New Zealand and the 2nd Australian Brigades moved to Helles to support a major attack towards Krithia. On 8 May, the 2nd Australian Brigade lost 1000 men in an hour for the gain of just 500 yards. The two Anzac brigades returned to Anzac Cove in mid May. At Anzac Cove, the fighting crystallised into trench warfare with snipers a constant danger. On 14 May, General Birdwood was grazed on the head by a deflected bullet and the following day, General Bridges was mortally wounded.
Ever since the landing, the two central sections of the Anzac line were deluged with a constant hail of rifle fire. The fire almost ceased on 18 May and the unaccustomed silence aroused suspicions which were soon confirmed by naval aircraft which detected Turkish troops massing for an attack. Four Turkish divisions, with 42 battalions and over 30000 men, attacked the Anzac lines in the early hours of 19 May. The attack, although badly co-ordinated in that it hit different Anzac positions at different times, was exceedingly brave and persistent. Line after line of Turks were cut down and they were only successful in entering the Anzac lines at one corner of Courtney's Post. This section of trench was single-handedly recaptured by Lance Corporal Albert Jacka of the 14th Australian Battalion who bayoneted two Turks and shot another five. Jacka won the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Australian in the 1914-18 War.
The Turkish losses were estimated at 10000 men of whom 3000 were killed. Anzac losses were only 628 hit and included Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick of the 3rd Field Ambulance who was killed by shellfire while evacuating a wounded man on his donkey. Such were the casualties that a short informal truce was held on 20 May to collect the wounded. A formal truce was organised for 24 May and from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm burial parties worked between the lines with each side interring the dead found in its half of no-man's land. The truce was honourably observed although both sides took the opportunity to thoroughly survey the territory held by their opponents.
In June and July, the British and French, despite improved artillery support, had little success in attacks towards Achi Baba. At Anzac Cove, the troops were never away from shellfire and had practically no chance to rest. Some battalions were taken, one at a time, to Imbross Island but only for 3 to 6 days rest. Until late in the campaign no regular canteen and no Red Cross stores reached Anzac Cove. The nights were pestilential with fleas and there was no delousing apparatus for lice. By the end of July, there were 25000 men at Anzac Cove but 200 sick were being evacuated each day.
The final attempt to seize the Dardanelles took place in August. The main attack was to be made by the New Zealand and Australian Division which was to capture the heart of the Turkish position, Chunuk Bair which was accessible and undefended. A series of Turkish outposts on the northern Anzac flank were seized after the fall of darkness on 6 August and two columns, one New Zealand and the other the 4th Australian Brigade, left Anzac to approach Chunuk Bair using separate routes. The Australian column lost its way in the maze of ravines and the New Zealand column halted for four hours waiting for one of its lost units. The delay was to have tragic consequences; the New Zealanders were not in position to support the Australian attack on the Nek and by the time the New Zealanders moved, the Turks had brought up reinforcements to defend Chunuk Bair. The fight for Chunuk Bair continued until 10 August when a Turkish counter attack pushed the New Zealand and British troops from Chunuk Bair to a lower spur.
In support of the thrust towards Chunuk Bair, diversionary operations were planned for Helles, Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove. The first diversion was at Helles on the afternoon of 6 August. The British attacked at The Vineyard where heavy hand-to-hand fighting raged for a number of days. The British IX Corps landed against negligible resistance at Suvla Bay, north of Anzac Cove on 7 August and then remained on the beaches for 36 hours. By the time the order to advance was given, Turkish reinforcements had arrived. After suffering 8000 casualties on 9 and 10 August, the British occupied positions only marginally different from those held at daybreak on 7 August.
At Anzac Cove, the 1st Australian Division was given the perilous task of attacking Lone Pine, justifiably considered as one of the strongest Turkish positions. The Turks had shown considerable ingenuity in making it almost impregnable. The plans for the Australian attack were laid with thoroughness, skill and imagination. Shortly before dusk on 6 August, an Australian assault succeeded in capturing the Turkish trenches. Turkish reserves were rushed to Lone Pine and the long Turkish attempt to retake the trenches by bombing began. From dark on 6 August until the night of 9 August a terrible exchange of handmade bombs went on almost continuously, flaring up four times into many hours of desperate fighting when successive Turkish reinforcements were thrown in. In four days, six Australian battalions lost 80 officers and 2197 men. Seven Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross.
