Place holder node for 2002
Advisory from Disability Compensation Branch
No. 1 of 2002
This is an advisory note only. It is not a Repatriation Commission Guideline or a Departmental Instruction. The advice is intended to indicate that some members of the ADF may have served at very different locations than Vung Tau, Nui Dat or Saigon. It is not exhaustive and there may be other locations visited by members of the ADF.
Members of Detachment 176 Air Dispatch (Det 176 AD) Coy RAASC served in South Vietnam from 1965 until 1972 and were continually detached to other units; mainly US and RAAF for varying lengths of time. This took individual members of the unit to the length and breadth of South Vietnam.
Det 176 AD Coy undertook varied roles, from that of crewmembers on medium to heavy lift helicopters where members spent time as gunners/loadmasters, to forward resupply officers, to crew on board the river patrol boats out of Vung Tau where they assisted in the maintenance of the curfew.
The following account from a member of Det 176 AD Coy indicates the varied duties of the unit:
I arrived in South Vietnam early in January 1968. During the period of March and April I was seconded to the American Forces as a pathfinder with 273rd Assault Helicopter Company (heavy). Initially I was based at Vung Tau airfield, however I seemed to end up working north from Duc Hoa to Duc Lap & Buon Tsuk operational areas.
During May, June and July 1968 I returned to Det 176 Ad Coy and worked mostly with Victor and Whisky Companies as well as 161 Battery (NZ Forces). Along with another dispatcher I was with 102nd Field Battery RAA at Fire Support Base (FSB) Coral and then was moved to FSB Balmoral.
From August to December I was once again seconded to the American Forces and did not return to a line south of between Song Be and Dong Ba Thin until December 1968. I assisted in operations as a forward supply officer with the US 1st Infantry Div and 127 Battalion, Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) that included operations into Cambodia.
I spent 3 weeks with the 127 Battalion ARVN at a border outpost west of Ban Don, eventually moving with the Battalion back to Ban Don. They could not hold the outpost for more than 3 or 4 days at a time, whereupon the US 11th Armoured Cavalry would assist in the retaking of the outpost at a high casualty rate for all units.
All members of Det 176 AD Coy were issued with flight logbooks. Although some logbooks have not survived the years, documentary evidence is available to assist with most claims. The Air Dispatch Association has selected details from four logbooks and has marked a copy of the master operations map to present a visual appreciation of the areas worked by Det 176 AD Coy. The attached list names the various locations where some members of Det 176 AD Coy served. The list is not exhaustive but indicates the wide range of the detachment.
John R Douglas
Director
Policy, Eligibility and Research
11 January 2002
Sgt GCpl WPte JPte C
GOLDGREENBLUE SILVER
Can Lho — Nha Trang — Bian Hoa — Tay Nian
Bien Hoa — Dak Pek — Bian Hoa — Lagi
Ton S en Nhut — Phan Thiet — Pleiku — Ham Tan
Ham Tan — Van Canh — Donh Donh — Tay Ninh
Phan Thiet — Plei Djerang — Antoi — Long Binh
Song Mao — Plateau GI — Vinh Bin — Mek To
Nha Trang — Qin Nhon — Binh Bar — Truong Toc
Bao Loc — Bien Hoa — Bac Lieu — Duc Hue
Tan Rai — Ton Sen Nhut — Anuet — Bunard
Bong Son — Ham Than — Song Bai — Lia Via
Ban Me Tout — Phan Thiet — Song Mao — Song Be
Plei Me — Sung Mau — Dak Pek — Dong Tam
Dak Pec — Chu Dron — Dak Scang — Lia Kay
Ben Brieng — Cheo Reo — Plei Me — Tan Lia
Dalat — Polie Kreng — Nha Trang — Ton Sen Nhut
Gia Nia — Plei Mrorg — Phu Tuc
Baloc — Cav Lanh — Dalat
Bin Bah — An Thoy — Gia Nghia
Anlac — Cia Mau — Baa Loc
Polie Kleng — Bac Liew — Phan Rhan
Phu Tuc — Tuh Vinh — Vinh Long
Duc Lap — Song Mao — Tra Vinh
Dat Do — Dalat — That Sun
Qui Nhon — Gia Nghia — Cao Lanh
Tam Ki — Bac Loc
Nhon Nghia
Phan Rang
Advisory from Disability Compensation Branch
No 2 of 2002
This is an advisory note only. It is not a Repatriation Commission Guideline or a Departmental Instruction. The advice is not intended to conflict with the proper application of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 or the judgements of the Courts. It may be subject to change as a result of cases at the AAT or interpretation by the Courts of the legislation. Nevertheless it represents a considered view that should be taken into account by all delegates.
