Additional Information
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information
Understanding Service Eligibility Instruments
This chapter provides explanatory information and examples relating to instruments and their application and interpretation.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments
Allotted For Duty
On this page:
- What does it mean to be allotted for duty?
- Background to allotment
- Eligibility arising from allotment
- Timeframe for eligibility
- Who is included in an instrument of allotment?
- Attached to the unit
- Allotted for Duty versus Assigned for Service
- Visitors to an Operational Area
- Attaches
- On Exercises
- Midshipmen undergoing training during the Vietnam War
- National Servicemen on HMAS Sydney
- Ships delivering supplies ('National Tasking')
- Service in Japan during the Korean War
- Service in Singapore during the Malayan Emergency (29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957)
Allotted for Duty
VEA section 5B(2)
For an individual to have operational service or qualifying service from service in an operational area (set out in Schedule 2 of the VEA), they (or their unit or ship) must have been allotted for duty in that area in addition to having actually served there.
This pathway to operational and qualifying service is only relevant to service up to approximately 1997, after which time service which meets similar criteria has instead been declared warlike service (which attracts the same benefits under the VEA). The term allotted for duty is not used in relation to warlike service. However, the term assigned for service or assigned for duty is generally used to refer to the official Defence Force process by which a person or their unit is allocated to a military operation that has been declared warlike.
It should be noted that service in earlier conflicts may involve a combination of allotment for duty and Warlike Service. For example, all service in the Vietnam War prior to 12 January 1973 requires a person or their unit to be allotted for duty in the operational area, but service from 12 January 1973 to 29 April 1975 in the Southern Zone of Vietnam is Warlike Service.
What does it mean to be allotted for duty?
Being allotted for duty is a formal process that involves a person or their unit or ship being included in an instrument of allotment issued expressly for use in determining eligibility under the VEA. An instrument of allotment is produced via the Australian Defence Force and signed either by the Vice Chief of the Defence Force or the Minister for Defence (or the Minister’s representative) depending on the specific item of Schedule 2 to which it refers. The task of allotting or assigning personnel for duty rests with the Service Chiefs.
An instrument of allotment is entirely separate from standard Defence personnel processes, meaning that a person having been placed, posted or allocated to a unit or a location, or a record in their service file indicating that they were so placed, posted or allocated, does not qualify as being allotted for duty.
Background to Allotment
The concept of being allotted for duty was introduced into legislation to provide for post-World War II service, for which the World War II qualifying service criteria were not entirely appropriate. The intention was to provide qualifying service in relation to service with similar characteristics to World War II qualifying service. World War II qualifying service generally required that a person incurred danger from hostile forces of the enemy while engaged in operations against the enemy. These specific criteria were not necessarily applicable to post World War II service in which there may not be a direct or acknowledged enemy.
The concept of incurring danger while engaged in operations against the enemy originated as the definition of ‘service in a theatre of war’ for the purpose of service pension eligibility in relation to service in World War I. This ‘theatre of war’ concept was then adopted for World War II. For practical reasons, guidelines were developed by the Repatriation Commission defining areas and dates for the purposes of indicating service in World War II that would automatically be accepted as meeting this test. All cases not falling within those guidelines then had to be determined on a case-by-case basis applying the ‘theatre of war’ test in its terms (i.e. requiring evidence of both personal danger and engagement in operations against the enemy). As far as can be ascertained, no qualifying service in relation to World War II was ever conceded for any service rendered after 29 October 1945.
In 1950, with the Korean and Malayan situations arising within days of each other, eligibility for Repatriation benefits had to be considered as a matter of urgency. It was considered inappropriate to use the definition of 'theatre of war' that had applied for the World Wars because there was no formal 'enemy'. In the case of Malaya the fight was against a communist insurgency and in the case of Korea there was no formal declaration of war and Australia did not at that time recognise the Peoples Republic of China.
This meant that a different method of determining eligibility for service pension had to be found. The concept of 'allotment for duty in an operational area' was created to fill the gap. It was considered that an 'operational area' would be prescribed only if the military situation in the relevant area were such that it warranted being prescribed (that is, the existence of danger from hostile forces against whom Australian forces were engaging in military operations). This supposition maintained a link to the incurred danger test, but there was no need for the test to be satisfied on an individual basis. In effect, the onus of the test being met was placed on the decision makers when determining an operational area. There was no need for there to be a formal ‘enemy’ as that term is understood in international law given the different nature of the conflicts in which Australian forces were engaged.
Eligibility arising from allotment
Because of its official nature, being allotted for duty via an instrument of allotment has sometimes resulted in a mistaken belief that all eligibility requirements under the VEA have been met. This is not the case.
For a person to have access to entitlements associated with operational or qualifying service under the VEA, there are additional requirements that need to be met. In addition to being allotted for duty, a person must have:
- For qualifying service: served in the operational area (set out in Schedule 2 of the VEA) while allotted for duty in the area; or
- For operational service: rendered continuous full-time service in the operational area (set out in Schedule 2 of the VEA) while allotted for duty there.
Timeframe for Eligibility
An operational area in Schedule 2 of the VEA includes both a geographical location and a period during which the area was considered operational. In order for a person who was allotted for duty in an operational area to have qualifying service or operational service they only need to have rendered service (or in the case of operational service, continuous full-time service) in the area at some point within the relevant timeframe. There are no minimum time requirements; a single day (or even a lesser period) in the relevant geographic area (while allotted for duty there) will allow an individual to be considered to have rendered qualifying service or operational service. There are several examples of people whose qualifying service stems from their presence on an aircraft or a ship that passed into an operational area (regardless of the time period), providing they or their unit was allotted or assigned for duty.
Who is included in an instrument of allotment?
A person can either be allotted for duty as an individual or as a member of a unit. Where a unit is allotted, it is important to understand who may be considered to be a member of that unit.
A member of a unit of the Defence Force may include not only a member of the Defence Force, but also others (such as civilians) who were at the time of the unit’s allotment for duty/assignment for service:
- a member of the unit,
- attached to the unit, or
- appointed for continuous full-time service with the unit.
Attached to the unit
For a person to be considered to be attached to a unit, they must have been attached according to the specific definition of the term in military parlance. This includes a requirement for an official attachment order or notice of attachment and that the attached individual comes under the same (military) command as all other members of the unit. The following definition is from the Australian Defence Force and defines being attached as:
The placement of units or personnel in an organisation where such placement is relatively temporary. Subject to limitations imposed in the attachment order, the commander of the formation, unit or organisation receiving the attachment will exercise the same degree of command and control thereover as he does over the units and personnel organic to his command.
It is important to note that simply serving in the same place as members of the Defence Force does not constitute being attached to that unit.
Allotted for Duty versus Assigned for Service
The term assigned for service is related to allotted for duty and due to the similarity between the terms, confusion can arise around their interaction.
The term assigned for service is used to refer to two different processes:
- Under the VEA, assigned for service has a specific meaning within the legislation, and relates to some specific post World War II operational service set out in sections 6D(1) and 6E of the VEA.Despite the similarity between the terms, the term assigned for service within the legislation has a separate meaning from allotted for duty and operates in parallel with allotment as a separate pathway to operational service for service over a similar period.
- Assigned for service (or other variants such as assigned for duty or assigned to [operation]) is also a non-legislative term used to refer to the official process by which a person or their unit is allocated to a military operation. In order to determine whether a person has warlike service from an operation that has been declared to be warlike, their service record needs to show that they or their unit was assigned for service on that operation. This usage of the term assigned for service can be seen as the successor of allotted for duty, in the same way as declarations of warlike service have superseded the use of operational areas.
Assigned for Service – Warlike Service (POST ALLOTMENT)
For a member of the ADF to render qualifying service under the banner of warlike service, the usual method is that the operation is declared warlike, the member is force assigned (or assigned for service) to the relevant operation and the member must then actually serve in the area of operations.
No formal instrument is required to establish assignment for warlike service. Generally, warlike service will be recorded on a member’s service documents. Where there is doubt, Defence is able to advise as to whether a member was assigned for warlike service.
Assigned for Service – Other Operational Service (CONTEMPORARY TO ALLOTMENT)
Under the VEA, as with allotment for duty, a person (or the unit of which they were a member) may be assigned for service via an instrument issued by the Department of Defence. A person or unit can be assigned for service only in relation to the following areas and dates set out in sections 6D(1) and 6E of the VEA:
- Singapore at any time from 29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957 (inclusive); or
- Japan at any time from 28 April 1952 to 19 April 1956 (inclusive); or
- North East Thailand (including Ubon) at any time during from 28 July 1962 to 24 June 1965 (inclusive); or
- North East Thailand (not including Ubon) at any time from 31 May 1962 to 27 July 1962; or
- the demilitarised zone between North Korea and South Korea after 18 April 1956; or
- HMA Ship Vampire or Quickmatch in Vietnam at any time from 25 January 1962 to 29 January 1962 (inclusive).
On its own, being assigned for service in relation to sections 6D(1) and 6E of the VEA does not provide eligibility for services and entitlements under the VEA. To be considered to have operational service under the VEA, in addition to being assigned for service in the specified areas between the specified dates, a person must:
- Have actually served in the specified area within the specified period; and
- Rendered continuous full-time service while serving in the specified area within the specified period.
Visitors to an operational area
Being present in an operational area does not on its own meet service requirements under the VEA. This means that any visitors to an operational area do not have eligibility to lodge a claim under the VEA unless they have also been allotted for duty in the operational area and (for operational service) have rendered continuous full-time service in that area. Allotment is at the discretion of the Australian Defence Force and it is generally unlikely that a visitor will be allotted.
The only current exception is in relation to certain visitors to operational areas in Vietnam (items 4 and 8 of schedule 2) who have been allotted for duty. These include those on staff inspection, equipment inspection, Attaché duties or public relations, familiarisation or welfare visits.
Any claims relating to visitors to operational areas should be referred to the Liability and Service Eligibility section for consultation with the Department of Defence.
Attachés
While those undertaking Attaché duties in operational areas in Vietnam have been allotted for duty, the otherwise consistent Defence view is that Defence Attachés are not to be allotted or assigned for duty. One of the reasons for this position is that whilst there is no one rule of international law which prohibits the force assignment of accredited defence staff, it is not consistent with the spirit of the Convention (the convention being the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 which governs in international law, the status and accreditation of diplomatic staff, including Defence Attachés). Additionally, the policy of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been clearly stated, that they only provide diplomatic accreditation to officers performing diplomatic functions at overseas embassies and that the function of a Defence Attaché is liaison between the armed forces of the two countries.
There is one exception to the principle that Defence Attachés are not allotted or assigned for duty, which relates to certain Defence staff during the Australian deployment to East Timor in 1999, However, the circumstances of these four Attachés were regarded as unique and did not create a precedent..
On Exercises
Australian Defence Force members who enter a declared operational area for the sole purpose of participation in an exercise, are not eligible for allotment for duty to the operation in respect of which the operational area has been declared.
Example: Clearance Diving Team 1 in Vietnam
Clearance Diving Team 1 (CDT 1) has been allotted for duty in the operational area of Vietnam for a short period in 1966, but questions have been raised over SEATO training Exercise Sea Spirit in which they participated between 29 May and 7 June 1965. This issue has been investigated by the Nature of Service (NOS) Directorate, Department of Defence. It was found that while CDT 1 was on board USS Catskill for the purposes of Exercise Sea Spirit when the ship closed with the coast of Vietnam for a rendezvous with USS Peacock. CDT 1 did not undertake any clearance diving manoeuvres while in this area, and nor was the Exercise or their participation in it connected to the conduct of the Vietnam War. It was found that CDT 1’s participation in Exercise Sea Spirit did not render them eligible for allotment for duty in the Vietnam operational area.
Example: Snowgum Force on Exercise Ramasoon in Thailand
In 1968 in Thailand ADF members participated in Exercise Ramasoon. This was a SEATO command post exercise to test communications between the forces of SEATO member countries. The Australian forces participating in the exercise were designated Snowgum Force. They were based at Yasothon and used only for purposes associated with Australian participation in the exercise.
Service as part of Exercise Ramasoon does not currently provide access to the VEA, because members were not allotted for duty in an operational area under the VEA. This is because while it was conducted in an operational area, it was not related to the war effort at that time.
Following a Review by Defence in 2001, service with Exercise Ramasoon was not reclassified because it involved neither the pursuit of military objectives, nor active operations against an enemy. The Review of Veterans’ Entitlements also considered the circumstances of Exercise Ramasoon and concluded that “Forces involved in any peacetime exercise, regardless of the area of the exercise and the presence or otherwise of forces undertaking warlike or non-warlike service, are engaged in peacetime service.”
Some members of this group have sought qualifying service on the basis that they served in a warlike area of operations and that they received the Australian Active Service Medal (AASM) 1945-75 with Clasp ‘Thailand’ and the Returned from Active Service Badge. The Department of Defence advises that these awards for service on Exercise Ramasoon were probably made in error, and that the service should more properly attract the ASM 1945-75 with Clasp ‘South-East Asia’. The ASM 1945-75 recognises service in certain areas in South-East Asia other than warlike service during the period 1955 to 1989.
The award of these medals should not be used as evidence of qualifying or operational service.
Midshipmen undergoing training during the Vietnam War
Where documentation is available to support the applicant's assertion, a Midshipman undergoing training on an allotted vessel in an operational area during the Vietnam War, may be considered to be a member of that ship's company for the purposes of Repatriation benefits, notwithstanding that their service records may reflect a posting to a different unit.
National Servicemen on HMAS Sydney
HMAS Sydney has been allotted for duty for service in the operational area of Malaya (item 2 of Schedule 2, VEA) from 21-28 September 1956 and again from 2-13 October 1956. Those who served on the ship included 203 of the 316 members of the Blaxland II intake of National Servicemen. The Department has not been able to obtain official information identifying which 203 members of the Blaxland II intake were the ones on HMAS Sydney, however those 203 can be considered to be members of the unit comprising HMAS Sydney, meaning they were allotted for duty along with the ship. These members therefore have operational service and qualifying service under the VEA.
Blaxland II national servicemen were administratively under HMAS Penguin even while serving on HMAS Sydney, as were those who did not serve on HMAS Sydney, and as a result their service records do not contain a reference to HMAS Sydney and there is nothing in official records to differentiate between the two groups. Previous determinations in relation to these individuals have depended on evidence such as letters home from HMAS Sydney and certificates from a ‘crossing the equator’ ceremony. Statutory Declarations from those who have already had their presence on HMAS Sydney established can also be considered as evidence in determining whether a member of the Blaxland II intake was present on HMAS Sydney for the purposes of operational and qualifying service.
There was also a Blaxland I intake of national servicemen. It has been established that only certain Blaxland II servicemen had any service on HMAS Sydney.
Ships Delivering Supplies (‘National Tasking’)
In some cases, individuals who served on ships that delivered items to areas in which a declared warlike operation was underway have believed their service on that ship to have been warlike service. In order for a person or ship to have warlike service, they or their unit or ship must have been assigned to the warlike operation through internal Defence processes.
The Department of Defence’s position is that ships that are Australian owned and tasked solely with transporting military or humanitarian stores to areas in which a military operation involving Australian Defence personnel is underway come under the category of ‘national tasking’. This means that the nature of the ship’s interaction with the operation is as a transport ship used in its intended capacity to transport items without any involvement with hostile forces or danger above the norm for shipping activities. In these cases, the ship is not assigned to the operation, and those on the ship are not considered to have served on the operation.
Two ships specifically investigated and found to be in this category are HMAS Tobruk, which transported supplies to East Timor during Operation Warden (but was not assigned to Operation Warden) and HMAS Jervis Bay which transported supplies to East Timor during Operation Tanager (but was not assigned to Operation Tanager). A complicating factor is that members on these vessels may have been awarded service medals for the above activity and/or had the operation recorded on their service record. These cases should be referred to L&SE for discussion with Defence to ascertain whether the member may have other eligibility. If the only involvement with the operation was on the national tasking the member does not have warlike service.
Service in Japan during the Korean War
Japan is not in the Korean War operational area, but Australian units based in Japan during the Korean War were allotted for duty in Korea. Of those allotted, only those who actually entered the operational area comprising Korea and Korean waters have qualifying service, as allotment alone does not provide access to VEA entitlements. Those who do have qualifying service will also have operational service for their period in Korea or Korean waters and from port to port.
Example: HMAS Vengeance
HMAS Vengeance was allotted for duty in Korea from 27 October 1954 to 3 December 1954. The ship travelled from Australia to Japan in order to pick up aircraft and personnel of No. 77 Squadron and transport them back to Australia. During this trip, HMAS Vengeance did not enter the operational area. This means that despite being allotted for duty, service on HMAS Vengeance is not qualifying service as it does not meet the requirement to have also entered the operational area.
While service on HMAS Vengeance is not qualifying service, it is operational service under the VEA, as HMAS Vengeance was assigned for service under section 6D(1) of the VEA via a 1998 instrument. Section 6D(1) provides operational service where an individual or unit was assigned for service in a relevant area. It does not provide qualifying service.
Service in Singapore during the Malayan Emergency (29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957)
Item 2 of Schedule 2 of the VEA sets out the operational area applicable to the Malayan Emergency. The operational area does not include Singapore. Some Australian units stationed in Singapore during the relevant period were allotted for duty in the operational area. However, not all of them entered the operational area and therefore, despite being allotted for duty in the operational area, they do not have qualifying service. Only those who left Singapore and actually entered the operational area have qualifying service.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/allotted-duty
Continuous Full-Time Service
On this page:
- What is Continuous Full-Time Service?
- Who has Continuous Full-Time Service?
- Who does not have Continuous Full-Time Service?
- What eligibility does Continuous Full-Time Service provide?
- How does it relate to Effective Full-Time Service?
- What effect do determinations of Continuous Full-Time Service have?
What is Continuous Full-Time Service?
VEA section 5R(1)(b)
Continuous full-time service under the VEA means service as a permanent member of the Australian Defence Force or the equivalent in the forces of a Commonwealth or allied country. Under MRCA it refers only to service as a full-time reservist for an agreed period.
Who has Continuous Full-Time Service?
Most regular members of the Defence Force (Army, Navy and Air Force) are appointed on a continuous full-time basis and thus meet the criteria for continuous full-time service. In addition, under sections 5R(1) (a) and (b) of the VEA, members of the Forces and civilians who would not otherwise meet the criteria can be deemed by Ministerial Instrument in to be members of the Defence Force who rendered continuous full-time service for a particular period or type of service rendered.
Reservists who elect to serve on a continuous full-time basis
Under the Defence Act 1903, a member of the Reserve Forces may make a voluntary undertaking to serve on a full-time basis for an agreed period and are accepted. Service under such an arrangement meets the definition of continuous full-time service and no Ministerial determination is necessary for the service to be recognised as such.
Regular Army Special Reserve (1940s and 1950s)
Service in the Regular Army Special Reserve, which was a component of the Permanent Military Forces in the 1940s and 1950s, is considered continuous full-time service.
60 and 90 day training camps
Periods spent on 60 and 90-day training camps are not considered continuous full-time service for reservists. However, they are regarded as continuous full-time duty for permanent members of the Defence Force. If a permanent member is called up immediately on the completion of one of these camps and subsequently, without a break in service, renders operational service, the period of the camp is also operational service.
Who does not have Continuous Full-Time Service?
The following groups do not meet the requirement for continuous full-time service:
Members of the citizens forces during World War 2 where service in such forces is not deemed to be continuous full-time service by ministerial instrument; and
persons who serve part-time, (such as members of the Reserve Forces) where such service is not deemed to be continuous full-time service by ministerial instrument.
What eligibility does Continuous Full-Time Service provide?
On its own, continuous full-time service does not confer any eligibility to claim under the VEA. It must always exist in combination with at least one other requirement. Continuous full-time service is a component of a number of different types of service under the VEA.