Chunuk Bair was expected to be taken by dawn on 7 August so that the attacking troops could then mount an attack back towards Anzac Cove. The dismounted 8th (Victorian) and 10th (West Australian) Light Horse Regiments were to attack towards Chunuk Bair by assaulting the formidable position at the Nek. Such an attack was considered hopeless unless aided by the troops attacking from Chunuk Bair and by the seizure of three Turkish positions adjacent to the Nek. As the time for the assault approached, the adjacent positions were still held by the Turks and the New Zealanders were still approaching the summit of Chunuk Bair. It was decided that something had to be done to help the New Zealanders approaching Chunuk Bair and that the attack on the Nek was to go ahead primarily as a feint to keep the Turks off Chunuk Bair. The attack was made by four lines, each of 150 men. Tragically the preceding bombardment ceased seven minutes prior to the attack. 234 Light Horsemen were killed and 138 were wounded in an area no larger than a tennis court.
On 10 August, the allies faced the fact that the August offensive had failed. In four days of fighting at Anzac Cove, Australian and British troops had suffered 12000 casualties. The bridgeheads of Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay were connected only by a thin strip of foreshore and on 21 August and again on 27 August attacks were made to improve this junction. The 2nd Australian Division commenced landing at Anzac Cove in mid August and some of its troops were involved in the fighting on 27 August. With the failure of the August battles, the future of the campaign was questioned. London received a number of criticisms of the conduct of the campaign including Keith Murdoch's colourful and partially inaccurate but influential report. By the end of October military opinion favoured evacuation and after five weeks of hesitation, the British government decided on withdrawal on 7 December.
Even before London made its decision, preparations began at Gallipoli for the evacuation. The forces at Anzac Cove were reduced to 36000 men and 97 guns and those at Suvla Bay to 41000 men and 91 guns. The troops were told that preparations for winter and the severe blizzard in late November were responsible for these reductions while the Turks were deceived by the seeming normality. Once the order to evacuate was received, troops, stores and guns were withdrawn each night with the number of troops at each front being reduced to 20000 men. These men, 10000 on each night, were to be withdrawn on the nights of 18/19 and 19/20 December. The evacuation on 18/19 December was successful without the Turks being alerted and just 10000 men remained for the last day at both Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay. The final evacuation began after dark on 19 December with 4100 men leaving their posts at nightfall. In order to deceive the Turks it was decided to hold all the front line posts, however lightly, until the last possible moment which at Anzac Cove was 1.30 am after which the front was gradually uncovered. The last party left Anzac Cove at 4.10 am and Suvla Bay at 5.10 am. Two Australians were wounded at Anzac Cove and casualties at Suvla Bay were negligible. On the night of 8 January 1916, the British withdrew from Helles, also with negligible casualties.
During the campaign 7600 Australians and 2500 New Zealanders were killed and 19000 Australians and 5000 New Zealanders wounded. French casualties were nearly as great as the Australians and British casualties were three times as great.
By the middle of 1916, massive German and French armies had been locked in battle on the Western Front for nearly two years. In August 1914, the British had sent a small expeditionary force to assist France. The British regulars were supplemented by Territorial forces in 1915, but it was not until mid-1916 that the armies raised by Kitchener, after the commencement of hostilities, were ready for battle. In early 1916 the Germans had attacked the French forces at Verdun, not just to gain ground but to grind the French into submission by attrition. The French resisted and held their ground at great cost. However, French forces were so heavily committed to defending Verdun that the French-British summer offensive became a British offensive with some French support.
The 1916 summer offensive was preceded by a week long artillery barrage. The original attack date was put back from 29 June until 1 July because of bad weather and misgivings about the success of the artillery. 1 July 1916 was bright and cloudless, perfect conditions for defenders whose positions had in many cases withstood the artillery barrage. At 7.30 am, 120,000 British infantry commenced their attack across no-mans-land. The attack was repulsed with massive casualties. In the greatest tragedy in British military history, 60,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded or missing. The losses on 1 July 1916 have never been forgotten and have eclipsed the remainder of the battle that continued for five months.