REASONS FOR DECISION IN RESTORATION OF WAR WIDOWS' PENSIONS
National Office provided a draft of the letter that should be used, with suitable additions and modifications for each circumstance, for accepted and non-accepted claims for reinstatement of a war widow's pension.
The additions and modifications are determined by the particular facts of the case.
Every sample rejection letter has to have appropriate information added. The additions in every case are the facts that the decision-maker relied on when making a determination and a clear statement of the reason that the claim was not accepted.
These letters constitute the decision being made and are subject to an appeal to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT). The AAT is likely to be critical of decisions that do not allow an applicant or a tribunal to understand the reasons for decision.
It is apparent from some letters that the reasons for decision are inadequate and any Court would determine that the reasons were insufficient for an ordinary person to understand why that decision was made.
Before all else you must be satisfied as to the identity of the claimant.
The minimum that can be said to constitute sufficient reasoning to make the decision a legal one means that there must be statement of the evidence that you used.
There must be statement whether that evidence was sufficient for you to be satisfied on the balance of probabilities that
If, after investigation, there is still insufficient evidence for all of the criteria to be met then the claimant is not a "reinstated pensioner". Self-serving statements from a claimant would of themselves be insufficient without more evidence. This is not an absolute reflection on the veracity of what is being said or written by the claimant. It is just prudent decision-making to corroborate such statements.
In addition to checking archived Departmental records, including Veterans' Children Education Scheme files, corroboration might come from a variety of sources.
The same is true when checking the claimant' statements about the deceased veteran's circumstances (dates and places of birth, service, marriage, death) and her remarriage details against documentary sources.
If desirable a face to face interview should be arranged.
Where death during World War 2 remains an issue, details of men and women who died whilst serving in the forces of Commonwealth countries from 1914 to 1921 and from 1939 to 1947 can be found at the Commonwealth War Graves Commission website at http://www.cwgc.org.uk/ [4]
Did she seek assistance from the AIF Canteens Funds Trust, the Services Canteens Trust Fund, and the Soldiers' Children Education Board for the education of her children (National Archives of Australia holds records from the pre-VCES schemes)?
If the only outstanding matter is whether the claimant had been a war widow or not, asking for any paperwork held by her or others which could provide pointers to payment of the pension. This could include
The claimant might also be able to give you contact details of people who could vouch for her being a war widow in the past, including,
Some investigatory options exist to pursue through the National Archives of Australia if verification of previous status is an issue. There are old DVA client files/index cards, which might hold details of grants of a war widow's pension and include:
Any Paper Accession Lists held by the NAA (or your Registry) for a particular Series should be checked beforehand as they might contain claimants' names. State Office Registries should be able to extract relevant DVA files from National Archives of Australia (NAA), especially where identification is confirmed from a Paper Accession List.
NAA contact details can be found at [5]http://www.naa.gov.au/about-us/contact/ [5]
The Repatriation Commission wants every applicant to have every chance to establish the case for re-instatement. Where a decision is to be made because of insufficient material the applicant should be offered a chance to make a further written statement about the circumstances of the payment.
If you have very little to go on then ask the applicant if she can provide any statements from friends or family. If not, then what about writing down what she remembers of receiving the payment or any of the ancillary services or benefits
[1] [6] .If she remarried after 1950 did she receive a payment as a gratuity when her war widow's pension was cancelled? Does she remember how it was paid to her or how much it was?
In 1931 (during the depression) and as a result of the Financial Emergency Act 1931, the 1914 provision was restored and benefits were again cancelled immediately upon remarriage.
In 1950 the Australian Soldiers' Repatriation Act 1950 was amended to provide for the payment of a remarriage gratuity (lump sum) to remarried war widows. This was equivalent to 26 payments or one year of war widow's pension.
This means that anyone remarried between 1931 and 1950 would never have been eligible for a gratuity payment. The non-receipt of this payment might be an indication that no war widow's pension was in payment. However, there are bound to be cases where a war widow's pension was paid and the widow claims that she never received the gratuity payment she was entitled to.
In every case where the gratuity is claimed a separate investigation is to take place. That matter is to be determined after the decision on restoration and is to be treated as a separate issue.