Continuous full-time service IS required under the VEA for most categories of operational service, for qualifying service in relation to submarine special operations and to Allied and Commonwealth veterans, and for defence service, except for hazardous service and British Nuclear Test Defence Service. In all cases, continuous full-time service is one of only a number of criteria which must be met before a person can be found to have rendered one or more of these types of service.
Continuous full-time service is NOT required under the VEA for peacekeeping service, hazardous service and warlike and non-warlike service. It is also not required for qualifying service except in relation to submarine special operations and Allied and Commonwealth veterans. While qualifying service includes service in an operational area while allotted for duty in that area, it does not require that the service rendered was continuous full-time service.
Under the MRCA, continuous full-time service does not relate to eligibility. It is a term used for the purposes of calculating payment amounts and determining appropriate rehabilitation and transition management.
How does it relate to Effective Full-Time Service?
Effective full-time service is a term used in the VEA in relation to defence service. Effective full-time service is the same as continuous full-time service except that it excludes absences of more than 21 days during which the person is not paid, is absent without leave or undergoing trial or imprisonment for an offence.
What effect do determinations of continuous full-time service have?
Determinations of continuous full-time service under section 5R(1) (b) of the VEA declare that the members or units of the Defence Force that are the subjects of the determinations are to be treated as if they were rendering continuous full-time service, for the purposes of any part of the VEA specified within the determinations. This allows people who would otherwise not have met the continuous full-time service criterion for the specified part of the VEA to be deemed to have met it. They still must also meet any other criteria set out in the relevant part of the VEA before they can be eligible to access benefits and entitlements relating to that part.
People who are the subject of this type of determination are generally members of the Australian Army, Navy and Air Force Reserves.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/continuous-full-time-service
Deemed Members and Declared Members
On this page:
- Deemed Members and Declared Members
- What eligibility does being deemed or declared a member provide?
- Which civilians are currently deemed members of the Defence Force?
- War artists and entertainers from 17 December 2015
- Declared Members under DRCA
Deemed Members and Declared Members
VEA section 5R(1)(a) and (c)
MRCA section 8
Under the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (VEA) and Military Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2004 (MRCA), civilians can be deemed or declared to be members of the Defence Force via Ministerial Determination by the Minister for Defence. Determinations are made in respect of non-members (civilians) who engaged in or performed acts at the request of, for the benefit of, or in relation to the Defence Force, and it is therefore deemed appropriate that they should be regarded as members for the duration of that service.
A determination provides access to entitlements and benefits to these individuals as if they were members of the Australian Defence Force, where all other relevant eligibility criteria are met.
Under the VEA, a person can be deemed to be a member of the Forces rendering continuous full-time service under section 5R(1)(a), or deemed to be a member of the Forces under section 5R(1)(c).
Under the MRCA, a person is made a declared member by determination under section 8.
What eligibility does being deemed or declared a member provide?
World War II
Under the VEA, where a civilian is the subject of a Ministerial determination under section 5R(1)(a) in relation to service during World War II, they will have eligible war service by virtue of that determination alone. This is because all members of the Defence Force on continuous full-time service during World War II have at least eligible war service. Like members of the Forces during World War II, civilians covered by this type of Ministerial determination can have operational and qualifying service if they served outside Australia and incurred danger from hostile forces of the enemy during the period of hostilities.
Post World War II
For service after World War II, a determination deeming a civilian to be a member of the Defence Force under the VEA or declaring a civilian to be a member under the MRCA does not of itself entitle the civilian to benefits under those Acts. In order to qualify for benefits, the civilian, like members of the Defence Force, must also:
Under the VEA: have warlike or non-warlike service, or have been allotted for duty in an operational area. To be allotted for duty a person must have either been named in an instrument of allotment or there must be evidence that they were attached to a unit of the Defence Force that was named in an instrument of allotment.
Under the MRCA: have defence service. (For war artists and entertainers this is limited to defence service before 17 December 2015). In the case of declared members, it is most likely that determinations will only have been made in cases where this criterion is met, which in effect means that there are no further requirements under the MRCA beyond a declared member determination.
Which civilians are currently deemed members of the Defence Force?
Civilians who have in the past been found to meet the above requirements include, but are not limited to:
Members of certain Philanthropic Organisations (as defined in relevant legislative instruments),
Artists and photographers commissioned to do work for the Australian Defence Force or Australian War Memorial (as defined in relevant legislative instruments), and
Certain entertainers and their support teams (under the MRCA until 17 December 2015 only).
It is important to note that civilian entertainers who provided entertainment to Australian personnel serving in historical overseas conflicts are not covered under the VEA and should not be granted any entitlements under that Act. Depending on the terms of their contracts, these entertainers may be covered under the SRCA, with any claims administered by Comcare.
War artists and entertainers from 17 December 2015
In December 2015, the Minister for Employment issued the Safety, Rehabilitation and Compensation (Definition of Employee - War artists and Entertainers) Notice 2015 with effect from 17 December 2015. From this date, war artists and entertainers who support the ADF on operations, and who are not already covered by another compensation scheme, are covered under the SRCA, with any claims administered by Comcare. This does not apply to accredited representatives of registered charities, persons holding honorary rank, etc., who continue to be covered under the MRCA.
Declared Members under DRCA
Section 5(3) of DRCA provides that the Minister for Veterans’ Affairs can make a determination to declare certain civilians to be members of the ADF for the purpose of compensation coverage under DRCA. Information on the classes of civilians covered can be found in the DRCA library.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/deemed-members-and-declared-members
Hazardous Service
On this page:
- What is hazardous service?
- Future hazardous service
- How does it differ from other service?
- What eligibility does hazardous service provide?
What is hazardous service?
VEA section 120(7)
Hazardous service is service under the VEA of a kind determined by the Minister of Defence in writing via instrument to be hazardous service.
Service determined to be hazardous generally involves activities exposing individuals or units to a degree of hazard above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty, such as mine avoidance and clearance, weapons inspections and destruction, Defence Force aid to civil power, Service protected or assisted evacuations and other operations requiring the application of minimum force to effect the protection of personnel or property, or other like activities.
Future Hazardous Service
Hazardous service is essentially a historical nature of service classification which applied prior to the introduction of the current classification system introduced in 1997. From that time, new operations have been determined as either warlike or non-warlike as warranted. Operations that meet the definition of hazardous service also fit within the definition of non-warlike service. As a result, operations that would previously have been declared hazardous service are instead declared non-warlike service. It is therefore anticipated that there will be no further determinations of hazardous service in the future.
How does it differ from other service?
Hazardous service differs from other similar types of service (such as non-warlike and peacekeeping service) in that the ‘occurrence’ head of liability does not apply to claims for compensation for injury, disease or death connected to hazardous service. However, as with peacekeeping and non-warlike service, there is coverage for a death, injury or disease that arose out of, or was attributable to hazardous service, resulted from an accident during hazardous service, would not have occurred or been contracted but for the hazardous service, or was contributed to in a material degree or aggravated by the hazardous service.
The period of time associated with aggravation of a condition also differs for hazardous service: in the case of peacekeeping and defence service, the period of service that contributed to the aggravation must have been 6 months or longer, while there is no such requirement for hazardous service.
What eligibility does hazardous service provide?
Hazardous service provides access to compensation for injury, disease and death relating to that service via Part IV of the VEA, under the more generous ‘reasonable hypothesis’ test and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof.
Hazardous service does not meet the requirements for qualifying service so it does not provide access to service pension.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/hazardous-service
Non-Warlike Service
On this page:
- Non-Warlike Service
- What kinds of service are declared Non-Warlike?
- What eligibility does Non-Warlike service provide?
- What does it mean to be assigned for service on a Non-Warlike operation?
- Future Operations
Non-Warlike Service
VEA section 5C(1)
MRCA section 6(1)(b)
Non-warlike service is a service type that applies to both the VEA and MRCA. It is service determined by the Minister for Defence to be non-warlike, in the form of a legislative instrument.
What kinds of service are declared Non-Warlike?
The types of service that the Minister has determined to be non-warlike operations are generally those military activities short of warlike operations where there is a risk associated with the assigned tasks and where the application of force is limited to self-defence. Casualties could occur but are not expected. These operations encompass but are not limited to hazardous activities that involve a higher degree of hazard than normal peacetime duty (for example, mine clearance), Peacekeeping operations in which military personnel help restore and maintain peace with the consent of all parties but do not have the power of enforcement, and activities involving the provision of humanitarian relief other than normal peacetime operations such as cyclone or earthquake relief flights or assistance.
What eligibility does Non-Warlike service provide?
Non-warlike service provides eligibility to claim for compensation for injury, disease and death under both the VEA and MRCA, using the more generous standard of proof. It is not considered qualifying service and therefore does not provide access to service pension. Under the VEA, non-warlike service is a sub-set of operational service.
If an operation is declared non-warlike, for a person to access benefits and entitlements associated with non-warlike service it only needs to be shown that the person or the person’s unit was assigned for service on the operation.
What does it mean to be assigned for service on a Non-Warlike operation?
In the context of non-warlike service, the term assigned for service refers to the Defence Force process by which a person or their unit is allocated to a military operation. In order to determine whether a person has non-warlike service from an operation that has been declared to be non-warlike, their service record needs to show that they or their unit was assigned for service on that operation.
This assigned for service requirement is not as strict as the allotment process. The only requirement is that the Department of Defence provide evidence that the member was assigned. No formal instrument is required.
Future Operations
Since 1997, declarations of non-warlike service and warlike service have been the preferred approach to determining operational service under the VEA. Declarations of non-warlike and warlike service have the advantage of not requiring legislative amendment and referring to a type of service recognised under both the VEA and the MRCA. It is expected that into the future, operations will either be declared warlike or non-warlike. Operations not classified as warlike or non-warlike since 1997 are regarded as peacetime service.
All warlike and non-warlike operations since the introduction of the MRCA in 2004 receive two declarations, one under the VEA and one under the MRCA. This is because income support and certain other benefits are still provided through the VEA, while compensation for injury, illness or death is mostly provided through the MRCA for operations from 1 July 2004 onwards.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/non-warlike-service
Peacekeeping Force
VEA section 68(1)
On this page:
- What is a Peacekeeping Force?
- Who can serve with a Peacekeeping Force?
- What eligiblity does service with a Peacekeeping Force provide?
- Future Peacekeeping Operations
Peacekeeping Force
This term relates to peacekeeping service under the VEA. In order for a person to have rendered peacekeeping service, they must have served as a member of a Peacekeeping Force. This is generally only applicable up to about 1997 when warlike and non-warlike service were introduced, as operations that meet the definition of peacekeeping service also fit within the definition of non-warlike service. This means that from that point onwards, operations that would have previously been declared peacekeeping service are instead declared non-warlike service. It is therefore anticipated that there will be no further declarations of Peacekeeping Forces in the future.
What is a Peacekeeping Force?
A Peacekeeping Force includes those set out in Schedule 3 of the VEA, and any further Peacekeeping Forces designated in writing by the Minister (via a notice published in the Gazette).
The intention (as described in section 68(1) of the VEA) is that a force will be designated as a Peacekeeping Force if it is raised for service outside Australia in a peacekeeping capacity or in a monitoring or observation capacity in a situation that may lead to an outbreak of hostilities.
A general rule of thumb is that a Peacekeeping Force involves military personnel, without powers of enforcement, who help restore and maintain peace in an area of conflict with the consent of all parties. These operations can encompass but are not limited to:
activities short of Peace Enforcement where the authorisation of the application of force is normally limited to minimum force necessary for self-defence;
activities, such as the enforcement of sanctions in a relatively benign environment which expose individuals or units to ‘hazards’ as described above;
military observer activities with the task of monitoring cease-fires, redirecting and alleviating cease-fire tensions, providing ‘good offices’ for negotiations and the impartial verification of assistance or cease-fire agreements, and other like activities; or
activities that would normally involve the provision of humanitarian relief (not including normal peacetime operations such as cyclone or earthquake relief flights or assistance).
Who can serve with a Peacekeeping Force?
Anyone who has been appointed or allocated to a Peacekeeping Force and has actually served outside Australia in that Peacekeeping Force, either as an Australian member of the Peacekeeping Force or a member of the Australian Contingent of the Peacekeeping Force, meets the criteria for having served with the Peacekeeping Force. This is not limited to members of the Australian Defence Force, but can also include members of the Australian Federal Police as well as officers seconded from State and Territory Police forces who serve with relevant Peacekeeping Forces.
However, Australian employees of the United Nations Organisation or of private or government welfare organisation during a peacekeeping mission are neither part of an Australian contingent nor members of a Peacekeeping Force.
Currently, those declared to be members of a Peacekeeping Force include mainly members of the Australian Defence Force and members of Federal, State and Territory Police.
What eligibility does service with a Peacekeeping Force provide?
Under the VEA, peacekeeping service provides eligibility broadly similar to that of operational service. This includes access to compensation for injury, disease and death and associated services relating to that peacekeeping service, under the more generous ‘reasonable hypothesis’ test and ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. Like operational service, it also provides access to Non Liability Health Care treatment for cancer (malignant neoplasm) and pulmonary tuberculosis in addition to the mental health treatment available to all current and former serving members with one or more days of continuous full-time service. Under the MRCA, service that meets the description of VEA peacekeeping service is considered non-warlike service and attracts similar compensation entitlements.
As peacekeeping service does not meet the requirements for qualifying service, it does not provide eligibility for the service pension.
Future Peacekeeping Operations
Since the introduction of warlike and non-warlike service in 1997, operations that meet the definition of peacekeeping service also fit within the definition of non-warlike service. As a result, operations that would previously have been declared peacekeeping service are instead declared non-warlike service. It is therefore anticipated that there will be no further declarations of Peacekeeping Forces in the future.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/peacekeeping-force
Warlike Service
On this page:
- Warlike service
- What kinds of service are declared Warlike?
- What eligibility does Warlike Service provide?
- What does it mean to be assigned for service on a Warlike operation?
- Future Operations
Warlike service
VEA section 5C(1)
MRCA section 6(1)(a)
Warlike service is a service type found under both the VEA and MRCA. It is service determined to be warlike by the Minister for Defence. A determination takes the form of a legislative instrument and can be made in relation to past, current and future operations.
What kinds of service are declared Warlike?
The types of service that the Minister has determined to be warlike operations are generally those military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties. Such operations can encompass but are not limited to:
- a state of declared war;
- conventional combat operations against an armed adversary; and
- peace enforcement operations.
What eligibility does Warlike Service provide?
Warlike service is qualifying service under the VEA and provides access to the service pension, where all relevant criteria are met. It is also operational service under the VEA and defence service under the MRCA, which means it provides eligibility to claim for compensation for injury, disease and death under both the VEA and MRCA, using the more generous beyond reasonable doubt standard of proof.
If an operation is declared warlike, for a person to access benefits and entitlements associated with warlike service it only needs to be shown that the person or the person’s unit was assigned for service on the operation.
What does it mean to be assigned for service on a Warlike operation?
In the context of warlike service, the term assigned for service refers to the Defence Force process by which a person or their unit is allocated to a military operation. In order to determine whether a person has warlike service from an operation that has been declared to be warlike, their service record needs to show that they or their unit was assigned for service on that operation.
This assigned for service requirement is not as strict as the allotment process. The only requirement is that the Department of Defence provide evidence that the member was assigned. No formal instrument is required.
Service in Vietnam Southern Zone
There is a Declaration of Warlike Service for those who served in Vietnam (Southern Zone) between 12 January 1973 and 29 April 1975. As this was not a single operation, those who come under this Declaration may have their service in Vietnam (Southern Zone) recorded in a number of different ways.
An example of one of the units which served in South Vietnam during this period is Headquarters Richmond Detachment S. This unit was an RAAF air transport detachment established to provide humanitarian assistance to the South Vietnamese Government prior to the North Vietnamese entry into Saigon in late April 1975. The detachment operated primarily from Saigon and was initially based there, relocating to Bangkok as the security situation deteriorated. The detachment was constituted at short notice due to the urgency of the situation, which means records are lacking. However, Defence has advised that a reference to 'HQRICDETS' in service records is to be taken as confirmation that a person served in South Vietnam with Detachment S.
Future Operations
Since 1997, declarations of warlike service have replaced the use of allotment for duty in operational areas. Declarations of warlike service have the advantage of not requiring legislative amendment and referring to a type of service recognised under both the VEA and the MRCA. It is expected that most future operations will be declared warlike or non-warlike only.
All warlike and non-warlike operations since the introduction of the MRCA in 2004 receive two declarations, one under the VEA and one under the MRCA. This is because income support is still provided through the VEA, while compensation for injury, illness or death is mostly provided through the MRCA for operations from 1 July 2004 onwards.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/warlike-service
Glossary
This page contains a short overview of each of the following service types:
- Qualifying Service
- Operational Service
- Hazardous Service
- Peacekeeping Service
- Non-Warlike Service
- Warlike Service
- Defence Service
- British Nuclear Test Defence Service
- Peacetime Service
- Eligible War Service
Qualifying Service is the type of service required to access income support payments under the VEA. Qualifying service during World Wars I and II was generally service where a person engaged in operations against the enemy and, while doing so, incurred danger from hostile forces of the enemy. Post-World War II qualifying service is broadly equivalent service, but the test is not applied individually (except in the case of Allied and Commonwealth Veterans) and instead service in certain areas during certain periods, or on certain operations (such as Submarine Special Operations), is formally determined to meet similar criteria. This takes the form of allotment for duty in operational areas included in Schedule 2 of the VEA, and from 1997, declarations of warlike service. All warlike service (before or after the introduction of the MRCA on 1 July 2004) is qualifying service. Members of the Australian Defence Force, certain civilians, and certain veterans who served with the forces of Allied and Commonwealth countries can have qualifying service. Requirements for qualifying service are set out in section 7A of the VEA.
Operational Service is required for access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part II of the VEA, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. It also provides access to Non Liability Health Care (NLHC) treatment for cancer and tuberculosis over and above the mental health treatment standardly provided through NHLC provisions. Operational service includes warlike and non-warlike service and other service that is broadly equivalent in nature to warlike and non-warlike service, and is set out in sections 6 to 6F and Schedule 2 of the VEA. While some operational service is also considered qualifying service, there are also a number of instances of operational service which do not meet the requirements for qualifying service. With only very few exceptions, only members of the Australian Defence Force and certain civilians can have operational service.
Hazardous service is service specifically determined to be hazardous by the Minister for Defence via an instrument under section 120(7) of the VEA. It is one of the types of service that provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part IV of the VEA, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. Determinations of hazardous service have historically usually been made in relation to service during peacetime that involves activities exposing individuals or units to a degree of hazard above and beyond that of normal peacetime duty. This can include things such as mine avoidance and clearance, weapons inspections and destruction, Defence Force aid to civil power, Service protected or assisted evacuations and other operations requiring the application of minimum force to effect the protection of personnel or property, or other like activities. For more detailed information see hazardous service.
Peacekeeping service is service with a Peacekeeping Force that has been described in Schedule 3 of the VEA (up to 1994) or designated by the Minister by formal declaration under section 68(1) of the VEA. A force is generally designated as a Peacekeeping Force if it is raised for service outside Australia in a peacekeeping capacity or in a monitoring or observation capacity in a situation that may lead to an outbreak of hostilities. To be considered a member of a designated Peacekeeping Force, an individual must have been appointed or allocated to the Force. Since the introduction of warlike and non-warlike service in 1997, operations which by their nature could be described as peacekeeping have instead typically been classified as non-warlike service. This has continued to apply since the MRCA commenced in 2004. Peacekeeping service is one of the types of service that provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part IV of the VEA, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. For further information see Peacekeeping Force.
Non-warlike service is a service type that applies to both the VEA and MRCA. It is service determined by the Minister for Defence to be non-warlike, in the form of a legislative instrument, under section 5C(1) of the VEA and/or section 6(1)(b) of the MRCA. Under the VEA it is also considered operational service. Non-warlike service generally involves military activities short of warlike operations where there is a risk associated with the assigned tasks and where the application of force is limited to self-defence. Non-warlike service provides access to compensation for injury, disease or death under Part II of the VEA or Chapter 4 of the MRCA, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. For more information see non-warlike service.