The Anzacs, after being withdrawn from Gallipoli, returned to Egypt for rest and retraining. The seven Australian infantry brigades were expanded to twelve and the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions joined the 1st and 2nd Divisions. A fifth Australian division, the 3rd, was formed in Australia and would not see action in 1916. The structure of the AIF after the reorganisation was as follows:
Brigade | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion |
1st Division | ||||
1st Brigade | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th |
2nd Brigade | 5th | 6th | 7th | 8th |
3rd Brigade | 9th | 10th | 11th | 12th |
2nd Division | ||||
5th Brigade | 17th | 18th | 19th | 20th |
6th Brigade | 21st | 22nd | 23rd | 24th |
7th Brigade | 25th | 26th | 27th | 28th |
3rd Division | ||||
9th Brigade | 33rd | 34th | 35th | 36th |
10th Brigade | 37th | 38th | 39th | 40th |
11th Brigade | 41st | 42nd | 43rd | 44th |
4th Division | ||||
4th Brigade | 13th | 14th | 15th | 16th |
12th Brigade | 45th | 46th | 47th | 48th |
13th Brigade | 49th | 50th | 51st | 52nd |
5th Division | ||||
8th Brigade | 29th | 30th | 31st | 32nd |
14th Brigade | 53rd | 54th | 55th | 56th |
15th Brigade | 57th | 58th | 59th | 60th |
In March 1916, the Australian divisions in Egypt began moving to France and were initially stationed at Armentieres, a quiet sector near the Belgium border. On 7 July, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were ordered to move to the Somme. The Official Australian Historian, C E W Bean, writing after the war, said the fighting on the Somme was the hardest experienced by the Australians in France.
Before the first Australian attack was launched on the Somme, Australians were to suffer severe losses as a direct consequence of the battle. Forces holding the rest of the British line were ordered to pin down the German divisions on their front in order to prevent the enemy reinforcing the Somme. A major feint was planned for Armentieres and was conducted by the 5th Australian Division and the British 61st Division. In the battle of Fromelles, on 19 July, the Australians managed at great cost to seize part of the German trenches but by the night of 20 July the position was so perilous that they were withdrawn. The 5th Australian Division lost 5533 men in less than 24 hours and was unable to be used for offensive action for many months.
The next major British attack on the Somme, on 14 July, achieved some fairly deep gains into the German lines but again failed to achieve a break-through. The Germans still held Pozieres which was strung out along the old Roman highway from Amiens to Bapaume. The village was a an well-defended outpost in front of a German defence works known as the OG Lines, an immensely strong system comprising two parallel trenches which ran along the crest of Pozieres ridge about 500 yards behind the village. The Australians were given the task of taking Pozieres village. The attack was preceded by a thorough bombardment which methodically pounded the village and the OG Lines for several days. The bombardment stripped away the trees that screened the village and the few broken walls that remained became more visible. The final bombardment began at dusk and, occurring before the moon had risen, was visible for 20 miles around. At 12.30 am on Sunday, 23 July, the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Australian Division attacked. The advance succeeded in reaching the main road through the village. The Germans counter-attacked at dawn but were defeated by machine-gun fire.
The Australians captured all their objectives except for the OG Lines where the trenches and the area surrounding them were so cratered by shellfire that the troops had difficulty locating their objective. The front trench, OG1, and the support line 100-200 yards to the east, OG2, were in some places untraceable and in others merely a depression among the holes and mounds. However, the area contained deep dug-outs which held German garrisons skilled in the use of grenades and supported by efficient machine-gunners. In a drawn-out struggle, Pte John Leak and Lt A S Blackburn won the Victoria Cross. OG1 was captured and held but OG2 was unable to be found. During daylight on 23 July, the forward troops deepened their new trenches and that night a reinforcing battalion pushed through and secured most of the remainder of the village.