National Office is gathering materials to show that it was not possible to have missed a proper payment of gratuity if the Repatriation Department was notified of the remarriage of a war widow.
A letter is attached that contains examples of some of the facts that might be available and some the reasons that might be given for your decision in light of those facts.
John R Douglas
Director
Policy Eligibility and Research
11 January 2002
Attachment A
I received your “Claim for Pension by a War Widow who remarried prior to 1984”, on 19 October 2001.
As you are aware the Government in its 2000 – 2001 Budget initiative, decided to restore the War Widow's pensions to widows who remarried on or before 28 May 1984 and consequently had their pension cancelled.
The criteria for restoration, all of which must be met are:
“Repealed Act” means an Act specified in Part I, II, III, IV or V of Schedule 1 of the Veterans' Entitlement Act 1986 or the Seamen's War Pensions and Allowances Act 1940.
If these four criteria are met I must make a verification determination that you are a “reinstated pensioner” for the purpose of restoring your War Widow's pension.
You have provided me with,
In addition I have recovered records held by the Department that show,
I have investigated your claim and find I am unable to be satisfied that you were in receipt of a War Widow's pension on or before 28 May 1984.
There is insufficient material available to me to allow me to verify that you are a reinstated pensioner.
Unfortunately, for the reasons given above, I am unable to determine that you are a reinstated pensioner and therefore you are ineligible for the restoration of the War Widow's Pension under the provisions of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986.
If you believe that this decision is incorrect in terms of the legislation, you have formal rights of appeal.
Your right of appeal is to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. An application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal must be lodged within three months of the date of this letter. The three month period may be extended upon application to the Tribunal. The address of the Tribunal is:
Deputy Registrar
Administrative Appeals Tribunal
GPO Box 9955
CAPITAL CITY STATE POSTCODE
If you would like further information, please call me on xxxxxxxx.
Yours sincerely
Delegate of the Repatriation Commission
January 2002
In one case the widow produced a letter from a company acknowledging her as a war widow and that she had had approval to spend up to 75 pounds on a fridge but would have to wait for one year because of the shortages of goods.
[1] (go back) [7]
Advisory from Disability Compensation Branch
No 3/2002
(Replaces 7/2000)
REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM
NATIONAL POLICE FIELD FORCE
POPULAR FORCES AND REGIONAL FORCES
PROVINCIAL RECONNAISSANCE UNITS
STATUS AS AN ALLIED DEFENCE FORCE
This advisory concerns the relationship of the:
to the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) and hence the possible status of members as allied veterans.
In 1999, a military historian, Dr Jeffrey Grey
[i], was commissioned to provide a report on the relationship between the RVNAF and the paramilitaries during this conflict. His conclusions were considered in light of the legislation and, consequently, the Commission agreed that the PF, RF and NPFF of the Republic of Vietnam could be considered as auxiliaries of the regular Defence Forces of the Republic of Vietnam. In 2002, the Commission further considered the position of the PRU and accepted that it could be considered an auxiliary of the RVNAF. The following reasons were provided. [9]
National Police Field Force
Expansion of the National Police began in 1964 and the organisation was divided into six main 'blocks' for functional purposes. Created in January 1965, the NPFF constituted a separate and discrete block within the National Police organisation. They were a lightly armed, highly mobile formation that could attack the Viet Cong in the villages. Its members received both military and civil police training at an NPFF Training Centre, usually located in the regional capital. Consequently, there was some confusion regarding the activities of the NPFF and those of the RF, the National Police and other organisations. Hunt
[ii], describes them as 'a separate police branch', and notes that their function was to fill the gap in operational terms between the ARVN and 'regular police forces'. Andrade[iii] describes them in similar terms. McNeil[iv] admits to the ambiguity of their position, located between the regular military and the regular police. [10]
In terms of personnel policy and in keeping with the requirements of the laws governing conscription, the NPFF was treated as an extension of the armed forces, specifically the ARVN. The ARVN was ordered to make a compulsory transfer of personnel to boost the size of the police. In pursuance of the General Mobilisation Law in 1968, between 6,000 and 9,000 men aged between 18-20 (ie within draft age) were sent to the NPFF and not to the ARVN. Further, all personnel within the National Police aged between 21-33 (within draft age) were gradually to be transferred to the NPFF with the agreement of the Ministry of Defence.