Warlike service is a service type that applies to both the VEA and MRCA. It is service determined by the Minister for Defence to be warlike, in the form of a legislative instrument, under section 5C(1) of the VEA and/or section 6(1)(a) of the MRCA. It generally involves military activities where the application of force is authorised to pursue specific military objectives and there is an expectation of casualties. Warlike service provides access to compensation for injury, disease or death under Part II of the VEA for service before 1 July 2004 or under Chapter 4 of the MRCA for service from 1 July 2004, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. It also provides access to income support under Part III of the VEA, for service both before and after 1 July 2004. Warlike service is considered to be both operational service and qualifying service under the VEA. For more information see warlike service.
Defence service under section 68(1) of the VEA includes certain effective full-time service of three years or more during peacetime (mostly limited to service before 7 April 1994). Hazardous Service and British Nuclear Test Defence Service are also considered defence service. Defence service that is not hazardous service or British Nuclear Test Defence Service provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part IV of the VEA, using the civil standard of proof, also known as ‘balance of probabilities’. Defence service is also a term used by the MRCA, with a separate and unrelated meaning. As described under section 6(1)(d) of the MRCA, defence service refers to all types of service covered by the MRCA.
British Nuclear Test defence service is a type of service under the VEA specifically limited to service during nuclear testing undertaken by the British in Australia and on islands off the mainland of Australia in the 1950s and early 1960s. British Nuclear Test Defence Service is described in section 69B of the VEA. It is one of the types of service that provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part IV of the VEA, using the more generous ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ standard of proof. It has no equivalent under the MRCA, as it is specific to a point in time not covered by that Act.
Peacetime service is a type of service set out under section 6(1)(c) of the MRCA. It encompasses all service recognised under the MRCA that is not considered to be warlike or non-warlike, and provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under the MRCA using the civil standard of proof, also known as ‘balance of probabilities’.
Eligible war service is described in section 7 of the VEA. It generally includes operational service as well as certain non-operational service within Australia and as an Australian Mariner during World Wars I and II. While operational service is considered to be eligible war service, it is possible for service to be eligible war service but not operational service. There is no equivalent MRCA service type as it is tailored to the unique conditions of the two World Wars, which are not covered by the MRCA. Eligible war service that is not also operational service provides access to compensation for service-related injury, disease or death under Part II of the VEA using the civil standard of proof, also known as ‘balance of probabilities’.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/understanding-service-eligibility-instruments/glossary
Historical Information
This chapter contains historical information relating to military operations and legislative change.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/historical-information
Part 1 Military History
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/historical-information/part-1-military-history
Ch 1 World War I
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i
S 1 Allied Countries
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-1-allied-countries
S 2 Gallipoli
Introduction
On 29 and 30 October 1914, the Ottoman Empire bombarded Russian ports in the Black Sea. Russia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on 1 November and Britain followed on 5 November. In early January 1915, Russia asked Britain for help to relieve Turkish pressure in the Caucasus. The British response was to attempt to force the straits of the Taradiddles which were like a long winding river between the narrow rugged Gallipoli peninsula and the neighbouring slopes of Asia Minor. The straits eventually opened into the Sea of Marmona at whose other end was the straits of Bosphorus which led to the Black Sea. On the straits was Constantinople, capital of the Ottoman Empire. The naval attempt to force the Dardanelles on 18 March was called off after the lost of three Battleships. The military were then given the task of securing the Gallipoli peninsula.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli
1.Anzac Landing
Dawn on Gallipoli Peninsula on Sunday 25 April 1915 was due at 4.05 am. The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps began landing in the inky darkness just before dawn at what was to become known as Anzac Cove. Further to the south, at the toe of the peninsula, the British 29th Division was also landing. In a diversionary attack the French landed some troops south of the entrance to the Dardanelles.
The 3rd Australian Brigade had been selected to land first and was told that there was open land between the beach and the comparatively low ridge that it would have to climb. However, the brigade landed a mile north of Gaba Tepe and the troops found themselves at the foot of a very steep, almost precipitous, 300 foot high hill. Stopping only for their breath, the Australians, who by this time were being fired on by the Turks, began the difficult climb to the summit which was quickly captured. The summit was found to be a small plateau, later named Plugge's Plateau, with its further edge also a very steep slope into a deep and tortuous valley rising to a second, slightly higher ridge 600 yards away. Hidden behind this second ridge was a third ridge which was the principal Australian objective for that first morning.
Six Turkish divisions were stationed on Gallipoli but most of these forces were in reserve. Only one Turkish battalion defended the coast where the Australians landed and despite the confusion caused by landing at the wrong beach and the subsequent intermixing of units, small parties of Australians began moving rapidly inland across difficult country. The first ridge was completely occupied shortly after sunrise and the Australians were moving across the second ridge and had reached the third ridge by 7 am. Two scouts of the 10th Battalion, Private A S Blackburn (who would win the VC at Pozieres in 1916) and Lance Corporal Robin, scouted Scrubby Knoll on the Third Ridge just as the first Turkish reserves were arriving. The Australian Official Historian, C E W Bean, credits Blackburn and Robin as coming nearer to the objective of the expedition than any other soldiers whose movements are known.
On the left of the perimeter, Australians reached the Nek by 8 am and then pushed forward, first to Baby 700 and then to the slopes of Battleship Hill. The next crest on this ridge was Chunuk Bair, the principal Australian objective for the first day. The Australians on Battleship Hill were so exposed that they had to withdraw to Baby 700. Throughout the morning and most of the afternoon a tense battle was fought with unsurpassed courage on both sides with the summit of Baby 700 changing hands no less than five times. Between 4.30 pm and 5 pm Turkish counter-attacks along the entire front forced the Australians back with Baby 700 being lost for the last time. By evening the Australian position was in jeopardy.
Australian and New Zealand reinforcements landed throughout the day but instead of a 4 mile front driven 1 1/2 miles inland, the troops were clinging to a foothold on the second ridge just half a mile inland on a front of one mile. Over 2000 casualties were suffered on the first day. Realising that the landing had achieved much less than had been intended, General Bridges, commanding the 1st Australian Division, after a conference with General Godley, commanding the New Zealand and Australian Division, recommended to the Anzac Corps Commander, General Birdwood that withdrawal be considered. Birdwood, at first shocked at the suggestion, passed it on to the Expeditionary Force commander, General Hamilton, who wrote back to Birdwood that there is nothing for it but to dig yourselves right in and stick it out.
Nightfall on 25 April brought one of the rare wet spells of the whole campaign. The Turkish batteries ceased firing and the Turkish rifle and machine gun fire became relatively harmless. After being pinned down all day, the Australians were now able to stand up and dig trenches to provide protection. Both sides continued all night and several Turkish assaults in the dark were defeated. The expected major counter-attack at dawn on Monday, 26 April did not materialise since the Turks, who had lost very heavily, were as exhausted as the invaders. On the third day, 27 April, a general counter-attack by Turkish reinforcements was broken up by guns from the warships off-shore when they attacked down the exposed slopes of Baby 700.
The Anzac Corps bridgehead was firmly established by the end of April with the left third of the front held by the New Zealand and Australian Division and the remainder of the front held by the 1st Australian Division. On the night of 5 May, the New Zealand and the 2nd Australian Brigades moved to Helles to support a major attack towards Krithia. On 8 May, the 2nd Australian Brigade lost 1000 men in an hour for the gain of just 500 yards. The two Anzac brigades returned to Anzac Cove in mid May. At Anzac Cove, the fighting crystallised into trench warfare with snipers a constant danger. On 14 May, General Birdwood was grazed on the head by a deflected bullet and the following day, General Bridges was mortally wounded.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/1anzac-landing
2. May 19
Ever since the landing, the two central sections of the Anzac line were deluged with a constant hail of rifle fire. The fire almost ceased on 18 May and the unaccustomed silence aroused suspicions which were soon confirmed by naval aircraft which detected Turkish troops massing for an attack. Four Turkish divisions, with 42 battalions and over 30000 men, attacked the Anzac lines in the early hours of 19 May. The attack, although badly co-ordinated in that it hit different Anzac positions at different times, was exceedingly brave and persistent. Line after line of Turks were cut down and they were only successful in entering the Anzac lines at one corner of Courtney's Post. This section of trench was single-handedly recaptured by Lance Corporal Albert Jacka of the 14th Australian Battalion who bayoneted two Turks and shot another five. Jacka won the first Victoria Cross awarded to an Australian in the 1914-18 War.
The Turkish losses were estimated at 10000 men of whom 3000 were killed. Anzac losses were only 628 hit and included Private John Simpson Kirkpatrick of the 3rd Field Ambulance who was killed by shellfire while evacuating a wounded man on his donkey. Such were the casualties that a short informal truce was held on 20 May to collect the wounded. A formal truce was organised for 24 May and from 7.30 am to 4.30 pm burial parties worked between the lines with each side interring the dead found in its half of no-man's land. The truce was honourably observed although both sides took the opportunity to thoroughly survey the territory held by their opponents.
In June and July, the British and French, despite improved artillery support, had little success in attacks towards Achi Baba. At Anzac Cove, the troops were never away from shellfire and had practically no chance to rest. Some battalions were taken, one at a time, to Imbross Island but only for 3 to 6 days rest. Until late in the campaign no regular canteen and no Red Cross stores reached Anzac Cove. The nights were pestilential with fleas and there was no delousing apparatus for lice. By the end of July, there were 25000 men at Anzac Cove but 200 sick were being evacuated each day.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/2-may-19
3. August Offensive
The final attempt to seize the Dardanelles took place in August. The main attack was to be made by the New Zealand and Australian Division which was to capture the heart of the Turkish position, Chunuk Bair which was accessible and undefended. A series of Turkish outposts on the northern Anzac flank were seized after the fall of darkness on 6 August and two columns, one New Zealand and the other the 4th Australian Brigade, left Anzac to approach Chunuk Bair using separate routes. The Australian column lost its way in the maze of ravines and the New Zealand column halted for four hours waiting for one of its lost units. The delay was to have tragic consequences; the New Zealanders were not in position to support the Australian attack on the Nek and by the time the New Zealanders moved, the Turks had brought up reinforcements to defend Chunuk Bair. The fight for Chunuk Bair continued until 10 August when a Turkish counter attack pushed the New Zealand and British troops from Chunuk Bair to a lower spur.
In support of the thrust towards Chunuk Bair, diversionary operations were planned for Helles, Suvla Bay and Anzac Cove. The first diversion was at Helles on the afternoon of 6 August. The British attacked at The Vineyard where heavy hand-to-hand fighting raged for a number of days. The British IX Corps landed against negligible resistance at Suvla Bay, north of Anzac Cove on 7 August and then remained on the beaches for 36 hours. By the time the order to advance was given, Turkish reinforcements had arrived. After suffering 8000 casualties on 9 and 10 August, the British occupied positions only marginally different from those held at daybreak on 7 August.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/3-august-offensive
4. Lone Pine
At Anzac Cove, the 1st Australian Division was given the perilous task of attacking Lone Pine, justifiably considered as one of the strongest Turkish positions. The Turks had shown considerable ingenuity in making it almost impregnable. The plans for the Australian attack were laid with thoroughness, skill and imagination. Shortly before dusk on 6 August, an Australian assault succeeded in capturing the Turkish trenches. Turkish reserves were rushed to Lone Pine and the long Turkish attempt to retake the trenches by bombing began. From dark on 6 August until the night of 9 August a terrible exchange of handmade bombs went on almost continuously, flaring up four times into many hours of desperate fighting when successive Turkish reinforcements were thrown in. In four days, six Australian battalions lost 80 officers and 2197 men. Seven Australians were awarded the Victoria Cross.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/4-lone-pine
5. The Nek
Chunuk Bair was expected to be taken by dawn on 7 August so that the attacking troops could then mount an attack back towards Anzac Cove. The dismounted 8th (Victorian) and 10th (West Australian) Light Horse Regiments were to attack towards Chunuk Bair by assaulting the formidable position at the Nek. Such an attack was considered hopeless unless aided by the troops attacking from Chunuk Bair and by the seizure of three Turkish positions adjacent to the Nek. As the time for the assault approached, the adjacent positions were still held by the Turks and the New Zealanders were still approaching the summit of Chunuk Bair. It was decided that something had to be done to help the New Zealanders approaching Chunuk Bair and that the attack on the Nek was to go ahead primarily as a feint to keep the Turks off Chunuk Bair. The attack was made by four lines, each of 150 men. Tragically the preceding bombardment ceased seven minutes prior to the attack. 234 Light Horsemen were killed and 138 were wounded in an area no larger than a tennis court.
On 10 August, the allies faced the fact that the August offensive had failed. In four days of fighting at Anzac Cove, Australian and British troops had suffered 12000 casualties. The bridgeheads of Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay were connected only by a thin strip of foreshore and on 21 August and again on 27 August attacks were made to improve this junction. The 2nd Australian Division commenced landing at Anzac Cove in mid August and some of its troops were involved in the fighting on 27 August. With the failure of the August battles, the future of the campaign was questioned. London received a number of criticisms of the conduct of the campaign including Keith Murdoch's colourful and partially inaccurate but influential report. By the end of October military opinion favoured evacuation and after five weeks of hesitation, the British government decided on withdrawal on 7 December.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/5-nek
6. Evacuation
Even before London made its decision, preparations began at Gallipoli for the evacuation. The forces at Anzac Cove were reduced to 36000 men and 97 guns and those at Suvla Bay to 41000 men and 91 guns. The troops were told that preparations for winter and the severe blizzard in late November were responsible for these reductions while the Turks were deceived by the seeming normality. Once the order to evacuate was received, troops, stores and guns were withdrawn each night with the number of troops at each front being reduced to 20000 men. These men, 10000 on each night, were to be withdrawn on the nights of 18/19 and 19/20 December. The evacuation on 18/19 December was successful without the Turks being alerted and just 10000 men remained for the last day at both Anzac Cove and Suvla Bay. The final evacuation began after dark on 19 December with 4100 men leaving their posts at nightfall. In order to deceive the Turks it was decided to hold all the front line posts, however lightly, until the last possible moment which at Anzac Cove was 1.30 am after which the front was gradually uncovered. The last party left Anzac Cove at 4.10 am and Suvla Bay at 5.10 am. Two Australians were wounded at Anzac Cove and casualties at Suvla Bay were negligible. On the night of 8 January 1916, the British withdrew from Helles, also with negligible casualties.
During the campaign 7600 Australians and 2500 New Zealanders were killed and 19000 Australians and 5000 New Zealanders wounded. French casualties were nearly as great as the Australians and British casualties were three times as great.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-2-gallipoli/6-evacuation
S 3 The Somme 1916
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-3-somme-1916
1. The Somme
By the middle of 1916, massive German and French armies had been locked in battle on the Western Front for nearly two years. In August 1914, the British had sent a small expeditionary force to assist France. The British regulars were supplemented by Territorial forces in 1915, but it was not until mid-1916 that the armies raised by Kitchener, after the commencement of hostilities, were ready for battle. In early 1916 the Germans had attacked the French forces at Verdun, not just to gain ground but to grind the French into submission by attrition. The French resisted and held their ground at great cost. However, French forces were so heavily committed to defending Verdun that the French-British summer offensive became a British offensive with some French support.
The 1916 summer offensive was preceded by a week long artillery barrage. The original attack date was put back from 29 June until 1 July because of bad weather and misgivings about the success of the artillery. 1 July 1916 was bright and cloudless, perfect conditions for defenders whose positions had in many cases withstood the artillery barrage. At 7.30 am, 120,000 British infantry commenced their attack across no-mans-land. The attack was repulsed with massive casualties. In the greatest tragedy in British military history, 60,000 British soldiers were killed, wounded or missing. The losses on 1 July 1916 have never been forgotten and have eclipsed the remainder of the battle that continued for five months.
The Anzacs, after being withdrawn from Gallipoli, returned to Egypt for rest and retraining. The seven Australian infantry brigades were expanded to twelve and the 4th and 5th Australian Divisions joined the 1st and 2nd Divisions. A fifth Australian division, the 3rd, was formed in Australia and would not see action in 1916. The structure of the AIF after the reorganisation was as follows:
Brigade | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion | Battalion |
1st Division | ||||
1st Brigade | 1st | 2nd | 3rd | 4th |
2nd Brigade | 5th | 6th | 7th | 8th |
3rd Brigade | 9th | 10th | 11th | 12th |
2nd Division | ||||
5th Brigade | 17th | 18th | 19th | 20th |
6th Brigade | 21st | 22nd | 23rd | 24th |
7th Brigade | 25th | 26th | 27th | 28th |
3rd Division | ||||
9th Brigade | 33rd | 34th | 35th | 36th |
10th Brigade | 37th | 38th | 39th | 40th |
11th Brigade | 41st | 42nd | 43rd | 44th |
4th Division | ||||
4th Brigade | 13th | 14th | 15th | 16th |
12th Brigade | 45th | 46th | 47th | 48th |
13th Brigade | 49th | 50th | 51st | 52nd |
5th Division | ||||
8th Brigade | 29th | 30th | 31st | 32nd |
14th Brigade | 53rd | 54th | 55th | 56th |
15th Brigade | 57th | 58th | 59th | 60th |
In March 1916, the Australian divisions in Egypt began moving to France and were initially stationed at Armentieres, a quiet sector near the Belgium border. On 7 July, the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions were ordered to move to the Somme. The Official Australian Historian, C E W Bean, writing after the war, said the fighting on the Somme was the hardest experienced by the Australians in France.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-3-somme-1916/1-somme
2. Fromelles
Before the first Australian attack was launched on the Somme, Australians were to suffer severe losses as a direct consequence of the battle. Forces holding the rest of the British line were ordered to pin down the German divisions on their front in order to prevent the enemy reinforcing the Somme. A major feint was planned for Armentieres and was conducted by the 5th Australian Division and the British 61st Division. In the battle of Fromelles, on 19 July, the Australians managed at great cost to seize part of the German trenches but by the night of 20 July the position was so perilous that they were withdrawn. The 5th Australian Division lost 5533 men in less than 24 hours and was unable to be used for offensive action for many months.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-3-somme-1916/2-fromelles
3. Poziers
The next major British attack on the Somme, on 14 July, achieved some fairly deep gains into the German lines but again failed to achieve a break-through. The Germans still held Pozieres which was strung out along the old Roman highway from Amiens to Bapaume. The village was a an well-defended outpost in front of a German defence works known as the OG Lines, an immensely strong system comprising two parallel trenches which ran along the crest of Pozieres ridge about 500 yards behind the village. The Australians were given the task of taking Pozieres village. The attack was preceded by a thorough bombardment which methodically pounded the village and the OG Lines for several days. The bombardment stripped away the trees that screened the village and the few broken walls that remained became more visible. The final bombardment began at dusk and, occurring before the moon had risen, was visible for 20 miles around. At 12.30 am on Sunday, 23 July, the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the 1st Australian Division attacked. The advance succeeded in reaching the main road through the village. The Germans counter-attacked at dawn but were defeated by machine-gun fire.
The Australians captured all their objectives except for the OG Lines where the trenches and the area surrounding them were so cratered by shellfire that the troops had difficulty locating their objective. The front trench, OG1, and the support line 100-200 yards to the east, OG2, were in some places untraceable and in others merely a depression among the holes and mounds. However, the area contained deep dug-outs which held German garrisons skilled in the use of grenades and supported by efficient machine-gunners. In a drawn-out struggle, Pte John Leak and Lt A S Blackburn won the Victoria Cross. OG1 was captured and held but OG2 was unable to be found. During daylight on 23 July, the forward troops deepened their new trenches and that night a reinforcing battalion pushed through and secured most of the remainder of the village.