The pressure on the Somme forced the Germans to diminish their attacks on Verdun and was materially wearing down the German Army. The Germans were being strained on the Somme but the British were was not immediately in a position to launch a major offensive. While the British were building up men and supplies in the rear, the Germans were to be kept under pressure by constant local assaults. The Australian task was to take Pozieres ridge. However, Pozieres being a key position, the German staff was determined that it should be regained. Three early attempts failed and at 7 am on 24 July, as soon as the loss of the village was certain, the Australian position was methodically bombarded. The Germans still held parts of two trench systems along the western edge of Pozieres, and the OG Lines east of the village. The Australians were to attack at night so that the Germans would be unable to see the assault forming and therefore unable to concentrate their artillery and machine-guns.
On the night of 24/25 July 1916 the Australian troops marched up for an attack on a crest where most landmarks had been pounded out of recognition. Only one of the two assaulting battalions for the attack against the OG Lines was in position by zero hour and only after a difficult search in confusion and uproar did the battalion find its objective. The Germans counter-attacked and only a portion of the trenches captured were retained after a furious bomb-fight. On the western side of Pozieres, a brilliant advance seized the German trenches and Pozieres cemetery. The German bombardment on 25 July increased in weight in preparation for an attempt to retake Pozieres. The attack was to be launched at 4.30 pm but the fresh German regiment was already worn out from that morning's bomb-fight in the OG Lines, the repeated changes of orders by the German staff and the dreadful approaches under artillery fire. After many reports that the task was hopeless the German order to attack was countermanded. However, the 1st Australian Division after three days' bombardment was also exhausted. The division had lost 5285 officers and men and was relieved by the 2nd Division.
The 2nd Division's attack on Pozieres ridge began at 12.15 am on 29 July. German artillery hindered preparations for the attack and the British artillery did not batter down all of the wire. Preparations were generally poor and except on the extreme left the attack failed with heavy loss. The 2nd Division in its next attack formed up just before dusk on 4 August without being detected by the Germans. The OG lines along the Pozieres crest were firmly seized and the Germans were swept away by the vigour of the attack which had been preceded by a four day bombardment. The 2nd Division was now more exhausted than the 1st had been and had suffered heavier losses than any Australian division was to suffer in one tour in the line although some British divisions suffered heavier losses. In twelve days, the 2nd Division had lost 6848 officers and men with five of its battalions each losing between 600 and 700 men. The relief by the 4th Australian Division took place under intense bombardment.
From Pozieres crest the Australians could at last look over the wide, shallow valley behind the ridge and observe the tree-tops and roofs of Courcelette and the woods in front of Bapaume about five miles distant. The Germans, aware that their convoys, troops and guns could be seen were greatly disturbed by the loss of the Pozieres heights and ordered their immediate recapture. The Australians had gradually pushed a big bulge into the German lines which permitted the enemy artillery to shell them from Thiepval in the rear, as well as from the front and both flanks. A great part the Australian front line was now completely enfiladed by German batteries. The bombardment was so heavy on the night of 6 August that the 4th Division was largely kept in the deep old German dug-outs. The Germans attacked in the dawn of 7 August, passed through the lightly held OG2, overran several of the deep dug-outs in OG1, captured some of the garrison, and moved down the slope towards Pozieres on a 400 yard front. At the critical moment, Lt. Albert Jacka, who had won the Victoria Cross on Gallipoli leapt from a position behind the Germans and charged them. Jacka's platoon, waiting in a deep dug-out, had been surprised by the attack. The enemy had bombed the dug-out and left a sentry over the stairway. Jacka rushed the sentry and with his surviving men attacked the Germans from behind together with other Australians scattered across the slope and on the flanks. The German attack was stopped with most of the captured Australians freed and many Germans captured. The lost ground was retaken and the Germans did not repeat their attempt to retake Pozieres heights.