[v] [11]
There is no question that the NPFF was never a formal part of the RVNAF, although it is worth noting that the Government of Vietnam certainly considered this option. It is equally clear that NPFF companies were regularly used as though they were part of the ARVN command structure, despite the complaints and protests of American advisers who wanted them used to attack the Viet Cong Infrastructure, as they were intended to do. That the NPFF was used in conventional combat is underlined by the award of a posthumous Silver Star Medal for gallantry to a National Policeman who was killed defending a machine gun position against an attack by two battalions of Viet Cong in Hau Nghia province in May 1966.
[vi] [12]
In 1960, the Regional Forces/Popular Forces were incorporated directly into the defence budget. In 1964, these Forces were integrated into the RVNAF and placed under the command of the Joint General Staff.
[vii] The Province Chief controlled the RF while the PF was controlled at the district level. An Officer of the ARVN generally commanded RF companies, while a Non–Commissioned Officer commanded the PF platoons. Service in both Forces was on a full-time basis, and the soldiers underwent a five-week training course at one of the two RF and 15 PF training facilities scattered around the country. They were poorly paid and, until 1967, poorly armed and equipped. However, Krepinevich[viii] points out that except during Tet, the RFs consistently suffered a higher rate of casualties than the ARVN. Additionally, they accounted for between 12-30 percent of enemy combat deaths while consuming only 2-4 percent of the resources expended to fight the war. [13]
As a result of two decrees signed by President Thieu on 2 July 1970, the RVNAF was reorganised and the RF/PF became components of the ARVN on a formal basis. There was no intention of raising the RF/PF to ARVN standards in terms of either training or equipment. However, when the 3rd Division was formed in the northern provinces in late 1971, the RF was used to provide a number of battalions for newly formed regiments. Additionally, in mid-1974, the Marine Division had eight RF battalions under its operational control and the Airborne Division controlled a further seven. The combined strength of the RF/PF in 1968 exceeded 300,000 members.
[ix] [14]
Professor Grey's report dealt with the organisational relationships between the RVNAF and the various paramilitary units and formations. The roles and structures of these groups were taken into account when assessing the claim to be a part of the regular forces or at least an auxiliary force.
Professor Grey reported that, in his opinion, it was appropriate to view the NPFF as an auxiliary force of the RVNAF. This opinion was based on the fact that the NPFF was deployed on military operations, was trained and equipped along military lines, and its functions went well beyond those of the uniformed civil police. The NPFF operated in conjunction with units of the armed forces and this was specified as part of its operational mission. Professor Grey's findings indicate that the role of the NPFF would satisfy the terms of the legislation.
A decision-maker should also be able to be satisfied that the PF and RF were auxiliaries of the regular ARVN. In his report, Professor Grey outlined the command and control relationship for both the RF and PF. He states that these two forces were incorporated directly into the defence budget and, in 1964, were integrated into the RVNAF and placed under the command of the Joint General Staff. As a result of two decrees signed by President Thieu on 2 July 1970, the RVNAF was reorganised and the RF and PF became components of the ARVN on a formal basis. These findings are enough to satisfy the legislative requirements of the VEA.
Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU)
The Repatriation Commission recently reconsidered Professor Grey's report regarding the status of the PRU following an inquiry from a State Office. Previous cases involving ex-PRU members were considered in light of Nolan
[x] and Choo[xi]. The advice that follows relates only to the status of the PRU as a Unit and does not absolve decision makers from ensuring that claimants do not gain access to benefits under the VEA if they served at any time with the enemy forces. [15]
Advised and funded by the CIA as part of the Phung Hoang (Phoenix) Program, the PRU had its origins in counter terrorist teams and worked under a cover arrangement with the Joint General Staff. In keeping with the laws governing conscription, service in the PRU provided an exemption from service in the ARVN. Additionally, the PRU had their own military style special warfare training facilities at Vung Tau
[xii]. They were issued with uniforms, openly bore M16 rifles and used military ranks. Advisers from the Australian and the US militaries were attached to and led the PRU. Further, the PRU reported to a military command and control structure. McNeill[xiii] states that members of the PRU were involved in overt and covert intelligence operations and were used in cordon and search operations, ambushes, raids and detention operations against armed Viet Cong. [16]
In 1967, the role of the PRU was formalised and they became part of the Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
[xiv] organisation. This organisational structure integrated the civilian and military effort at the province level and facilitated the gathering of intelligence against the Viet Cong Infrastructure and targeting of forces against them. This meant that the military advisers with the PRU were no longer separated from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam.[xv] [17]
In March 1969, the PRU were officially recognised by Prime Ministerial decree. The decree set out the command and control arrangements for the PRU. These units now came under the non-operational control of the National Police and were tasked by the Province Chief. However, their organisation, specific duties and operational policies were still defined by the Minister of Internal Affairs in consultation with the Minister for National Defence.