The pressure on the Somme forced the Germans to diminish their attacks on Verdun and was materially wearing down the German Army. The Germans were being strained on the Somme but the British were was not immediately in a position to launch a major offensive. While the British were building up men and supplies in the rear, the Germans were to be kept under pressure by constant local assaults. The Australian task was to take Pozieres ridge. However, Pozieres being a key position, the German staff was determined that it should be regained. Three early attempts failed and at 7 am on 24 July, as soon as the loss of the village was certain, the Australian position was methodically bombarded. The Germans still held parts of two trench systems along the western edge of Pozieres, and the OG Lines east of the village. The Australians were to attack at night so that the Germans would be unable to see the assault forming and therefore unable to concentrate their artillery and machine-guns.
On the night of 24/25 July 1916 the Australian troops marched up for an attack on a crest where most landmarks had been pounded out of recognition. Only one of the two assaulting battalions for the attack against the OG Lines was in position by zero hour and only after a difficult search in confusion and uproar did the battalion find its objective. The Germans counter-attacked and only a portion of the trenches captured were retained after a furious bomb-fight. On the western side of Pozieres, a brilliant advance seized the German trenches and Pozieres cemetery. The German bombardment on 25 July increased in weight in preparation for an attempt to retake Pozieres. The attack was to be launched at 4.30 pm but the fresh German regiment was already worn out from that morning's bomb-fight in the OG Lines, the repeated changes of orders by the German staff and the dreadful approaches under artillery fire. After many reports that the task was hopeless the German order to attack was countermanded. However, the 1st Australian Division after three days' bombardment was also exhausted. The division had lost 5285 officers and men and was relieved by the 2nd Division.
The 2nd Division's attack on Pozieres ridge began at 12.15 am on 29 July. German artillery hindered preparations for the attack and the British artillery did not batter down all of the wire. Preparations were generally poor and except on the extreme left the attack failed with heavy loss. The 2nd Division in its next attack formed up just before dusk on 4 August without being detected by the Germans. The OG lines along the Pozieres crest were firmly seized and the Germans were swept away by the vigour of the attack which had been preceded by a four day bombardment. The 2nd Division was now more exhausted than the 1st had been and had suffered heavier losses than any Australian division was to suffer in one tour in the line although some British divisions suffered heavier losses. In twelve days, the 2nd Division had lost 6848 officers and men with five of its battalions each losing between 600 and 700 men. The relief by the 4th Australian Division took place under intense bombardment.
From Pozieres crest the Australians could at last look over the wide, shallow valley behind the ridge and observe the tree-tops and roofs of Courcelette and the woods in front of Bapaume about five miles distant. The Germans, aware that their convoys, troops and guns could be seen were greatly disturbed by the loss of the Pozieres heights and ordered their immediate recapture. The Australians had gradually pushed a big bulge into the German lines which permitted the enemy artillery to shell them from Thiepval in the rear, as well as from the front and both flanks. A great part the Australian front line was now completely enfiladed by German batteries. The bombardment was so heavy on the night of 6 August that the 4th Division was largely kept in the deep old German dug-outs. The Germans attacked in the dawn of 7 August, passed through the lightly held OG2, overran several of the deep dug-outs in OG1, captured some of the garrison, and moved down the slope towards Pozieres on a 400 yard front. At the critical moment, Lt. Albert Jacka, who had won the Victoria Cross on Gallipoli leapt from a position behind the Germans and charged them. Jacka's platoon, waiting in a deep dug-out, had been surprised by the attack. The enemy had bombed the dug-out and left a sentry over the stairway. Jacka rushed the sentry and with his surviving men attacked the Germans from behind together with other Australians scattered across the slope and on the flanks. The German attack was stopped with most of the captured Australians freed and many Germans captured. The lost ground was retaken and the Germans did not repeat their attempt to retake Pozieres heights.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-3-somme-1916/3-poziers
4. Mouquet Farm
The Australians now thrust north along the ridge on which the OG trenches continued, while on the left the British kept pace by seizing, one after another, the old communication trenches running between the old German front and second lines. The first step was taken on the night of 8 August and on the night of 10 August, patrols pushed out and established posts in the valley south of the mound of rubble which appeared to be all that remained of Mouquet Farm. On the night of 11 August, after preparations of dreadful difficulty, a formal attack was made, bringing the Australians and the British on their left to a line directly facing the German position running through Mouquet Farm. An attack on the farm itself was planned for 13 August. A quarry near the farm was captured and a company under Capt. Harry Murray seized part of the German Fabeck trench, north-east of the farm. Here Murray and his men were outflanked by the Germans, C E W Bean wrote `this former miner, who was to become known as a most famous fighting leader, fought his way back with his men in one of the most ably conducted actions in Australian experience'. The attempt to drive the salient deeper was continued in attack after attack for another month, but its ultimate achievement was to secure no more than part of the Fabeck trench reached by Murray's company that night. The 4th Division was now relieved after a loss of 4649 men.
The 1st Australian Division, with its battalions brought up to two-thirds strength by reinforcements, was put in again. After another 2650 casualties, the 2nd Division took up the task and tried with larger forces to seize Mouquet Farm, which was by then realised to contain very large and deep dug-outs. The 4th Australian Division was brought back and delivered attacks on the nights of 27 and 28 August. The strategy of slowly pushing a salient behind an enemy salient had come to a halt. At the cost of another 2409 casualties, the 4th Division had driven the salient as far as it ever went. In early September, the Australians moved to a quiet area at Ypres. Between July and September Pozieres ridge was the only sector on the Somme in which the British forces had steadily pushed ahead. The German artillery was free to concentrate as it wished and although the Australians suffered other intense bombardments in France, there was never anything comparable in duration or effect to that suffered on the Somme. In seven weeks, the Australians launched 19 attacks, all except two on narrow fronts. 23,000 Australian officers and men were killed or wounded at Pozieres, a place C E W Bean said was `more densely sown with Australian sacrifice that any other place on earth.'
The fighting on the Somme highlighted the essential problem of the 1914-18 War. Modern technology had brought mass armies to the battlefield and was able to supply and maintain those armies in the field for an indefinite period but the technology to move the armies on the battlefield and to break though the trench lines still awaited development. The horse was still invaluable in moving supplies up to the front lines but was obsolete on the battlefield. On 15 September, the replacement for the horse on the battlefield, the tank was first used by the British. From Pozieres and other points along the line, tanks heaved their monstrous shapes forward among British, Canadian and New Zealand infantry, and succeeded in driving the enemy almost to the bottom of the valley on which the Australians had looked out. Mouquet Farm finally fell on 28 September.
On 9 October the Australians were ordered to return to the Somme but by the time they arrived the autumn rains had turned the fields ploughed up by the massed artillery into a sea of mud. The broken ground was passable in dry weather, but with the rains it became a bog. Preparations had not been made for these conditions and both the trenches and the tracks leading to them became impassable. It took five or six relays of stretcher-bearers, each team, six or eight strong, many hours to get a wounded man from the front line to an ambulance, a few miles back. The roads leading to the front gave way under the heavy traffic. In these conditions, the worst experienced by the First AIF, two attempts were made to carry the line forward. On 5 and 14 November, portion of the attacking troops entered the German trenches which were held for some hours until the impossibility of keeping the partial gains were realised. The mud of the Somme meant that major offensive action would have to wait until the spring
Winter on the Somme was a battle against mud, rain, and frost-bite. Road repairs commenced miles behind the front lines and slowly inched forward until material finally reached the trenches and the dreadful conditions at that front began to slowly improve. Thousands of duckboards were laid to enable supplies and material to be moved forward. In January and February 1917, four weeks of cold weather froze the mud and water and covered the trenches with snow.
The Germans were hard tried but not broken by the Battle of the Somme. The losses on all sides were heavy. For the Germans, it was the beginning of the end. The Chantilly conference in November 1916 had already decided to strike at the Germans from all directions in the spring of 1917. The Germans realising that another offensive was in the offering when the weather improved, played out the last act of the battle when, in March 1917, they withdrew to the Hindenburg. line giving up more territory than they had lost during all of the 1916 fighting.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-3-somme-1916/4-mouquet-farm
S 4 Hindenberg Line 1917
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-4-hindenberg-line-1917
1. German Withdrawal
The German Army, in February 1917, commenced a withdrawal from the Somme battlefields to prepared fortified position known as the Hindenburg line. The Germans implemented a scorched earth policy, and all trees or poles over six feet tall were cut down and villages razed. The 5th Australian Division entered the burning town of Bapaume on 17 March and in the following days, troops from the 2nd and 5th Divisions were involved in sharp clashes with German rearguards. Heavy fighting took place through the several fortified villages left by the Germans to delay the advance.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-4-hindenberg-line-1917/1-german-withdrawal
2. Lagincourt
On 15 April 1917, the Germans counterattack at Lagnicourt with 16,000 troops. The attack was repulsed by fewer than 4,000 men of the 1st and 2nd Australian Divisions.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-4-hindenberg-line-1917/2-lagincourt
3. First Bullecourt 11 April 1917
On 11 April 1917, the 4th Australian Division attacked towards Bullecourt in support of the offensive that had opened at Arras on 9 April. At the suggestion of the Tanks Corps, a mass concentration of tanks were to precede the infantry and break down the wire and seize the Hindenburg Line. The tanks, which were slower than walking men and with thin steel failed with none reaching the wire before the infantry and only four reaching the wire at all with just one reaching the first trench in the Australian sector. Despite no artillery barrage and the failure by the tanks, the 4th Division achieved through sheer bravery and magnificent leadership what was then regarded as impossible - they broke into the Hindenburg Line. Owing to mistaken reports, mainly from air and artillery observers, they were left without support. At first the artillery did not fire because of misleading reports, then it fired on its own infantry and finally German machine-gunners closed the gate behind the Australian infantry. The 4th Division suffered more than 3,000 casualties including 1170 officers and men, captured.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-4-hindenberg-line-1917/3-first-bullecourt-11-april-1917
4. Second Bullecourt 3-26 May 1917
From 3 until 26 May the 1st, 2nd and 5th Australian Divisions made a another attempt to seize Bullecourt. The Australians established a two mile gap in the Hindenburg Line became two miles wide and withstood counterattacked by elite German troops on 15 May.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-4-hindenberg-line-1917/4-second-bullecourt-3-26-may-1917
S 5 Third Battle of Ypres 1917
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-5-third-battle-ypres-1917
1. Menin Road
The Battle of Menin Road was a well planned and well executed battle with limited but reasonable objectives which were achieved. Two Australian divisions formed the centre of the attacking force of eleven Divisions of the Second and Fifth Armies. This was the first time two Australian divisions attacked side by side. Lieutenant F Birks, MM of the 6th Bn won the VC when he rushed a pill-box and captured it, enabling his battalion to advance. He was killed the following day, about the time that Lance-Corporal R R Inwood, 10th Bn, was performing the gallant actions which were to win him the VC.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-5-third-battle-ypres-1917/1-menin-road
2. Broodseinde
Following the success at Menin Road on 20 September and similar success at Polygon Wood on 26 September a third major assault on German positions near Passchendaele was launched on 4 October 1917. The main assault included the 3rd Australian Division and the New Zealander Division. Heavy casualties were inflicted on the enemy and more than 5,000 prisoners were captured. In bitter fighting against German pillboxes the 1st Division, 2nd Division and two brigades of the 3rd Division lost 6,432 men, but with their allies inflicted on the Germans what their official history calls "the black day of October 4". Lance-Corporal Walter Peeler of the 3rd Pioneer Bn attached to the 37th Bn and Sergeant Lewis McGee of the 40th Bn both won the VC in this battle.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-5-third-battle-ypres-1917/2-broodseinde
S 6 Amiens 1918
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-6-amiens-1918
1. First Battle
First Battle of Amiens - 1918
With the withdrawal of Russia from the first world war in 1917, the German High Command reinforced for a massive assault on the western front. The German commander, Ludendorff, considered a breakthrough unlikely but felt enough progress could be made to place Germany in a dominant position during peace negotiations. The great offensive, code named 'Michael', began on 21 March 1918 at St Quentin, and within three days the British 5th army was in semi-chaotic retreat. The principal aim of the German attacks was to drive a wedge between the British and French armies by capturing the channel ports. all territory gained by the allies during the bloody confrontations of 1916 and 1917 on the Somme were surrendered within weeks. The 3rd and 4th Australian divisions were resting when ordered to proceed to Amiens with all haste. The 4th brigade from 4th division was the first unit to arrive and checked the German advance at Hebuterne, some 18 miles north-east of Amiens. catching the weary but victorious German troops in open country, the 4th brigade quickly proved that the best form of defence was swift but limited counter-attacks. for almost two weeks this brigade successfully held a section of the line normally held by two divisions. Ten miles east of Amiens, the 3rd division dug in on Morlancourt ridge, just behind the old 1916 Somme battlefield. before the Germans could close on them, the Australians counter-attacked, checked the German advance and recaptured some territory. With the arrival of the 5th division in support of the Morlancourt position, the 9th brigade from 3rd division crossed the Somme river to the south to assist in the defence of Villers Bretonneux. over the next three months a series of limited attacks, combined with the tactic of peaceful penetration gradually succeeded in regaining allied initiative in the area.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-6-amiens-1918/1-first-battle
2. Hamel
The Australians with both American and tank support made great gains at Hamel on 4 July 1918. This was the first major action by General Sir John Monash since taking command of the Australian Corps the previous month and was the model for the offensive of 8 August.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-6-amiens-1918/2-hamel
3. Second Battle
Second Battle of Amiens - 1918
The British Fourth Army which included both the Australian and Canadian Corps commenced the final advance of the First World War at dawn on 8 August 1918 with the assistance of 430 tanks. The British plan of attack was meticulous and the leading troops including the 2nd and 3rd Australian Divisions cut a clear path through the forward German defences. General Ludendorff, the German commander, later described the attack on 8 August as the black day of the German army. The attack was resumed next morning on the Australian front by the 1st and 2nd Divisions and further territory was gained. In the following eight weeks Australian troops successfully breached a succession of German defence lines including Mont St Quentin in early September and the Hindenburg line at the end of the month.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-6-amiens-1918/3-second-battle
S 7 Palestine 1916-18
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-7-palestine-1916-18
1. Light Horse
The Light Horse Brigades were organised as follows by 1918:
Brigades | Regiment | Regiment | Regiment |
1st | 1st | 2nd | 3rd |
2nd | 5th | 6th | 7th |
3rd | 8th | 9th | 10th |
4th | 4th | 11th | 12th |
5th | 14th | 15th |
|
Divisional and Corps Troops came from the 4th and 13th Regiments.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-7-palestine-1916-18/1-light-horse
2. Beersheba
The expulsion of Turkish forces from Egypt in late 1916 led to the establishment by the Turks of a line of fortifications guarding entry into central Palestine. The line extended for more than 24 miles from Gaza on the coast to the town of Beersheba. Following two unsuccessful attempts to turn the western flank at Gaza in March and April 1917, a plan was developed to attack and turn the eastern part of the line at Beersheba. The Desert Mounted Corps under the command of Australian General H G Chauvel was given this responsibility. By 30 October Chauvel's forces were in position in the desert east of the town. On 31 October, two divisions of infantry began a diversionary frontal attack on Beersheba whilst Chauvel's horsemen attacked Turkish positions in the hills north-east of the town. The Turks resisted strongly and it was not until 3 pm that the main position on Tel-el-Saba hill was overcome. Despite the lateness in the day Chauvel ordered a cavalry charge against the heavily defended town of Beersheba whose wells held the key to success or failure of the battle. The Australian 4th Light Horse Brigade, under Brig-Gen Grant began moving towards the Turkish lines at 4.30 pm with only bayonets either attached to their rifle or in their hands. As the Brigade advanced it was subject to machine-gun and shrapnel fire but the Light Horsemen pressed forward and two Turkish trenches were cleared at the gallop. Some light horsemen dismounted and engaged the Turkish defenders in hand-to-hand fighting, while others galloped ahead into the town where the Turks were overwhelmed by the ferocity of the assault and soon surrendered.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-7-palestine-1916-18/2-beersheba
S 8 Australian Flying Corps
The first operational group dispatched was the half-flight sent to the Mesopotamia. Some excellent reconnaissance work was completed despite poor machines and appalling conditions. Three of the four pilots were killed or captured and a number of ground crew were captured at Kut-el Arama and died in captivity.
1 Sqn, Australian Flying Corps, of 28 officers and 195 other ranks, departed for Egypt in early 1916. The squadron flying Be2c's initially operated out of an airfield near Heliopolis. They assisted in reconnaissance and bombing raids against Turkish forces attacking the canal in august 1916 and accompanied the advance into Palestine and Syria. During a bombing attack on Turkish positions at Gaza in March 1917, Lt F N McNamara won the only VC awarded to an Australian airman in the war by landing his plane and rescuing another pilot who had be forced down.
Three Australian squadrons became operational on the Western Front in late 1917. 3 Sqn, AFC had been raised in Egypt by December 1916 while 2 Sqn, AFC and 4 Sqn, AFC were formed in Australia and arrived in England in January and March 1917. The leading Australian air ace in France was Capt A H Cobby who was credited with destroying 29 aircraft and 13 balloons. The operational squadrons were supported by three training squadrons in England.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-8-australian-flying-corps
S 9 Australian Army Nursing Service
Over 2000 Australian nurses served abroad in every major theatre of conflict in the 1914-18 War. At Gallipoli, nurses served in hospital ships off the coast and in primitive hospitals on Lemnos. By 1916 in France, the AANS reserve provided enough nurses to staff no 1 Australian general hospital at Rouen and no 2 Australian general hospital at Wimeraux. They remained in France until the end of hostilities, and continued to minister to the men in hospitals and on troop ships back to Australia.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-1-world-war-i/s-9-australian-army-nursing-service
Ch 2 World War II
Ch 3 Korean War
Ch 4 Malayan Emergency and Confrontation
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation
S 1 Units Allotted/Assigned for Operational Service
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-1-units-allottedassigned-operational-service
S 2 Operational Area
Schedule 2 of the VEA defines the operational areas for the Malayan Emergency and Indonesian Confrontation. There are five items in Schedule 2 that describe different operational areas and periods.
Operational Area | Time Limits |
Item 2 - Malaya and waters up to 18.5 kilometres from the coast. | 29 June 1950 - 31 August 1957 |
Item 3 - Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore. | 1 September 1957 - 31 July 1960 |
Item 5 - Malay/Thai Border. | 1 August 1960 - 16 August 1964 |
Item 6 - Borneo (Sarawak, Sabah and Brunei) and the adjacent sea up to 80.5 kilometres from the high water mark. | 8 December 1962 - 16 August 1964 |
Item 7 - Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (excluding the northern states area above) and the waters around the Malayan States up to 80.5 kilometres from the high water mark. | 17 August 1964 - 14 September 1966 |
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-2-operational-area
S 3 Historical Notes
About this section
This section provides historical notes on the Malayan emergency and confrontation.
Bibliography
Smith, E D Counter-Insurgency Operations 1: Malaya and Borneo, Ian Allan Ltd, 1985
James, H & Sheil-Small, D. The Undeclared War, Leo Cooper Ltd, 1971
Miller, H. Jungle War in Malaya, The Campaign against Communism 1948?1960, Arthur Barker Ltd, 1972
Clutterbuck, R. The Long War, The Emergency in Malaya 1948-1960. Cassell & Co Ltd, 1966
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-3-historical-notes
S 4 Far East Strategic Reserve
Introduction
Members of the Australian Defence Force serving in what is now known as the Federation of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei had coverage under the VEA for specified periods between 1950 and 1966.
Qualifying service
To have qualifying service for a service pension a veteran must have:
- been allotted for duty in an operational area either individually or as a member of a unit, and
- served in the operational area to which the person was allotted.
Between 1950 and 1966 Australian units were allotted for duty under Items 2, 3, 5, 6 and 7 of Schedule 2 of the VEA.
Copies of allotment certificates are in the Service Eligibility Assistant in the Legislation Library.
Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 - Malayan Emergency
Item 2 of Schedule 2 covers the area of Malaya, including the waters contiguous to the coast of Malaya for a distance of 18.5 kilometres seaward from the coast for the period from 29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957. Singapore is not included in the Item 2 operational area. Units stationed in Singapore during this period were allotted for duty in the Item 2 operational area but the individual must enter the Item 2 operational area to have qualifying service.
Item 3 of Schedule 2 covers Malaya and Singapore from 1 September 1957 to 31 July 1960.
From 1 January 2001, ships of the Royal Australian Navy that served with the Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR) between 2 July 1955 and 31 July 1960 have been allotted for duty under Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2.
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Items 5 of Schedule 2 Malay/Thai Border
The Malayan Emergency officially ended on 31 July 1960. Security operations against Communist Terrorists (CTs) continued to be conducted intermittently on the Malay/Thai border in the northern parts of the states of the Perlis, Kedah, Perak and Kelantan.
Item 5 of Schedule 2 covers the period from 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964. Operations after 16 August 1964 are included in Item 7.
From 1 January 2001 service on the Malay/Thai Border for the period 1 August 1960 to 16 August 1964 has qualifying service. The applicant's service records will probably not indicate service on the Malay-Thai Border. An advisory to assist delegates in determining claims for qualifying service has been issued.
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Items 6 and 7 of Schedule 2 - Indonesian Confrontation.
Item 6 of Schedule 2 covers service in Borneo (Sarawak, Brunei and Sabah) for qualifying service purposes from 8 December 1962 to 16 August 1964.
Item 7 covers service in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei and the waters adjacent to those countries is covered for qualifying service purposes from 17 August 1964 to 30 September 1967. Please note that the instrument covers only the period 17 August 1964 to 14 September 1966.
From 1 January 2001 Army and RAAF units stationed in Malaya and Singapore have qualifying service. (RAN ships have been covered since 1966.) Coverage was extended from 17 August 1964 the date of the first Indonesian landing on the Malay Peninsula to 11 August 1966 the date of the Treaty of Bangkok that ended Confrontation. Units that have the later date of 14 September 1966 are Army units in Borneo and RAN ships at sea that have been covered for VEA benefits since 1966.
Allotment Instruments – History Library
Historical Notes and Maps – History Library
Members not allotted
Members of the Australian Army, RAN or RAAF on staff, equipment, public relations, familiarisation or welfare visits to or inspections of Australian Forces in the operational area have not been allotted for duty and do not have qualifying service although they entered the operational area.
Far East Strategic Reserve (FESR)
Australian Army, RAN and RAAF units serving on the Malay Peninsula from 1955 until 1971 were part of the Far East Strategic Reserve. From 1997 operational service was extended to RAN ships for the period 1955 to 1963. From 1 January 2001 qualifying service was extended to RAN ships from 1955 to 1960.
Operational service
Servicepersons who were allotted for duty and who served in the following operational areas have both qualifying service and operational service;
- Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 - Malayan Emergency
- Items 5 of Schedule 2 - Malay/Thai Border
- Items 6 and 7 of Schedule 2 - Indonesian Confrontation.
In addition servicepersons who served in units listed on the allotment instruments for the following operational areas have operational service but not qualifying service:
- Singapore from 29 June 1950 to 31 August 1957, or
- Malaya and Singapore from 1 August 1960 to 27 May 1963.
Please note that from 1997 until 2001 Army and RAAF units were covered by Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 and RAN units were covered under s.6D of the VEA. From 1 January 2001, all services were listed in Items 2 and 3 of Schedule 2 and s.6D of the VEA. The end date of Item 3 of Schedule 2 was amended from 1963 to 1960. Army and RAAF units previously covered by Item 3 of Schedule 2 are now covered by s.6D.
Service outside Australia in Non-Operational Areas
Subsection 13(6) VEA provides for claims in respect of death or incapacity to be accepted in limited circumstances where the person did not render operational service in an operational area.
The provision was introduced when cross-border operations were being conducted in Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo) by the Australian Defence Force during Indonesian Confrontation. Since Australia retained diplomatic links with Indonesia throughout this period, Kalimantan was not included within the operational area of Item 6 of Schedule 2. Cross-border operations (known as claret operations) were conducted by 3RAR and 4RAR as well as the SAS. In mid 1965 an SAS patrol was attacked by a rogue elephant while operating in Kalimantan. One of the patrol was badly gored and died before help could be summoned.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-4-malayan-emergency-and-confrontation/s-4-far-east-strategic-reserve
Ch 5 Vietnam War and North East Thailand
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand
S 1 Commonwealth and Allied Countries
Commonwealth countries:
- New Zealand
Allied countries:
- Philippines
- South Korea
- South Vietnam
- Thailand
- United States
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-1-commonwealth-and-allied-countries
S 2 Operational Area
Schedule 2 of the Act defines the operational area as the southern zone of Vietnam and the waters up to 185.2 kilometres from the shore of Vietnam other than the land or waters forming part of Cambodia or China.
The period in which this was an operational area was 31 Jul 62 to 11 Jan 73, the date when the troops were withdrawn following the election of the Whitlam Government on 2 Dec 72.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-2-operational-area
S 3 Units Allotted for Operational Service
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-3-units-allotted-operational-service
North East Thailand (including Ubon)
Last amended: 25 June 2012
Service with the RAAF at Ubon during the period from and including 31 May to and including 27 July 1962 is operational and qualifying service for members of the following allotted units:
- No 36 Squadron RAAF
- No 79 Squadron RAAF
- Base Squadron Ubon RAAF
- Detachment, No 5 Airfield Construction Squadron RAAF
Service in North East Thailand (not including Ubon) is operational service only during the period from and including 31 May to and including 27 July 1962 for members of the below units:
- Detachment, 2 Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers serving on Operation CROWN or Operation POST CROWN
- Detachment, 16 Commonwealth Field Ambulance serving on Operation CROWN
- Detachment, 208 Signal Squadron serving on Operation CROWN
Service in North East Thailand (including Ubon) is operational service only during the period from and including 28 July 1962 to and including 24 June 1965 for members of the below units:
Australian Army
- Detachment, 2 Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers serving on Operation CROWN or Operation POST CROWN
- Detachment, 16 Commonwealth Field Ambulance serving on Operation CROWN
- Detachment, 208 Signal Squadron serving on Operation CROWN
RAAF
- No 36 Squadron RAAF
- No 79 Squadron RAAF
- Base Squadron Ubon RAAF
- Detachment, No 5 Airfield Construction Squadron RAAF
Service in North East Thailand (including Ubon) is operational and qualifying service during the period from and including 25 June 1965 to and including 31 August 1968 for members of the following allotted units:
Australian Army
- Detachment, 2 Field Troop, Royal Australian Engineers serving on Operation CROWN or Operation POST CROWN
- Detachment, 16 Commonwealth Field Ambulance serving on Operation CROWN
- Detachment, 208 Signal Squadron serving on Operation CROWN
RAAF
- No 36 Squadron RAAF
- No 79 Squadron RAAF
- Base Squadron Ubon RAAF
- Detachment, No 5 Airfield Construction Squadron RAAF
The relevant instruments can be found under the tab 'Thailand' in the Service Eligibility Assistant in the CLIK Legislation Library.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/north-east-thailand-including-ubon
Vietnam War
Last amended: 13 June 2013
The following table provides information on units allotted for duty in connection with the Vietnam conflict.
Army
Unit | From | To |
Headquarter Units |
|
|
AATTV | 31 Jul 62 | 19 Dec 72 |
AAAGV | 6 Mar 72 | 23 Dec 72 |
Aust Embassy Guard Pl (from AAAGV/ personnel) | 18 Dec 72 | 1 Jul 73 |
HQ AAFV redesignated as HQ AFV (Army Component) | 25 May 65 3 May 66 | 2 May 66 15 Mar 72 |
HQ 145 Sig Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
709 Sig Tp | 25 May 65 | 20 Nov 67 |
527 Sig Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 5 Jul 67 |
581 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
552 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
506 Sig Tp (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
520 Sig Tp (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
Det 547 Sig Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
547 Sig Tp (less Det) (op Tp (Type A)) | 2 Mar 67 | 23 Dec 71 |
HQ 110 Sig Sqn | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
110 Sig Sqn | 21 Nov 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
704 Sig Tp (less Det) | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
557 Sig Tp (less Det) | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
561 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
532 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
503 Sig Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 20 Nov 67 |
Fd Op Research Sect | 29 Nov 65 | 6 Mar 72 |
HQ AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 2 Mar 72 |
1 Aust CA Unit | 2 Mar 67 | 25 Nov 71 |
Det 198 Wks Sect | 9 Jan 67 | 1 Mar 67 |
198 Wks Sect | 2 Mar 67 | 23 Dec 72 |
Det 11 MC Gp | 1 Apr 66 | 12 Mar 72 |
HQ 1 TF | 1 Apr 66 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 APC Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 APC Sqn (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Jan 67 |
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 23 Dec 69 | 16 Dec 70 |
A Sqn 1 Armd Regt LAD | 23 Dec 69 | 16 Dec 70 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 16 Jan 67 | 12 May 69 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 7 Jan 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
A Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 7 Jan 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
B Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 11 Feb 69 | 22 Dec 69 |
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt | 13 May 69 | 6 Jan 71 |
B Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 13 May 69 | 6 Jan 71 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 29 Jan 68 | 10 Feb 69 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt | 17 Dec 70 | 30 Sep71 |
C Sqn 1 Armd Regt LAD | 17 Dec 70 | 30 Sep 71 |
104 Fd Bty | 5 May 71 | 20 Dec 71 |
105 Fd Bty | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar66 |
1 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
1 Fd Regt (Restd) | 25 Feb 69 | 10 May70 |
4 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 2 Mar 67 | 28 May 68 |
4 Fd Regt | 24 Feb 70 | 18 Mar 71 |
12 Fd Regt (less one Bty) | 29 Jan 68 | 11 Mar 69 |
12 Fd Regt | 27 Jan 71 | 20 Dec 71 |
Det 131 Div Loc Bty | 1 Apr 66 | 19 Aug 71 |
3 Fd Tp | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 Fd Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 | 30 Nov 67 |
1 Fd Sqn (Restd) | 1 Dec 67 | 18 Nov 71 |
21 Engr Sp Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 9 Dec 71 |
Det 1 Topo Svy Tp | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
A Sect 1 Topo Svy Tp | 2 Mar 67 | 7 Oct 71 |
103 Sig Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
104 Sig Sqn (TF) | 2 Mar 67 | 15 Dec 71 |
Det 152 Sig Sqn (SAS) | 31 Aug 66 | 15 Oct 71 |
1 RAR | 25 May 65 19 Jan 68 | 14 Jun 66 28 Feb 69 |
2 RAR | 2 Mar 67 28 Apr 70 | 18 Jun 68 4 Jun 71 |
3 RAR | 12 Dec 67 12 Feb 71 | 5 Dec 68 19 Oct 71 |
4 RAR | 29 Jan 68 1 May 71 | 30 May 69 12 Mar 72 |
5 RAR | 1 Apr 66 28 Jan 69 | 5 Jul67 5 Mar 70 |
6 RAR | 1 Apr 66 7 May 69 | 5 Jul 67 28 May 70 |
7 RAR | 2 Mar 67 10 Feb 70 | 26 Apr 68 10 Mar 71 |
8 RAR | 18 Nov 69 | 12 Nov 70 |
9 RAR | 5 Nov 68 | 5 Dec 69 |
1 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 2 Mar 67 3 Feb 70 | 18 Feb 68 18 Feb 71 |
2 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 29 Jan 68 18 Feb 71 | 4 Mar 69 15 Oct 71 |
3 SAS Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 3 Feb 69 | 5 Jul 67 20 Feb 70 |
Det 1 Div Int Unit | 1 Apr 66 | 11 Nov 71 |
1 Tpt Pl | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
2 Tpt Pl | 21 Apr 67 | 12 Nov 70 |
Det 1 Fwd Del Tp | 29 Jan 68 | 21 Jul 71 |
Det 1 OFP | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
Det 6 OFP | 2 Mar 67 | 31 Jan 68 |
1 OFP | 1 Feb 68 | 12 Feb 72 |
106 Fd Wksp Stores Sect | 15 Nov 68 | 25 Sep 71 |
Det 131 Div Loc Bty Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Aug 71 |
1 Fd Sqn Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 30 Oct 71 |
106 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 15 Nov 68 | 7 Oct 71 |
1 TF HQ LAD | 1 Apr 66 | 19 Oct 71 |
Det 1 APC Sqn LAD | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Jan 67 |
Det A Sqn 3 Cav Regt LAD | 16 Jan 67 | 12 May 69 |
Bty Sect 4 Fd Regt LAD redesignated as 105 Fd Bty Sect 12 Fd Regt LAD | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
1 Fd Regt LAD | 1 Apr 66 25 Feb 69 | 5 Jul 67 10 May 70 |
4 Fd Regt LAD | 2 Mar 67 24 Feb 70 | 28 May 68 18 Mar 71 |
12 Fd Regt LAD | 29 Jan 68 27 Jan 71 | 11 Mar 69 20 Dec 71 |
Det 1 Div Cash Office | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Jan 67 |
1 Det AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 27 Feb 72 |
Sect 1 Div Pro Coy redesignated as Pro Sect 1 Pro Coy | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Jan 67 |
AFV Pro Unit | 1 Feb 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 Aust Rft Unit | 1 Apr 66 | 29 Sep 71 |
|
|
|
Logistic Support Units |
|
|
Aust Log Sp Coy | 25 May 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
HQ 1 Aust Log Sp Gp | 1 Apr 66 | 16 Oct 71 |
Det 55 Adv Engr Stores Sqn | 1 Apr 66 | 16 Feb 68 |
Det 55 Engr Wksp and Pk Sqn | 17 Feb 68 | 14 Jun 71 |
55 Engr Wksp and Pk Sqn | 15 Jun 71 | 12 Mar 72 |
17 Const Sqn (less one Tp) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
17 Const Sqn | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Feb 72 |
Det 30 Terminal Sqn | 9 Jan 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
161 Recce Flt | 14 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
161 (Indep) Recce Flt | 1 Apr 66 | 8 Mar 72 |
Det 8 Pet Pl | 9 Jan 67 | 26 Aug 68 |
8 Pet Pl RAASC | 27 Aug 68 | 12 Feb 72 |
HQ 26 Coy RAASC | 8 Jan 68 | 31 Oct 69 |
HQ 26 Tpt Coy RAASC | 1 Nov 69 | 30 Jun 71 |
HQ 1 Coy RAASC | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
21 Sup Pl RAASC | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
87 Tpt Pl | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
Det 52 Sup Pl | 18 Dec 67 | 5 May 71 |
3 Small Ship Tp (AV 1355 Vernon Sturdee) | 11 Apr 66 23 Jan 67 | 25 Jun 67 14 Dec 67 |
1 Small Ship Tp (AV 1356 Clive Steele) | 26 Jun 66 3 Dec 66 17 Jan 67 29 Jan 68 21 Jul 69 11 Jul 70 2 Mar 71 | 23 Nov 66 9 Jan 67 16 Mar 67 27 Apr 69 2 Mar 70 3 Sep 70 12 Mar 71 |
2 Small Ship Tp (AV 1353 Harry Chauvel) | 23 Oct 67 21 May 70 | 21 Mar 68 6 Jun 70 |
4 Small Ship Tp (AV 1354 Brudenell White) | 22 Sep 70 | 24 Oct 70 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AS 3051 John Monash) | 5 May 66 29 Jul 66 3 Dec 67 17 Feb 68 16 Dec 68 20 Feb 69 25 Oct 69 27 Jul 71 | 14 May 66 20 Sep 66 31 Jan 68 31 Mar 68 26 Dec 68 4 Mar 69 7 Dec 69 14 Oct 71 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AV 1356 Clive Steele) | 23 Feb 71 | 20 Mar 71 |
Det 32 Small Ship Sqn (AV 1353 Harry Chauvel) | 11 Nov 70 | 15 Dec 70 |
HQ 5 Coy RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
86 Tpt Pl RAASC | 9 Jan 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
85 Tpt Pl (Tipper) RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 16 Sep 71 |
25 Sup Pl RAASC | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 176 AD Coy | 1 Apr 66 | 31 May 67 |
176 AD Coy | 1Apr 67 | 18 Nov 71 |
1 Aust Fd Hosp | 13 Nov 67 | 14 Dec 71 |
8 Fd Amb | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
2 Fd Amb (less one Coy) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
33 Dental Unit (less Det) | 1 Apr 66 | 1 Mar 67 |
Det 1 Fd Med and Dental Unit | 20 Nov 67 | 6 Mar 68 |
Det 1 Fd Med and Dent Eqpt Dep | 7 Mar 68 | 25 Nov 71 |
33 Dental Unit | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 1 Fd Hygiene Coy | 5 Dec 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
HQ 2 Comp Ord Depot (Type A) | 1 Apr 66 | 15 Nov 67 |
2 Adv Ord Dep | 16 Nov 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
both the above units included the following sub-units: a. 13 Ord Sup Con Pl b. 16 Ord Veh Pl c. 14 Ord Stores Pl d. 18 Ord Dep Ldy Sect e. 15 Ord Ammo Pl f. 19 Ord Sup Con Pl g. 20 Ord Stores Pl
|
|
|
1 Indep Armd Sqn Wksp | 29 Jan 68 | 2 Feb 68 |
1 Armd Sqn Wksp (absorbed by 106 Fd Wksp - details above) | 3 Feb 68 | 14 Nov 68 |
17 Const Sqn Wksp | 1 Apr 66 | 25 Nov 71 |
Det 1 Div St Wksp - redesignated as: | 1 Apr 66 | 31 Oct 69 |
5 Coy RAASC Wksp | 1 Nov 69 | 25 Nov 71 |
101 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 1 Apr 66 | 5 Jul 67 |
102 Fd Wksp (Type A) | 2 Mar 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
2 Det AFV Cash Office | 1 Feb 67 | 27 Feb 72 |
Det 1 Div Post Unit - absorbed by: | 1 Apr 66 | 8 Nov 67 |
Det 1 Comm Z Postal Unit | 19 Oct 66 | 28 Feb 72 |
Det 5 ASCO Unit - redesignated as: | 1 Apr 66 | 26 Feb 68 |
HQ 2 AFCU | 27 Feb 68 | 12 Mar 72 |
Det 2 Aust Fd Canteen Unit - redesignated as 1 Pl 2 AFCU | 27 Feb 68 | 12 Mar 72 |
67 GL Sect | 1 Apr 66 | 2 Dec 71 |
1 Aust Rest and Con Centre - redesignated as: | 11 Feb 66 | 7 Dec 67 |
AFV Amenities and Welfare Unit | 8 Dec 67 | 12 Mar 72 |
1 Psy Ops Unit | 13 Apr 70 | 25 Nov 71 |
Navy
Ships and units allotted for duty in Vietnam
Ship | From | To |
HMAS Brisbane | 20 Mar 69 16 Mar 71 | 13 Oct 69 11 Oct 71 |
HMAS Perth | 2 Sep 67 19 Sep 68 14 Sep 70 | 10 Apr 68 12 Apr 69 8 Apr 71 |
HMAS Hobart | 7 Mar 67 22 Mar 68 16 Mar 70 | 27 Sep 67 11 Oct 68 9 Oct 70 |
HMAS Vendetta | 15 Sep 69 | 11 Apr 70 |
Clearance Diving Team 3* |
|
|
Contingent 1 | 5 Feb 67 | 29 Aug 67 |
Contingent 2 | 12 Aug 67 | 11 Mar 68 |
Contingent 3 | 11 Feb 68 | 3 Sep 68 |
Contingent 4 | 12 Aug 68 | 4 Mar 69 |
Contingent 5 | 10 Feb 69 | 21 Aug 69 |
Contingent 6 | 12 Aug 69 | 10 Mar 70 |
Contingent 7 | 10 Mar 70 | 29 Oct 70 |
Contingent 8 | 14 Oct 70 | 5 May 71 |
RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV) (a detachment of No 723 Squadron)* |
|
|
Contingent 1 | 15 Oct 67 | 17 Oct 68 |
Contingent 2 | 9 Sep 68 | 11 Sep 69 |
Contingent 3 | 9 Sep 69 | 10 Sep 70 |
Contingent 4 | 9 Sep 70 | 16 Jun 71 |
RAN Element of No 9 (Helicopter) Squadron, RAAF | From date of departure from Australia to date of arrival in Australia. | |
Notes:
- *These are the dates applicable to the main body of the contingent. Individual periods of service will be entered on the Record of Service.