The Australians now thrust north along the ridge on which the OG trenches continued, while on the left the British kept pace by seizing, one after another, the old communication trenches running between the old German front and second lines. The first step was taken on the night of 8 August and on the night of 10 August, patrols pushed out and established posts in the valley south of the mound of rubble which appeared to be all that remained of Mouquet Farm. On the night of 11 August, after preparations of dreadful difficulty, a formal attack was made, bringing the Australians and the British on their left to a line directly facing the German position running through Mouquet Farm. An attack on the farm itself was planned for 13 August. A quarry near the farm was captured and a company under Capt. Harry Murray seized part of the German Fabeck trench, north-east of the farm. Here Murray and his men were outflanked by the Germans, C E W Bean wrote `this former miner, who was to become known as a most famous fighting leader, fought his way back with his men in one of the most ably conducted actions in Australian experience'. The attempt to drive the salient deeper was continued in attack after attack for another month, but its ultimate achievement was to secure no more than part of the Fabeck trench reached by Murray's company that night. The 4th Division was now relieved after a loss of 4649 men.
The 1st Australian Division, with its battalions brought up to two-thirds strength by reinforcements, was put in again. After another 2650 casualties, the 2nd Division took up the task and tried with larger forces to seize Mouquet Farm, which was by then realised to contain very large and deep dug-outs. The 4th Australian Division was brought back and delivered attacks on the nights of 27 and 28 August. The strategy of slowly pushing a salient behind an enemy salient had come to a halt. At the cost of another 2409 casualties, the 4th Division had driven the salient as far as it ever went. In early September, the Australians moved to a quiet area at Ypres. Between July and September Pozieres ridge was the only sector on the Somme in which the British forces had steadily pushed ahead. The German artillery was free to concentrate as it wished and although the Australians suffered other intense bombardments in France, there was never anything comparable in duration or effect to that suffered on the Somme. In seven weeks, the Australians launched 19 attacks, all except two on narrow fronts. 23,000 Australian officers and men were killed or wounded at Pozieres, a place C E W Bean said was `more densely sown with Australian sacrifice that any other place on earth.'
The fighting on the Somme highlighted the essential problem of the 1914-18 War. Modern technology had brought mass armies to the battlefield and was able to supply and maintain those armies in the field for an indefinite period but the technology to move the armies on the battlefield and to break though the trench lines still awaited development. The horse was still invaluable in moving supplies up to the front lines but was obsolete on the battlefield. On 15 September, the replacement for the horse on the battlefield, the tank was first used by the British. From Pozieres and other points along the line, tanks heaved their monstrous shapes forward among British, Canadian and New Zealand infantry, and succeeded in driving the enemy almost to the bottom of the valley on which the Australians had looked out. Mouquet Farm finally fell on 28 September.
On 9 October the Australians were ordered to return to the Somme but by the time they arrived the autumn rains had turned the fields ploughed up by the massed artillery into a sea of mud. The broken ground was passable in dry weather, but with the rains it became a bog. Preparations had not been made for these conditions and both the trenches and the tracks leading to them became impassable. It took five or six relays of stretcher-bearers, each team, six or eight strong, many hours to get a wounded man from the front line to an ambulance, a few miles back. The roads leading to the front gave way under the heavy traffic. In these conditions, the worst experienced by the First AIF, two attempts were made to carry the line forward. On 5 and 14 November, portion of the attacking troops entered the German trenches which were held for some hours until the impossibility of keeping the partial gains were realised. The mud of the Somme meant that major offensive action would have to wait until the spring
Winter on the Somme was a battle against mud, rain, and frost-bite. Road repairs commenced miles behind the front lines and slowly inched forward until material finally reached the trenches and the dreadful conditions at that front began to slowly improve. Thousands of duckboards were laid to enable supplies and material to be moved forward. In January and February 1917, four weeks of cold weather froze the mud and water and covered the trenches with snow.
The Germans were hard tried but not broken by the Battle of the Somme. The losses on all sides were heavy. For the Germans, it was the beginning of the end. The Chantilly conference in November 1916 had already decided to strike at the Germans from all directions in the spring of 1917. The Germans realising that another offensive was in the offering when the weather improved, played out the last act of the battle when, in March 1917, they withdrew to the Hindenburg. line giving up more territory than they had lost during all of the 1916 fighting.