[xvi] On disbanding, PRU personnel were transferred to the Vietnamese National Police Special Branch. [18]
Professor Grey reported that, in his opinion, it was appropriate to view the PRU as an auxiliary force of the RVNAF. This opinion was based on the fact that the PRU were trained, uniformed and disciplined along military lines, had a clear combat function, and received Advisers and other support from Military Assistance Command Vietnam. Whilst their early legal status was problematic, they were raised with the agreement and under the administrative authority of the Joint General Staff. While funded by the CIA, they were sanctioned at the highest level. Although their status was regularised through some element of control by the National Police, they continued to receive operational direction through the Vietnamese Ministry of Defence until they were wound up following the demise of the Phoenix Program.
[xvii] [19]
The mission of the PRU as described by McNeill is consistent with paramilitary operations and similar to the role of the Special Branch of the Royal Malay Police Force as stated in Choo. This proposition is further supported by the fact that, on disbandment of the PRU, remaining personnel were transferred to the Special Branch of the Vietnamese National Police. Additionally, the notion in Choo of functional integration and mutual support is implicit in the roles and command structure enunciated in the Prime Ministerial Decree that gave official recognition to the PRU. The emergence of Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, the integration of the civilian and military effort at the provincial level and the fact that the PRU's advisers were no longer separated from the Military Assistance Command Vietnam after 1967 only strengthens this proposition.
Consequently, the Commission has agreed that these findings indicate that, on the balance of probabilities, the AAT could find t — hat the PRU was an 'auxiliary service' 'of' the regular forces of the Republic of Vietnam.
Please note that the findings on this Advisory relate only to the NPFF and PRU and not to any other branch of the Police Force.
There may be claims from Vietnamese veterans with service in:
·People's Self Defence Force
·People's Action Teams
·Revolutionary Development Cadres
·Rural Development Cadres
In general these units are a mixture of service types and not considered as meeting the full test for auxiliary forces. In some cases, membership of such a force merely deferred conscription. Other forces were not under the direct control of the Ministry of Defence. Nevertheless, any such claim must be treated on its merit. The service of any particular Vietnamese claimant within these units could be quite distinct from another person's experience.
Decision-makers are reminded that a person may not gain access to benefits under the VEA if they served at any time with the enemy forces. In this situation, we are talking of service with the North Vietnamese Army, the Peoples' Army of Vietnam, or the Viet Cong.
During the course of the conflict many former cadres and members of the enemy forces were captured and some were recruited or turned and performed service for the Republic of Vietnam or the United States. This was The Hoi Chanh program. Any person who was turned, that is any one who was a member of a Hoi Chanh unit (sometimes the person is referred to as a Chieu Hoi) is prevented from accessing benefits under the VEA.
Within the program were Armed Propaganda Teams, the Kit Carson Scouts, Civilian Irregular Defence Groups, Mobile Strike Forces, and some members of the PRU.
Members of these groups were the first to experience the extreme retribution followed by the new government of a united Vietnam. In fact so dangerous was their position that they were amongst the first to seek escape from Vietnam. Persons in this position are no different to those who had served with the Italian Army before joining the partisans in World War 2.
However, any suspected instance of a Chieu Hoi applicant needs to be considered in the light of the law and the decisions of the Tribunals and Courts. In circumstances where the enemy makes conscription compulsory, but the person seeks to leave that force (escape) at the earliest opportunity, there may by some scope for still being able to satisfy the requirements of the VEA.
This advisory does not detract from any other instruction concerning the determination of claims from allied veterans. Decision-makers are still required to ask for military and/or civilian documentation, obtain proof of identity and proof of 10-year residency.
In the absence of any military and/or civilian documentation, a Statutory Declaration is the very least that is required.
The original Report is held in National Office. A complete copy may be obtained on request to National Office (Vicki Ludwig on 02 6289 6274).
[Original signed]
Mark Johnson
Branch Head
Disability Compensation
7 Aug 2002
30 January 2001 — 1 of 15
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