Ships and units allotted for duty in Vietnam - support or logistic roles
Ship | Last Port Of Call
| Date | In Port Vietnam | First Port Of Call | Date |
HMAS Anzac | Sydney | 20 May 68 | 1 Jun 68 | Darwin | 7 Jun 68 |
HMAS Boonaroo | Cairns | 13 Mar 67 | 28 Mar-2 Apr 67 | Darwin | 13 Apr 67 |
HMAS Derwent | Manila Singapore Singapore | 26 May 66 10 Feb 69 4 Nov 71 | 6-8 Jun 66 15 Feb 69 6-7 Nov 71 | Singapore Singapore Singapore | 13 Jun 66 18 Feb 69 8 Nov 71 |
HMAS Duchess | Sydney Manus Island Singapore Sydney Singapore Singapore | 27 May 65 20 Sept 65 18 Nov 68 16 Nov 69 3 Apr 71 17 May 71 | 8-11 Jun 65 28-30 Sep 65 20 Nov 68 28 Nov 69 5 Apr 71 22-23 May 71 | Fremantle Hong Kong Hong Kong Singapore Hong Kong Hong Kong | 26 Jun 65 3 Oct 65 25 Nov 68 29 Nov 69 8 Apr 71 1 Jun 71 |
MV Jeparit (RAN personnel only) | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Newcastle Sydney Sydney Sydney
| 11 Mar 67 28 Apr 67 9 Jun 67 27 Jul 67 13 Sept 67 30 Oct 67 18 Dec 67 9 Feb 68 23 Mar 68 10 May 68 21 Jun 68 6 Aug 68 22 Sept 68 4 Nov 68 28 Dec 68 14 Mar 69 24 Apr 69 4 Jun 69 16 Jul 69 7 Sept 69 22 Oct 69
| 27 Mar-4 Apr 67 12-16 May 67 24 Jun-2 Jul 67 11-18 Aug 67 27 Sep-5 Oct 67 13-22 Nov 67 2-11 Jan 68 24-27 Feb 68 6-15 Apr 68 24-29 May 68 5-11 Jul 68 21-27 Aug 68 7-12 Oct 68 19-25 Nov 68 12-19 Jan 69 29 Mar-3 Apr 69 8-12 May 69 19-23 Jun 69 30 Jul-6 Aug 69 24-29 Sep 69 9-13 Nov 69 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Newcastle Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 21 Apr 67 2 Jun 67 19 Jul 67 4 Sept 67 22 Oct 67 9 Dec 67 26 Jan 68 14 Mar 68 1 May 68 15 Jun 68 28 Jul 68 13 Sept 68 29 Oct 68 17 Dec 68 5 Feb 69 19 Apr 69 29 May 69 10 Jul 69 25 Aug 69 13 Oct 69 29 Nov 69 |
HMAS Jeparit | Sydney Darwin Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 19 Dec 69 16 Feb 70 26 Mar 70 16 May 70 6 Jul 70 18 Aug 70 | 4-10 Jan 70 25 Feb-3 Mar 70 13-18 Apr 70 8-13 Jun 70 22-27 Jul 70 4-7 Sep 70 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 26 Jan 70 21 Mar 70 6 May 70 28 Jun 70 12 Aug 70 23 Sept 70 |
| Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Townsville Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney
| 1 Oct 70 15 Nov 70 4 Jan 71 16 Feb 71 2 Apr 71 13 May 71 7 Jul 71 20 Aug 71 11 Oct 71 25 Nov 71 10 Jan 72 | 21-25 Oct 70 3-8 Dec 70 21-24 Jan 71 8-12 Mar 71 19-22 Apr 71 30 May-2 Jun 71 21-25 Jul 71 8-15 Sep 71 29 Oct-3 Nov 71 13-18 Dec 71 3-6 Feb 72 | Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Townsville Sydney Townsville Brisbane Sydney
| 8 Nov 70 23 Dec 70 8 Feb 71 26 Mar 71 7 May 71 26 Jun 71 8 Aug 71 30 Sept 71 14 Nov 71 31 Dec 71 11 Mar 72 |
HMAS Melbourne (1) | Subic Bay Singapore Manila
| 31 May 65 25 Apr 66 25 May 66 | 7-8 Jun 65 3-4 May 66 6 Jun 66 | Sydney Hong Kong Penang | 22 Jun 65 6 May 66 9 Jun 66 |
HMAS Parramatta | Tawau Singapore Bangkok
| 25 May 65 5 Apr 68 15 May 71 | 8-11 Jun 65 9 Apr 68 22 May 71 | Singapore Singapore Subic Bay | 14 Jun 65 17 Apr 68 24 May 71
|
HMAS Queenborough | Hong Kong
| 27 Jan 63 | 29 Jan-4 Feb 63 | Singapore | 6 Feb 63 |
HMAS Quiberon | Hong Kong | 27 Jan 63 | 29 Jan-4 Feb 63 | Singapore | 6 Feb 63 |
HMAS Quickmatch* |
|
| See note at bottom of tables |
|
|
HMAS Stuart | Sydney Singapore
| 16 May 67 25 Jan 68 | 30 May 67 3 Feb 68 | Darwin Singapore | 8 Jun 67 5 Feb 68 |
HMAS Swan | Singapore Singapore
| 4 Oct 71 6 Dec 71 | 6-7 Oct 71 8-9 Dec 71 | Manila Subic Bay | 14 Oct 71 11 Dec 71 |
HMAS Sydney
| Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Singapore Sydney Fremantle Sydney Sydney Sydney Fremantle Fremantle Townsville Brisbane Sydney Fremantle | 27 May 65 14 Sept 65 22 Apr 66 25 May 66 8 Apr 67 28 Apr 67 19 May 67 20 Dec 67 17 Jan 68 27 Mar 68 21 May 68 13 Nov 68 8 Feb 69 8 May 69 17 Nov 69 16 Feb 70 21 Oct 70 | 8-11 Jun 65 28-30 Sep 65 4-6 May 66 6-8 Jun 66 20 Apr 67 30 Apr 67 30 May 67 27 Dec 67 3 Feb 68 9 Apr 68 1 Jun 68 20 Nov 68 15 Feb 69 19 May 69 28 Nov 69 27 Feb 70 31 Oct-1 Nov 70 | Fremantle Sydney Sydney Hong Kong Singapore Sydney Brisbane Fremantle Sydney Sydney Brisbane Fremantle Townsville Brisbane Fremantle Fremantle Brisbane | 26 Jun 65 20 Oct 65 18 May 66 11 Jun 66 22 Apr 67 12 May 67 14 Jun 67 3 Jan 68 16 Feb 68 26 Apr 68 13 Jun 68 28 Nov 68 25 Feb 69 30 May 69 5 Dec 69 5 Mar 70 12 Nov 70 |
| Port Adelaide Port Adelaide Townsville Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney Sydney | 15 Feb 71 26 Mar 71 13 May 71 20 Sept 71 26 Oct 71 24 Nov 71 14 Feb 72 1 Nov 72 | 25 Feb 71 5 Apr 71 22-23 May 71 6-7 Oct 71 6-7 Nov 71 8-9 Dec 71 28-29 Feb 72 23-24 Nov 72 | Fremantle Hong Kong Townsville Port Adelaide Sydney Townsville Townsville Hong Kong | 4 Mar 71 8 Apr 71 1 Jun 71 16 Oct 71 18 Nov 71 17 Dec 71 9 Mar 72 30 Nov 72 |
Unit | From | To |
Helicopter Flights Embarked in HMAS Sydney |
|
|
725 Squadron
| 20.04.67 30.04.67 30.05.67 | 20.04.67 30.04.67 30.05.67 |
817 Squadron | 27.12.67 03.02.68 09.04.68 01.06.68 20.11.68 | 27.12.67 03.02.68 09.04.68 01.06.68 20.11.68 |
Ship | Last Port Of Call
| Date | In Port Vietnam | First Port Of Call | Date |
HMAS Torrens | Manila
| 16 Feb 72 | 28-29 Feb 72 | Hong Kong | 3 Mar 72 |
HMAS Vampire (2)* |
Subic Bay Manus Island Manus Island Singapore Singapore Pulau Air
|
31 May 65 27 Apr 66 13 Apr 67 28 Apr 67 14 May 69 21 Nov 72 | See note at bottom of table 7-8 Jun 65 4-6 May 66 20 Apr 67 30 Apr 67 19 May 69 23-24 Nov 72 |
Sydney Hong Kong Singapore Singapore Manila Pulau Tioman |
22 Jun 65 9 May 66 22 Apr 67 5 May 67 25 May 69 26 Nov 72 |
HMAS Vendetta (3) | Manus Island Sydney Manila
| 20 Sept 65 25 May 66 28 Oct 70 | 28-30 Sep 65 6-8 Jun 66 31 Oct-1 Nov 70 | Hong Kong Hong Kong Colombo | 3 Oct 65 11 Jun 66 9 Nov 70 |
HMAS Yarra (2) | Singapore Manila Singapore Singapore Singapore
| 25 Apr 66 26 May 66 22 Dec 67 22 Feb 70 22 Feb 71 | 4-6 May 66 6 Jun 66 27 Dec 67 27 Feb 70 25 Feb 71 | Hong Kong Penang Singapore Singapore Hong Kong | 9 May 66 9 Jun 66 1 Jan 68 1 Mar 70 1 Mar 71 |
RAN Band |
|
| 26 May-5 Jun 70 |
|
|
*HMA Ships Vampire and Quickmatch visited Saigon during the period 25 – 29 January 1962. This service is covered under section 6E of the VEA and is operational but NOT qualifying service.
Notes:
(1) The aircraft carrier HMAS Melbourne with HMA Ships Vampire and Yarra escorted HMAS Sydney to Vietnam. HMAS Sydney docked in Vung Tau harbour. The other ships did not enter harbour but were well within the Vietnam operational area before being detached for other duty.
(2) HMAS Vendetta did one tour of duty in Vietnam between October 1969 to March 1970 and on three occasions in 1965, 1966 and late 1970 escorted HMAS Sydney to and from Vietnam.
(3) RAN CLearance Divers Team 1 (CDT1) during SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT, Vietnam.
Policy Advice:
- There is no evidence that CDT1 was allotted for duty in Vietnam during the period 29 May to 7 June 1969.
- There is evidence that contingent 5 of CDT3 was allotted for duty in Vietnam during this period.
This policy advice was provided to DVA by the Nature of Service (NOS) Directorate, Department of Defence, and reflects information available to the NOS Directorate from the RAN Sea Power Centre; 'Reports of Proceedings' for CDT1 for the period from the Australian War Memorial; and the United States Navy History and Heritage Command website that contains the monthly reports of the US Commander of Naval Forces in Vietnam at the time.
The 'Reports of Proceedings' were compiled on a monthly basis by the Commanding Officer of CDT1 and record the activities undertaken by the team each month.
The 'Reports of Proceedings' reveal that CDT1 embarked on USS CATSKILL for the period 29 May to 7 June 1969 for a mine countermeasure phase of the SEATO Exercise SEA SPIRIT.
USS CATSKILL was on passage from Manila Bay (Philippines) to Sattahip in Thailand and on the night of 31 May 69 closed with the coast of Vietnam for a rendezvous with the USS Peacock. There was no CDT operational activity involved in this manoeuvre.
The mine countermeasure phase of the exercise was conducted over 3-4 June 1969 in the vicinity of Sattahip and involved the clearance of part of 'Channel E-F' leading into the Sattahip Area of Operations.
There is no evidence that the mine countermeasure phase of the exercise was connected to the conduct of the Vietnam War. In a covering letter on the Report of Proceedings for June 1969 to the Secretary of the Navy, the Flag Officer Commanding the Australian Fleet advised that.....'CDT1 gained considerable experience from the SE Asian visit and acquitted themselves well'.
Australian Defence Force members who enter a declared operational area for the sole purpose of participation in an exercise, including participation in SEATO exercises in the vicinity of Vietnam, are not eligible for allotment for duty to the operation in respect of which the operational area has been declared.
Further, the Sea Power Centre advise that CDT 3 (not CDT 1) was normally activated for the purpose of overseas active service and at the end of that service it was deactivated.
(4) Midshipmen undergoing training during the Vietnam War
Policy Advice:
Where documentation is available to support the applicant's assertion, then a Midshipman undergoing training on an allotted vessel in an operational area during the Vietnam War, may be considered to be a member of that ship's company for the purposes of Repatriation benefits, notwithstanding that their service records may reflect a posting to a different unit.
(5) Table of Royal Australian Navy vessels in Vietnamese estuarine waters during the Vietnam War.
This Table lists all RAN vessels in Vietnamese estuarine waters during the Vietnamese War. It provides the date/s of arrival and departure from Vietnamese waters for each ship, and the time-period/s when the potable water supply may be expected to include water distilled from Vietnamese estuarine waters.
SHIP | Arrival in Vietnamese estuarine waters | Departure from Vietnamese estuarine waters | Time period when distilled water was in potable water tanks | Period when no distilled water in potable water tanks |
HMAS Anzac (II) | 01/06/1968 | 01/06/1968* | From and including 01/06/1968 to and including 01/06/1970 | Before 01/06/1968 and After 01/06/1970 |
HMAS Brisbane (II) | 01/04/1969 | 09/04/1969 | From and including 01/04/1969 to and including 16/08/1973 | Before 01/04/1969 and After 16/08/1973 |
16/04/1969 | 17/05/1969 | |||
16/04/1971 | 19/04/1971 | |||
15/05/1971 | 15/05/1971 | |||
17/05/1971 | 17/05/1971 | |||
19/05/1971 | 19/05/1971 | |||
23/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
28/05/1971 | 28/05/1971 | |||
31/05/1971 | 31/05/1971 | |||
12/06/1971 | 12/06/1971 | |||
25/06/1971 | 25/06/1971 | |||
16/08/1971 | 16/08/1971 | |||
HMAS Derwent
| 06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | From and including 06/06/1966 to and including 08/06/1968 and From and including 15/02/1969 to and including 15/02/1971 and From and including 06/11/1971 to and including 06/11/1973 | Before 06/06/1966 and From 09/06/1968 to 14/02/1969 and From 16/02/1971 to 05/11/1971 and After 06/11/1973 |
15/02/1969 | 15/02/1969* | |||
06/11/1971 | 06/11/1971* | |||
HMAS Duchess | 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 and to and including 30/09/1967 and From and including 20/11/1968 to and including 23/05/1973 | Before 08/06/1965 and From 01/10/1967 to 19/11/1968 and After 23/05/1973 |
28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | |||
20/11/1968 | 20/11/1968* | |||
28/11/1969 | 28/11/1969* | |||
05/04/1971 | 05/04/1971* | |||
22/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
HMAS Hobart (II) | 15/04/1967 | 15/04/1967 | From and including 15/04/1967 to and including 17/09/1972 | Before 15/04/1967 and After 17/09/1972 |
26/05/1968 | 26/05/1968 | |||
28/07/1968 | 28/07/1968 | |||
15/08/1968 | 15/08/1968 | |||
17/08/1968 | 17/08/1968 | |||
19/08/1968 | 19/08/1968 | |||
23/08/1968 | 23/08/1968 | |||
25/08/1968 | 25/08/1968 | |||
27/08/1968 | 27/08/1968 | |||
29/08/1968 | 29/08/1968 | |||
25/04/1970 | 27/04/1970 | |||
15/06/1970 | 16/06/1970 | |||
20/08/1970 | 22/08/1970 | |||
26/08/1970 | 26/08/1970 | |||
28/08/1970 | 29/08/1970 | |||
14/09/1970 | 14/09/1970 | |||
17/09/1970 | 17/09/1970 | |||
HMAS Parramatta (III)
| 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 to and including 11/06/1967 And From and including 09/04/1968 to and including 09/04/1970 and From and including 22/05/1971 to and including 22/05/1973 | Before 08/06/1965 and From 12/06/1967 to 08/04/1968 and From 10/04/1970 to 21/05/1971 and After 22/05/1973 |
09/04/1968 | 09/04/1968* | |||
22 /05/1971 | 22/05/1971* | |||
HMAS Perth (II) | 19/11/1968 | 19/11/1968 | From and including 19/11/1968 to and including 16/01/1973 | Before 19/11/1968 and After 16/01/1973 |
25/11/1968 | 25/11/1968 | |||
12/12/1968 | 14/12/1968 | |||
21/12/1968 | 21/12/1968 | |||
23/12/1968 | 23/12/1968 | |||
25/12/1968 | 25/12/1968 | |||
09/01/1969 | 16/01/1969 | |||
03/03/1969 | 05/03/1969 | |||
03/10/1970 | 04/10/1970 | |||
04/11/1970 | 05/11/1970 | |||
07/11/1970 | 08/11/1970 | |||
16/11/1970 | 16/11/1970 | |||
18/11/1970 | 18/11/1970 | |||
21/12/1970 | 21/12/1970 | |||
16/01/1971 | 16/01/1971 | |||
HMAS Queenborough | 31/01/1963 | 04/02/1963 | From and including 31/01/1963 to and including 04/02/1965 | Before 31/01/1963 and After 04/02/1965 |
HMAS Quiberon | 31/01/1963 | 04/02/1963 | From and including 31/01/1963 to and including 04/02/1965 | Before 31/01/1963 and After 04/02/1965 |
HMAS Stuart (II) | 30/05/1967 | 30/05/1967* | From and including 30/05/1967 to and including 03/02/1970 | Before 30/05/1967 and After 03/02/1970 |
03/02/1968 | 03/02/1968* | |||
HMAS Sydney (III) | 08/06/1965 | 11/06/1965 | From and including 08/06/1965 to and including 24/11/1974 | Before 08/06/1965 and After 24/11/1974 |
28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | |||
04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | |||
06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | |||
20/04/1967 | 20/04/1967* | |||
30/04/1967 | 30/04/1967* | |||
30/05/1967 | 30/05/1967* | |||
27/12/1967 | 27/12/1967* | |||
03/02/1968 | 03/02/1967* | |||
09/04/1968 | 09/04/1968* | |||
01/06/1968 | 01/06/1968* | |||
20/11/1968 | 20/11/1968* | |||
15/02/1969 | 15/02/1969* | |||
19/05/1969 | 19/05/1969* | |||
28/11/1969 | 28/11/1969* | |||
27/02/1970 | 27/02/1970* | |||
31/10/1970 | 01/11/1970 | |||
25/02/1971 | 25/02/1971* | |||
05/04/1971 | 05/04/1971* | |||
22/05/1971 | 23/05/1971 | |||
06/10/1971 | 07/10/1971 | |||
07/11/1971 | 07/11/1971 | |||
08/12/1971 | 09/12/1971 | |||
28/02/1972 | 29/02/1972 | |||
23/11/1972 | 24/11/1972 | |||
| ||||
HMAS Swan (III) | 06/10/1971 | 07/10/1971 | From and including 06/10/1971 to and including 09/12/1973 | Before 06/10/1971 and After 09/12/1973 |
08/12/1971 | 09/12/1971 | |||
HMAS Torrens (II) | 29/02/1972 | 29/02/1972 | From and including 29/02/1972 to and including 28/02/1974 | Before 29/02/1972 and After 01/03/1974 |
HMAS Vampire (II) | 04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | From and including 04/05/1966 to and including 30/04/1969 and From and including 19/05/1969 to and including 19/05/1971 and From and including 23/11/1972 to and including 24/11/1974 | Before 04/05/1966 and From 01/05/1969 to 18/05/1969 and From 20/05/1971 to 22/11/1972 and After 24/11/1974 |
20/04/1967 | 20/04/1967* | |||
30/04/1967 | 30/04/1967* | |||
19/05/1969 | 19/05/1969* | |||
23/11/1972 | 24/11/1972 | |||
HMAS Vendetta (II) | 28/09/1965 | 30/09/1965 | From and including 28/09/1965 to and including 08/06/1968 And From and including 02/10/1969to and including 01/11/1972 | Before 28/09/1965 and From 09/06/1968 to 01/10/1969 and After 01/11/1972 |
06/06/1966 | 08/06/1966 | |||
02/10/1969 | 06/10/1969 | |||
12/10/1969 | 19/10/1969 | |||
23/11/1969 | 24/11/1969 | |||
31/10/1970 | 01/11/1970 | |||
HMAS Yarra (III) | 04/05/1966 | 06/05/1966 | From and including 04/05/1966 to and including 27/12/1969 From and including 27/02/1970 to and including 25/02/1973 | Before 04/05/1966 and From 28/12/1969 to 26/02/1970 and After 25/02/1973 |
27/12/1967 | 27/12/1967* | |||
27/02/1970 | 27/02/1970 | |||
25/02/1971 | 25/02/1971 | |||
Source: Royal Australian Navy advice to DVA provided 20 October 2015
** No end date or other explanatory information provided by Department of Defence – assume ship departed on the same day as it arrived
Air Force
Air Force units
Unit | From | To |
RAAF Tpt Flt Vietnam (RTFV) became: | 30 Jul 64 | 1 Jun 66 |
No 35 Squadron | 1 Jun 66 | 26 Feb 72 |
RAAF Element HQAFV | 13 Jun 66 | 26 Feb 72 |
Known as RAAFHQAFV, and included Movement Control Office Vietnam and Air Movement Section Tan San Nhut | ||
Headquarters RAAF Contingent, Vung Tau (included RAAF Element Advanced Tactical Operations Centre (ATOC) Nui Dat) | 27 Jun 67 | 29 Feb 72 |
No 2 Squadron, Phan Rang | 19 Apr 67 | 9 Jun 71 |
No 9 Squadron, Vung Tau | 12 Jun 66 | 24 Dec 71 |
Base Support Flight, Vung Tau (includes Air Movements Sect, Vung Tau) became | 14 May 66 | 18 Sep 68 |
No 1 Operational Support Unit, Vung Tau | 19 Sep 68 | 7 Mar 72 |
No 5 Airfield Construction Squadron (5ACS) Detachment B | 25 Jan 67 | 17 Feb 68 |
RAAF Element, 161 Recce Flt (Army) - renamed | 10 Sep 65 | 31 Mar 66 |
161 (Indep) Recce Flt | 1 Apr 66 | 6 Nov 68 |
Individual Members Allotted for Operational Service
Additional to RAAF units assigned to 'special duty' in Vietnam, aircrews of Nos 36 and 37 Squadrons, ex RAAF Richmond, NSW, flew continual air transport tasks of supply support and medical evacuation missions. Also involved in Vietnam was the Dakota Flight of No 2 Squadron, Butterworth.