The German Army, in February 1917, commenced a withdrawal from the Somme battlefields to prepared fortified position known as the Hindenburg line. The Germans implemented a scorched earth policy, and all trees or poles over six feet tall were cut down and villages razed. The 5th Australian Division entered the burning town of Bapaume on 17 March and in the following days, troops from the 2nd and 5th Divisions were involved in sharp clashes with German rearguards. Heavy fighting took place through the several fortified villages left by the Germans to delay the advance.
On 15 April 1917, the Germans counterattack at Lagnicourt with 16,000 troops. The attack was repulsed by fewer than 4,000 men of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions.
On 11 April 1917, the 4th Australian Division attacked towards Bullecourt in support of the offensive that had opened at Arras on 9 April. At the suggestion of the Tanks Corps, a mass concentration of tanks were to precede the infantry and break down the wire and seize the Hindenburg Line. The tanks, which were slower than walking men and with thin steel failed with none reaching the wire before the infantry and only four reaching the wire at all with just one reaching the first trench in the Australian sector. Despite no artillery barrage and the failure by the tanks, the 4th Division achieved through sheer bravery and magnificent leadership what was then regarded as impossible - they broke into the Hindenburg Line. Owing to mistaken reports, mainly from air and artillery observers, they were left without support. At first the artillery did not fire because of misleading reports, then it fired on its own infantry and finally German machine-gunners closed the gate behind the Australian infantry. The 4th Division suffered more than 3,000 casualties including 1170 officers and men, captured.
From 3 until 26 May the 1st, 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions made a another attempt to seize Bullecourt. The Australians established a two mile gap in the Hindenburg Line became two miles wide and withstood counterattacked by elite German troops on 15 May.
The Battle of Menin Road was a well planned and well executed battle with limited but reasonable objectives which were achieved. Two Australian divisions formed the centre of the attacking force of eleven Divisions of the Second and Fifth Armies. This was the first time two Australian divisions attacked side by side. Lieutenant F Birks, MM of the 6th Bn won the VC when he rushed a pill-box and captured it, enabling his battalion to advance. He was killed the following day, about the time that Lance-Corporal R R Inwood, 10th Bn, was performing the gallant actions which were to win him the VC.
Following the success at Menin Road on 20 September and similar success at Polygon Wood on 26 September a third major assault on German positions near Passchendaele was launched on 4 October 1917. The main assault included the 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealander Division. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and more than 5,000 prisoners were captured. In bitter fighting against German pillboxes the 1st Division, 2nd Division and two brigades of the 3rd Division lost 6,432 men, but with their allies inflicted on the Germans what their official history calls "the black day of October 4". Lance-Corporal Walter Peeler of the 3rd Pioneer Bn attached to the 37th Bn and Sergeant Lewis McGee of the 40th Bn both won the VC in this battle.
With the withdrawal of Russia from the first world war in 1917, the German High Command reinforced for a massive assault on the western front. The German commander, Ludendorff, considered a breakthrough unlikely but felt enough progress could be made to place Germany in a dominant position during peace negotiations. The great offensive, code named 'Michael', began on 21 March 1918 at St Quentin, and within three days the British 5th army was in semi-chaotic retreat. The principal aim of the German attacks was to drive a wedge between the British and French armies by capturing the channel ports. all territory gained by the allies during the bloody confrontations of 1916 and 1917 on the Somme were surrendered within weeks. The 3rd and 4th Australian divisions were resting when ordered to proceed to Amiens with all haste. The 4th brigade from 4th division was the first unit to arrive and checked the German advance at Hebuterne, some 18 miles north-east of Amiens. catching the weary but victorious German troops in open country, the 4th brigade quickly proved that the best form of defence was swift but limited counter-attacks. for almost two weeks this brigade successfully held a section of the line normally held by two divisions. Ten miles east of Amiens, the 3rd division dug in on Morlancourt ridge, just behind the old 1916 Somme battlefield. before the Germans could close on them, the Australians counter-attacked, checked the German advance and recaptured some territory. With the arrival of the 5th division in support of the Morlancourt position, the 9th brigade from 3rd division crossed the Somme river to the south to assist in the defence of Villers Bretonneux. over the next three months a series of limited attacks, combined with the tactic of peaceful penetration gradually succeeded in regaining allied initiative in the area.