This was renamed Transport Support Flight, Butterworth, on 1 Mar 67. Dakota aircraft of the latter Flights carried out ambassadorial flights and supply tasks into Vietnam and aircrew, flight crew and ground staff could qualify for 'special service' if certified as having participated in operations in Vietnam. This will be indicated on each member's Record of Service.
Aircrew of the Australian Air Force Detachment, Sangley Point
Aircrew of the Australian Air Force Detachment, Sangley Point are allotted.
The Repatriation Commission made a decision in September 2011 to concede entry into the Vietnam operational area for aircrew members of RAAF Detachment Sangley Point who served in Operation Trimdon.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-3-units-allotted-operational-service/vietnam-war
S 4 Chronology
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology
During 1965
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1965
During 1966
Apr 66
22Sydney departed Sydney on 3rd voyage.
May 66
4Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
17 MV Boonaroo left Sydney on 1st Vietnam voyage.
18Sydney returned to Sydney.
25Sydney departed Sydney on 4th voyage.
Jun 66
6Boonaroo arrived in Vietnam.
6Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
17 — MV Jeparit left Sydney for Vung Tau on 1st Vietnam voyage.
Jul 66
Sydney returned to Sydney. Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau. Boonaroo returned to Sydney.
Aug 66
22Jeparit departed Sydney on 2nd voyage.
Sep 66
15Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Oct 66
16Jeparit departed Sydney on 3rd voyage.
Nov 66
1Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Dec 66
3Jeparit departed Sydney on 4th voyage.
17Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1966
During 1967
Jan 67
21Jeparit departed Sydney on 5th voyage.
Feb 67
6 — First Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
18 — CDT3 assumed Operation Stabledoor and EOD responsibilities at Vung Tau.
22Boonaroo left Sydney on 2nd voyage to Vietnam (via Melbourne).
Mar 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
1 — White Ensign hauled down at 0900 and new Australian White Ensign hoisted in RAN ships and establishments.
1 — HMAS Boonaroo commissioned at Melbourne.
7 — HMAS Hobart departed Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
9 — RAN detachment joined Jeparit at Sydney
10Boonaroo departed Melbourne for Can Ranh Bay, continuing her 2nd voyage.
11Jeparit departed Sydney on 6th voyage (1st with RAN detachment).
15Hobart joined US Seventh Fleet at US Naval Base, Subic Bay.
27Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Boonaroo arrived at Cam Ranh Bay.
31Hobart on station off Quang Ngai province, I Corps Tactical Zone, for - NGFS.
Apr 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau, operations in III Corps.
1-15Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
8Sydney departed Sydney on 5th voyage: 7RAR embarked.
16-23Hobart in Operation Sea Dragon.
20Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 7RAR landed, 5RAR embarked.
21Hobart received enemy fire north of Cap Falaise (first time under fire).
22Hobart under fire near Song Ma river (second time).
22Sydney arrived at Singapore.
23Hobart left Sea Dragon for destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk.
28Jeparit departed Sydney on 7th voyage.
28Sydney departed Singapore on 6th voyage.
29Boonaroo arrived Sydney.
30Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
May 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
6-8Hobart in destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk
8Boonaroo paid off at Melbourne.
8-26Hobart in Operation Sea Dragon.
11Hobart under fire near mouth of Kien Giang (third time).
12Sydney arrived at Sydney: 5RAR disembarked.
12Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
17Hobart under fire while bombarding Truc Li ferry (fourth time).
18Hobart provided - NGFS for Operation Beau Charger.
19Sydney left Brisbane on 7 — th voyage with 2RAR embarked.
24Hobart under fire twice near Hon Matt island (fifth and sixth times).
30Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 2RAR disembarked, 6RAR embarked.
Jun 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
9Jeparit left Sydney on 8th voyage.
14Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 6RAR disembarked.
15-22Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
18Hobart in support of Operation Beacon Torch.
22Hobart on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Jul 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
24Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol and in destroyer screen of USS Forrestal
27Jeparit left Sydney on 9th voyage.
29Hobart joined USS Forrestal which was on fire in the Tonkin Gulf.
Aug 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. Hobart in northern Sea Dragon patrol.
2Hobart, USS St Paul and USS Blue received enemy fire while bombarding Cong Phu railway spur (Hobart's seventh time under fire).
9Hobart and USS Boston under fire near Sam Son (eighth time for Hobart).
11Hobart and Boston under fire north of Hon Me island (ninth time for Hobart).
13 — Second Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
26 — Able Seaman D C Trompp wounded in action in Phuoc Tuy province - first RAN casualty of Vietnam War.
Sep 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
2 — HMAS Perth left Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
6-12Hobart - NGFS northern I Corps.
14Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
26-29Perth provided - NGFS for Operation Pershing in northern I Corps.
27Hobart returned to Sydney, ending first deployment.
30Perth - NGFS near DMZ.
Oct 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps.
3 — First Naval Staff Officer joined HQ Australian Force Vietnam in Saigon.
16 — 1st Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '67) joined US Army 135th Aviation Company at Vung Tau.
17Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
18Perth and USS Newport News under fire near Sam Son. Perth hit by one shell with four sailors injured. (Perth first time under fire).
24Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
30Jeparit left Sydney on 10th voyage.
Nov 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
1Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
2 — 135th Assault Helicopter Company began combat operations.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
27Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Perth assigned to northern Sea Dragon.
Dec 67
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.*
3Perth and USS Newport News under fire in Bay of Brandon (Perth second time).
13Perth in southern Sea Dragon patrol.
16 — 135th AHC experienced first night combat operations.
16Sydney left Adelaide on 8 — th voyage with 3RAR embarked.
17Perth and USS Hamner under fire off Dong Hoi. (Perth third time).
18Jeparit left Sydney on 11th voyage.
27Sydney arrived Vung Tau; 3RAR disembarked.
31 — 135th AHC began operating from Camp Blackhorse near Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1967
During 1968
Jan 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
3Sydney arrived Fremantle.
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
9Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
17Sydney left Sydney on 9 — th voyage.
20Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
25Perth and USS Bordelon under fire near Cap St. Anne. (Perth fourth time).
Feb 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
3Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
9Jeparit left Sydney on 12th voyage.
12 — Third Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
14Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
16Sydney returned to Sydney.
22 — Lieutenant Commander P J Vickers killed in action, near Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
24Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Mar 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
11Perth 011 southern Sea Dragon patrol.
22Hobart left Sydney for second Vietnam deployment.
23Perth left Sea Dragon.
23Jeparit left Sydney on 13th voyage.
27Sydney left Sydney on 10 — th voyage with 1RAR embarked.
31Perth turned over to Hobart at Subic Bay.
Apr 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
9Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 1RAR disembarked, 7RAR embarked.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10Perth returned to Sydney ending first deployment.
13-18Hobart - NGFS off northern I Corps.
18Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
22Hobart and USS Collett under fire near Dong Hoi. (Hobart tenth time).
23Hobart and Collett under fire near Ke Anh (Hobart eleventh time).
26Sydney arrived in Sydney: 7RAR disembarked.
May 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in Ill Corps.
10Jeparit left Sydney on 14th voyage.
20Hobart - NGFS off northern I Corps.
21Sydney left Brisbane on 1 — 1 — th voyage with 4RAR embarked.
24Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Jun 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps. Sydney arrived at Vung Tau; 4RAR disembarked, 2RAR embarked.
11Hobart on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
13Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 2RAR disembarked.
14Hobart and USS Chandler under fire north west of Cap Lay (Hobart twelfth time).
17Hobart hit by three missiles fired by a USAF aircraft north of Cap Lay. Chief Electrician R H Hunt and Ordinary Seaman R J Butterworth were killed and three sailors seriously injured.
21Jeparit left Sydney on 15th voyage.
Jul 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III and IV Corps.
6Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
25Hobart took up - NGFS station off Da Nang in I Corps after repair of missile damage at Subic Bay.
Aug 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
6Jeparit left Sydney on 16th voyage-.
13 — Fourth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
14-22Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps, south west of Vung Tau.
21 — Lieutenant A A Casadio and Petty Officer 0 C Phillips killed in action near Camp Blackhorse, Xuan Loc, Long Khanh province.
23-28Hobart - NGFS off coast of Phuoc Tuy, III Corps.
26Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Sep 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
9 — Second contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '68) arrived in Vietnam.
14-21Hobart t - NGFS between Da Nang and Hue, I Corps.
19Perth left Sydney on second Vietnam deployment.
22-25Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps.
22Jeparit left Sydney on 17th voyage.
29Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
Oct 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
7-9Perth - NGFS near Da Nang, I Corps.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
9-10Perth on Sea Dragon patrol.
10Perth and USS Leonard F Mason under fire (Perth fifth time).
11Hobart returned to Sydney ending second deployment.
20-23Perth on northern Sea Dragon patrol.
24-27Perth - NGFS in northern I Corps.
27Perth on southern Sea Dragon patrol.
28Perth - NGFS in northern I Corps.
Nov 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
1 — US Joint Chiefs of Staff announced all sea, air and land bombardment of North Vietnam to cease at 2100 that night. Sea Dragon task units disbanded.
4Jeparit left Sydney on 18th voyage.
9Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 2 — th voyage with 9 RAR embarked.
12-17Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
17-30Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
20Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 9RAR disembarked.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
23 — 135th AHC moved to Bearcat in Bien Hoa province.
Dec 68
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in III Corps.
5Sydney arrived at Sydney.
12-17Perth - NGFS in I Corps.
18Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
19Perth- NGFS in III Corps.
20-26Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
28Jeparit left Sydney on 19th voyage.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1968
During 1969
Jan 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
3 — Sub-Lieutenant A J. Huelin killed in aircraft accident near Saigon.
9-17Perth - NGFS in IV Corps.
14Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Perth joined destroyer screen of USS Kitty Hawk.
Feb 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
3Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 3 — th voyage with 5 RAR embarked.
11 — Fifth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 5RAR disembarked.
22Perth - NGFS in I Corps.
28Sydney returned to Sydney.
Mar 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
7-16Perth - NGFS in II Corps.
14Jeparit left Sydney on 20th voyage.
20Brisbane left Sydney on first Vietnam deployment.
30Brisbane relieved Perth at Subic Bay.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Apr 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
15-30Brisbane - NGFS in IV Corps.
20Perth returned to Sydney completing second deployment.
24Jeparit left Sydney on 21st voyage.
May 69
CDT3 Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-17Brisbane - NGFS in IV Corps.
5Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 4 — th voyage with 6RAR embarked.
l0Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
19Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 6RAR disembarked 4RAR embarked.
30Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 4RAR disembarked.
31 — Leading Aircrewman N. E. Shipp killed in action near Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong province.
Jun 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
2Jeparit left Sydney on 22nd voyage.
10-14Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
15-16Brisbane - NGFS in I Corps.
18-19Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
20Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
30Brisbane attempted salvage of MV Sincere on fire in South China Sea.
Jul 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-3Brisbane stood by MV Sincere.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
16Jeparit left Sydney on 23rd voyage.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Aug 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau: operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-2Brisbane - NGFS in II Corps.
3-6Brisbane - NGFS in III Corps.
13 — Sixth Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
23-31Brisbane in destroyer screen of USS Oriskany.
Sep 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-13Brisbane in destroyer screens of USS Oriskany and USS Constellation.
7Jeparit left Sydney 011 24th voyage.
10 — Third Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '69) arrived at Bearcat.
15Vendetta left Sydney on Vietnam deployment.
26Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
28Brisbane turned over to Vendetta at Subic Bay.
Oct 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
2-19 — Vendetta - NGFS in I Corps.
13 — Brisbane returned to Sydney ending first deployment.
20-24Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
22Jeparit left Sydney on 25th voyage.
Nov 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
9-10 — Vendetta - NGFS in III Corps.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
11-25Vendetta - NGFS in I Corps.
16-29Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
17Sydney left Brisbane on 1 — 5 — th voyage with 8RAR embarked.
28Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 8RAR disembarked 9RAR embarked.
Dec 69
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
9Sydney arrived at Adelaide: 9RAR disembarked.
11Jeparit commissioned at Sydney.
19Jeparit left Sydney on 26th voyage.
21-31Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1969
During 1970
Jan 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
l-14Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Feb 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV operations in IV Corps.
5Jeparit left Sydney on 27th voyage.
16Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 6 — th Vietnam voyage with 7RAR embarked.
18-20Vendetta - NGFS in III Corps.
21-28Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
27Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 7RAR disembarked, 5RAR embarked.
28Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Mar 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
1-4Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
5Sydney arrived at Fremantle: 5RAR disembarked.
11 — Seventh Contingent CDT3 arrived in Vietnam.
15-16Vendetta - NGFS in II Corps.
16Hobart left Sydney on third Vietnam deployment.
17-23Vendetta - NGFS in IV Corps.
26Jeparit left Sydney on 28th voyage.
28Vendetta returned over to Hobart at Subic Bay.
Apr 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6-21Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
11Vendetta returned to Sydney, ending Vietnam deployment.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
22-30Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
May 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in III Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
11-14Hobart - NGFS in lI Corps.
15Jeparit left Sydney on 29th voyage.
15-22Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
22-24Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
Jun 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6-9Hobart - NGFS in II Corps.
9Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10-21Hobart - NGFS in I Corps.
22 — Able Seaman B. K. Wojcik killed in accident at Cam Ranh Bay.
Jul 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in 111 and IV Corps. RANHFV: operations in IV Corps.
6Jeparit left Sydney on 30th voyage.
9-11Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
11-21Hobart - NGFS in IV Corps.
21-23Hobart - NGFS in III Corps.
22Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
23-31Hobart - NGFS in 1I Corps.
Aug 70
CDT3: Operation Stabledoor and EOD at Vung Tau; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region Corps tactical zones renamed Military Regions.
1-4Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 2.
14 — CDT3 relinquished responsibility for Operation Stabledoor at Vung Tau.
14-29Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 1.
15 — CDT3 left Vung Tau to join USN Support Facility at Da Nang.
18Jeparit left Sydney on 31st voyage.
Sep 70
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
6 — 135th AHC moved from Bearcat to Dong Tam, Dinh Tuong province.
10 — Fourth Contingent RAN Helicopter Flight Vietnam (RANHFV '70) arrived at Dong Tam.
12-23Hobart - NGFS in Military Region 3.
14Perth departed Sydney on third Vietnam deployment.
28Hobart turned over to Perth at Subic Bay.
30Sydney left Sydney on 1 — 7 — th voyage via Singapore.
Oct 70
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4
1Jeparit left Sydney on 32nd voyage.
3-24Perth - NGFS in Military Region 1.
16 — Eighth Contingent CDT3 arrived at Da Nang.
17Hobart arrived in Sydney, ending third deployment.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
31Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 8RAR embarked.
Nov 70
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4-16Perth - NGFS in Military Region 1.
12Sydney arrived at Brisbane: 8RAR disembarked.
15Jeparit left Sydney on 33rd voyage.
17-18Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
Dec 70
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1. RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
2-4Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
5Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
5-20Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
21-22Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1970
During 1971
Jan 71
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
4 Jeparit left Sydney on 34th voyage.
10-15Perth in destroyer screen of USS Hancock
16-17Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
17-31Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Feb 71
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang; operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
1-2Perth - NGFS in Military Region 4.
15Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 8 — th voyage with 3RAR embarked.
16Jeparit left Sydney on 35th voyage.
22-23Perth - NGFS in Military Region 2.
23-28Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
25Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 3RAR disembarked, 7RAR embarked.
Mar 71
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang, operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
1-2Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
2-4Perth - NGFS in Military Region 2.
5Perth - NGFS in Military Region 3.
7-11Perth in destroyer screen of USS Ranger and USS Kitty Hawk
8 Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
10Sydney returned to Sydney: 7RAR disembarked.
16Brisbane left Sydney on second Vietnam deployment.
26Sydney left Adelaide on 1 — 9 — th voyage.
29Perth turned over to Brisbane at Subic Bay.
Apr 71
CDT3: EOD at Da Nang, operations in Military Region 1.
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
2Jeparit left Sydney on 36th voyage.
5Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
5-6Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
8Perth returned to Sydney, ending third deployment.
8-15Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
17-21Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
19Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
19 CDT3 relinquished responsibility for EOD at Da Nang to US Army.
23Sydney returned to Sydney.
30 Minister for Navy announced CDT3 and RANHFV would be withdrawn from Vietnam.
May 71
RANHFV: operations in Military Region 4.
5 — Eighth Contingent CDT3 returned to Australia.
13Sydney departed Townsville on 20 — th voyage: 4RAR embarked.
13Jeparit departed Sydney on 37th voyage.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 1.
22Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: 4RAR disembarked, 2RAR embarked.
31Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Jun 71
1Sydney arrived at Townsville: 2RAR disembarked.
8 — RANHFV pilots ceased flying operations.
16 — Fourth Contingent RANHFV returned to Australia.
24-26Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
27-30Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
Jul 71
1-21Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 4.
3Jeparit departed Sydney on 38th voyage.
21Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
22-23Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 3.
Aug 71
12 — Naval Staff Office, HQ Australian Force Vietnam closed.
15-31Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 1.
18 — Prime Minister announced withdrawal of all remaining Australian combat forces in Vietnam. Brisbane not to be replaced.
20Jeparit departed Sydney on 39th voyage.
Sep 71
1-6Brisbane - NGFS in Military Region 2.
8Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
20Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 1st voyage.
Oct 71
6-7Sydney at Vung Tau: 3RAR embarked.
11Jeparit left Sydney on 40th voyage.
15Brisbane returned to Sydney, ending second deployment.
19Sydney arrived at Sydney.
26Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 2nd voyage.
27Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
Nov 71
6Sydney at Vung Tau; final army units embarked.
18Sydney arrived at Sydney.
24Sydney departed Sydney on 23rd voyage.
25Jeparit departed Sydney on 41st voyage.
Dec 71
8-9Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
13Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
17Sydney arrived at Townsville.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1971
During 1972
Jan 72
10Jeparit departed Sydney on 42nd voyage.
Feb 72
3Jeparit arrived at Vung Tau.
14Sydney departed Sydney on 2 — 4th voyage.
29Sydney arrived at Vung Tau: embarked 457 soldiers.
Mar 72
11Jeparit returned to Sydney.
12Sydney returned to Sydney.
15Jeparit paid off in Sydney
Nov 72
1Sydney departed Sydney on 25th voyage.
23-24Sydney arrived at Vung Tau.
30Sydney arrived at Hong Kong.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/during-1972
The 3RAR in South Vietnam - First Tour 1967/1968
Dec 67
12 — 3RAR Advance Party flew from Adelaide to Saigon.
16 — 3RAR Main Body departed Outer Harbour Port Adelaide on HMAS Sydney.
27 — 3RAR Rear Party departed Adelaide by air.
27 — 3RAR Main Body disembarked at Vung Tau and moved to Nui Dat
28 — 3RAR Rear Party arrived at Vung Tau and moved to Nui Dat.
Jan 68
6 — 3RAR Op Balaklava
9-11 — 3RAR Op Bordertown.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR moved to FSPB Harrison, Bien Hoa Province (Op Coburg) .
31 — Enemy Lunar New Year (Tet) Offensive commenced with widespread attacks on major cities and installations in South Vietnam.
Feb 68
1 — Task Force Base mortared. Viet Cong battalion (D445) in occupation of Phuoc Le (Baria) .
l-2 — A Coy, 3RAR in action at Baria with 3 Troop A Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment.
3-6 — D Coy, 3RAR in action in Long Dien with 2/52 ARVN Rangers.
5 — B Coy, 3RAR in contact in Hoa Long.
7-9 — B Coy, 3RAR in action in Baria and Long Dien.
10 — 3RAR relieved 7RAR in Bien Hoa province (Op Coburg)
18 — Mortar and ground attack on FSPB Andersen.
28 — Mortar attack on FSPB Andersen.
Mar 68
1 — 3RAR returned to Nui Dat from Op Coburg.
3 — Commemorative service for 3RAR and supporting arms members killed in action in Long Dien and during Op Coburg.
8 — 3RAR, less D Coy, commenced Op Pinnaroo.
17 — D Coy, 3RAR joined Op Pinnaroo.
Apr 68
9 — Main Body 1RAR arrived in South Vietnam. Main Body 7RAR departed for Australia.
12 — D Coy, 3RAR returned from Op Pinnaroo.
15 — Op Pinnaroo completed.
21 — 3RAR commenced Op Toan Thang (Phase 1)
May 68
3 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Toan Thang (Phase 1)
10 — 3RAR continued Op Toan Thang (Phase 1) relieving 2RAR at FSPB Andersen
13 — 3RAR occupied blocking position 20 miles north-north- east of Saigon. Mortar and ground attack on FSPB Coral.
16 — Enemy regimental mortar and ground attacks on FSPB Coral.
24 — 3RAR moved to FSPB Balmoral.
26 — Mortar attack on FSPB Coral. Mortar and battalion ground attacks on FSPB Balmoral.
28 — Regimental mortar and ground attacks on FSPB Balmoral by 165 Regiment 7th North Vietnamese Army Division.
Jun 68
1 — Main Body 4RAR arrived in Vung Tau on HMAS Sydney. Main Body 2RAR departed for Australia.
5 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Toan Thang (Phase 1).
14 — D Coy, 3RAR cordon and search in Long Dien.
25-30 — B Coy, 3RAR participated in Op Ulladulla with C Squadron 1st Armoured Regiment.
Jul 68
3 — 3RAR relieved 1RAR in AO Birdsville Op Toan Thang (Phase 2).
18 — 3RAR redeployed into AO Yass to commence Op Merino.
24 — 3RAR returned to base from Op Merino.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR cordon and search north-east Hoa Long.
Aug 68
2-13 — 3RAR Op Platypus.
22 — Outskirts of Saigon rocketed. 1RAR and tanks in contact with Viet Cong occupying Long Dien.
23 — 3RAR Op Magnetic, Long Son Island.
28 — 3RAR Op Diamantina (until 5 Sep)
Sep 68
6 — B and D Companies relieved 1RAR companies in defensive tasks in the vicinity of Baria and Long Dien (Op Nowra).
10 — A Coy, 3RAR relieved C Coy 1RAR on land-clearing Ops in AO Warburton.
15 — B Coy, 3RAR returned from Baria Stadium defence task.
19-25 — C Coy, 3RAR Route 2 security Op Ngai Giao area.
24 — D Coy, 3RAR returned from Long Dien.
28 — 3RAR tactical HQ, B and D Companies inserted into FSPB Cedar to commence Op Windsor.
29 — C Coy, 3RAR flown in to join Op Windsor.
Oct 68
2 — A Coy, 3RAR returned from land-clearing Ops AO Warburton.
6 — A Coy, 3RAR flown in to join Op Windsor.
12 — Op Windsor concluded, 3RAR redeployed into AO Garran to commence Op Capital.
21 — A, B and D Companies returned from Op Capital.
22 — 3RAR HQ and C Coy returned from Op Capital. 161 Fd Bty redeployed to FSPB Wilton.
25 — C Coy, 3RAR commenced Op Harvest.
27 — 3RAR HQ group and D Coy joined Op Harvest.
29 — 3RAR Advance Recce Party returned by air to Australia.
30 — A Coy, 3RAR deployed into AO Rapier on Op Diamond Pin.
Nov 68
2 — 3RAR HQ, C and D Companies returned from Op Harvest. A Coy, 3RAR returned from Op Diamond Pin.
5 — 9RAR Advance Party (150) arrived at Nui Dat. 3RAR Advance Party (146) returned to Australia by air.
19 — 9RAR Rear Party (40) arrived at Nui Dat. 3RAR Rear Party (40) returned to Australia by air.
20 — 9RAR Main body arrived at Nui Dat ex HMAS Sydney. 3RAR Main Body (417) departed on HMAS Sydney for Australia.
Dec 68
2 — 3RAR Main Body disembarked Outer Harbour Port Adelaide, South Australia
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-4-chronology/3rar-south-vietnam-first-tour-19671968
S 5 Historical Notes - TET 1968
In Vietnam, the Tet celebrations usher in the lunar New Year and are the most important festive celebrations of the year. Tet began on 30 Jan in 1968 and was to be the start of week-long holidays with families reuniting and South Vietnamese soldiers granted leave to return home. The Viet Cong announced a 7 day ceasefire to commence from 27 Jan 68 but the South Vietnamese Government, concerned that a long truce would only give the enemy freedom of movement, restricted the ceasefire to thirty-six hours from 6pm on 29 Jan. Tet leave for the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was limited, with a minimum strength of 50 per cent of troops in all units on full alert. The ceasefire was cancelled entirely in Quang Tri and Thua Thien provinces because of the strong military pressure from North Vietnamese forces surrounding the US Marine base at Khe Sanh.
Intelligence reports expected a major enemy offensive in early 1968. The main enemy units were identified and a date early in Feb was predicted. There was some warning that attacks would be launched against the cities and towns of Vietnam, but the magnitude and ferocity of the attacks that eventually took place was not anticipated. Tet-1968 swept the length of South Vietnam in a three day cataclysm that saw the national capital, 5 of 6 autonomous cities, 36 of 44 provincial capitals and 64 of 242 district capitals attacked. The brunt of the assault was borne by half strength ARVN units assigned to defensive duties near population areas. The very shock of such a massive attack produced incredulity before a rational response. However, nobody in Saigon or Washington anticipated even remotely the psychological impact the offensive would have in the United States. The sheer audacity of the offensive destroyed the credibility of the American military among it own people and strengthened the anti-war movement in the United States.
The main provincial towns in Phuoc Tuy came under heavy attack on 31 Jan. Ba Ria, the capital of Phuoc Tuy, was occupied by a reinforced Viet Cong battalion (D445 Provincial Battalion which had seen heavy contact with the 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) since Aug 66). Early the next day, A Company, 3rd Battalion Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR), and 3 Troop, A Squadron 3rd Cavalry reached Ba Ria to assist the hard pressed ARVN forces in clearing the Viet Cong from the province capital. Savage fighting immediately broke out and forty Viet Cong were killed in the following 24 hours. Fire fights were sharp and intense and ranged from street to street among the tightly packed buildings of the town. The enemy fought tenaciously from well-prepared positions with rockets, small-arms and machine gun fire. Armoured personnel carriers (APCs) provided heavy and accurate machine gun fire and also assisted in the evacuation of Australian and Allied wounded. A Sioux helicopter pilot from 161 Independent Reconnaissance Flight landed his helicopter three times under enemy fire in the town square to evacuate the more serious casualties. The Viet Cong attack on Ba Ria was repelled by the afternoon of 2 Feb.
3RAR supported the 2/52 ARVN Ranger Battalion from 3 to 6 Feb to clear Long Dien, 5km east of Ba Ria. The Australian battalion saw heavy fighting on 4 Feb in clearing the Viet Cong from a number of entrenched positions during which the battalion, which had arrived in Vietnam the previous Dec, suffered its first fatality. From 5 to 9 Feb, 3RAR twice cordoned off Hoa Long, situated just south of Nui Dat and also assisted in securing the eastern approaches to Ba Ria. On 8 Feb at Long Dien, a platoon of B Coy 3RAR was engaged with heavy fire from entrenched positions. The platoon went to ground to return fire and was immediately assaulted by the Viet Cong. The attack was thrown back by rifle and machine gun fire with 9 enemy killed and 6 more who were seen to fall. Three Australians were killed in action.
The Tet-1968 fighting cut the road from Vung Tau to Nui Dat in the first week of Feb. Supplies that normally were brought by road convoy were instead lifted in by Caribou aircraft from No 35 Squadron, RAAF. A total of 482,907 lbs of freight were flown into Nui Dat in three successive days. As in all Tet-1968 attacks, the timing of the offensive in Phuoc Tuy province coincided with the holiday leave of the bulk of ARVN troops and National Police. The Viet Cong targets in Tet-1968 were the cities and towns of South Vietnam and not the military bases which were well defended by the full strength US, Australian and Korean units on full alert. While Australian troops rushed to support ARVN units in Phuoc Tuy, in other provinces US and allied troops also offered assistance to the ARVN who bore the brunt of the fight. It was not surprising that the Viet Cong were able to infiltrate men, equipment and supplies into position for the attack. Attacking under the cover of the Tet holidays, against population centres when ARVN units were at half strength, was an ideal opportunity. What was surprising was that the Viet Cong, which had for so long been elusive and extremely reluctant to take casualties, put themselves into a situation where half the attacking force was eliminated. Tet-1968 was over within days in Phuoc Tuy and most other provinces. However, it took weeks to be contained in Saigon, Hue and Khe Sanh.
The Saigon area in 1968 was defended by the South Vietnam 5th Ranger Group and seven regional, service and police battalions. However, there were also two elite airborne battalions on hand when Tet-1968 erupted. The Viet Cong's simultaneous rocket, mortar and ground attacks against many installations and buildings throughout the national capital achieved complete tactical surprise. The most important mission - seizing the United States Embassy - was given to 19 members of the C10 VC City Sapper Battalion which was composed of Saigon inhabitants. Viet Cong sappers breached the Embassy wall with satchel charges but the US Marine guard prevented them taking the main Chancery building. US reinforcements landed on the Chancery roof by helicopters and by 9am had killed the sappers attacking the Embassy. Other targets such as the ARVN General Staff compound were also quickly cleared but fighting was to continue for weeks around the Phu Tho racetrack, involving heavy street to street fighting. The Viet Cong renewed its assault on 17-18 Feb when 57 rocket shellings and ten firefights erupted inside Saigon and Cholon. The final Saigon battle of Tet-1968 was a fierce battle between ARVN rangers and main force Viet Cong in Cholon on 7 Mar.
Australian troops were not involved in the Tet-1968 battles in Saigon. However 1ATF which, since its formation in May 66, had operated exclusively in Phuoc Tuy province, commenced its first operation outside the province a week prior to Tet-1968. Operation Coburg began on 24 Jan and lasted until 1 Mar. Two battalions, 2RAR and 7RAR were deployed in the area where 1RAR had operated in 1965/66, east of the major US logistical complex in the Long Binh/Bien Hoa area to protect the base from rockets and mortars. 7RAR was relieved on 10 Feb by 3RAR which established Fire Support Base (FSB) Andersen close to well known Viet Cong lines of communications. Late in Feb, FSB Andersen was attacked on three occasions - the first attacks by ground assault on an Australian FSB. They were not to be the last.
The third largest city in South Vietnam, the ancient walled capital of Hue was infiltrated and seized by the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese just after the Tet New Year midnight rites. By daybreak, the Viet Cong flag was flying from the masthead of the Imperial Palace where it would fly for twenty-five days until pulled down by ARVN troops. The struggle for Hue lasted nearly five weeks with two NVA regiments and two Viet Cong sapper battalions pitted against eight US and 13 South Vietnamese infantry battalions in one of the most savage and prolonged battles of the Vietnam War. The NVA/Viet Cong forces were outnumbered by vastly superior forces, but continued to hold onto the city because of the propaganda value of seizing and holding, even temporarily, the cultural and religious centre of South Vietnam. The hard and bitter fighting to defeat the NVA/Viet Cong forces was mainly done by the ARVN soldiers of 1st Corps who, after Tet-1968, attained a new found esprit de corps. There were a number of Australian advisers from the Australian Army Training Team and the ARVN units that retook Hue. Their story is recounted in The Team by Ian McNeill. In retaking the city of Hue which had been previously unscarred by the war, extensive damage occurred. Some 30,000 artillery rounds were fired during the battle and whole blocks of the city were reduced to rubble. Thousands of citizens became refugees but this was not the only price paid by the people of Hue. The NVA, with lists provided by the Viet Cong, undertook a campaign of extermination of school teachers, government officials, and those who refused to rise up against the government. Bodies later exhumed revealed that nearly 5000 were executed. In the battle to regain Hue, RAAF Canberra bombers from No 2 Squadron flew missions in support of troops within the city itself and the surrounding countryside.
From 30 Jan 68 until the end of Apr 68, RAAF Canberra bombers flew many strikes in support of the besieged US Marine combat base at Khe Sanh.
The siege of Khe Sanh began on 19 Jan 68 when a US Marine platoon was ambushed just west of the base. Two reinforced NVA divisions, the 304th and 325C commenced an extended siege of the base which lasted for 77 days. They constructed entrenched approach works, with snipers patiently waiting for careless targets while constantly shelling the marines who struggled to keep the base supplied. The weather and hostile fire dictated 679 supply drops in addition to the 455 aircraft that landed during the siege. With the easing of the monsoon, the US 1st Cavalry Division re-established the land route to Khe Sanh in early Apr.
In May 68, a further offensive was launched against Saigon and a dozen other cities were attacked with rockets and mortars in what became known as Mini-Tet. On 6 May attacks were launched against Tan Son Nhut air base and on 7 May fighting erupted again in Cholon. During this fighting three Australian and one British pressmen were killed when their jeep drove into a Viet Cong ambush. Australian troops were again moved out of Phuoc Tuy to help block the routes taken by the Viet Cong in and out of Saigon. On 13 May and 16 May, 1RAR and the 12th Field Regiment were severely tested at FSB Coral when the base was assaulted by what was assumed to be a North Vietnamese regiment. On 26 and 28 May 3RAR, with the help of Centurion tanks, repulsed two further attacks on FSB Balmoral. In a little over two weeks, lATF lost 26 killed and 110 wounded.
In retrospect, General Westmoreland the US Commander in Vietnam in 1968, said he and officials in Washington should have tried more to alert the American public to the coming of a major enemy attack. In 1976, he wrote in his autobiography, A Soldier Reports: "No one to my knowledge foresaw that, in terms of public opinion, press and television would transform what was undeniably a catastrophic military defeat for the enemy into a presumed debacle for Americans and South Vietnamese, an attitude that still lingers in the minds of many."
Bibliography
Fairfax, Denis, Navy in Vietnam, AGPS, 1980
Frost, Frank, Australia's War in Vietnam, Allen & Unwin, 1987
Hopkins, Maj-Gen R N L, Australian Armour, AWM & AGPS, 1978
McNeill, Ian, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam 1962?1972, UQ Press and AWM, 1984
Oberdorfer, Don, Tet!, 1971
Odgers, George, Mission Vietnam: RAAF Operations 1964?1972, AGPS, 1974
Stanton, Shelby L, The Rise and Fall of an American Army, Presido Press, 1985,
Stanton, Shelby L, Vietnam Order of Battle, US News Books, 1981
Stuart, Major R F, 3RAR in South Vietnam 1967?1968
Westmoreland, General William C, A Soldier Reports, Doubleday, 1976
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-5-vietnam-war-and-north-east-thailand/s-5-historical-notes-tet-1968
Ch 6 Persian Gulf
This chapter contains the following sections:
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-6-persian-gulf
Ch 7 Peacekeeping Forces in the Middle East
Ch 8 Post WW2 Service in Operational Areas
Ch 9 East Timor
This chapter contains the following sections:
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-9-east-timor
Ch 10 War on Terrorism
This chapter contains the following sections:
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-10-war-terrorism
Ch 11 War in Iraq
This chapter contains the following sections:
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-11-war-iraq
Ch 12 Solomon Islands
Operation Anode – Non-Warlike Service
Service rendered as a member of the ADF assigned for service on or after 24 July 2003 with OPERATION ANODE in the specified area is non-warlike service under subsection 5C(1) of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986.
The specified area comprises of the total land areas, territorial waters and superjacent airspace boundaries of the Solomon Islands.
This determination was made by the Minister for Defence 31 — st July 2003.
View copy of instrument in the Service Eligibility Assistant in the Legislation Library here.
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/part-1-military-history/ch-12-solomon-islands
Part 2 Repatriation History
Part 3 Order of Battle
Part 4 Other Relevant Topics and Useful Links
Part 5 Military History Research
NLHC mental health - Disaster Relief and Border Protection operations
The Repatriation Commission, in a decision ratified on 6 May 2020, endorsed the attached document as an indicative list of operations that it considers 'disaster relief service' and 'border protection service'. This list is relevant to assessing Reservist eligibility for treatment of any mental health condition through Non-Liability Health Care arrangements should they have no other eligibility pathway to access said arrangements.
The list is indicative only and is not definitive or exhaustive. The Australian Defence Force has been involved in numerous domestic and international disaster relief operations throughout its history and naming them all is not practicable. Some activities were never formally declared as named operations.
The Commission also delegated future consideration of operations to the First Assistant Secretary, Veterans' Services Design Division. Operations added through delegations are marked with an '*' in the document below.
If a client claims disaster relief/border protection service on any operation or activity not currently included on the attached list, delegates are to seek further clarification from Policy Development Branch at L.and.SE.Policy@dva.gov.au.
Updated operation list:
Source URL: https://clik.dva.gov.au/service-eligibility-assistant/additional-information/nlhc-mental-health-disaster-relief-and-border-protection-operations