The Australians with both American and tank support made great gains at Hamel on 4 July 1918. This was the first major action by General Sir John Monash since taking command of the Australian Corps the previous month and was the model for the offensive of 8 August.
The British Fourth Army which included both the Australian and Canadian Corps commenced the final advance of the First World War at dawn on 8 August 1918 with the assistance of 430 tanks. The British plan of attack was meticulous and the leading troops including the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions cut a clear path through the forward German defences. General Ludendorff, the German commander, later described the attack on 8 August as the black day of the German army. The attack was resumed next morning on the Australian front by the 1st and 2nd Divisions and further territory was gained. In the following eight weeks Australian troops successfully breached a succession of German defence lines including Mont St Quentin in early September and the Hindenburg line at the end of the month.
The Light Horse Brigades were organised as follows by 1918:
Brigades | Regiment | Regiment | Regiment |
1st | 1st | 2nd | 3rd |
2nd | 5th | 6th | 7th |
3rd | 8th | 9th | 10th |
4th | 4th | 11th | 12th |
5th | 14th | 15th |
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Divisional and Corps Troops came from the 4th and 13th Regiments.
The expulsion of Turkish forces from Egypt in late 1916 led to the establishment by the Turks of a line of fortifications guarding entry into central Palestine. The line extended for more than 24 miles from Gaza on the coast to the town of Beersheba. Following two unsuccessful attempts to turn the western flank at Gaza in March and April 1917, a plan was developed to attack and turn the eastern part of the line at Beersheba. The Desert Mounted Corps under the command of Australian General H G Chauvel was given this responsibility. By 30 October Chauvel's forces were in position in the desert east of the town. On 31 October, two divisions of infantry began a diversionary frontal attack on Beersheba whilst Chauvel's horsemen attacked Turkish positions in the hills north-east of the town. The Turks resisted strongly and it was not until 3 pm that the main position on Tel-el-Saba hill was overcome. Despite the lateness in the day Chauvel ordered a cavalry charge against the heavily defended town of Beersheba whose wells held the key to success or failure of the battle. The Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, under Brig-Gen Grant began moving towards the Turkish lines at 4.30 pm with only bayonets either attached to their rifle or in their hands. As the Brigade advanced it was subject to machine-gun and shrapnel fire but the Light Horsemen pressed forward and two Turkish trenches were cleared at the gallop. Some light horsemen dismounted and engaged the Turkish defenders in hand-to-hand fighting, while others galloped ahead into the town where the Turks were overwhelmed by the ferocity of the assault and soon surrendered.
The first operational group dispatched was the half-flight sent to the Mesopotamia. Some excellent reconnaissance work was completed despite poor machines and appalling conditions. Three of the four pilots were killed or captured and a number of ground crew were captured at Kut-el Arama and died in captivity.
1 Sqn, Australian Flying Corps, of 28 officers and 195 other ranks, departed for Egypt in early 1916. The squadron flying Be2c's initially operated out of an airfield near Heliopolis. They assisted in reconnaissance and bombing raids against Turkish forces attacking the canal in august 1916 and accompanied the advance into Palestine and Syria. During a bombing attack on Turkish positions at Gaza in March 1917, Lt F N McNamara won the only VC awarded to an Australian airman in the war by landing his plane and rescuing another pilot who had be forced down.
Three Australian squadrons became operational on the Western Front in late 1917. 3 Sqn, AFC had been raised in Egypt by December 1916 while 2 Sqn, AFC and 4 Sqn, AFC were formed in Australia and arrived in England in January and March 1917. The leading Australian air ace in France was Capt A H Cobby who was credited with destroying 29 aircraft and 13 balloons. The operational squadrons were supported by three training squadrons in England.
Over 2000 Australian nurses served abroad in every major theatre of conflict in the 1914-18 War. At Gallipoli, nurses served in hospital ships off the coast and in primitive hospitals on Lemnos. By 1916 in France, the AANS reserve provided enough nurses to staff no 1 Australian general hospital at Rouen and no 2 Australian general hospital at Wimeraux. They remained in France until the end of hostilities, and continued to minister to the men in hospitals and on troop ships back to Australia.
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